The Illinois Supreme Court appeared skeptical of a due process challenge to revocation of a liquor license during the recent oral argument in WISAM 1, d/b/a Sheridan Liquors v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission. Our detailed preview of the facts and underlying court opinions in WISAM 1 is here.
WISAM 1 involves a liquor store whose license was revoked by the City of Peoria pursuant to Section 3-28 of the city ordinances, which forbids any “officer, associate, member, representative, agent or employee” of a liquor licensee from violating a city ordinance, state or federal law “in or about the licensed premises.” The administrative charges were based upon the federal criminal conviction of a former manager of the plaintiff store for “structuring” currency deposits – deliberately manipulating deposits to keep them under the $10,000 limit which triggers an automatic currency transaction report. The Appellate Court affirmed the revocation, finding that although the proceedings below were somewhat dubious (the Commissioner entered a directed finding of the violation at the outset of the hearing based upon the federal trial transcript), the defendant had suffered no prejudice as a result. The court pointed to the testimony of the plaintiff’s president, who conceded that the plaintiff deliberately kept withdrawals for its check cashing business below $10,000 because of the limits on the store’s insurance. The court held that the Commission permissibly concluded that the true purpose of the withdrawal pattern was structuring.
Counsel for the defendant began the argument, explaining that before opening statements at the administrative hearing, three volumes of testimony from the federal trial were admitted pursuant to stipulation. Justice Thomas asked why the decision couldn’t be affirmed on the basis that the stipulations were sufficient to support revocation. Counsel responded that the stipulation had been misrepresented in the record, with some suggesting that the stipulation admitted that the charges in the federal indictment were true. Justice Thomas asked whether it was disputed that the former manager was convicted at his trial of offenses relating to the financial and business operations of the store. Counsel said that it was not. Justice Thomas then repeated his question – why isn’t the stipulation enough. Counsel responded that it was not sufficient because the Municipal Code required that the offense occur “in or about” the licensed premises. Justice Theis pointed out that counsel had framed the issue as one of due process in the petition for leave to appeal, not as sufficiency of the evidence. Counsel responded that sufficiency of the evidence was part of the due process violation. Justice Theis asked whether it was true that the main thrust of the defendant's argument was being denied the opportunity to be heard. Counsel agreed that the hallmark of due process was the opportunity to be heard. Justice Theis pointed out that defendant had the opportunity to present evidence, so how was defendant denied the opportunity to be heard? Counsel answered that the evidence was given in an offer of proof; the Commissioner agreed that the principal question had already been settled in favor of finding a violation. The defendant's offer of proof was never considered, defendant argued. Justice Theis questioned whether that was a due process violation; the defendant was allowed to offer exhibits. Counsel again argued that defendant was merely making an offer of proof after already having lost. Justice Theis pointed out that defendant's offer of proof was to show that the pattern of bank deposits was explained by the insurance limits - so what was the prejudice? Counsel answered that no one ever considered the evidence. Justice Theis asked whether the evidence was presented to the federal jury and rejected. Counsel agreed that it was, albeit inartfully. The defendant merely stipulated to things which were not subject to question, according to counsel. Justice Burke asked whether the Liquor Commission had considered the defendant's offer of proof, and counsel answered that he had tried to lay out in his initial brief exactly what happened. Justice Burke asked whether defendant's position was that the Commission had not been allowed to consider defendant's evidence. Counsel answered that the Appellate Court had concluded that the evidence had been considered by the Liquor Commission. Justice Theis asked what specific statements the defendant objected to. Counsel noted one witness' comments that he had worked at the store in the 1990s and recalled the store was charging 2% for cashing checks, although the liquor license hadn't been granted until 2002. Justice Theis asked what the due process violation was, and counsel answered that the Liquor Commission used transcripts to find a violation. Justice Theis suggested that the defendant had testified that checks were being cashed at the store, and the store owner had to figure out how to structure deposits. Counsel agreed, and Justice Theis asked then what was wrong with admitting the transcript? Counsel again answered that nobody at the hearing had said that violations occurred in or about the licensed premises. Justice Thomas asked whether the fact finder could make a reasonable inference from the stipulation, and counsel answered that the stipulation never said that anything had happened at the store; even the federal prosecutors alleged that the unlawful conduct occurred solely at the bank.
Counsel for the state Liquor Commission followed, arguing that the stipulation plus the indictment was sufficient evidence for the fact finder to infer the needed facts. Justice Burke asked whether the Commission had made its decision based totally on the stipulation, thus making proof unnecessary. Counsel answered that the Commission did have a hearing; the hearing officer did make an initial finding, which the Commission agreed was premature. The defendant was permitted to offer additional information, including insurance documents and the owner's testimony. The Commission looked at all evidence that had been submitted. Justice Theis asked whether the Commission has any rules for hearings. Counsel answered that the Municipal Code governed. Justice Burke asked whether the defendant was allowed to cross-examine witnesses before the Commission. Counsel responded that the defendant could cross-examine any witness, and pointed out that if the stipulation was sufficient support for the judgment, there was no need to reach the question of whether the transcripts had been incorrectly admitted. Justice Burke asked what proof the City had without the federal transcripts, and counsel pointed to the stipulation. Justice Burke suggested that there were no live witnesses needed, and counsel argued that the owner of the liquor store had testified and acknowledged the handling of the store's money; that was enough for a reasonable inference. Justice Kilbride asked what evidence there was that the conduct had occurred in or about the premises. Counsel answered that the parties' stipulation provided that the offenses were convicted as charged in the indictment, and involved the operations of the store. Based on that, the Commission could make a reasonable inference that the two-year conspiracy of the manager must have occurred, at least in part, at the store. Justice Kilbride suggested that the stipulation didn't really concede that the offenses occurred in or about the premises. Counsel agreed, but again argued that it was a reasonable inference, further supported by the transcript.
Counsel for the City of Peoria argued next, insisting that every act of the manager was imputable to the licensee. Justice Burke asked whether the licensee was part of the federal case, and counsel answered no. The defendant had argued that the withdrawals had been structured to stay under $10,000 for insurance reasons, counsel argued, but in fact, the limit for amounts held outside the store was only $5,000. So if insurance limits were the reason for the pattern, why wouldn't withdrawals have been half as high?
In rebuttal, counsel for the defendant argued that the Deputy Commissioner's finding had indeed been based on the federal indictment and transcripts. Justice Theis asked counsel what additional evidence he would have introduced but for the due process violation, and counsel answered that he would have cross-examined the witnesses presented in federal court. Justice Theis asked whether the heart of the defendant's case was that there needed to be a retrial of the federal claim, and counsel said essentially, yes - the defendant was not present for the federal trial, so its result was not binding upon the defendant. Counsel asked what other evidence the defendant would have presented, and counsel answered that defendant would have confronted every witness with the insurance policies. Justice Theis noted that the defendant had presented the insurance policies to the Commissioner - what else would defendant have done? Counsel again answered that the defendant would have cross-examined the witnesses. Justice Burke asked whether it was a structural error in an administrative hearing where the defendant is not permitted to present a defense, and counsel agreed that the error was fundamental. Chief Justice Garman asked whether the federal indictment and conviction had any effect on the case, and counsel answered that since the indictment said that the structuring occurred at the Bank, it actually supported the opposite of the inference needed to justify the violation finding. Justice Kilbride asked about counsel's earlier statement that the criminal verdict hadn't ripened into a judgment. Counsel answered that the sentencing hadn't occurred at the time of the hearing, but has now happened. The manager has not appealed, according to counsel; he has already completed his sentence. Justice Thomas noted that the Liquor Commission has held that licensees are strictly accountable for all violations on the premises - does that bring the employer into the mix? Counsel answered no - the question would still be whether a violation occurred on the premises.
We expect WISAM 1 to be decided in three to four months.
Image courtesy of Flickr by josephleenovak.