In a case where both the plaintiffs and the defendant agreed the matter should be arbitrated, the Southern District of Ohio refused to compel arbitration and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for the appointment of arbitrators. The parties’ contract provided for arbitration before the American Arbitration Association, but the AAA declined to administer the arbitration because the defendant “failed to comply with the AAA’s policies regarding consumer claims.” Both parties were amenable to private arbitrations, but they could not agree whether the arbitration should be conducted individually or as one consolidated arbitration. As a result, the plaintiffs argued that the parties had reached an impasse and requested that the court either compel arbitration or appoint arbitrators.
The court first held that a party may not seek to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA “where there has been no refusal to arbitrate.” “A party has ‘refused to arbitrate’ within the meaning of Section 4 if it commences litigation or is ordered to arbitrate the dispute by the relevant arbitral authority and it fails to do so.” The court denied the motion to compel arbitration under Section 4 because it found that the defendant had not unequivocally refused to arbitrate. Rather, the defendant expressly acknowledged the agreement to arbitrate, and the parties were working together to select arbitrators, but had so far failed to agree. Although the parties had not been able to agree on arbitrators for more than a year, the court found that some of this delay was attributable to the plaintiffs’ change in position regarding consolidated arbitration.
With regard to the plaintiffs’ motion for appointment of arbitrators, the court noted that the FAA “expressly favors the selection of arbitrators by parties rather than courts[, however,] Congress recognized that judicial intervention may be required in certain circumstances.” Section 5 of the FAA provides for the appointment of arbitrators “if for any [ ] reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator.” For purposes of Section 5, a “lapse” has been defined as “a lapse in time in the naming of the arbitrator … or some other mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process.” Several courts have found such a “lapse” to have occurred where the parties have deadlocked with regard to the appointment of arbitrators or the process pursuant to which the appointments should be made. Here, despite the one-year delay, the court found that no deadlock had occurred, as the parties both agreed that they were amenable to private arbitration and the names of specific arbitrators had been exchanged. In addition, the AAA had informed the parties that it would consider accepting the arbitration if the defendant took certain steps.
As a result, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction under Section 4 to compel arbitration and under Section 5 to appoint arbitrators, and dismissed the action without prejudice.
Allen v. Horter Investment Management, LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2020).
