In the final announced opinion day of 2013, the Supreme Court has filed its opinion in Hooker v. The Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, holding that the plaintiffs – widows of two deceased firefighters – are not entitled to the inclusion of “duty availability pay” in their survivors’ annuities. Our detailed summary of the facts and underlying opinions in Hooker is here. Our report on the oral argument is here.
Following the deaths of their husbands, plaintiffs were granted widow’s pensions by the defendant. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Cook County Circuit Court, arguing that they were entitled to the annuity awarded to the widow of a firefighter who died in the line of duty. Relying upon intervening new authority from the Appellate Court, the Circuit Court entered an agreed order upholding the plaintiffs’ position. The Board awarded the annuities retroactive to the date of the new authority – 2004. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to raise three claims: (1) they were entitled to the annuity retroactive to the date of their husbands’ deaths, (2) class certification of all widows similarly situated, and (3) when their annuities were calculated, “duty availability pay” – DAP – should have been included, even though the decedents never received it.
The Circuit Court permitted the amendment, but stayed proceedings while the dispute over the starting date for the annuities was resolved. In 2007, the court directed the Board to pay the annuities retroactive to the date of the decedents’ deaths. The Board appealed and the appellate court affirmed. Following that, the Circuit Court dismissed Count I of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint as moot. Since plaintiffs no longer had an individual claim, the Court dismissed Count II, the putative class claim, as well. As for Count III, the Circuit Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the Board’s cross-motion, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to have DAP included in calculating their annuities. The Appellate Court reversed.
In an opinion by Justice Anne M. Burke, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court. Hooker turns on harmonizing two sections of the Pension Code. First, we have Section 6-140, which describes the annuities plaintiffs were entitled to receive:
The annuity for the widow of a fireman whose death results from the performance of an act or acts of duty shall be an amount equal to 50% of the current annual salary attached to the classified position to which the fireman was certified at the time of his death and 75% thereof after December 31, 1972.
Note the words “current annual salary.” What this means is that the survivors’ annuity is not necessarily tied to the salary the firefighter was actually receiving at any time during his or her career.
Next, we have Section 6-111(i) of the Code, a 2004 amendment by the legislature defining the term “salary” to include DAP (which had been created in the early 1990s as part of a collective bargaining agreement):
[T]he salary of a fireman, as calculated for any purpose under this Article, shall include any duty availability pay received by the fireman . . . and references in this Article to the salary attached to or appropriated for the permanent assigned position or classified career service rank, grade, or position of the fireman shall be deemed to include that duty availability pay.
The plaintiffs argued that by virtue of the term “deemed” in the final clause of Section 6-111(i), DAP must be included in salary calculations regardless of whether or not the firefighter ever received it. But according to the majority, the correct interpretation of the clause was that the final reference to “that duty availability pay” was a reference back to “any duty availability pay received by the fireman.” Therefore, if the firefighter never received DAP, it was excluded from “salary” for purposes of the annuity. By concluding that the final clause clarified that “salary” should always include DAP, the majority concluded that the Appellate Court had improperly added the words “even if it was not received by the fireman” to the statute. (As for the italics I’ve added to Section 6-111(i) – we’ll get to that in a minute in discussing the dissent).
The majority concluded that any other result would lead to anomalous results. “Salary” would always be paid “so long as there are firefighters,” the majority wrote. But at least in theory, DAP could be eliminated whenever the parties negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, if DAP was included in the calculation, the possibility existed that survivors would be receiving annuities based on DAP, even though their partners never received it, while current firefighters would not be receiving DAP at all.
Justice Mary Jane Theis dissented, joined by Justice Thomas L. Kilbride. Justice Theis concluded that the “current annual salary” under Section 6-140 for calculating annuities “was flexible, increasing with the changes in [firefighters’] salaries as provided for under the applicable budget appropriations.” Justice Theis then turned to Section 6-111(i), the Pension Code’s definition of “salary.” Justice Theis argued that the words “as calculated for any purpose under this Article” were the crucial passage of Section 6-111(i), noting that the majority “inexplicably omits this critical language” from its quotation of the statute. According to the dissent, the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ annuity was based only on categories of pay actually received by their decedents effectively read this clause out of Section 6-111(i), as well as rendering the reference to “current annual salary” in Section 6-140 meaningless.