In both its response to defendants’ argument for dismissal of the UIGEA charges and of the IGBA charges, the government runs from the language of the statute, which, in each case,requires dismissal of the charges against defendants. Defendants demonstrate in their opening briefs that the express language of Section 5362(2) of UIGEA exempts financial transaction providers like Mr. Campos and Mr. Elie from prosecution under UIGEA. See Campos Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss1 5-12; Elie UIGEA Br. 3-10. Defendants also have demonstrated that under long-standing judicial interpretations of the phrase “business of betting or wagering,” the poker companies in this case,which hosted online poker play by others in exchange for a fee, are not in the “business of betting or wagering” under UIGEA. Finally, the term “subject to chance” as used in UIGEA is hopelessly vague as applied to online poker, such that defendants’ rights to due process and fair notice are violated by this prosecution. Boxed into a corner, the government seeks to avoid dismissal of the UIGEA counts by distorting the statute and mischaracterizing defendants’ straightforward arguments. But, as explained at length herein, these tactics are unavailing. Nor has the government rebutted defendants’ arguments in favor of dismissing the IGBA counts. The government’s opposition to these arguments is based on a core assumption: that Internet poker is prohibited under IGBA. But while the government’s brief is long on colorful

history—from Mississippi riverboats to country music tunes—it is short on what matters: the text that Congress used when it enacted IGBA. Here, as always, that language is determinative.

What it shows is that Internet poker is not covered by the terms of the statute.