The D.C. Circuit, normally an infrequent presence on this blog, has two cases in one week!
One involves Osama bin Laden's driver and his happy adventures with retroactivity. The was a remand for a judge who thought that a below guidelines sentence is only appropriate when there are "compelling reasons" to go below the guidelines range.
There's also go action in a Sixth Circuit meth case involving the Fourth Amendment, and a crime of violence case out of the Tenth Circuit.
Fire up those 28(j) templates - here are this week's Short Wins:
1. Consolidated Sixth Circuit Cases: United States v. Beals; United States v. Miller; United States v. Ambrose: In case arising out of an alleged methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution conspiracy, Pamela Miller, Leslie Beals, and Bobby Ambrose challenged their convictions for drug-related offenses. The Court dismissed Miller's appeal and affirmed Beals' convictions. The Court affirmed Mr. Ambrose's convictions but remanded for the district court to make findings on "unresolved matters" related to the execution of the search warrant, the fruits of which were presented at trial. The Court further ruled that, if the district court determines on remand that the officers exceeded the warrant's scope, it should determine whether blanket suppression of all of the evidence presented against Mr. Ambrose is warranted and, if so, how this affects his convictions and sentences.
2. United States v. Hamdan, DC Circuit: Salim Hamdan, an al Queda member who worked for Osama bin Laden, was convicted by a military commission for "material support for terrorism," a war crime specified by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, based on actions he took from 1996 to 2001 - before the enactment of the Military Commissions Act. Because the D.C. Circuit read the Military Commissions Act not to retroactively punish new crimes, and because material support for terrorism was not a pre-existing war crime under the relevant statute that was on the books at the time of his conduct (10 U.S.C. § 821), the Court reversed the military commissions court's judgment and directed that Hamdan's conviction be vacated.
3. United States v. Joe, Tenth Circuit: In aggravated sexual abuse case, the district court erred when it enhanced the appellants' offense levels for physical restraint of the victim and use of force against the victim because it is impossible to commit aggravated sexual abuse without also applying force that constitutes physical restraint of the victim. Because this error was not harmless, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for resentencing.
4. United States v. Terrell, D.C. Circuit: In possession with intent to distribute crack case, the district court committed plain error in sentencing appellant because it took too narrow a view of its authority to deviate from the Sentencing Guidelines. In particular, the Court stated that it would sentence appellant below the Guidelines only if it found "compelling reasons" to do so. This approach was forbidden before appellant's sentencing. Because this error affected appellant's substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, resentencing was warranted.
5. United States v. Duran, Tenth Circuit: The district court erred in applying a crime of violence sentencing enhancement when it sentenced appellant pursuant to his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Because appellant's prior conviction for aggravated assault can be committed with a mens rea no higher than recklessness under Texas law, the crime is not a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). As a result, the enhancement did not apply, and remand for resentencing was warranted.
6. United States v. Quinn, Seventh Circuit: In child pornography case, the district court erred in failing to explain its decision to sentence appellant to a lifetime of supervised release. The term of supervised release was vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing with instructions for the court to consider (1) how appellant's arguments that he has a lower-than-normal risk of recidivism affect the appropriate length of supervised release, (2) the interaction between the length and terms of supervised release, and (3) the possibility of setting sunset dates for some of the more onerous terms of supervised release.