As we await Thursday's oral argument before the California Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, our series of preview posts continues. This time in Part 4, we take a look at the seven amicus curiae briefs filed in support of the defendant. To read all the briefs in Iskanian, check out the National Chamber Litigation Center’s page on the case here.
Not surprisingly given the recent cases, reading the defense amici is a much different experience than reviewing the briefs filed in support of the plaintiff. The plaintiff-side briefs tend to be somewhat defensive in tone, focused on limiting Discover Bank and Concepcion, differentiating Gentry or suggesting reasons why perhaps the ultimate decision in Iskanian could wind up much ado about little (a Supreme Court decision founded on waiver). The defense amici, on the other hand, are by and large on the offensive, trying to broaden the battlefield and bring as much previous law as possible into question in the wake of Concepcion.
We begin with the brief of the Pacific Legal Foundation. The PLF's Free Enterprise project "defends the freedom of contract, including the right of parties to agree by contract to the process for resolving disputes that might arise between them." While other parts of Gentry might survive, the passages setting "categorical, per se requirements specific to arbitration clauses" necessarily had to fall in the wake of Concepcion, the PLF argues. Indeed, Armendariz itself was on "particularly shaky ground" according to the PLF. Nor was Gentry a mere distant cousin of the departed rule of Discover Bank, amicus argued: "Iskanian's effort to distance Gentry from Discover Bank could succeed only with the exercise of willful blindness." The PLF challenged the United Policyholders’ assertion that arbitration clauses were occasionally upheld between Gentry and Concepcion, writing that its Westlaw search had revealed eight decisions during those years striking arbitration clauses against only one where a clause survived. The California courts have "express[ed] their distrust and disapproval of arbitration" in a series of cases since 1984, the PLF writes, "only to have the United States Supreme Court step in to reverse." The time has come for California courts "to make their peace with the Supremacy Clause."
Amicus the Association of Corporate Counsel focused its brief on the practical effects of decisions giving effect to the FAA's national policy in favor of arbitration. In-house counsel use arbitration as a "basic tool to resolve disputes" quickly and inexpensively, amicus argued. Empirical studies confirm the efficiencies of arbitration. According to one study, arbitrations tend to close about 33 percent faster than litigation in employment discrimination cases; another study found that arbitration cases wrap up twice as fast as litigation. Yet another study of employment cases - this time excluding discrimination cases from the database - concluded that arbitration cases ended three times as fast as courtroom litigation. Studies reflect similarly enormous savings in fees and costs expended by litigants. Reversal would "severely burden in-house counsel and their companies," amicus wrote. At minimum, it would likely be necessary to review contracts applying in California. Worse yet, other jurisdictions might be tempted to follow suit in looking for ways around the imperative of the FAA.
Amici The National Retail Federation and Rent-A-Center, Inc. took aim at the central issue in Iskanian – the fate of Gentry in the wake of Concepcion. Concepcion’s commands are “clear and far-reaching,” the NRF amici write. Gentry cannot be reconciled with Concepcion for several reasons. First, Gentry repeatedly invokes Discover Bank. Second, as other amici have pointed out, the Gentry rule necessarily involves imposing class arbitration on a party which never agreed to it, directly contrary to Concepcion. The NRF amici end their brief by reviewing the ultimate fate at the U.S. Supreme Court of recent cases in which state courts relied on public policy to refuse to enforce arbitration clauses: in each case, the state court's decision was reversed.
Amici the California Chamber of Commerce and the Civil Justice Association of California make similar arguments that Gentry cannot survive Concepcion. According to amici, post-Concepcion decisions from the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit such as CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A. and Coneff v. AT&T Corp. confirm that Concepcion is meant to be read broadly.
Amicus the Employers Group is “the nation’s oldest and largest human resources management association, representing nearly 5,000 companies.” The Employers Group challenges one of the central premises argued by the plaintiff and several plaintiff’s amici – the notion that PAGA is a public-benefit statute. “Civil penalties paid by an employer under the PAGA do not inure to the benefit of the public,” amicus writes; at most, they benefit other aggrieved parties. In that sense, Iskanian’s situation was similar to Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., where the Ninth Circuit declined to apply California’s Broughton/Cruz rule – which holds that claims for broad injunctive relief benefiting the general public cannot be arbitrated – on the grounds that the relief sought there did not benefit the general public. (And in case you’re wondering, a number of courts have held in the last few years that Concepcion dooms Broughton/Cruz too.)
According to amicus, the theme plaintiff and his amici return to again and again – that Discover Bank was about unconscionability while Gentry was about unwaivable statutory rights – is a “distinction without a difference,” since both derive from the same public policy rationale. Not only can Gentry not survive, amicus concludes – Iskanian would be a good opportunity for the Court to revisit Armendariz and Ralphs Grocery too.
Finally, the Employers Group offers an interesting response to the plaintiff’s-side argument that PAGA suits must by definition be representative actions. By taking that position, amicus argues, the plaintiff is restricting the scope and flexibility of the statute, since if the plaintiff were correct, the Labor Commissioner cannot seek PAGA penalties on behalf of a single employee.
Amici the Retail Litigation Center, Inc. and the California Retailers Association offer details on the progeny of California’s major arbitration decisions. Armendariz, for example, has spawned 25 published Court of Appeal opinions, at least 6 published opinions from the Ninth Circuit and many more unpublished Court of Appeal opinions and trial court orders. Even after Concepcion, several California courts have refused to enforce arbitration clauses; amici point to cases such as Ajamian v. CantoC02E, L.P., where the Court of Appeal “dismissed Concepcion in a footnote,” and Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., where the court asserted that Gentry remained viable because most wage-and-hour claims involve too little money to justify the expense of arbitration. (Not surprisingly in the wake of Italian Colors, the California Supreme Court has issued a grant-and-hold in Franco, awaiting Iskanian.)
Amici turn then to the plaintiff’s “effective vindication” theory. The notion that “unwaivable rights” are enough to overcome the FAA was rejected more than twenty years ago in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. Amici point out that the construction advocated by the plaintiff’s side necessarily creates two separate proceedings out of a single dispute – wage and hour claims in arbitration, and the purportedly non-arbitrable PAGA claims in court. The amici conclude by arguing that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion – still heard today – that arbitration is somehow an inferior forum for certain types of claims.
Amicus the California New Car Dealers Association points out that while the United States Supreme Court has occasionally discussed “effective vindication” – always in dicta – in relation to federal statutory rights, it has never actually refused to enforce an arbitration clause based upon the “effective vindication” theory. Amicus argues that it was the California Supreme Court in Broughton that applied the theory with respect to state-law rights, disregarding the theoretical basis for it – the need to reconcile conflicting Congressional mandates. Broughton led straight to Armendariz,and then to Discover Bank, Gentry and the original decision in Sonic-Calabasas. Each of these decisions drew dissents arguing that the Court was straying further from the FAA and the U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance, with Justice Chin writing in Broughton, Cruz and Sonic-Calabasas, and Justice Baxter writing in Gentry. According to the amicus, the dissenters have now been vindicated by Concepcion, which rejected the public policy rationale which lies at the foundation of both Discover Bank and Gentry. The New Car Dealers’ brief concludes by pointing out that due process-based protections in the text of the FAA requiring that parties be granted notice and an opportunity to present relevant and material evidence and argument before neutral arbitrators obviate any need for states to superimpose additional limits on arbitration in pursuit of their own public policies.
Join us back here soon for the conclusion of our five part series: Waiting for Iskanian, Part 5: The Parties’ Briefs.
Image courtesy of Flickr by J. Saper.