On 10 July 2025, following a comprehensive Staff Working Document published in September 2024, the Commission launched a public consultation to revise Regulation 1/2003. The exercise collected over 80 contributions according to the Commission's press release – from business associations, large companies, law firms, lawyers' associations, and public authorities. The feedback signals a broad appetite to modernize the regulation for digital-era enforcement, with legislative work now openly on the horizon. The feedback reads like a practitioner's split-screen: stronger investigative tools (search-term RFIs, clearer preservation expectations, remote inspections, and potentially more structured interviews) on one side; tighter procedural brakes (scope limits, written decisions, audit trails, privacy and legal professional privilege) on the other. Add the push to make interim measures and commitments move faster, and the “refit” has the potential to end up as a true redesign of how cases are run.
In what follows, we take a closer look at the summary which the Commission has published on the feedback it received (and which can be downloaded here). While that summary comes with a few caveats (it being solely a factual summary, selectively curated, not legally binding on the Commission, and omitting feedback from national competition authorities for now), it is highly informative as to what the focal points of the final reform will be and what companies and their competition lawyers may reasonably expect the draft legislation to look like. This article tracks the main asks which have surfaced by now, the friction points, and what companies should already be doing if they don't want to adapt to the changes looming on the horizon at speed.
According to the Commission’s summary, stakeholders broadly accept that the Commission needs effective ways to collect, preserve, and test evidence – but insist that “effective” cannot become a synonym for “unbounded.”
Search-term RFIs and the deadline problem
Respondents reported that the costs of Commission requests for information (RFIs) are difficult to quantify because they vary with question complexity, market scope, internal resources, and the frequent need to hire external lawyers, consultants, and IT support. Deadlines were widely considered too short (as many practitioners will agree). Extensions can be requested, but several stakeholders called for longer deadlines set up front and greater flexibility when the inevitable happens – overbreadth, technical hurdles, privilege review.
Preservation orders
Should Regulation 1/2003 spell out a specific power for the Commission to order preservation of evidence? Views were divided. One group questioned the need, pointing to existing preservation duties under case law and raising concerns about costs (including IT system changes), scope creep, and extraterritorial reach. They called for guidance on complying with the existing duty rather than a new power. Others argued preservation orders could be less intrusive than dawn raids, provide greater legal certainty on the scope of preservation, and enable more targeted initial data collection. Even supporters, however, made backing conditional: orders must be proportionate, limited in scope and time, and kept under review. Narrower orders were described as manageable; format demands that diverge from how companies ordinarily retain data were flagged as a direct path to additional IT and legal costs.
Overall, respondents were split: while a majority flagged preservation orders as at least neutral (if not positive) on legal certainty, a majority also rated the impact as (very) negative on administrative burden, flexibility, and costs.
Stakeholders also flagged the predictable “second-order effects”: sanctions might improve compliance and investigative effectiveness, but could also drive over-preservation, inefficiency, and breach risks despite good-faith implementation.
Remote inspections
Inspections are valuable and expensive – with respondents suggesting that costs can reach EUR 300,000 when on-site work is coupled with continued review at the Commission’s premises. Remote inspections are pitched as an answer to digital reality, but respondents treated them less as a “new format” than a “new risk profile,” demanding safeguards at least equivalent to on-site inspections: company representation (including external counsel), respect for privacy, privilege, and defence rights, a clearly defined scope, a complete audit trail, and a formal written decision as the legal basis (for more on email seizures, see our previous article here).
Notably, some respondents assumed “fully virtual” inspections, but the Commission clarified in its feedback summary that remote inspections would not necessarily be entirely virtual – they could occur at the Commission’s premises, with company representatives attending. On costs, the feedback pulls both ways: some expected costs to be reallocated rather than reduced; others argued remote inspections could be less disruptive and save time and travel. Compared with search-term RFIs, remote inspections were seen as potentially more targeted but also more intrusive and less flexible. Majorities rated the rights-of-defence impact of inspections conducted outside company premises as negative or very negative.
Compulsory interviews
Most respondents said companies typically do not refuse to make representatives available for interviews. But one lawyers’ association reported that members counsel clients against interviews because they are “less predictable” than written submissions – a data point that may at least partly explain the push for a compulsory power to interview as part of the current reform.
Benefits identified included greater investigative effectiveness, a reduced need for inspections, and more targeted RFIs. Several stakeholders framed the proposal as an alignment exercise, pointing to the Commission’s existing interview powers under the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the powers of national competition authorities (NCAs) under the ECN+ Directive. Sceptics questioned efficiency and litigation risk: interviews may be less effective than RFIs, and the tool carries appeal risk, legal fees, travel costs, record-management burdens, and business disruption.
If compulsory interviews should arrive, respondents insisted on robust safeguards:
- advance notice,
- protection against self-incrimination,
- legal professional privilege (with some calling for extension to in-house counsel, see also below in section 6),
- legal representation for company and individual,
- the ability to review and correct the record,
- a challengeable summoning decision,
- and the right to cross-examine before the Hearing Officer.
On sanctions, respondents saw fines as a way to ensure compliance but urged restraint – limited to intentional breaches, with proportionality concerns, duplication risk vis-à-vis existing RFI sanctions, and the risk of an “unfriendly” business environment through chilling effects.
Stakeholders also focused on the “back end”: how cases move – and how decisions land. They argued for more structured and transparent processes, clearer timelines, greater reliance on Article 9 commitments, better market testing of remedies under Article 7, clearer enforcement priorities, and stronger monitoring of compliance (for more on remedies and their effectiveness, see our earlier piece here).
Interim measures
Interim measures have surfaced in the last twelve months or so as the “hot topic” for procedural reform, with officials hoping to be able to “freeze” potentially critical conduct more easily and keep competitive harm from manifesting irreparably.
On substance, 23 respondents said, however, that the legal test for interim measures should not change; nine saw merit in a less onerous test. Suggestions included replacing “serious and irreparable harm to competition” with “serious and immediate harm/significant damage to consumers or markets” and substituting “prima facie infringement” with “reasonable suspicion.” The trade-off is classic: faster triggering promises more effective enforcement in fast-moving markets, but increases the risk of false positives and operational disruption.
Procedurally, 26 respondents supported amendments aimed at speeding things up – introducing deadlines, limiting access to file, a shortened procedure in complaint-led cases, and even dispensing with Advisory Committee consultation. But 11 respondents underlined the importance of maintaining an oral hearing, and the sharpest divide concerned interim measures without a prior hearing: 20 respondents opposed them, citing far-reaching limits on rights of defence, false positives, and reputational damage. Only three businesses were positive, citing effectiveness gains from fast intervention.
Commitments
Stakeholders debated a deadline for submitting binding commitments offers following a detailed opening decision. Benefits cited were predictability, shorter proceedings, and legal certainty. Costs were equally pointed: the opening decision might not be detailed enough to understand concerns; a deadline could restrict the ability to craft tailored commitments; and the Commission would lose flexibility to accept commitments later. Views were mixed on the trigger date – alternatives ranged from the Statement of Objections to the start of negotiations – and on whether a commitments proposal should be binding and final with only a one-time amendment.
Access to file and confidentiality rings
Preparing non-confidential file versions is time-consuming and expensive. Respondents described costs ranging from hundreds of hours and tens of thousands of euros (medium cases) to thousands of hours and hundreds of thousands of euros (large cases). To ease that burden, the consultation tested two models for mandatory confidentiality rings. Option 1 would give Statement of Objections addressees non-confidential access to documents cited in the SO, while external advisers access the full accessible file under confidentiality conditions. Option 2 would grant all accessible documents to a limited number of external advisers under confidentiality conditions.
According to the Commission, there was a clear favourite. Of 23 respondents providing a meaningful assessment, 14 preferred Option 1, 4 preferred Option 2, and 4 rejected both. The concern driving that preference is constitutional in feel: respondents stressed that external advisers are “not always” in a position to properly assess documents, and a system that fully delegates defence to external advisers increases reliance on – and costs for – external legal teams. For information providers, rings could reduce the redaction burden, but only if technical and legal safeguards genuinely protect confidential information.
Stakeholders generally supported introducing Commission powers to investigate and sanction breaches of confidentiality obligations during investigations – alongside strict NDAs, (virtual) data rooms with audit capability, and tiered protections for especially sensitive information. In other words: the nutshell-consensus is “yes, provided it comes with its own rulebook.”
Only 11 stakeholders indicated they or their members had submitted a Form C complaint in the past 10 years – yet the system generates recurring tension between participation on the one hand and administrative burden on the other. Form C has proven a recurring pain-point for the Commission in recent years, as even the few complainants coming forward may bind a considerable amount of Brussels's resources (particularly as the Commission is required to present complainants with a fully-fledged decision subject to judicial review whenever it rejects a complaint).
But of 21 stakeholders who addressed the question, views were split on whether the right to a rejection decision following a complaint should be removed. Supporters framed it as administrative decluttering; opponents – particularly citizens, NGOs, and legal professionals – warned it would reduce legal certainty and weaken checks and balances. On simplification, stakeholders proposed allowing simplified initial complaints, clearer guidance on priority cases, time limits for answers, and a guided digital submission tool. Legal professionals called for more transparency through informal contacts and communication with the Commission.
At the same time, extending rights currently attributed to formal complainants to other third parties drew cautious or mixed responses. Most flagged that more rights mean more complexity, higher costs, and greater confidentiality risk – potentially slowing proceedings. The lower-friction alternative was improving existing participation: earlier third-party input, clearer roles, harmonised procedural rights, and regular status updates. One business suggested borrowing the DMA's structured opportunities for interested-party contributions at key procedural stages.
While EU competition law is a largely harmonized area of the law, there is one notable exception provided in Article 3(2) of the Regulation. Under the current framework, Member States are allowed to adopt and enforce stricter national rules on unilateral conduct, meaning that companies may, for the same type of conduct, face different rules and sanctions depending on the Member State they are operating in; moreover, this exception is seen by many as a source of friction with EU investigations or rules, in particular in the digital sector. The consultation tested two options to deal with such frictions – neither of which drew a clean majority.
Option 1: coordinated coexistence
Option 1 would maintain the current system and adapt coordination under Regulation 1/2003 to also cover stricter national unilateral-conduct laws. Reactions ranged from “insufficient” to “no changes required.” One law firm said it could help avoid duplicate proceedings and conflicting outcomes; another pointed to bpost (C-117/20) and the ne bis in idem principle. A business association argued that Option 1 would still leave key issues unaddressed – divergent remedies, fragmented enforcement, and even the integrity of the Single Market. A public authority questioned whether any new mechanism is needed beyond Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 38 DMA.
Option 2: discontinue Article 3(2)
Option 2 would discontinue the current system under Article 3(2). Stakeholders opposing such discontinuation highlighted the value of stricter national laws in reflecting local realities, lowering market-entry barriers for SMEs, and enabling swift intervention against abuses of economic power. These are not purely academic edge cases: the French concept of abuse of economic dependence has been used as a basis for major sanctions and Germany treats its Section 19a ARC as a central intervention lever for digital firms perceived as structurally powerful (without having to prove dominance on individual markets). Meanwhile, 14 respondents said discontinuation could reduce costs for companies facing higher innovation and expansion costs under varying local regimes, and 13 pointed to legal uncertainty, arguing the scope of Article 3(2) is “not always clear.”
While we do not have a summary of NCA feedback (yet), it is worth pointing out the institutional mood music accompanying this discussion. National authorities – particularly in France, Germany, and Austria – have resisted any move that would narrow the space for stricter rules on unilateral conduct. But the effect of that push remains unclear as of yet. Andreas Mundt, president of the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO), has recently suggested that the Commission is unlikely to use the revision to “cap” stricter national regimes and the Commission has reportedly indicated to NCAs that it will (merely) concentrate on re-shaping information exchange and cooperation as part of the reform, while potentially clarifying what counts as “stricter national rules on unilateral conduct.” However, in a recent European Parliament exchange, MEP Piotr Müller criticised any potential shift of enforcement “to Brussels” as a “step in the wrong direction,” signalling that the issue is still undecided – with Commissioner Teresa Ribera, in charge of EU competition policy, stating that the “Commission is considering how to address the risk of fragmented competition law enforcement that has been associated with the (increased) use of stricter national laws on unilateral conduct”.
The jury, it seems, is not quite done deliberating.
The consultation’s “other topics” bucket captured several recurring asks that did not fit neatly into the questionnaire:
- Article 7 remedies: Two respondents want the Commission’s toolkit strengthened with sufficient discretion for (quasi-)structural remedies; one business association and one lawyers’ association favour maintaining the hierarchy between behavioural and structural remedies.
- Cartel-specific deterrence: One citizen proposed director disqualification and seizure of bonus payments for cartel infringements.
- Settlement beyond cartels: Five respondents argued for extending the formal cartel settlement procedure to non-cartel infringements or creating a cooperation-procedure framework.
- Fines process: Seven respondents commented on the process for imposing fines, though the summary does not detail their positions.
- Limitation periods and retaliation: Two respondents suggested extending limitation periods and introducing sanctions against retaliatory behaviour by companies under investigation.
- LPP for in-house counsel: Eight respondents advocated for extending legal professional privilege to in-house counsel, arguing it would reflect the approach already taken in several Member States and strengthen compliance frameworks (for a deeper dive on that hotly debated issue, see our recent article here). Eight further respondents commented on due process and procedural fairness more broadly.
The consultation summary may read like a “reform shopping list” but there is a recurring fine print under virtually every topic: “yes, but only if …” Assuming the need to make compromises when aligning the conflicting interests will prevail, that “if” will be the most intriguing part of the forthcoming draft of the revised Regulation. One can only speculate at this point as to how this will be facilitated for each of the topics described above. For the time being, four pressure points emerge as potentially most impactful for the way companies engage with competition authorities, train their employees and handle their internal processes.
- Document preservation may become more important than ever, if legal hold notices should stop being a best practice and start being an official trigger point (coupled with sanctions). If that should materialise, reliably knowing what to preserve, for whom, for how long, and why will become essential for companies – even more so than today.
- Remote inspections would compress the timeline but expand the “risk surface”. While such inspections can reduce disruption and speed evidence capture, they can also magnify rights-of-defence, privacy, and privilege concerns. Depending on their scope and legal safeguards (and of course the extent to which officials would actually rely on them), companies will have to adjust to significant changes compared to the days of “traditional” dawn raids.
- Interviews with individuals might become a front-line evidentiary event where non-attendance or misleading answers can be fined. More than before, that would raise a crucial compliance question: how do you prepare employees to participate without jeopardising the defence or losing control of the narrative?
- Confidentiality rings may reduce (or at least shift) costs, but create new procedural challenges (“leak-proofing”) and risks if companies are forced to outsource their understanding of the file to external advisers.
Procedurally, the path ahead is clear. The Commission has signalled an intention to publish an Impact Assessment Report and move towards a full legislative proposal by Q3 this year, potentially in September 2026. Once that draft arrives, we may expect the debate to sharpen quickly – especially on measures that trade administrative efficiency for perceived procedural risk.
