Amy Coe filed a putative class action against Philips Oral Healthcare, Inc. (“Philips”), alleging that several of the defendant’s vibrating toothbrushes were defective and failed to perform as advertised.  Coe v. Philips Oral Healthcare, Inc., No. C13-518 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2014).  Coe filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington and sought to represent a nationwide class of consumers solely under Washington law.

Philips filed a motion to deny class certification, asking the District Court to preemptively deny certification even though Coe have not moved for class certification.  Philips argued that the laws of the consumers’ home states, and not Washington law, must apply to their claims.  As there are conflicts between the consumer protection laws of Washington and other states, Philips argued that the requirements for class certification could never be satisfied due to the predominating individualized issues involved with determining whether a particular class member would prevail under the particular laws of her or his state.

Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision of Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009), the District Court noted a defendant may file an affirmative motion to deny class certification under Rule 23 so long as the plaintiff is not procedurally prejudiced by the timing of the motion.  The District Court held that resolution of Philip’s motion to deny class certification would not prejudice Coe, as resolution of the motion would essentially depend on the legal issue of a choice-of-law analysis. 

Under Washington law, courts must determine which state has the “most significant relationship” to the cause of action.  Coe argued that Philips, a Washington corporation, spent significant time and resources at its Washington facilities designing and attempting to fix the toothbrushes.  While Washington law permits claims under its consumer protection laws by non-residents against Washington corporation, the District Court held that the most significant aspects of the litigation—the marketing of the product, where the products were distributed and purchased, and where the place of injury actually occurred—were outside of Washington and in each consumer’s home state. 

Because the individual consumer protection laws of each putative class member’s home state were materially different, Coe would be unable to show that common questions predominated over individualized issues, such that Coe could not meet Rule 23(b)(3) as required for class certification.  Thus, the District Court granted Philip’s affirmative motion to deny class certification.