Court: Connecticut Superior Court – Judicial District of Bridgeport
Plaintiffs Evan Plotkin and Martha Barry-Plotkin filed suit claiming Mr. Plotkin had asbestos exposure from, among other things, personal use of Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder (J&J) from the 1950s through the 2000s. Plaintiffs further claimed the use of J&J resulted in Mr. Plotkin to develop mesothelioma.
The lawsuit eventually encompassed J&J and its entities created by three attempts at bankruptcy: Kenvue Inc., Johnson & Johnson Holdco (NA) Inc., LLT Management LLC, LTL Management LLC and Pecos River Talc LLC (collectively, “J&J entities”). This case ultimately proceeded to trial against the J&J entities. At trial, plaintiffs relied upon expert testimony from Arnold Brody, Ph.D. (a pathologist and cell biologist expert), Steven Haber (pulmonologist expert); William Longo (an electron microscopist expert), Mark Bailey (a geologist expert) and David Madigan, Ph.D. (an expert in statistics). The J&J entities, meanwhile, relied upon expert testimony from Richard Attanoos, M.D. (an expert in pathology).
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found all J&J entities were strictly liable and negligent. The jury specifically found that the J&J entities failed to warn, and that their conduct caused Mr. Plotkin’s injury. On October 15, 2024, the jury awarded $15 million in damages to plaintiffs. Following the verdict, the J&J entities filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Plaintiffs opposed.
Under Connecticut law, a trial court may set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because the jury, on the basis of the evidence presented, mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case can be applied. A trial court should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they or some of them were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality.
A verdict is not defective as a matter of law, as long as it contains an intelligible finding that clearly manifests the intent of the jury. Furthermore, “Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues. . . . [T]o render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must be a factual basis for the opinion.” The trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert witness opinions. The court’s decision is not to be disturbed unless its discretion has been abused, or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law.
In the instant matter, the J&J entities’ motion to set aside the jury verdict and for a new trial primarily argued the court should have precluded, in whole or in part, the opinions of plaintiff’s expert witnesses as those opinions failed to meet the threshold test for admissibility, which they claim were prejudicial, among other assertions. The court was not persuaded.
For instance, the J&J entities argued plaintiff’s medical causation expert – Dr. Haber – should not have been permitted to opine that Mr. Plotkin’s exposure to J&J increased his risk of mesothelioma because this opinion was based, in whole or in part, upon the opinions of some of plaintiffs’ other experts. However, Connecticut law has maintained experts may rely on the reports of other experts in formulating his or her own specific opinions, particularly where the expert in question is qualified to because he or she has the requisite professional training, experience and knowledge that allows him or her to evaluate and rely on the work of the other experts. Here, the court found it was beyond dispute that Dr. Haber was qualified to use the data provided by some of plaintiff’s other experts, along with his own professional training, knowledge and experience, to arrive at his opinion that Mr. Plotkin’s exposure to asbestos-containing J&J increased his risk of developing mesothelioma.
As such, Dr. Haber’s opinions at issue were admissible under Connecticut law. The court made similar findings regarding the J&J entities’ arguments regarding plaintiff’s other experts. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in the oversight of this trial. The court further found the jury’s verdict is not manifestly unjust considering it contains an intelligible finding that clearly demonstrates the jury’s intent.
As such, the court ultimately denied the J&J entities’ motion to set aside the jury verdict and for a new trial in its entirety.
Read the full decision here.
