D.C. Circuit Rejects Proposed Expansion of Associational Standing

On May 1, 2026, the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin,[1] clarifying the limits of associational standing, and rejecting a proposed expansion that would have blurred the distinction between associations and the members they purport to represent. The court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to establish associational standing by treating the organizations’ “board members, supporters, and staff” as the “functional equivalents” of members on whose behalf the organizations may assert associational standing.

Background

The case was brought by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (“PEER”) and the Center for Environmental Health (“CEH”), alleging that EPA has failed to fulfill its responsibilities to address the risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).[2] PEER and CEH asserted that USEPA received conclusive data showing PFOA’s carcinogenicity, and argued that this triggered nondiscretionary duties for USEPA to take action to address the identified risk pursuant to Section 4(f) and 7(a) of TSCA. The District Court dismissed the action, rejecting both claims. Upon appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal, but on entirely different grounds, finding that plaintiffs failed to establish associational standing.

Associational Standing Test

In examining the standing issue, the D.C. Circuit applied the 3-part test for associational standing set forth in Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n[3], which requires an organization to show:

(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;

(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and

(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.[4]

The DC Circuit elaborated that “Associational standing rests on the assumption that there is a meaningful alignment of an organization’s interests and the interests of a constituency that the organization seeks to protect.”[5] Such an alignment occurs when the organization’s purpose is to advance the interests of its members, the members are the primary beneficiary of the organization’s activities, and the organization is sufficiently subject to the members’ influence to ensure it represents their views. “This framework preserves the sanctity of the relationship between the organization and its members that justifies an organization suing as the representative of its members.”[6]

The traditional approach to associational standing is for a “voluntary membership organization” to represent the interests of its members.[7] Alternatively, an organization can assert associational standing if it demonstrates that it “is the functional equivalent of a traditional membership organization.”[8] Both PEER and CEH conceded that they were not traditional membership organizations, and therefore sought to assert associational standing using the “functional equivalent” approach. Lacking a membership base, each organization brought the action on behalf of the organization’s “board members, supporters, and staff.”

Analysis of PEER and CEH Standing

In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit noted that neither organization claimed that its purpose was to serve its employees, nor that its employees were the primary beneficiaries of its work. Further, the employees were not constituents whose interests the organizations exist to represent, and any influence the employees had on the organization arose from their role as employees obligated to carry out the organization's objectives. Nor were the organizations meaningfully subject to their employees’ influence in the relevant sense; any influence the employees had arose from their roles as employees carrying out organizational objectives, not as constituents whose interests the organizations exist to represent. The court concluded that employees, in this structure, “are the means by which the organizations act, not the constituency whose interests define those actions.”[9]

Applying the Hunt test, the court determined that treating the employees as members “would collapse the distinction between representative and represented that Hunt presupposes.”[10] The D.C. Circuit stated, “Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever adopted such an expansive conception of associational standing pursuant to which an employee’s influence over her employing organization suffices to make her the ‘functional equivalent’ of a member on whose behalf the organization may assert associational standing.”[11] The court concluded that “there is nothing in Appellants’ Complaint or in the evidence presented to the District Court that supports PEER and CEH’s claims of associational standing.” It therefore rejected the organizations’ “concededly novel theory” and declined to extend associational standing to PEER and CEH.[12]

While this case concerns a procedural issue, i.e., standing, the implications of the decision are significant. A finding of standing in this case would have potentially paved the way for membership organizations to bootstrap their way to standing by asserting that they represent the interests of their board members, supporters, and/or employees. At Dickinson Wright, we continue to monitor critical issues that may impact your environmental compliance operations.

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