• Reduce Attack Surface. Simply put, companies should understand from where a threat may come, including an open-facing commercial internet site, a third-party/supplier/vendor network, or a phishing attack. The use of a vendor assessment will help in understanding the particular vectors a threat may take.  Note, however, that such efforts should be undertaken under advice of counsel so as to ensure the results are protected under the attorney-client privilege.  The end result of this is to ensure that a company maintains network “situational awareness” and that it knows that only authorized devices and entities are able to access company systems, both physically and logically

Questions to ask/Things to know:

  • What points of entry do we have into our system and where are they?
  • What type of services/programs do we use to ensure that we can detect malicious activities at those points of entry?
  • Do we know what “normal” looks like so that we can quickly spot “abnormal”?
  • How sensitive to intrusion are our systems? What would an intruder need to “trip” before we know they are present?
  • What are our procedures and protocols when malicious activity is identified? Are they available offline should our systems go down?
  • Do we have the name of a knowledgeable cyber-security attorney and reputable cybersecurity vendor included in our procedures and protocol
  • Alignment to Cybersecurity / Computer Network Defense Service Providers. While this last focus is DoD organizational by nature, it reflects that the expectations and pressures placed on CISOs are immense and, often, unrealistic. Accordingly, it may behoove a company to employ (or retain) a reputable vendor to not only monitor and detect intrusions, but provide actionable cyber-threat intelligence. The good news here is that you can secure a good – and affordable – start in identifying current threats from the information provided by government partnership programs like the U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Force, the FBI’s InfraGard, DHS’s United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), or its newly christened Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) system (but speak with your attorneys before going too far with AIS, as discussed here). If, however, your organization decides to employ vendors to keep it apprised of the deepest and darkest of malware and exploits, make sure that chosen vendor is reputable and understands what makes your company unique. Also, and perhaps most important, if your company invests in obtaining cyber threat intelligence, be prepared to use it. As recognized by the FBI, unlike straight-forward information, “intelligence” is “information that has been analyzed and refined so that it is useful to policymakers in making decisions.” Make sure your company can act on the intelligence it receives.

Questions to ask/Things to know:

  • How are we keeping apprised of threats to our systems?
  • Do we know who would want to access our systems (foreign governments, terrorists, hacktivists, etc.) and why (IP theft, PII or PHI theft, vandalism)?
  • Who tests our system’s integrity (e.g. penetration testing/“PenTesting”)? Is the process independent of our IT department or, as Juvenal asked: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” – who will guard the guardians?
  • Do we use an outside vendor for cybersecurity assessments? Who? Are we using outside counsel to oversee those tests to ensure the results are privileged?
  • Do we react to potential threats or do we wait for an event?
  • How do we act when a vulnerability is discovered?
  • Who cares (DoD, FCC, FTC, SEC, State AGs) that our systems may have been compromised?

Not surprisingly, for DoD contractors these efforts are already on the table via the “adequate security” controls found in NIST SP 800-171 (blogged about most recently here) and required through DFARS 252.204-7012(b)(1)(ii)(A). But for commercial companies struggling to find the right mix of security for themselves and their vendors, these identified efforts should serve as a good place to start so you will not be labeled a cybersecurity “shirker,” or worse, by government regulators or the plaintiff’s bar.  So, in conclusion, let me borrow the training video’s final plate for one more piece of 1940s VD/cybersecurity advice:

“Do not be so weak as to let some ignorant individuals persuade you that you must seek [merely a basic cybersecurity regiment] to be a good sport. If you follow his advice, you are only being a fool. [Risk and liability] control are developed by keeping a healthy [cyber-protocol] and a clean [information system].  Those essentials are required in meeting the many problems of life, in protecting the health of your [business partnerships] and the [income and profit that] you expect to be a part of your future, and in serving your country [and its regulators] to the best of your ability.”