Rapid advances in 5G, the Internet of Things, and other next-generation technologies have transformed standard-essential patent (“SEP”) disputes from bilateral commercial conflicts into broader contests over global forum selection, industrial policy, and rulemaking.
WTO dispute DS611 (“DS611”) is a case in point. On 18 February 2022, the European Union (“EU”)initiated WTO proceedings against China, alleging that Chinese courts’ systematic issuance of anti-suit injunctions (“ASIs”) in SEP cases breached China’s obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) and the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (“Accession Protocol”). On 7 December 2022, the EU requested the establishment of a panel (WT/DS611/5), and the Dispute Settlement Body established the panel on 27 January 2023. In its interim report dated 24 April 2025, the panel found the existence of China's so-called “ASI policy” but rejected the EU's other allegations beyond “transparency of relevant Chinese judicial rulings.” The report was subsequently appealed through an Article 25 appeal arbitration under the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (“MPIA”). In their award of 21 July 2025 (WT/DS611/ARB25), the Article 25 arbitrators largely upheld the panel’s findings on transparency, but reversed key aspects of the panel’s reasoning and found China’s ASI policy inconsistent with TRIPS Articles 28.1 and 28.2, read together with the first sentence of Article 1.1. This note summarizes the key holdings and highlights practical implications for parties navigating parallel FRAND and SEP litigation across jurisdictions..
- Factual Background of the Dispute
When a patent is incorporated into a technical standard, the patent holder is typically required to make commitments to standard-setting organizations to license their patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In practice, FRAND negotiations may break down, and parties may litigate in parallel in multiple jurisdictions.
Since the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”)’s Intellectual Property Tribunal issued China’s first high-profile SEP-related ASI in Huawei v. Conversant in August 2020, Chinese courts have granted several ASIs in SEP disputes. In the DS611 dispute, EU cited five representative cases as listed below.
The EU argued that the five decisions referred to above, together with the way Chinese courts applied interim measures in those cases, revealed the existence of an unwritten but generally applicable “ASI policy” in the SEP context. According to the EU, this policy enables Chinese courts to impose broad restraints on SEP holders’ ability to pursue injunctions and other remedies before non-Chinese courts.
- Issues in Dispute
- Claims Advanced by the EU
The EU challenged both (i) China’s alleged generally applicable practice of granting ASIs in SEP disputes and (ii) the specific ASI decisions in the five representative cases. In essence, the EU’s claims fell into three groups: (1) ASIs allegedly impair substantive TRIPS rights (Article 28, read with Article 1.1); (2) ASIs allegedly interfere with access to effective remedies (Articles 41 and 44); and (3) China allegedly failed to comply with TRIPS transparency obligations and uniform administration commitments (Article 63; Accession Protocol Article 2(A)(2)).
- Alleged Impairment of Substantive Patent Protection—Articles 1.1, 28.1 and 28.2 of the TRIPS Agreement
The EU argued that Article 1.11 of the TRIPS Agreement does not merely require Members to give effect to the provisions of TRIPS within their domestic legal systems, but also entails a negative obligation: Members must refrain from adopting measures that undermine the the practical ability of other Members to give effect to TRIPS-compliant IP protection in their own legal systems.
Against this background, the EU contended that the issuance of ASIs by Chinese courts in SEP disputes restricted patent holders’ ability to exercise the exclusive rights guaranteed under Article 28.12 of TRIPS. The EU further maintained that such injunctions adversely affected patent holders’ freedom, under Article 28.23, to enter into licensing agreements in respect of the patents concerned.
- Alleged Interference with Access to Remedies before Foreign Courts
The EU further argued that China’s ASI policy interfered with patent holders’ ability to seek remedies before courts in other jurisdictions. The combination of broad prohibitions and significant daily penalties, in the EU’s view, effectively impeded access to civil remedies—including injunctive relief—before courts in the countries where the patents were granted.
In the EU’s view, this practical constraint was inconsistent with TRIPS Article 44.14 (injunctive relief) and Article 41.15 (effective enforcement procedures), because it reduced the availability of judicial relief in other Members’ territories and weakened overall enforcement of patent rights.
- Alleged Lack of Transparency and Inconsistent Application of Domestic Law—Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 2(A)(2) of China’s WTO Accession Protocol
The EU further alleged violations of TRIPS transparency obligations. In particular, the EU argued that at least some ASI decisions—most notably the decisions in Xiaomi v. InterDigital—were of general applicability in their interpretation and application of China’s rules on interim measures yet were not made publicly available. According to the EU, this constituted a breach of Article 63.16 of TRIPS, which requires Members to publish judicial decisions of general application.
The EU also relied on Article 63.37 of TRIPS, submitting that it had formally requested China to provide relevant judicial decisions and legal bases relating to ASIs. In the EU’s view, China was not prepared to supply the requested information in the manner required by Article 63.3..
In addition, the EU invoked Article 2(A)(2) of the Accession Protocol, arguing that Chinese courts, in applying the Civil Procedure Law and related judicial interpretations in the ASI cases at issue, failed to ensure a uniform, impartial and reasonable application of domestic law.
- China’s Response
- Absence of an Independent “ASI Policy”
China argued that what the EU characterized as an “ASI policy” did not constitute a generally applicable measure Rather, it reflected the application of existing laws and judicial interpretations by Chinese courts in a limited number of individual cases, based on their specific factual circumstances.
China further maintained that, even if the panel were to find the existence of a challengeable “ASI policy”, the EU had not demonstrated any inconsistency with TRIPS or the Accession Protocol.
- ASIs Do Not Undermine Patent Exclusivity or Licensing Freedom
China emphasized that Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement is to ensure that each Member establishes and maintains, within its own territory, a system of intellectual-property protection and enforcement that meets the minimum standards prescribed by TRIPS. According to China, Article 1.1 does not create an abstract “external obligation” prohibiting Members from adopting any domestic measures that might incidentally affect litigation choices or institutional arrangements in other Members’ jurisdictions. Rather, TRIPS is premised on the territorial nature of intellectual-property rights and is concerned with minimum standards of protection within individual Members, not with constructing a unified cross-border enforcement regime.
On this basis, China argued that Articles 28.1 and 28.2 of TRIPS require Members to confer, under their domestic law, exclusive patent rights and the right to assign or conclude licensing agreements, requirements that Chinese law already satisfies. ASIs issued by Chinese courts, China maintained, are interim measures directed at parties within China. While such measures may, for a limited period, affect a party’s strategic choice as to whether to initiate or continue litigation abroad, they neither alter the substantive content of patent rights under the laws of other Members nor negate a patent holder’s ability to negotiate and conclude licensing agreements in respect of the patents concerned. Accordingly, China contended that ASIs do not infringe the rights guaranteed under Articles 28.1 and 28.2 of TRIPS.
China likewise argued that Articles 41.1 and 44.1 of TRIPS are concerned with domestic enforcement procedures and the availability of injunctive relief within a Member’s own legal system, rather than with judicial coordination between different Members. Article 44.1, in China’s view, merely requires Members to empower their courts to order cessation of infringement; it does not prohibit Members from adopting interim measures that may influence parties’ litigation strategies in other jurisdictions. Interpreting Article 44.1 as barring any domestic measure that could potentially affect a foreign court’s discretion to grant injunctions would, China argued, go beyond the text and systemic context of the provision.
China also maintained that the “enforcement procedures” referred to in Article 41.1 should be understood as procedures initiated by right holders for the direct purpose of restraining or remedying infringement, as contemplated in Part III of TRIPS. By contrast, ASIs in SEP disputes are typically sought by implementers in the context of disputes over licensing terms or FRAND rates. Their function, China argued, is to preserve the jurisdiction of Chinese courts over contractual disputes and to avoid conflicts arising from parallel proceedings, rather than to enforce intellectual-property rights as such. Consequently, Article 41.1—including its requirement to avoid barriers to legitimate trade—was not applicable.
- No Breach of Transparency Obligations or Article 2(A)(2) of the Accession Protocol
China denied that the decisions rendered in Xiaomi v. InterDigital constituted “judicial decisions of general application” within the meaning of Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. According to China, although the case was included among selected or illustrative cases, it does not carry precedential or binding force under Chinese law. Rather, it represents an application of existing laws and judicial interpretations to the specific facts of an individual dispute and does not amount to a generally binding rule with external normative effect. As such, China argued, the decision did not automatically fall within the category of judicial decisions that must be published pursuant to Article 63.1.
China further maintained that Article 63.3 of TRIPS requires Members only to be “prepared to supply” the information referred to in Article 63.1 upon written request by another Member. In China’s view, certain requests made by the EU exceeded the scope of Article 63.3 and were framed in overly broad terms. China argued that it had fulfilled its transparency obligations by making publicly available the relevant laws, judicial interpretations, and several representative cases, and that TRIPS does not require the disclosure of all individual judicial decisions or complete records in response to such requests.
With respect to Article 2(A)(2) of China’s Accession Protocol, China emphasized that the obligation to apply domestic laws in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” is directed primarily at administrative and trade-related regulatory measures. China argued that isolated differences in judicial reasoning or outcomes cannot be elevated into a violation of Article 2(A)(2). Moreover, the EU had failed to demonstrate the existence of any systemic or persistent lack of uniformity, impartiality, or reasonableness in the application of the Civil Procedure Law or related judicial interpretations by Chinese courts in the ASI cases at issue.
- The Panel’s Interim Report
After consultations failed to resolve the dispute, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO established a panel at the request of the EU on 27 January 2023. and the panel was composed on 28 March 2023.
Thereafter, the panel conducted the proceedings in accordance with the DSU, including the exchange of written submissions, the holding of oral hearings, and the issuance of written questions to the parties. Several WTO Members participated in the proceedings as third parties. The panel’s report was circulated to Members on 24 April 2025 as part of the EU’s Notice of Appeal initiating the Article 25 appeal arbitration process.
- Establishment of an “ASI Policy”
As a preliminary matter, the Panel examined whether an “ASI policy” existed, applying established WTO standards governing the identification of unwritten measures. To that end, the Panel reviewed the evidence submitted by the EU, including judicial interpretations and guiding documents issued by the SPC concerning interim measures in intellectual property cases, ASI decisions rendered by Chinese courts in multiple SEP disputes, as well as institutional practices whereby such cases were summarized and promoted through their inclusion in selected case compilations and court work reports.
Based on this evidence, the Panel found that a coherent set of practices relating to ASIs had emerged in the SEP context in China. The Panel further concluded that these practices were of general application and prospective in nature and thus constituted a “rule or norm” attributable to China. As such, the alleged ASI policy qualified as a challengeable “measure” within the meaning of WTO law. This finding served as the foundation for the Panel’s subsequent examination of the claims under the TRIPS Agreement and other relevant obligations.
- Findings on Responsibility under the Substantive Provisions of TRIPS
With respect to substantive obligations, the panel adopted a relatively cautious interpretative approach.
As regards the relationship between Article 1.1 of TRIPS and Articles 28.1 and 28.2, the panel considered that the primary function of the first sentence of Article 1.1 is to require Members to give effect to the provisions of TRIPS through their domestic legal systems, that is, to establish and maintain within their own territories a system of protection and enforcement that meets the minimum standards prescribed by the Agreement. From this provision, no abstract and general obligation can be derived to the effect that a Member must refrain from adopting domestic measures that may weaken another Member’s ability to comply with its obligations under TRIPS. On this basis, the panel further observed that, although ASIs may have a certain impact on proceedings before foreign courts, the TRIPS framework is designed on the premise of the territoriality of intellectual property rights and contains no specific rules on the coordination of parallel proceedings or the use of ASIs. The EU also failed to demonstrate that China’s ASI policy, as such, constituted an overreaching restriction on the rights confirmed under Articles 28.1 and 28.2. Accordingly, the panel found that the EU’s claims in this respect were unfounded.
With respect to Articles 41.1 and 44.1 of TRIPS, the panel likewise rejected the EU’s arguments. The panel reasoned that the “enforcement procedures” referred to in Article 41.1 are those procedures provided for in Part III of TRIPS that are initiated by right holders as applicants and are aimed at stopping, preventing, deterring, or remedying acts of infringement. China’s ASI policy does not itself fall within the scope of such “enforcement procedures” and therefore lies neither within the ambit of the first sentence of Article 41.1 nor under the constraint imposed by the second sentence concerning the avoidance of barriers to legitimate trade. As for Article 44.1, the panel held that the purpose of that provision is to require Members to empower their domestic judicial authorities to grant injunctions within their own territories, and that it does not extend to an obligation prohibiting Members from adopting measures that may affect whether courts in other jurisdictions grant injunctions. The EU’s reasoning tended toward treating all ASIs as a denial of injunctive relief per se, which goes beyond the ordinary meaning and systemic context of the provision; accordingly, the panel did not uphold the EU’s claims based on Article 44.1.
- Transparency Obligations and Article 2(A)(2) of the Accession Protocol
By contrast, the panel found China in breach of TRIPS transparency obligations. In relation to Xiaomi v. InterDigital, the panel noted that the ASI decision in that case, together with the decision on reconsideration, had been incorporated into the system of guiding cases published by Chinese courts and cited as an illustrative example in the work reports of provincial high people’s courts, indicating that the case possessed a certain degree of referential value for the adjudication of subsequent cases. On this basis, the panel considered that the decisions at issue constituted “judicial decisions of general application” within the meaning of Article 63.1 of TRIPS and should therefore have been made publicly available. Because the relevant decisions were not disclosed to the public, and because China was not prepared to provide the complete set of relevant decisions when the EU submitted information requests pursuant to Article 63.3 of TRIPS, the panel found that China had breached its transparency obligations in two respects: first, by failing to comply with the obligation under Article 63.1 to publish judicial decisions of general application; and second, by failing to comply with the first sentence of Article 63.3, which requires Members to be prepared to supply, upon written request by another Member, information of the type referred to in paragraph 1.
As regards the EU’s claim under Article 2(A)(2) of the Accession Protocol, alleging a failure to apply domestic law in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner,” the panel found that the EU had not demonstrated that Chinese courts had engaged in a systematic, non-uniform, unjust or unreasonable application of the Civil Procedure Law and relevant judicial interpretations in the ASI cases at issue. The evidentiary basis for this claim was therefore insufficient, and the panel declined to uphold it.
In sum, the panel’s conclusions may be summarized in three points. First, it confirmed the existence of an ASI policy attributable to China. Second, it found that the EU had failed to establish that this policy was inconsistent with Articles 28.1, 28.2, 41.1, or 44.1 of TRIPS, and, for reasons of judicial economy, it did not undertake separate substantive findings with respect to the five individual ASI decisions; likewise, it rejected the EU’s claims under Article 2(A)(2) of China’s Accession Protocol. Third, it determined that China had failed to comply with transparency obligations directly related to ASIs, specifically by not meeting the requirements under Article 63.1 and the first sentence of Article 63.3 of TRIPS
- The WTO Arbitration Award
- Initiation of the Arbitration Procedure under DSU Article 25
Against the backdrop of the Appellate Body’s continued non-functioning, the EU and China reached a special procedural arrangement during the panel proceedings, pursuant to Article 25 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). Under this arrangement, the parties agreed that, should either party appeal the panel report, the dispute would be submitted to arbitration within the framework of the MPIA. The agreed procedures were notified to WTO Members on 4 July 2023 (WT/DS611/7).
Following the issuance of the panel report, the EU appealed on core legal issues, including the interpretation of Article 1.1 of TRIPS and its relationship with Articles 28.1 and 28.2, while China filed a cross-appeal concerning the finding of an ASI policy and the panel’s conclusions on transparency. Pursuant to the special procedure, the MPIA arbitrators issued their award on 21 July 2025 (WT/DS611/ARB25).
- Reinterpretation of Article 1.1 and Article 28 of TRIPS and the Finding of Inconsistency
The arbitral tribunal upheld the panel’s finding that China maintains an “ASI policy,” rejecting China’s argument that the decisions at issue were merely isolated, case-specific rulings incapable of amounting to a general policy.
The award reasoned that Article 1.1 requires Members not only to implement TRIPS minimum standards domestically, but also to ensure that their measures do not deprive right holders of the practical ability to enjoy the patent rights guaranteed by TRIPS. In the arbitrators’ view, this requirement can operate as a constraint on measures that frustrate the exercise of TRIPS rights in other Members’ territories.
Applying that interpretation, the arbitrators found that China’s ASI policy, in the specific context of SEP disputes, effectively prevented or deterred SEP holders from enforcing their patent rights abroad, including by seeking injunctions. They considered this to be inconsistent with TRIPS Articles 28.1 and 28.2, read together with the first sentence of Article 1.1, and the panel’s finding of “no violation” on this point was therefore reversed.
- Overall Upholding of the Findings under Articles 44.1, 41.1, and 63 of TRIPS
With respect to Articles 44.1 and 41.1 of TRIPS, the arbitral tribunal largely upheld the panel’s conclusions. The award reasoned that the core function of Article 44.1 is to require Members to provide, within their domestic legal systems, an institutional basis for injunctive and similar relief. The EU failed to demonstrate that China’s ASI policy, as such, amounted to a denial of injunctive relief or an improper restriction thereof; accordingly, no violation of Article 44.1 was established. As regards Article 41.1, the tribunal concurred with the panel’s analysis, finding that the ASI policy does not itself constitute an “enforcement procedure” within the meaning of Part III of TRIPS, but rather an ancillary measure related to enforcement procedures, and therefore should not be directly subjected to review under the second sentence of Article 41.1.
The arbitrators upheld the panel’s findings on transparency under TRIPS Article 63. The arbitrators confirmed that the ASI decision in Xiaomi v. InterDigital, together with the decision on reconsideration, constituted “judicial decisions of general application” within the meaning of Article 63.1 of TRIPS, and that China’s failure to publish them amounted to a breach of that provision. The panel’s finding that China had violated the first sentence of Article 63.3 by not being prepared to provide the requested information to the EU remained in force, as it was not appealed, and thus formed part of the outcome of the dispute.
In sum, by incorporating the panel’s findings that were not appealed, the arbitral award produced the outcome of this dispute within the WTO framework. On the one hand, it found that China’s ASI policy, as a measure of general application, was inconsistent with the first sentence of Article 1.1 and with Articles 28.1 and 28.2 of TRIPS. On the other hand, it upheld the panel’s adverse conclusions on transparency, namely that China had breached Articles 63.1 and the first sentence of Article 63.3 of TRIPS by failing to publish and to provide the relevant judicial decisions to the EU. Pursuant to the special procedure agreed by the parties under DSU Article 25, the arbitral award, together with the panel findings that were not appealed, jointly constituted the final ruling in this case, recommending that China bring the ASI-related measures at issue into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.8
- Practical Implications: What DS611 Means for Cross-Border SEP Litigation
- Evolution of the Global Intellectual Property Governance Landscape Behind the Dispute
DS611 shows how procedural tools developed in national SEP litigation—such as ASIs—can become the subject of public international law scrutiny. For companies litigating FRAND issues globally, strategic choices on forum selection and interim relief may now carry WTO-law implications for the responding Member.
- The Spillover of SEP Disputes from Private Interest Conflicts to Public Interest Issues
The pronounced divergence between the WTO panel and the subsequent MPIA arbitral tribunal in their respective rulings highlights the evolving nature of SEP disputes. This shift indicates that SEP disputes have moved beyond inter-firm disagreements to become systemic issues involving the international coordination of judicial jurisdiction and the balancing of national economic interests. Courts in different jurisdictions seek to assert jurisdiction by issuing injunctions, giving rise to a “race for jurisdiction,”9 which, in essence, reflects a contest for discursive and normative influence in the formulation of international rules.
- Article 25 appeal arbitration (MPIA) as a viable path to finality
DS611 illustrates how DSU Article 25 appeal arbitration can provide a functioning appellate layer when the Appellate Body is unavailable. For WTO Members and stakeholders, MPIA practice may shape the development of trade and IP jurisprudence in the near term.
- Compliance and litigation-management signals: transparency and publication
On transparency, both the panel and the arbitrators emphasized publication obligations where judicial materials are treated as having broader referential value. For stakeholders, this increases the importance of monitoring how courts characterize and disseminate decisions on interim measures in SEP cases.
- China’s Responses and Developments in Judicial Practice
Following the award, China’s Ministry of Commerce publicly stated that China had noted the findings and would handle the matter in accordance with WTO rules. An official of the SPC stated that the so-called “ASI policy’’ has never existed. Public statements also emphasized that ASIs are a tool used in multiple jurisdictions and that China would continue to protect the legitimate rights and interests of right holders and implementers.
In the period after the dispute was initiated, publicly visible ASI practice in China appears more restrained, with fewer publicly reported SEP-related ASIs. At the same time, In Huawei v. Netgear in 2024, the SPC issued an anti–ASI, for the first time activating a judicial remedy directed against extraterritorial ASIs. This develop pment indicates that China is further enriching its toolkits in international intellectual property disputes, to better navigate the complex strategic contestation in this field.
- Practical Takeaways for Companies
DS611 strengthens arguments that overly broad ASIs (especially those backed by significant penalties) may be challenged as impairing patent rights under TRIPS Article 28 when used to restrain enforcement abroad. Early case assessment should therefore include the likelihood and scope of ASI/anti-ASI relief across jurisdictions, and the evidentiary record needed to address proportionality and necessity. Yet, DS611 does not eliminate the availability of ASIs as a litigation-management tool, but it increases legal risk around breadth and effect. Parties seeking FRAND determinations in China should pay close attention to how requested interim measures are framed, documented, and limited to what is necessary for the proceeding.
At the strategic level, it is essential to clarify core objectives: patent licensing litigation, antitrust actions, and other SEP-related proceedings are ultimately only means of dispute resolution, and leveraging the deterrent effect of litigation to gain bargaining power in commercial negotiations remains a key pathway to breaking deadlocks.
At the tactical level, given the global interconnectivity of SEP disputes, companies should engage in early and comprehensive planning of dispute resolution strategies, making full use of both cooperative and adversarial tools—including good-faith negotiations, litigation, injunctions, and even multilateral mechanisms such as the WTO—to safeguard their legitimate interests.
Note List
1. The provision states: “Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”
2. The provision states that: “A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.”
3. The provision states that: “Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.”
4. The provision states that: “The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after customs clearance. Members are not obliged to accord such authority in respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject matter would entail the infringement of an intellectual property right.”
5. The provision states that: “Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”
6. The provision states that: “Laws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made effective by a Member and pertaining to the subject matter of this Agreement (the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement and prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights) shall be published in a national language, or, where such publication is not practicable, made publicly available, in such a manner as to enable governments and right holders to become acquainted with them. Agreements concerning the subject matter of this Agreement which are in force between the government or a governmental agency of a Member and the government or a governmental agency of another Member shall also be published.”
7. The provision states that: “Each Member shall be prepared to supply, in response to a written request from another Member, information of the type referred to in paragraph 1. A Member having reason to believe that a specific judicial decision, administrative ruling or bilateral agreement in the field of intellectual property affects its rights under this Agreement may also request in writing to be given or made available sufficient details of such specific judicial decisions, administrative rulings or bilateral agreements.”
8. See World Trade Organization, China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, Award of the Arbitrators, WT/DS611/ARB25, 21 July 2025.
9. See King Fung Tsang & Jyh-An Lee, The Ping-Pong Olympics of Antisuit Injunctions in FRAND, 28 Michigan Technology Law Review 305, 315 (2022)..
