Mintz Project Analyst John B. McEachern contributed to this article.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced on January 14, 2026, increased jurisdictional thresholds for (1) notifications under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act), (2) the HSR Act filing fee schedule, and (3) the interlocking directorate thresholds under Section 8 of the Clayton Act.
Revised HSR Act Thresholds
The FTC revises these thresholds annually based on changes in the gross national product. The new thresholds will be effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register and will apply to all transactions closing on or after that date.
The HSR Act requires parties engaged in certain transactions (including mergers, joint ventures, exclusive licenses, and acquisitions of voting securities, assets, or non-corporate interests) to file an HSR notification and report form with the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and to observe the statutorily prescribed waiting period (usually 30 days, or 15 days in the case of cash tender offers and bankruptcy) prior to closing, if the parties meet “Size of Transaction” and “Size of Person” thresholds (absent any applicable exemptions).
A transaction is reportable if:
Revised Filing Fee Schedule
Revised Interlocking Directorate Thresholds
The FTC also approved Revised Jurisdiction thresholds for Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which, unlike the HSR Act thresholds, become effective upon publication in the Federal Register. Section 8 prohibits an officer or director of one firm from simultaneously serving as an officer or director of a competing firm if (1) each firm has capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $54,402,000; and (2) each corporation’s competitive sales are at least $5,440,200.
The FTC’s substantive changes to the HSR Rules,[1] effective February 10, 2025, place an emphasis on gathering additional information as part of the merger filing process to better inform the agencies of potential Section 8 violations. In addition, the agencies have evidenced an increased scrutiny of interlocking directorates through numerous policy statements and actions.[2]
It is therefore especially important in the current antitrust enforcement environment to monitor roles of a company’s officers and directors at other organizations.
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