The Michigan Court of Appeals recently issued a decision that considered the probate court’s power to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. In re Estate of Frieda Mae Chapman, 2026 WL 407397, Docket Nos. 373055 & 373058 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2026) (unpublished).
The case involved the Chapman family. Parents Leonard and Frieda had three sons, including Glenn and Christopher. Leonard and Frieda created their joint trust (the “Chapman Trust”), naming Christopher as both trustee and sole remainder beneficiary. Leonard predeceased Frieda. After Leonard’s death, Christopher served as power of attorney for Frieda. When Frieda died, Glenn was appointed as personal representative of her estate. Frieda owned certain financial accounts which were subject to beneficiary designations in favor of her sons in varying percentages. Those accounts paid out after Frieda’s death.
In Livingston County probate court, Glenn — as personal representative of Frieda’s estate (Petitioner) — filed his petition against Christopher as Trustee of the Chapman Trust, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Subsequently, Petitioner “moved for a constructive trust, alleging that after obtaining power of attorney in 2017, [Christopher] made numerous transfers of funds from Frieda’s financial accounts, … used the transferred funds for his personal use, and … facilitated Frieda’s change of the beneficiary designations of her financial accounts to increase [his] share while decreasing [Glenn’s] share.” Id. at 1. This first constructive trust motion apparently sought to freeze funds transferred to Christopher from Frieda’s accounts during her lifetime.
Petitioner then amended his petition to add claims of embezzlement, conversion, undue influence, conspiracy, unjust enrichment and fraud against Christopher. “Petitioner also moved for an accounting and a constructive trust of the funds [Christopher] received from the distribution of the financial account assets. … Petitioner argued that a constructive trust of the funds respondent had received was necessary to preserve the assets until [Christopher] could provide the probate court with an accounting.” Id. at 2.
Here, it seems that Petitioner filed another motion for preliminary relief — this time, entry of a constructive trust over the funds paid to Christopher as designated beneficiary of Frieda’s accounts. This second constructive trust motion apparently sought to freeze funds paid out to Christopher from Frieda’s accounts after her death.
The probate court held a hearing, ordered Christopher to account for his management of Frieda’s assets as power of attorney, and “ordered a constructive trust established and funded with the amounts identified in the petition unless it was demonstrated by an accounting or otherwise that the funds were properly distributed.” Id. The probate court denied Christopher’s motion for relief from the ruling, as did the Shiawassee County probate court after the proceeding was transferred there. Christopher appealed.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings by the two probate courts. “The probate court was well within its authority to impose a restraint on the funds in question while the proceedings were pending to determine the assets of the estate, which depended upon whether … [Christopher] had breached his fiduciary duty when exercising power of attorney over [Frieda’s] financial accounts, which presumably would be part of the estate if the beneficiary designations were determined to be fraudulent.” Id. at 4. Unfortunately, the appellate court cited no legal authority for its ruling.
The ruling seems problematic for several reasons. Petitioner should have moved for entry of a preliminary injunction freezing assets under MCL 700.1309, not a constructive trust. A constructive trust and a preliminary injunction are not interchangeable. A constructive trust is a remedy (a form of ultimate relief) that may be imposed based on a final determination on the merits that, as between two parties, the party in possession of a particular asset ought to be deemed to be holding the asset as constructive trustee for the benefit of the party not in possession. Here, no such final determination had been made, and so it was premature for the probate court to impose a constructive trust (which is not a form of preliminary relief).
Moreover, a constructive trust presupposes that the party alleged to be in possession is actually in possession of the specific asset that rightfully belongs to the party not in possession. If the party alleged to be in possession can prove that he no longer possesses the asset in question, then the court must look to other forms of relief, such as a money judgment. If the probate court decided to enter a preliminary injunction freezing assets, then it should have specifically ruled that it was freezing “cash received by Christopher from Frieda’s financial accounts during her lifetime or upon her death.”
Instead, the probate court imposed a constructive trust over “the amounts identified in the petition,” apparently meaning any cash in Christopher’s possession in the amounts claimed by the Petitioner, regardless of the source of the cash. It appears that Christopher’s general assets were frozen so that Petitioner, if successful, would be able to satisfy either a constructive trust or a money judgment. Christopher’s assets should only have been frozen to the extent that they constituted, or were directly traceable to, the specific assets claimed by Petitioner.
In sum, the court could have entered a preliminary injunction to prohibit disposition of those directly traceable to Frieda’s living estate or decedent’s estate and implicated by Petitioner’s claims, but it could not generally prohibit Christopher from disposing of his other assets.
