On March 23, Judge Stengel in the Eastern District of PA denied an employer’s motion to dismiss a Title VII case filed by an employee claiming discrimination and harassment based on her appearance and perceived sexual orientation. Ellingsworth v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., No. 16-3187 (E.D.P.A. Mar. 23, 2017).

The plaintiff, a woman who lived with her husband and was not gay, claimed that her supervisor harassed her by, among other things, telling plaintiff she “dresses like a dyke,” badgering her to show her “lesbian tattoo” to coworkers, and informing coworkers that plaintiff was a lesbian. In its motion, the employer argued that the complaint should be dismissed because Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. The court ultimately denied the employer’s motion by holding that gender stereotyping—not sexual orientation—was the real issue in the case, and that Title VII’s “because of sex” language clearly encompasses employers’ subjectively held gender stereotypes. In doing so, the court also held that the employer’s “ultra-hyper focus” on sexual orientation “ignores the broader impact of Title VII’s ‘because of sex’ language,” which prohibits, among other things, discrimination based on failure to conform to an employer’s idea of how a woman should look, act, or dress. In reaching its conclusions, the court relied in part on the 2016 EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center decision from the Western District of PA which went one step further than Ellingsworth by expressly holding that gender stereotyping necessarily encompasses the employer’s views on the propriety of an individual’s sexual preference. 

Judge Stengel’s opinion notes the Supreme Court’s “increasingly broad view” of Title VII’s protection against discrimination “because of sex.” The Ellingsworth decision is one of several recent federal court opinions echoing the notion that Title VII may soon be—if it is not already—interpreted to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, and the like.