The recent unanimous California Supreme Court opinion in Whitehead v. City of Oakland addressed the permissible scope of pre-event liability releases under Government Code §835 in cases involving injuries on public property.[i] For race organizers, municipalities, and athletes participating in cycling events, Whitehead reinforces some boundaries while raising questions about others.
In Whitehead, a cyclist riding through Oakland during a sanctioned bike ride struck a defect in the pavement, sustaining injuries. Prior to the ride, the cyclist had signed a liability waiver. Government Code §835 imposes a statutory duty on public entities to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition and California Civil Code §1668 bars contracts that exempt parties from liability for violation of statutory law. At its core, Whitehead held the waiver was unenforceable as to his §835 claim because such claims are grounded in statutory duties—not mere common law negligence.
Whitehead confirms liability waivers remain enforceable as to ordinary negligence claims, including those against private event organizers and contractors who do not owe duties under §835. As such, a release signed prior to a cycling event may still bar a claim for common law negligence, unless the conduct rises to a level of gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct.
Whitehead emphasized the enforceability of a waiver may also turn on how the cyclist used the roadway. If the use of the public way was “non-ordinary”—such as an Olympic-style triathlon cycling event or an aircraft landing—the court might view the risk as voluntarily assumed under contract,[ii] leaving the waiver enforceable.[iii]
Many potential scenarios lead to open questions. Suppose a triathlon allows cyclists to engage in “drafting” (riding within inches of each other at high speeds so one cyclist can pass another). Is that ordinary use? Will the release still bar claims if one rider crashes into a pothole the city failed to repair? Whitehead suggests the waiver would be enforceable, since §835 was not designed to provide protection in that situation. The Whitehead opinion provides no categorical rule.
The opinion also leaves unresolved what other statutory or regulatory duties might limit enforceability of liability releases. Hypothetically, if a local building code required a handrail at “race headquarters” and a cyclist fell due to its absence, could a signed release still bar recovery? Likely not, based on the cases cited in the majority opinion with approval.[iv]
Similarly, imagine a race permit issued by a public agency required race organizers to deploy traffic cones, temporary signage, and sworn officers until all riders cleared the course. If either the contractor or public agency (provider of the sworn officers) removed protections early, a release might not defeat a negligence claim premised on violation of those duties derived from regulation, statute, and permit.
Takeaways
In short, while Whitehead reaffirms the viability of certain pre-event waivers as tools for managing risk in cycling events, they are not absolute shields—particularly when public property and statutory safety obligations are involved. Organizers and their counsel should carefully distinguish between common law and statutory duties and monitor developing case law in this evolving space.
Sources
[i] Whitehead v. City of Oakland (2025) 17 Cal.5th 735.
[ii] Whitehead v. City of Oakland (2025) 17 Cal.5th 735, 754, where Justice Kruger’s concurring opinion notes “The conditions that make a road safe for ordinary use may not be the same as the conditions that make the road safe for landing a plane … or, say, holding the cycling leg of the Olympic triathlon.”
[iii] Id. at p. 748, explaining Whitehead “was riding his bike on an open road, using the lane – as a member of the general public might – for its intended purpose”. Whitehead was not involved in “a competitive race on a closed course.” The Court distinguished “bicycle racing” from “riding a bicycle on paved pathways”.
[iv] Id. at p. 743, citing “violation of a municipal code ordinance” as ground for application of section 1668 to set aside an exculpatory clause in a commercial lease. Same page – citing “general industry safety order” as a law that allowed invocation of section 1668. Same page – citing “code violations” as grounds for invoking section 1668.
