When lawyers think of “forum shopping,” they typically envision the strategic selection of a favorable state or circuit. Last Term, the Supreme Court addressed a more unusual form of the practice. Although plaintiffs may initially select a state forum, defendants may remove cases that present certain federal issues to federal court. But what if the plaintiff then amends their complaint to delete the federal issue that justified removal? Do these post-removal amendments erase federal jurisdiction and compel remand to state court, putting the plaintiff back in control of the forum? Or does the complaint at the time of removal control?
For years, those questions were largely settled. Circuits had long agreed that federal question jurisdiction was determined by the complaint at the time of removal. Plaintiffs could not eliminate removal jurisdiction simply by amending their complaint to delete federal claims or issues. The Supreme Court appeared to have taken the same view in a 2007 footnote, explaining such tactics would “raise forum-manipulation concerns.” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 n.6 (2007).
That all changed last January. In Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025), a consumer brought federal and state law claims against a dog food manufacturer in Missouri state court. After the defendant removed the case, the plaintiff amended her complaint to eliminate the federal claims and moved to remand. She argued that her amendments extinguished both federal question jurisdiction and any supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. In an unexpected move, the Eighth Circuit agreed, breaking with the other circuits and creating a lopsided split that the Supreme Court agreed to review.
The Court unanimously affirmed, holding that plaintiffs have the power to compel remand by excising federal claims from their complaints. As Justice Kagan’s opinion explained, an amended complaint “supersedes” the old one. When a plaintiff deletes certain allegations or claims from their complaint, those issues are no longer part of the case. No more federal claims, no more federal jurisdiction.
As the Court acknowledged, this new rule allows plaintiffs to reassert control over the forum in certain cases. Several circuits have confronted these scenarios in the year since Royal Canin was decided, teasing out the fact patterns that plaintiffs may be able to exploit and that defendants should be ready for.
First, the Ninth Circuit recently held that plaintiffs could defeat the removal of certain class actions by striking the class allegations from their complaints. The Class Action Fairness Act supplies federal jurisdiction over state-law class actions that are large enough to meet several statutory requirements. In Faulk v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 159 F.4th 618 (9th Cir. 2025), the defendants removed a class action under CAFA, which prompted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to “excise” the class allegations. In the past, these post-removal amendments would not have compelled remand, as the Ninth Circuit (and several others) had held. See, e.g., Broadway Grill, Inc. v. Visa Inc., 856 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 2017); In Touch Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco P’ship, 788 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2010). But under Royal Canin, the amended complaint controlled. Because it no longer brought a class action, the case fell outside the scope of CAFA—and eliminated federal jurisdiction.
The Fourth Circuit similarly concluded that plaintiffs could compel remand by limiting the scope of their state-law claims to avoid the reach of federal preclusion statutes. One of these statutes is the Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act, which prohibits plaintiffs from bringing certain state-law class actions involving nationally traded securities. It also permits defendants who face such claims to remove the case to federal court, which then decides whether the claims are barred by SLUSA. In Black v. Mantei & Associates, Ltd., 145 F.4th 528 (4th Cir. 2025), the defendant did just that, removing a suit that brought securities misrepresentation claims under South Carolina law. The plaintiff amended his complaint to disclaim any allegations or damages in connection with a covered security. Once again, some circuits would previously have found such amendments ineffective to alter federal jurisdiction. See Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir. 2002). But as the Fourth Circuit recognized, Royal Canin compelled the opposite result. The amended complaint controlled for purposes of removal jurisdiction, and it no longer fell within the scope of SLUSA.
More scenarios like these are sure to reach the courts of appeals in the coming years. One question that may soon arise relates to fraudulent joinder. This doctrine allows a defendant to remove a case under diversity jurisdiction even if complete diversity is lacking, so long as the defendant can show that the non-diverse parties were added as a “sham.” Courts typically find this test met when the plaintiff has “no possibility” of imposing liability on the disputed party. But in order to assess that “no possibility” standard, courts have traditionally looked to the complaint at “the time the petition for removal was filed.” Hogan v. Raymond Corp., 536 F. App’x 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2013); Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1995). Appellate courts may soon have to confront how that rule squares with Royal Canin’s pronouncement that the amended complaint “supersedes” the removed one for jurisdictional purposes.
Another lurking issue relates to a notable footnote from Royal Canin. What if a case is removed under diversity jurisdiction, but the plaintiff then amends their complaint to reduce the amount-in-controversy below the statutory threshold of $75,000? One might think that such amendments would also destroy diversity jurisdiction, since the amended complaint’s lower value would “supersede” the original one. But as the Court explained, certain jurisdictional facts, such as a party’s citizenship, are treated as immutable; they are fixed at the time a suit is commenced. The Court recognized that amount-in-controversy fit that mold as well. Because the value of a suit concerns a “fact on the ground,” post-removal amendments to it cannot eliminate diversity jurisdiction. Time will tell whether this footnote gains any traction in future disputes over removal jurisdiction. Defendants may well find other “facts on the ground” that are similarly fixed at the time of filing and immune to post-removal amendments. But whatever the implications of that footnote, appellate courts and litigants are already feeling the impact of Royal Canin, with post-removal amendments already proving their ability to compel remand in a variety of scenarios.
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