Background: From the Trial Court to the Appeal
Diego Pavia’s journey to a NCAA Division I starting quarterback position was anything but conventional. After leading his junior college (JUCO) team to a national championship, Pavia transferred to first one, then a second, Division I school. By 2024, Pavia became a breakout star in the SEC, leading his school to a historic win and drawing attention from NFL scouts. He also began receiving lucrative offers tied to his name, image, and likeness, yet his eligibility was in doubt.
The NCAA’s “JUCO Rule” requires athletes to count junior college seasons toward the four-season cap on athletic competition, commonly referred to as the “five-year-rule.” Pavia had played two years in JUCO, the first of which, the 2020 season, was not counted toward the five-year-rule because the NCAA had granted a waiver to all student athletes to exclude the 2020 season due to Covid. Pavia’s second JUCO season, along with three in Division I, meant that per NCAA rules, his eligibility was exhausted following the 2024 season. Pavia responded with a lawsuit under the Sherman Antitrust Act, arguing that the NCAA’s rule unlawfully restricted competition in the labor market for college athletes.
The trial court granted him a preliminary injunction, blocking the NCAA from enforcing the JUCO Rule against him for the 2025 season and preventing it from punishing his current school under its restitution rule. That ruling ensured that Pavia could play in the short term. The NCAA appealed, hoping to reverse the injunction and reaffirm its control over eligibility rules. But before the Sixth Circuit could issue a decision, the NCAA announced a blanket waiver allowing all athletes in Pavia’s situation to play the 2025 season.
The Legal Arguments on Appeal
The appeal centered on whether the district court had overstepped by granting relief that let Pavia play despite the NCAA’s eligibility rules. The NCAA argued that the injunction was unnecessary, while Pavia maintained that the JUCO Rule violated antitrust law by restraining competition among athletes and schools.
Both sides also sparred over whether the case was moot. Pavia insisted that appellate review would influence the course of his broader lawsuit, which sought to extend his eligibility into 2026. The NCAA countered that allowing the injunction to stand could embolden further challenges to its rules. In the end, both attempted to claim that their disputes fell into the narrow exception for issues “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The court, however, was unconvinced.
The Sixth Circuit’s Ruling
The Sixth Circuit ultimately dismissed the NCAA’s appeal as moot. Because Pavia already had the relief he sought — a guarantee to play in 2025 — the court concluded that no further ruling could provide “effectual relief” because what the NCAA was appealing was the injunction — which it itself had effectively mooted by granting the blanket waiver. The court reasoned that regardless of the outcome of the NCAA’s appeal, Pavia would remain on the field for the 2025 season, and the restitution rule was irrelevant because he was not playing in violation of NCAA policy.
The court also explained why the usual exceptions to mootness did not apply. Challenges to NCAA eligibility rules are not so fleeting as to escape review entirely; indeed, other circuits have issued decisions on similar rules within the span of an athletic season. Nor was there a reasonable expectation that Pavia himself would be subject to the same rule again, since his challenge for the 2026 season presented a distinct and different question. And although the doctrine of “voluntary cessation” can sometimes prevent defendants from mooting a case by changing course mid-litigation, the court noted that neither party had raised that argument in their briefing.
Finally, the court refused to vacate the district court’s injunction under the Munsingwear rule. Because it was the NCAA’s own waiver that mooted the case, it could not wipe away the injunction it sought to challenge.
Broader Implications
Although the ruling turned on mootness rather than the merits, the concurring opinions made clear that the legal questions at the heart of Pavia’s case remain very much alive. Judge Thapar emphasized the unsettled nature of antitrust law as applied to NCAA eligibility rules. He noted that courts have yet to fully examine whether rules like the JUCO Rule operate as unlawful restraints of trade, and he called for a more complete evidentiary record on market effects and justifications.
Judge Hermandorfer, meanwhile, focused on the real-world impact of the JUCO Rule in the labor market for Division I football players. He highlighted that excluding experienced JUCO players like Pavia from competition may depress overall wages and opportunities in a market where the NCAA already wields monopsony power.
Both opinions pointed to the broader uncertainty facing the NCAA in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021) and the rise of NIL compensation.
Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling did not settle the legality of the JUCO Rule, but by dismissing the appeal as moot, the court left intact the preliminary injunction and cleared the way for Pavia’s broader challenge to proceed. Pavia’s complaint before the district court remains pending, and he will likely continue to press his claim that he should be permitted to play another season in 2026.
For now, Pavia plays on. But looming ahead is a deeper question: whether eligibility rules, like compensation rules before them, will survive increasing antitrust scrutiny.
