The U.S. Department of State (“State”) announced an update to its miliary drone export review policy on September 15, 2025, pursuant to which advanced unmanned aerial systems (“UAS”) will be subject to an export control policy similar to that of crewed aircraft, rather than more restrictive review applicable to missiles. Key takeaways include:
1. Policy Shift: Drones Reviewed Like Fighter Jets, Not Missiles
State announced that pursuant to the policy change, it will consider requests to export UAS similarly to how it reviews requests to export crewed fighter aircraft, rather than as missile systems. This marks a departure from the longstanding application of the Missile Technology Control Regime (“MTCR”) to exports of certain UAS, which imposed a strong presumption against the transfer of large, weaponizable drones due to their range and payload capabilities and provided for rigorous review of other UAS transfers.
Although the policy may still be taking shape, the upshot of State’s announcement may be that under the new approach, advanced military drones, such as “Reaper”-style systems, will be reviewed for export in a manner similar to fighter jets, streamlining the process and enabling more routine sales to trusted foreign partners.
2. Background: The MTCR and Export Control Laws
Defense articles are controlled for export under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”), which are administered by State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, although exports through the U.S. government’s Foreign Military Sales (“FMS”) channel generally are exempt from ITAR licensing requirements. In an FMS transaction, the U.S. government itself sells defense articles to foreign governments and international organizations, as compared to direct commercial sales of defense articles by private defense contractors, which generally are subject to ITAR licensing requirements unless an exemption applies.
The MTCR is not itself a set of export control regulations that is directly applicable to exporters. Rather, it is a multilateral export control regime whereby various member state participants agree to control the same items (as listed in the MTCR Annex) and apply the same export review guidelines (as set out in the MTCR Guidelines). The guidelines provide for rigorous review of requests to export items listed in the annex and, with respect to highly controlled “Category I” items, provide for a strong presumption of denial. Furthermore, under the ITAR, exemption availability for MTCR-listed items is very limited.
3. Effort to Streamline FMS and Enhance U.S. Competitiveness
The policy shift appears intended to accelerate and simplify the sale of advanced U.S. military drones to allied governments through the FMS channel, reducing timelines and increasing predictability for buyers and industry. This is part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to reform the FMS process, as announced in a presidential executive order in April 2025.
Under the new approach, U.S. manufacturers may be poised to benefit from improved competitiveness against foreign suppliers, particularly those from Israel, China, and Turkey, which have emerged as significant competitors in this space.
4. Scope and Coverage: Focus on Large, Armed UAS
While officials did not specify which models would qualify under the revised process, reports suggest the change primarily affects large, armed military drones with significant endurance and payload capacity. In particular, a likely subject is UAS “specially designed to incorporate a defense article” as identified in Category VIII(a)(5) of the U.S. Munitions List (“USML”) under the ITAR, which applies MTCR control to UAS with a range of 300 km or more.
Notably, the new State policy does not alter any USML listings or the scope of any ITAR controls applicable to UAS, nor does it alter controls on non-military UAS, which remain subject to U.S. Department of Commerce jurisdiction under the Export Administration Regulations.
It remains to be seen how the policy will affect restrictions on loitering munitions or other missile-like systems.
5. Continued Safeguards: Nonproliferation, Human Rights, and Oversight
Despite the more permissive posture, all transfers remain subject to case-by-case review under the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer (“CAT”) Policy. Key considerations include national security, regional stability, human rights, law-of-war compliance, and the risk of misuse or diversion.
6. Geopolitical and Market Implications
The policy seems poised to unlock or accelerate sales to U.S. partners, supporting U.S. objectives to strengthen allied intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (“ISR”), and strike capabilities. This is particularly relevant for NATO allies facing increased drone threats and for partners seeking to modernize their defense capabilities.
The move may also foster interoperability, training, and accountability among U.S. allies, embedding U.S. oversight into the operation and sustainment of transferred systems.
7. Implementation and Open Questions
While the policy shift is clear at a strategic level, several implementation details remain unresolved, including the precise technical parameters for covered systems, the treatment of enabling subsystems, and the calibration of authorization timelines. Furthermore, the response of MTCR partners and foreign competitors to the U.S. reinterpretation of export controls is yet to be seen and may influence the broader nonproliferation landscape.
Overall, State’s decision to shift away from MTCR-based review of UAS represents a potentially significant development. The change is designed to facilitate faster, more predictable sales to trusted partners while maintaining robust nonproliferation and human rights safeguards. It will be important to monitor State’s implementation of the policy in the months ahead.
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