What Chilutti v. Uber Means for Arbitration Strategy in Pennsylvania

Blank Rome Appellate Insights: Winning on Appeal

1. Introduction

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s latest decision has delivered a meaningful win for businesses relying on arbitration agreements. By holding that orders compelling arbitration are not immediately appealable, the decision bolsters the efficiency that arbitration is meant to provide and reduces the risk of procedural delays. However, the ruling also leaves in place the Superior Court’s heightened scrutiny standard for online arbitration clauses, which may challenge the enforceability of existing terms of service. Companies should keep in mind that they still face a certain degree of uncertainty in online contracting, and may expect judicial scrutiny in the months ahead.

2. Procedural History

In September 2020, Shannon and Keith Chilutti filed a negligence action in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas after Ms. Chilutti (a wheelchair user) was injured during an Uber wheelchair-accessible vehicle (“WAV”) ride. Uber petitioned to compel arbitration, arguing that when the Chiluttis initially enrolled in Uber, they agreed to arbitrate the claims they presented in their complaint. On April 26, 2021, the trial court granted Uber’s petition and stayed the court proceedings pending arbitration.

The Chiluttis appealed. In a published opinion, a divided en banc Superior Court first held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, reasoning that an order compelling common-law arbitration (as opposed to statutory arbitration) was separable, implicated rights too important to be denied review, and risked irreparable loss because post‑award review of common‑law arbitration is “very limited” under 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341. Relying on Sage v. Greenspan, the Court concluded a party may be unable to obtain vacatur merely because an arbitrator enforced an invalid arbitration clause, since misapplication of law is not “fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other irregularity.” (emphasis added).

On the merits, however, the Superior Court reversed, holding the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate and remanding to the trial court. Judge Stabile penned a dissent, which Judges Olsen and Sullivan joined, arguing that the trial court's order did not qualify as a collateral order because any challenge to arbitration could be fully reviewed after final judgment. Construing the collateral order doctrine narrowly, Judge Stabile maintained that, although the Sage court applied a “very limited” standard of review regarding common law arbitration, that limitation did not apply when a party claimed that there was no agreement to arbitrate at all. Relying on Civan v. Windermere Farms, the dissent emphasized that a court could always vacate an award if the parties were compelled to arbitrate without an actual agreement, or if the award was unjust or unconscionable. For that reason, the dissent maintained, postponing review would not cause irreparable harm, and the appeal should have been quashed.

3. Decision and Impact

On January 21, 2026, in a long-awaited opinion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sided with Uber, holding that the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and staying litigation does not constitute an immediately appealable collateral order. The Court emphasized that all three prongs of the collateral order doctrine must be clearly satisfied, with particular focus on “irreparable loss.” The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs would retain the ability to challenge the arbitration order after final judgment, which did not deprive them of appellate review. Further, the Court rejected the argument that potential litigation costs satisfy the irreparability requirement, noting that “[i]f expenditure of resources when such expenditure could be avoided through an interlocutory appeal sufficed for [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure] 313 purposes, then every interlocutory order presumably would satisfy the irreparable loss prong of the collateral order rule. The exception would devour the rule.” In contrast to the permissive language in the Superior Court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that Section 7341’s “very limited” review applies to awards, rather than to trial court orders compelling arbitration, and that arbitrability can be challenged de novo on appeal from the final judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to quash the appeal.

4. Impact on Online Arbitration Agreements

While the Supreme Court resolved the procedural question, its decision left the substantive enforceability issues raised by the Superior Court unresolved. The 2023 en banc Superior Court opinion had created uniquely heightened standards for securing consumer assent to online arbitration agreements. The Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if (1) the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial; and (2) when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver itself is at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. As the Superior Court acknowledged, these were “stricter burdens” than even the Ninth Circuit has imposed.

Because the Supreme Court vacated the lower en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds without commenting on the merits, the Superior Court’s reasoning (although no longer binding) stands as the last meaningful appellate assessment of browsewrap arbitration agreements in Pennsylvania. Since the Supreme Court did not reject the Superior Court’s analysis, judges evaluating motions to compel arbitration may treat Chilutti as persuasive authority and apply its enforceability test, at least until the Supreme Court agrees to take up the issue again.

5. Conclusion

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision confirms that orders compelling arbitration are not immediately appealable as collateral orders. For business defendants, this means less risk of prolonged litigation over arbitration clauses; for plaintiffs, it underscores the importance of raising all relevant arguments at the trial court level and being prepared to challenge arbitration orders only after the conclusion of arbitration and entry of final judgment.

However, companies should remain vigilant regarding the enforceability of their online arbitration agreements. Pennsylvania courts have continued applying Chilutti’s heightened standards in subsequent cases.

Blank Rome’s appellate and business litigation lawyers will continue to monitor Chilutti’s impact as it develops.

This article is one in a series of articles written for Blank Rome Appellate Insights: Winning on Appeal - March 2026.

1. Chilutti v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2026 WL 156181, at *1 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (“Chilutti II”).
2. See Chilutti v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“Chilutti I”).
3. Id. at 438.
4. Id. at 455 (Stabile, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 455–56 (Stabile, J., dissenting).
6. Chilutti II, 2026 WL 156181, at *1.
7. Id. at *4.
8. Id. at *6.
9. Id. at *7 (quoting J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d 425, 442-43 (Pa. 2023) (Wecht, J., concurring)).
10. Id. at *5–6.
11. Id.
12. Chilutti I, 300 A.3d at 449–50.
13. Id. at 450.
14. Id. at 449–50.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (Pa. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cty. Mar. 24, 2025) (invoking Chilutti to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen); Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 2025 WL 307623, at *8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2025) (holding that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti”).

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