


CANADIAN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

FAQs and 2019 Trends



Blakes
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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION..... 1

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CANADIAN PUBLIC M&A..... 2

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. Who regulates trading in securities in Canada? | 2 |
| 2. How are Canadian public issuers typically acquired? | 2 |
| 3. We're considering investing in a Canadian public issuer. At what stage would we have to publicly disclose our investment? | 4 |
| 4. We're considering increasing our stake in a Canadian public issuer. At what stage would we have to make a public take-over bid? | 5 |
| 5. What can we do to avoid triggering the take-over bid requirements? | 5 |
| 6. If we approach a Canadian public issuer about a possible M&A transaction, when would that transaction need to be publicly disclosed? | 5 |
| 7. Should we expect the target board to insist on an auction? | 6 |
| 8. Are there special protections under Canadian securities laws for minority shareholders in Canadian M&A transactions? | 6 |
| 9. Are defences to unsolicited take-over bids available to target boards? | 7 |
| 10. Can a significant securityholder enter into an agreement to agree to vote in favour of our plan of arrangement or tender to our bid? Can we offer any inducements to vote or tender? | 8 |
| 11. When a friendly deal has been negotiated, what deal protection measures are commonly used in Canada? | 9 |
| 12. What types of M&A transactions are subject to Canada's antitrust law? | 9 |
| 13. If the transaction is subject to Canada's antitrust law review, what is the test for challenging the transaction? | 11 |
| 14. Does Canada have rules restricting M&A transactions by non-Canadians? | 11 |
| 15. What is the Cooperative National Securities Regulation Framework? | 13 |

2019 TRENDS IN CANADIAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE M&A..... 14

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. Volatility | 14 |
| 2. Cannabis..... | 15 |
| 3. Relations with China | 16 |
| 4. United States Cross-Border Transactions | 17 |
| 5. Mining | 18 |
| 6. Oil and Gas..... | 19 |
| 7. Private Equity Firms and Pension Funds | 19 |
| 8. Hostile Take-Over Bids..... | 20 |

INTRODUCTION

Our *Canadian Mergers and Acquisitions: FAQs and 2019 Trends* answers frequently asked questions regarding the regulation of public M&A in Canada and provides an outlook for what 2019 may hold based on significant developments we observed from the Canadian deal environment in 2018.

Despite headwinds such as turbulent stock markets, struggling oil prices and global political and economic uncertainty, much of which could continue in 2019, global M&A aggregate value once again surpassed US\$3-trillion in 2018 and showed some recovery from the lower levels of activity experienced in 2017. Canadian M&A activity was also strong, driven in part by highly active private equity firms and pension funds and a surging Canadian-cannabis industry.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CANADIAN PUBLIC M&A

1

Who regulates trading in securities in Canada?

Trading in securities, including in M&A transactions, is largely regulated through securities legislation enacted by each of the provinces and territories. Each provincial or territorial securities act creates and empowers a provincial or territorial securities regulator to enforce such laws. These regulators have enacted a number of national, multilateral and local rules and policies that, among other things, seek to harmonize the application of certain aspects of securities laws across the country, including in relation to M&A transactions. In addition, companies whose securities are listed for trading on a stock exchange in Canada are subject to rules imposed by such stock exchange.

2

How are Canadian public issuers typically acquired?

Canadian public companies are typically acquired by way of either a plan of arrangement or take-over bid. A plan of arrangement is akin to a U.S. merger transaction with the addition of court supervision. “Friendly” M&A transactions are usually structured as plans of arrangement, with take-over bids being principally used for unsupported or “hostile” transactions. In preparing the annual *Blakes Canadian Public M&A Deal Study*, we found that over 90 per cent of the friendly transactions reviewed in recent years were completed by way of a plan of arrangement, with the other deals being completed by way of a take-over bid or a non-arrangement shareholder-approved structure, such as an amalgamation.



Plan of Arrangement

A plan of arrangement is a shareholder and court-approved transaction governed by the corporate legislation of the target. An arrangement practically requires the target's involvement and support but is subject to a less prescriptive regulatory regime than a take-over bid.

The parties to a plan of arrangement generally enter into a definitive transaction document known as an "arrangement agreement" setting out the basis for the combination, which is followed by an application to a provincial court for approval of the process for completing the transaction. The court order will require the calling of a target shareholders' meeting (typically held 45 to 90 days after an arrangement agreement is entered into), specify the approval threshold (typically two-thirds of the votes cast at the meeting) and provide for the grant of dissent rights to target shareholders. A meeting circular providing information regarding the transaction will then be sent to target shareholders. Where the offered consideration includes securities of the offeror, the circular must contain prospectus-level disclosure regarding the offeror's business and financial results. The meeting circular is not subject to any regulatory pre-clearance review.

Arrangements have a number of advantages over take-over bids. Most significantly, a plan of arrangement provides for the acquisition of 100 per cent of the target's shares in a single step without the need for a second-step transaction, can facilitate dealing with multiple classes of securities (particularly convertible instruments) as part of the transaction and, if securities of the offeror are to be offered to U.S. shareholders of the target, provides an exemption under U.S. securities laws from the requirement to register such securities.

Take-Over Bid

Unlike plans of arrangement, take-over bids may be made with or without the agreement of the target. If the bid is successful, a "second-step" transaction is required in order to acquire 100 per cent of the target shares (in connection with which dissent rights will be applicable).

Canadian securities legislation contains detailed procedural and substantive requirements applicable to non-exempt take-over bids governing such things as required disclosure, timing, conditionality, share purchases outside of the bid and rules applicable to deposit, withdrawal and take-up. The offeror must prepare a take-over bid circular that sets out prescribed information about the offer and the parties, including securityholdings and past dealings by the offeror and related parties in securities of the target, the nature of any financing relating to the bid and prospectus-level disclosure regarding the offeror if the bid consideration includes offeror securities. Unlike a meeting circular for an arrangement, a take-over bid circular mailed to securityholders in Quebec must also be prepared in the French language. In addition, the board of directors of the target issuer must deliver its own circular to target securityholders in response to the bid.

Certain amendments to the take-over bid rules came into effect in 2016, harmonizing the take-over bid regime across Canada and, among other things, providing target boards with additional time and discretion when responding to a take-over bid — bids must now remain open for at least 105 days (an increase from 35 days), unless the target board waives that minimum in favour of a shorter period (not less than 35 days) or unless the target enters into certain alternative transactions in response to the bid (in which case the period moves to 35 days).

3

We're considering investing in a Canadian public issuer. At what stage would we have to publicly disclose our investment?

There are two regimes that require disclosure of a holding in a Canadian public issuer: early warning reporting and insider reporting.

Under the early warning regime, the acquisition of, or ability to exercise control or direction over, 10 per cent or more of the voting or equity securities of a Canadian public issuer must be promptly publicly disclosed via press release and regulatory filing. Subsequent acquisitions or dispositions while above the 10 per cent threshold of two per cent or more of voting or equity securities must also be disclosed, including when ownership levels fall below the 10 per cent reporting threshold. However, once below the 10 per cent threshold, subsequent disclosure is required only where an acquisition again results in securityholdings at or above the 10 per cent threshold. Notably, the early warning disclosure threshold is reduced to five per cent for so long as a take-over bid or issuer bid is outstanding. Eligible institutional investors can avail themselves of an alternative reporting regime.

In addition, upon acquiring or obtaining control or direction over 10 per cent or more of the voting securities of a Canadian public issuer, the offeror becomes an “insider” of that issuer. As a result, the offeror is required to report in a publicly searchable database its holding of, as well as any subsequent trades in, securities of the issuer.

Offerors must also be aware of Canadian “pre-bid integration rules,” designed to ensure that all of a target’s securityholders are treated equally in the context of a take-over bid. The rules “integrate” pre-bid purchases by an offeror (other than qualifying purchases made over a stock exchange) by requiring, among other things, that consideration offered under any subsequent formal bid by the offeror be at least equal to the consideration paid in any such purchases made within the 90 days preceding the formal bid.

4

We're considering increasing our stake in a Canadian public issuer. At what stage would we have to make a public take-over bid?

Any offer to acquire outstanding voting or equity securities made to anyone in Canada that would result in the offeror holding 20 per cent or more of the voting or equity securities of any class of a Canadian public issuer will constitute a take-over bid for Canadian securities law purposes. As a result, unless an exemption from the formal take-over bid requirements is applicable, the offer would be required to be made to all securityholders of the class in Canada on the same terms and conditions.

5

What can we do to avoid triggering the take-over bid requirements?

Exemptions from the take-over bid rules are available in certain circumstances. One of the most commonly used exemptions is the "private agreement" exemption, under which purchases may be made by way of private agreements with five or fewer vendors without complying with the requirement to make an offer to all securityholders of the class). Canadian laws exempt such purchases only if the purchase price (including brokerage fees and commissions) does not exceed 115 per cent of the market price of the securities.

6

If we approach a Canadian public issuer about a possible M&A transaction, when would that transaction need to be publicly disclosed?

Canadian public issuers are required to promptly disclose any "material changes" in their affairs. Material changes are changes in the business, operations or capital of an issuer that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of its securities. This concept includes a decision by either the board of the issuer to implement such a change or senior management if they believe that approval of the board is probable.

Preliminary discussions and conditional proposals where material terms have not been agreed are not generally viewed as disclosable, and in most cases, public issuers do not announce a transaction until a definitive agreement in respect of the transaction has been entered into. However, any determination of the existence of a material change is highly fact-specific and needs to be carefully considered in the context of a specific transaction.

7

Should we expect the target board to insist on an auction?

A board of a target company is not required to hold an auction before entering into an agreement for the sale of the company and often will enter into such agreements without an auction. However, a target board may determine that conducting an auction or a more limited market check before entering into an M&A transaction is in the best interests of the corporation and proceed on that basis.

8

Are there special protections under Canadian securities laws for minority shareholders in Canadian M&A transactions?

In addition to certain remedies available to minority target shareholders under Canadian corporate laws, securities regulators in some Canadian jurisdictions have adopted specific protections for minority target securityholders in certain categories of M&A transactions that are capable of being abusive or unfair to minority shareholders, such as insider bids and related-party transactions. The protections include enhanced disclosure obligations and, subject to certain prescribed exemptions, requirements to obtain a formal valuation of target shares (and any non-cash consideration to be provided) prepared by an independent valuator and, in the case of shareholder-approved transactions such as arrangements, a separate “majority of the minority” approval by target shareholders. A subset of such categories of transactions that staff of the applicable securities regulators perceive as giving rise to material conflict of interest concerns are subject to enhanced regulatory scrutiny and expectations. This scrutiny includes staff review of such material conflict of interest transactions on a real-time basis to assess compliance. In addition, although it is the responsibility of the target board of directors and any special committee to determine whether a fairness opinion is necessary, where a target board does obtain a fairness opinion for a material conflict of interest transaction, certain additional disclosure is expected by staff, including with respect to the financial adviser’s compensation arrangements.

9

Are defences to unsolicited take-over bids available to target boards?

A target facing an unsolicited take-over bid has a number of options available to it in responding to the hostile bid. In fact, the Canadian securities regulators have provided guidance that supports the use of defensive tactics in appropriate circumstances (e.g., where taken by a target board in a genuine attempt to obtain a better bid). That said, Canadian securities regulators are of the view that unrestricted auctions produce the most desirable results in change of control contests. They have also indicated that tactics that could deny or severely limit the ability of target securityholders to decide for themselves whether to accept an offer may result in regulatory action.

Poison Pills

Historically, one of the most common defensive tactics employed by Canadian target boards was a securityholders' rights plan (commonly known as a "poison pill"). Although securities regulators did not generally allow a target's poison pill to remain operative indefinitely, while it remained operative (typically for a period of approximately 60 days following the date of the take-over bid), a poison pill effectively prevented a bidder from acquiring any target shares under its bid without approval of the target. Prior to the 2016 changes to the bid regime that increased the minimum period during which a hostile bid must remain open from 35 days to 105 days, poison pills were used to provide target boards additional time beyond the 35-day minimum period to respond to a hostile bid. The 2016 changes to the bid regime are generally seen as providing target boards sufficient time to identify and explore other value-maximizing alternatives. As such, poison pills are not expected to play a meaningful role in Canada going forward as a defensive tactic in response to hostile bids.

Private Placements

Another defensive tactic available to a target facing a hostile bid is a “tactical” private placement. As a result of the 2016 changes to the bid rules, a bidder is not permitted to acquire shares under a take-over bid unless more than 50 per cent of all outstanding target shares (other than those held by the offeror and its joint actors) have been tendered to the bid. A significant private placement of target shares to a shareholder friendly to the target, particularly by an issuer with a low market capitalization, can reduce the likelihood that this minimum tender requirement will be satisfied.

Not surprisingly, private placements with material dilutive impact undertaken in the face of hostile bids have been subject to increased scrutiny by Canadian securities regulators. When reviewing such transactions, the regulators consider and balance competing factors, including the extent to which the private placement serves a *bona fide* corporate objective of the target and the principle of facilitating shareholder choice in an open and even-handed bidding process. When balancing these factors, the regulators will often afford significant deference to the business judgment of target boards. In other words, the mere fact that a substantial private placement is undertaken in the face of a hostile bid will not necessarily result in the securities regulators concluding that the placement is an impermissible defensive tactic.

10

Can a significant securityholder enter into an agreement to agree to vote in favour of our plan of arrangement or tender to our bid? Can we offer any inducements to vote or tender?

Offerors commonly enter into support agreements with significant target securityholders or target management and directors whereby such securityholders agree to support the transaction, including by voting in favour of a plan of arrangement or tendering to the offeror’s take-over bid.

In considering support agreements in the context of a take-over bid, it is important to note that Canadian securities laws provide that all holders of a target’s securities must be offered identical consideration in a take-over bid and prohibit an offeror from entering into a separate agreement that has the effect of providing to one securityholder greater consideration for its securities than that offered to the other securityholders (subject to certain limited exceptions). Offering non-identical consideration can also introduce additional complexity in the context of a plan of arrangement and would need to be carefully considered in the context of a specific transaction prior to extending any such offers.

11

When a friendly deal has been negotiated, what deal protection measures are commonly used in Canada?

In a public M&A transaction in Canada, a target will generally have the right to terminate the transaction in the event it receives a proposal that is superior, from a financial perspective, to the agreed-upon transaction. There are several deal protection measures commonly used by buyers to reduce the likelihood that the target will terminate the transaction in order to accept a superior proposal, including:

- **No shop.** Offerors typically obtain a “no-shop” covenant under which the target board is prohibited from soliciting or encouraging competing bids from other buyers.
- **Right to match.** The offeror is frequently granted an opportunity to match any superior proposal during a limited period after the superior proposal is received by the target.
- **Break fees.** Break fees payable by a target to a buyer in connection with the target’s termination of the transaction with the buyer generally range between two to five per cent of target equity value. Reciprocal or reverse break fees, pursuant to which an offeror is obligated to pay a fee to the target if the transaction fails for specified reasons, are not uncommon in Canada, including in mergers of equals, transactions where significant regulatory issues exist or sponsor-backed deals.

12

What types of M&A transactions are subject to Canada’s antitrust law?

Canada’s antitrust law is set out in the *Competition Act*, which is administered and enforced by the Competition Bureau, led by the Commissioner of Competition (Commissioner). There are two parts of the *Competition Act* that apply to M&A transactions: the pre-merger notification provisions and the substantive merger review provisions. All transactions are subject to the latter, while only those transactions that exceed certain thresholds are subject to the former.

Because all M&A transactions are subject to the *Competition Act*, it is critical that the parties to a transaction plan early to determine whether competition concerns are raised in order to consider such matters as risk allocation and closing conditions. Completing a transaction that is subject to pre-merger notification is a criminal offence, unless the applicable statutory waiting period has expired, been waived or terminated early.

A transaction is notifiable if each of the following tests for pre-merger notification is exceeded:

- **Size of parties test.** The parties to the transaction, together with their affiliates, have aggregate assets in Canada with a book value, or aggregate gross revenues from sales in, from or into Canada, in excess of C\$400-million.
- **Size of transaction test.** The aggregate value of the assets in Canada, or aggregate gross revenues from sales in or from Canada generated from the assets in Canada, of the target and its subsidiaries (or, in the case of an asset transaction, from the assets being acquired) exceeds C\$96-million (2019). Notably, a separate test applies to an amalgamation, and the target must own or control an operating business in Canada (or, in an asset transaction, the assets being acquired must be from an operating business).
- **Equity interest test.** The transaction would result in the offeror having more than 20 per cent of the voting shares of a public target (35 per cent in the case of a private entity), provided that, where the offeror already holds in excess of such applicable ownership threshold at launch (but less than a majority), the threshold is whether the contemplated acquisition would result in the offeror having more than 50 per cent of the target's voting shares.

Where a transaction is notifiable and the parties file a formal notification, a waiting period commences and runs for an initial 30 days. At the end of the waiting period, the parties are legally entitled to close their transaction, even if the Commissioner's review is ongoing, unless the Commissioner issues a supplementary information request (SIR) to the parties. A SIR is similar to a second request under the *U.S. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 1976*. If a SIR is issued, the parties cannot lawfully close their transaction until 30 days after the day on which both parties have complied with the SIR. A SIR is issued in relatively rare cases involving significant competitive overlap between the parties (approximately 10 per cent of notified transactions). There is a special provision for unsolicited offers, designed to prevent a target from delaying the start of the waiting period, that makes the expiration of the waiting period contingent on the offeror's provision of information rather than both parties.

While the parties to a notifiable transaction are generally free to complete their transaction following the expiry of the statutory waiting period, the Commissioner's review can, and often does, take longer than the statutory waiting period. The Commissioner has the statutory right to review and challenge any M&A transaction within one year after closing, unless an advance ruling certificate is issued. Alternatively, the Commissioner may issue a "no-action" letter, indicating that, at that time, he does not intend to challenge the M&A transaction but retains the right to challenge the transaction at any time before or within one year following its substantial completion. As a practical matter, however, we are not aware of any situation in which the Commissioner has challenged a transaction post-closing after having issued an unqualified no-action letter.

13

If the transaction is subject to Canada's antitrust law review, what is the test for challenging the transaction?

Regardless of whether an M&A transaction is subject to notification or not, the test applicable to any transaction is whether it prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition substantially. The analysis has historically taken place in the context of a relevant market that is defined based on product and geographic dimensions. The *Competition Act* provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be considered when assessing the competitive impact of an M&A transaction.

The *Competition Act* contains an express efficiency defence — unique to Canada — that allows an M&A transaction to proceed provided it generates gains in efficiency that are greater than, and offset, the anticompetitive effects resulting from the transaction.

14

Does Canada have rules restricting M&A transactions by non-Canadians?

A direct acquisition of control of a Canadian business by a non-Canadian that exceeds the applicable review threshold cannot be completed until the responsible minister under the *Investment Canada Act* has reviewed the investment and declared, or is deemed to have declared, that the investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada. An acquisition of more than 50 per cent of the voting securities of a corporation or non-corporate entity is deemed to be an acquisition of control. The acquisition of between one-third and one-half of the voting securities of a corporation creates a rebuttable presumption that control has been acquired while, subject to certain exceptions, the acquisition of less than one-third of the votes of a corporation or less than a majority of the votes of a non-corporate entity is deemed not to constitute an acquisition of control for these purposes.

Notwithstanding the above, the *Investment Canada Act* provides that the responsible minister under the Act can determine that control in fact will be or has been acquired, even below the previously noted thresholds, in the following circumstances:

- The acquisition of a Canadian cultural business (as such term is defined)
- The acquisition by a state-owned enterprise (SOE) (as such term is defined)
- Where the acquisition could be injurious to Canada's national security

The direct acquisition of control of a non-cultural Canadian business by an investor ultimately controlled in a World Trade Organization (WTO) member country is subject to review where the Canadian business, along with any businesses that it controls, has (1) for non-SOE investors, an enterprise value of C\$1-billion or more, or (2) for SOE investors, a book value of C\$398-million (2018) or greater. For non-WTO investor transactions, or where the Canadian business qualifies as a cultural business, the review threshold is exceeded where the Canadian business has a book value of assets of C\$5-million or more.

Under the terms of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union, acquisitions of control of Canadian businesses with an enterprise value of less than C\$1.5-billion by non-SOE investors of a CETA signatory country are not subject to review under the *Investment Canada Act*, with some industry-specific exceptions. It is important to note that should Brexit proceed, the United Kingdom will no longer be a member of CETA, and United Kingdom investments will become subject to the C\$1-billion threshold referenced above. The C\$1.5-billion threshold also applies to non-SOE investors from certain jurisdictions that have free trade agreements with Canada, namely the United States, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Honduras and South Korea. This threshold was recently extended to several other countries under the newly signed Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), including Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam.

Other than in respect of cultural businesses, if the Canadian business is being acquired indirectly, and the WTO investor rule is met, or if the applicable review threshold is not exceeded, the transaction is subject only to a post-closing notice requirement.

Transactions that are reviewable require the approval of the responsible minister. The initial waiting period is up to 45 days after the investor submits an application for net benefit review, which can be extended by the responsible minister unilaterally by a further 30 days and, thereafter, only with the consent of the responsible minister and investor.



All investments involving a Canadian entity, whether or not the investment is direct or indirect and whether or not control will be acquired, are subject to possible review on grounds of whether an investment is likely to be injurious to national security. There are broad powers under the national security provisions of the *Investment Canada Act* to direct parties not to implement an investment or to implement it with conditions. Where a review takes place after closing, such powers include the right to require the divestiture of control or to impose terms and conditions on the investment.

In addition to the *Investment Canada Act*, other federal statutes regulate and restrict foreign investment, particularly industries and sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, broadcasting, newspapers and financial institutions.

15

What is the Cooperative National Securities Regulation Framework?

While provincial and territorial regulation of trading in securities remains the status quo, for well over a decade, there have been various initiatives aimed at reforming the current system, some of which have had the goal of establishing a Canadian federal securities regulatory regime. Most recently, certain provinces and territories proposed a cooperative system with a single regulator administering a federal act and uniform provincial and territorial acts that would be adopted by all provinces and territories opting to participate in the cooperative system. It has not yet been determined whether the cooperative system will be implemented and, if it is implemented, which provinces and territories will participate in this voluntary regulatory scheme. Likewise, any timeline for implementation remains uncertain.

2019 TRENDS IN CANADIAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE M&A

The Canadian M&A market experienced a material increase last year, with total deal value rising from US\$265.8-billion in 2017 to US\$331.2-billion in 2018. There was also an increase in average deal size, which rose from US\$152-million in 2017 to US\$170-million in 2018. In line with the increase in total value and average deal size, this past year saw the number of deals announced increase from 3,216 in 2017 to 3,785 in 2018, reflecting another strong year for M&A in Canada.

Looking back on the 2018 Canadian M&A market, below are some noteworthy trends and expectations for 2019.

1

Volatility

Despite an increase in deal volume, 2018 was a year marked by volatility. The S&P/TSX composite index started 2018 by falling nearly seven per cent in the first quarter, bounced back in the second quarter, remained relatively flat in the third, and then lost 11 per cent in the fourth quarter. As of December 31, 2018, the index had dropped 12 per cent over the course of 2018, a year that was characterized by political and economic uncertainty, including the China-United States trade disputes, Canada's relationship with China and the negotiation of a new North American trade deal.

The year also saw oil prices struggling, magnified in Canada by a significant gap between the price of Western Canadian Select bitumen-blend heavy oil and New York-traded West Texas Intermediate oil, a gap that narrowed following the Alberta government's mandatory oil curtailment in late 2018. In addition, Canadian interest rates may be in flux. After increasing interest rates five times since July 2017, the Bank of Canada announced in early January 2019 that it was maintaining interest rates at then-current levels. In making its announcement, however, the bank signalled that further increases may be on the horizon.

Although Canadian stock markets began 2019 in positive territory, early indications are that 2019 may be another year of continued market volatility, both globally and in Canada. While falling stock prices are not necessarily a negative for M&A, as opportunities may exist to acquire under-valued targets, M&A activity can be adversely impacted by market unpredictability as financiers may be less inclined to deploy the required capital and resources to pursue acquisitions. Should the volatility

that Canadian and global markets experienced in 2018 continue throughout 2019, more risk-adverse acquirors may step back and wait for a time of greater certainty to pursue acquisitions. It will be interesting to see, should such a trend develop, if that retrenchment will be outweighed by Canadian pension funds and other financial buyers putting their increasing pools of capital “to work” through new acquisitions where they perceive valuations to be attractive.

2

Cannabis

In October 2018, Canada became the second nation in the world, after Uruguay, to legalize cannabis for recreational use. Against that backdrop, the cannabis sector experienced a frenzy of M&A transactions. In 2018, Canadian cannabis deal volume rose by over 600 per cent based on deal value (from US\$1.27-billion in 2017 to US\$9-billion in 2018). Unsurprisingly, in 2018, Canada accounted for 73 per cent of the transactions within the global cannabis sector based on deal value.

The Canadian cannabis sector saw many notable transactions, including Aurora Cannabis Inc.'s US\$2.2-billion acquisition of MedReleaf Corp. in a record-setting deal for the cannabis sector. In December 2018, following in the footsteps of U.S.-based Constellation Brands Inc., which in 2017 purchased a 9.9 per cent stake in Canopy Growth Corporation, Altria Group Inc. (Altria), the U.S.-based parent company of tobacco giant Philip Morris USA, announced its acquisition of a 45 per cent stake in Cronos Group Inc. for US\$1.79-billion. This investment by Altria is yet another example of cannabis-related M&A activity in Canada attracting U.S. investors.



There is still uncertainty about cross-border transactions by Canadian cannabis companies into the United States. The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) announced in early 2018 that, due to the classification by U.S. federal law of marijuana as a Schedule 1 illegal drug, any TSX-listed companies operating in the U.S. (notwithstanding that cannabis may be legal at a state level) are not in compliance with the TSX-listing requirements and may be at risk of delisting. However, the Canadian Stock Exchange (CSE), an independent Canadian stock market that traditionally attracted issuers with smaller market capitalizations, does not share the TSX's position on companies with U.S. operations. The CSE has experienced an influx of listings by cannabis issuers, with 51 such listings in 2018 as compared to 19 in 2017.

With the success of the Canadian Securities Exchange in attracting issuers in the cannabis sector and recreational cannabis now legal (at the state level) in an increasing number of U.S. states, and other U.S. states exploring such legalization, cross-border M&A transactions may increase in 2019 on the expectation of increased local legalization. In addition, further consolidation seems likely, as participants in Canada may seek greater scale to enhance efficiency, seek access to international growth, and address legal and practical restraints on distribution and supply in Canada. The possibility of further involvement (whether by way of acquisition or strategic investment) of consumer products and pharmaceutical companies in the cannabis space also bodes well for continued M&A activity.

3

Relations with China

Over recent years, Canada's federal Liberal government has worked with Chinese officials in an attempt to increase foreign investment from China. Currently, China represents Canada's second-largest trading partner. These efforts may have helped spur the marked increase in the value of both inbound and outbound transactions with China. Inbound deals increased by 365 per cent from US\$640-million in 2017 to US\$2.98-billion in 2018, and outbound deals increased by 244 per cent from US\$4.75-billion in 2017 to US\$16.32-billion in 2018.

Notwithstanding these positive trends, various events in 2018 placed a strain on what was previously a strengthening Canada-China relationship. Notably, in May 2018, the Canadian federal government blocked CCCC International Holding Limited's friendly acquisition of construction company Aeon Group Inc. on national security grounds. It remains unclear whether this decision pertained specifically to that transaction and has created uncertainty regarding both inbound and outbound deals involving China.

The friction between Canada and China worsened following high-profile arrests and legal proceedings involving nationals from both countries. Canada is also caught in the middle of the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S. and China, two of the world's largest economies.

These political headwinds, coupled with the continued impact of the currency controls imposed by China in an attempt to stabilize its currency, have the potential to negatively impact the number of both inbound and outbound transactions with China in 2019 as the governments of Canada, China and the U.S. work to resolve tensions between these nations. If a mutually beneficial outcome is achieved, Canadian businesses may continue to benefit in 2019 from the positive trend of Chinese involvement in Canadian M&A transactions in recent years

4

United States Cross-Border Transactions

Historically, Canada and the U.S. have enjoyed a robust level of cross-border M&A activity. Despite the uncertainty that persisted within the U.S. and its increasingly protectionist policies during 2018, cross-border transactions involving Canada and the United States showed an increase of nearly 30 per cent from 2017 to 2018. Outbound deals into the U.S. increased by 40 per cent from US\$80.56-billion in 2017 to US\$112.9-billion in 2018, with inbound deals decreasing slightly (9.8 per cent) from US\$21.52-billion in 2017 to US\$19.42-billion in 2018.

In light of the close historical relationship and the geographic and other ties between the two countries, it would seem reasonable for U.S./Canada cross-border transaction levels to remain strong. However, current political tensions could result in a dampening of activity compared to prior years.



5

The past year brought some clarity to Canada's relationship with the United States, with the North American Free Trade Agreement being renegotiated and its successor, the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) — known as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in the U.S. — being signed in the fall of 2018. However, as of early 2019, the CUSMA has yet to be ratified by the legislatures of the respective countries. Ratification by the U.S. of the current iteration of the CUSMA is not guaranteed following the Democrats regaining control of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, the implications of the CUSMA, should it be ratified in its original or some other form, are far from certain. Accordingly, 2019 could see Canadian companies take a cautious approach to involvement with the U.S. until the impact of the CUSMA takes shape.

Conversely, Canada is well positioned to benefit from the geopolitical uncertainty surrounding the U.S. and its protectionist mindset, as foreign investors looking to invest in North America may be steered toward Canada instead of the U.S.

Mining

Though not near record levels, the Canadian mining sector saw another increase in M&A activity in 2018 as compared to 2017, with a 51 per cent increase in deal value from US\$10.7-billion in 2017 to US\$16.19-billion in 2018. The value of M&A transactions with any involvement from a Canadian company accounted for approximately 25 per cent of the global M&A volume in the sector.

Perhaps the most significant acquisition in the Canadian mining industry in 2018 was Barrick Gold Corporation's "no-premium" US\$6-billion acquisition of Randgold Resources Ltd., which closed in early January 2019. This deal is widely expected to spur additional significant mining M&A activity as mining majors seek value in increased resource bases and the combined experience of senior management teams. Industry participants are watching to see if the transaction signals a move from the significant premiums that were typical in mining M&A in the early to mid-2000s. Newmont Mining Corporation's mid-January 2019 agreement to acquire Goldcorp Inc. in a stock-for-stock transaction valued at C\$10-billion could be seen as early evidence of both such trends. The deal was priced at a 17 per cent premium, considered modest based on precedent transactions.

6

Oil and Gas

In 2017, Canadian oil and gas companies experienced significant M&A activity, fuelled in part by relative stability in global oil prices. However, much of this activity involved foreign investors exiting the Canadian oil and gas sector. As expected, 2018 saw a decline, with a 14.4 per cent decrease from US\$35.98-billion in 2017 to US\$30.8-billion in Canadian oil and gas deal volume, due in part to a decrease in the number of total deals in Canada. This decline is in stark contrast to the 25.4 per cent increase in global oil and gas deal volume in 2018.

Notable transactions in the Canadian oil and gas sector in 2018 include Encana Corporation's US\$8.1-billion acquisition of Newfield Exploration Company and Husky Energy Inc.'s ultimately unsuccessful hostile take-over bid for MEG Energy Corp., valued at US\$4.9-billion. An interesting development within the Canadian energy infrastructure sector was the acquisition of the Trans Mountain pipeline by Canada's federal government from Kinder Morgan Canada Limited to advance construction of the C\$7.4-billion Trans Mountain pipeline expansion.

Despite a down year for oil and gas M&A transactions in Canada last year, low oil prices, particularly if they stabilize, could spur additional M&A activity as energy companies look to consolidation to increase scale and efficiency.

7

Private Equity Firms and Pension Funds

Once again, private equity firms and pension funds have been highly active in the Canadian M&A space, with the number of announced transactions by Canadian pension funds and private equity firms as acquirors growing nearly 40 per cent in volume in 2018 as compared to the prior year. As in 2017, on the private equity side, this increase in M&A activity is likely attributable to private equity firms' vast pools of available capital to be invested.

This past year, Canadian private equity firms and pension funds once again participated in some noteworthy megadeals. In fact, the three largest Canadian M&A transactions in 2018 involved outbound investments by Canadian private equity firms and pension funds, including Canada Pension Plan Investment Board joining a Blackstone Group-led consortium that acquired a majority interest in Thomson Reuters Corporation's financial and risk business in a deal that valued the business at US\$20-billion.

These and other multibillion-dollar deals demonstrate that Canadian private equity firms and pension funds continue to look to the international market to find new opportunities. With these types of organizations having significant amounts of yet-to-be-deployed capital, 2019 may bring another strong year for cash-based M&A transactions by these market participants.

8

Hostile Take-Over Bids

In May 2016, substantial changes to the Canadian take-over bid regime came into force. Prior to those changes coming into effect, there was widespread uncertainty regarding their impact on Canadian hostile bids. Part of this uncertainty resulted from the change that required unsupported bids, subject to limited exceptions, to remain open for at least 105 days. This period was a significant increase from the previous requirement that a bid need only remain open for 35 days.



This increase was predicted to lessen the number of potential hostile bids. As a cash bid cannot be contingent on an offeror obtaining financing, a hostile bidder would need to have financing in place at the time of launch and pay any associated standby fees for the entirety of the potentially 105-day-long period. In addition, it was unclear how many bidders would be willing to leave a bid open for such a long period of time, considering the increased possibility that the bid may attract competing offers for the target in question, including negotiated “white knight” transactions supported by target management.

Almost three years have passed since the new rules were implemented. While there has been a decline in hostile-bid activity following their implementation, the new rules have not been the death knell for hostile take-over bids that some had predicted. Between May 2016 and the end of 2018, 12 offerors launched hostile bids (four in 2016, three in 2017 and five in 2018). While these numbers are all below the number of hostile bids launched in 2014 and 2015 (six and 10, respectively), recent experience (including a hostile bid in the cannabis space launched in January 2019) has demonstrated that there is still appetite for hostile take-over bids in the Canadian M&A market.

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