For Purposes of International Law there are Two citizens in the country of the United States

In his work, "The Government of the United States: National, State, and Local," (1919), William Bennett Munro (Professor of Municipal Government at Harvard University) **[Footnote 1]**, states at page 73:

"So far as the rules of international law are concerned, only one citizenship is recognized, namely, citizenship of the United States. In relations with foreign powers all citizens of the United States, wherever resident, are alike; they are equally entitled to the protection of the national government; they carry the same sort of passport; they have the same privileges and immunities abroad. But constitutional law, the supreme law of the United States, still recognizes the dual nature of American citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment being explicit on that point when it uses the words 'citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they reside,' although no one can now possess one form of citizenship without the other. Apart from the question of determining the courts in which suits shall be brought, however, the duality is not of any practical importance because citizens of the United States have the same privileges and immunities in all the states."

http://books.google.com/books?id=klsvAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is quoted by Munro as follows:

"citizens of the United States and of the **STATES** wherein they reside."

However, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

"citizens of the United States and of the **STATE** wherein they reside."

This mistake is intentional as in the paragraph before this paragraph he writes:

"But the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, reversed this doctrine, asserting that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the **STATES** wherein they reside.' This amendment declared citizenship to be primarily of the United

States and only consequentially of the several states. Citizenship of the United States was made fundamental. Since 1868 any citizen of the United States by birth or naturalization becomes a citizen of a state by merely taking up his residence there. No state can either bestow American citizenship or withhold it.

http://books.google.com/books?id=klsvAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA72#v=onepage&q&f=false

Munro's changing of the word "State" into the word "States" changes the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of one who is a citizen of the United States being a citizen of a State also by residing in a State, one who is a citizen of the United States, is according to Munro's, a citizen of the several States also by residing in a State. This he admits:

"But the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, reversed this doctrine, asserting that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they reside.' *This amendment declared citizenship to be primarily of the United States and only consequentially of the* ***several states***."

However, this is not the case. When a citizen of the United States is residing within a State, a citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State:

"The Fourteenth Amendment declares that citizens of the United States are citizens of the ***state*** within they reside; therefore the plaintiff was at the time of making her application, a citizen of the United States and a citizen of the State of Illinois.

We do not here mean to say that there may not be a temporary residence in one State, with intent to return to another, which will not create citizenship in the former. But the plaintiff states nothing to take her case out of the definition of ***citizenship of a State*** as defined by the first section of the fourteenth amendment." Bradwell v. State of Illinois: 83 U.S. 130, at 138 (1873).

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA138#v=onepage&q=&f=false

William Munro concluded that: "So far as the rules of international law are concerned, only one citizenship is recognized, namely, citizenship of the United States."

This is incorrect. This paper will show that there are two citizens, not one, in the country of the United States, under the Constitution of the United States of America.

In the country of the United States there are now two citizens since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the *Slaughterhouse Cases*: a citizen of the United States, under Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America. **[Footnote 2]** The following cases on diversity of citizenship show that there is a citizen of the United States, and a citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States:

"The petition avers, that the plaintiff, Richard Raynal Keene, is a citizen of the state of Maryland; and that James Brown, the defendant, is a citizen or resident of the state of Louisiana, holding his fixed and permanent domicil in the parish of St. Charles. The petition, then, does not aver positively, that the defendant is a citizen of the state of Louisiana, but in the alternative, that he is a citizen or a resident. Consistently with this averment, he may be either.

" . . . A citizen of the United States may become a citizen of that state in which he has a fixed and permanent domicil; ***but the petition DOES NOT AVER that the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States***. . . .

The decisions of this court require, that the averment of jurisdiction shall be positive, and that the declaration shall state expressly the fact on which jurisdiction depends. It is not sufficient that jurisdiction may be inferred argumentatively from its averments.

The answer of James Brown asserts, that both plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the State of Louisiana.

Without indicating any opinion on the question, whether any admission in the plea can cure an insufficient allegation of jurisdiction in the declaration, we are all of opinion that this answer does not cure the defect of the petition. If the averment of the answer may be looked into, the whole averment must be taken together. It is that both plaintiff and defendant are citizens of Louisiana." Brown v. Keene: 33 U.S. (Peters 8) 112, at 115 thru 116 (1834).

http://books.google.com/books?id=DUUFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA115#v=onepage&q&f=false

"*Syllabus*:

The facts, which involved the sufficiency of averments and proof of diverse citizenship to maintain the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court, are stated in the opinion of the court.

Opinion:

We come to the contention that the citizenship of Edwards was not averred in the complaint or shown by the record, and hence jurisdiction did not appear.

In answering the question, whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the controversy, we must put ourselves in the place of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and decide the question with reference to the transcript of record in that court.

Had the transcript shown nothing more as to the status of Edwards than the averment of the complaint that he was a 'resident of the State of Delaware,' as such an averment would not necessarily have imported that Edwards was a citizen of Delaware, a negative answer would have been impelled by prior decisions. *Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Duthie,* 189 U.S. 76; *Horne v. George H. Hammond Co.*, 155 U.S. 393; *Denny v. Pironi*, 141 U.S. 121; *Robertson v. Cease*, 97 U.S. 646. The whole record, however, may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of citizenship, and if the requisite citizenship, is anywhere expressly averred in the record, or facts are therein stated which in legal intendment constitute such allegation, that is sufficient. *Horne v. George H. Hammond Co*., supra and cases cited.

As this is an action at law, we are bound to assume that the testimony of the plaintiff contained in the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and recited to have been given on the trial, was preserved in a bill of exceptions, which formed part of the transcript of record filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Being a part of the record, and proper to be resorted to in settling a question of the character of that now under consideration, *Robertson v. Cease*, 97 U.S. 648, we come to ascertain what is established by the uncontradicted evidence referred to.

In the first place, it shows that Edwards, prior to his employment on the New York Sun and the New Haven Palladium, was legally domiciled in the State of Delaware. Next, it demonstrates that he had no intention to abandon such domicil, for he testified under oath as follows: 'One of the reasons I left the New Haven Palladium was, it was too far away from home. I lived in Delaware, and I had to go back and forth. My family are over in Delaware.' Now, it is elementary that, to effect a change of one's legal domicil, two things are indispensable: First, residence in a new domicil, and, second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made, except facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. Either without the other is insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change. *Mitchell v. United States*, 21 Wall. 350.

As Delaware must, then, be held to have been the legal domicil of Edwards at the time he commenced this action, ***had it appeared that he was a citizen of the United States, it would have resulted, by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that Edwards was also a citizen of the State of Delaware***. *Anderson v. Watt*, 138 U.S. 694. ***Be this as it may, however, Delaware being the legal domicil of Edwards, it was impossible for him to have been a citizen of another***

State, District, or Territory, and he must then have been either a citizen of Delaware or a citizen or subject of a foreign State. In either of these contingencies, the Circuit Court would have had jurisdiction over the controversy. But, in the light of the testimony, we are satisfied that the averment in the complaint, that Edwards was a resident 'of' the State of Delaware, was intended to mean, and, reasonably construed, must be interpreted as averring, that ***the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Delaware***. *Jones v. Andrews*, 10 Wall. 327, 331; *Express Company v. Kountze*, 8 Wall. 342." Sun Printing & Publishing Association v. Edwards: 194 U.S. 377, at 381 thru 383 (1904).

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"The bill filed in the Circuit Court by the ***plaintiff, McQuesten, alleged her to be 'a citizen of the United States and of the State of Massachusetts***, and residing at Turner Falls in said State,' ***while the defendants Steigleder and wife were alleged to be 'citizens of the State of Washington***, and residing at the city of Seattle in said State.' *Statement of the Case*, Steigleder v. McQuesten: 198 U.S. 141 (1905). {After the Fourteenth Amendment}

"***The averment in the bill that the parties were citizens of different States was sufficient to make a prima facie case of jurisdiction so far as it depended on citizenship***.' *Opinion*, Steigleder v. McQuesten: 198 U.S. 141, at 142 (1905). {After the Fourteenth Amendment}

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A citizen of the United States, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer a citizen of the Union; that is, the United States of America, but now is a citizen of the United States (Fourteenth Amendment), that is, a citizen of the territories and possessions of the United States, including the District of Columbia as well as federal enclaves with the several States. **[Footnote 4]** Thus, a citizen of the United States has a domicile in the territories and possessions of the United States, including the District of Columbia as well as federal enclaves with the several States, but not in any of the several States.

A citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, is one who is born in an individual State of the Union, both before and after the adoption of the Constitution:

(Before the Fourteenth Amendment)

"It appears that the plaintiff in error, though ***a native-born citizen of Louisiana***, was married in the State of Mississippi, while under age, with the consent of her guardian, to a citizen of the latter State, and that their domicile, during the duration

of their marriage, was in Mississippi." Conner v. Elliott: 59 U.S. (Howard 18) 591, at 592 (1855).

http://books.google.com/books?id=RkcFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA592#v=onepage&q&f=false

(After the Fourteenth Amendment)

"Joseph A. Iasigi, ***a native born citizen of Massachusetts***, was arrested, February 14, 1897, on a warrant issued by one of the city magistrates of the city of New York, as a fugitive from the justice of the State of Massachusetts." Iasigi v. Van De Carr: 166 U.S. 391, at 392 (1897).

http://books.google.com/books?id=xuUGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA392#v=onepage&q&f=false

A citizen of the United States can become a citizen of a State, under Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by residing in a State:

"The Fourteenth Amendment declares that citizens of the United States are citizens of the state within they reside; therefore the plaintiff was at the time of making her application, a citizen of the United States and a citizen of the State of Illinois.

We do not here mean to say that there may not be a temporary residence in one State, with intent to return to another, which will not create citizenship in the former. But the plaintiff states nothing to take her case out of the definition of ***citizenship of a State as defined by the first section of the fourteenth amendment***." Bradwell v. State of Illinois: 83 U.S. 130, at 138 (1873).

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA138#v=onepage&q=&f=false

"Resides," as used in Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, has been presumed to mean "permanent residence." **[Footnote 5]** However, in the *Slaughterhouse Cases*, the Supreme Court states that "resides" means "bona fide residence":

"One of these privileges is conferred by the very article (Fourteenth Amendment) under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a ***bona fide residence*** therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State." Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 80 (1873).

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA80#v=onepage&q&f=false

Bona fide residence does not mean domicile:

" . . . The very meaning of ***domicil*** is the technically preeminent headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that have been attached to it by the law may be determined. *Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus*, 172 Massachusetts, 154, 157. In its nature it is one, and if any case two are recognized for different purposes it is a doubtful anomaly. *Dicey, Conflict of Laws*, 2d ed. 98." Williamson v. Osenton: 232 U.S. 619, at 625 (1914).

http://books.google.com/books?id=2u4GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA625#v=onepage&q&f=false

"A person may maintain more than one residence and the fact that one is maintained for political purposes does not itself prevent the residence from being actual and bona fide. *Intent to maintain a residence is an important factor, but intent alone does not establish a* ***bona fide residence****. There must be actual, physical use or occupation of quarters for living purposes before residence is established*." Williamson v. Village of Baskin: 339 So.2d 474 (1976).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13547316696383020452

"Our statute 65.02, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. reads, 'In order to obtain a divorce the complainant must have ***resided*** (emphasis not mine) ninety days in the State of Florida before the filing of the bill of complaint.' It is obvious that the word ***resided*** (emphasis not mine) could not properly be construed to encompass citizenship in a legal sense [***domicile***] because one may come to this State, establish a ***bona fide residence*** of ninety days, thereafter institute a divorce action and have it heard and conclusively adjudicated on its merits before he could under the law become a citizen and enjoy all the privileges of citizenship. On the other hand, a person might reside in Florida many years and never become a citizen of this State or renounce his citizenship in a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, failure to renounce pre-existing citizenship is nothing more than a circumstance to be considered in connection with the question of the ***bona fides*** (emphasis not mine) of the plaintiff's residence which is the real test under our statutory law. It is necessary, as provided in 98.01, Florida States 1941, F.S.A., that a person '. . . shall have ***resided*** (emphasis not mine) **AND had his** habitation, domicile, **home**, and place of permanent abode **in Florida for one year, and in the county for six months**, . . .' in order to qualify as a voter and for full-fledged citizenship. Citizenship is not a statutory jurisdictional prerequisite for divorce and neither of the words 'citizen' and 'citizenship' can be read into our statute." Pawley v. Pawley: 46 So.2d 464, at 471 (1950).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15312812472711174511

"The durational residency requirement under attack in this case is a part of Iowa's comprehensive statutory regulation of domestic relations, an area that has

long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Cases decided by this Court over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact. In *Barber v. Barber*, 21 How. 582, 584 (1859), the Court said: 'We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce. . . .' In *Pennoyer v. Neff*, 95 U.S. 714, 734-735 (1878), the Court said: 'The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved,' and the same view was reaffirmed in *Simms v. Simms*, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899). . . .

The imposition of a durational residency requirement for divorce is scarcely unique to Iowa, since 48 States impose such a requirement as a condition for maintaining an action of divorce. As might be expected, the periods vary among States and range from six weeks to two years. The one-year period selected by Iowa is the most common length of time prescribed.

Appellant contends that the Iowa requirement of one year's residence is unconstitutional for two separate reasons: . . . and, *second*, because it denies a litigant the opportunity to make an individualized showing of ***bona fide residence*** and therefore denies such residents access to the only method of legally dissolving their marriage. *Vlandis v. Kline*, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); *Boddie v. Connecticut*, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). . . . .

We therefore hold that the state interest in requiring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the State. . . .

Nor are we of the view that the failure to provide an individualized determination of residency violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Vlandis v. Kline*, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), relied upon by appellant, held that Connecticut might not arbitrarily invoke a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence against students who sought to obtain in-state tuition rates when that presumption was not necessarily or universally true in fact. But in *Vlandis* the Court warned that its decision should not 'be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating ***bona fide residence***, a reasonable durational residency requirement.' *Id*., at 452. See *Stams v. Malkerson*, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971). An individualized determination of physical presence plus the intent to remain, which appellant apparently seeks, would not entitle her to a divorce even if she could have made such a showing. For Iowa requires not merely '***domicile***' in that sense, but (***actual***) ***residence*** in the State for a year in order for its courts to exercise their divorce jurisdiction." Sosna v. State of Iowa: 419 U.S. 393, at 404, 405, 409 thru 410 (1975).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4796843726517835120

Therefore, a citizen of the United States, under Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, when residing in a particular State, is not a domiciliary, but an actual resident of the particular State. However, because of the Fourteenth Amendment, he or she is made a citizen of that particular State.

Thus, a citizen of the United States is a citizen and resident of a particular State and not a citizen and domiciliary of a particular State. However a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, can become a citizen and domiciliary of a particular State:

"As to who are citizens of the State. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that –

> 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside.'

Therefore when a person who is a citizen of the United States by birth or naturalization, comes to this State and ***resides*** (emphasis not mine) here he is a citizen of this State. . . .

Where a citizen of another State comes to this State and resides in some town for a temporary purpose, though such stay be protracted, he does not thereby become a citizen of this State. *Easterly v. Goodwin*, 35 Conn., 286.

With such a person, his residence here must be in the sense of making it a home which he has no present intention of abandoning. I think that it must be a domiciliary residence." The Residence of a Male Citizen, Opinions of the Attorney-General; State of Connecticut; Hartford, February 1, 1909; Report of the Tax Commissioner for Biennial Period 1909 and 1910, pages 52 thru 53. **[Footnote 6]**

http://books.google.com/books?id=Eb9JAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA52#v=onepage&q&f=false

A citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution is a citizen of the several States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. **[Footnote 3]** and is entitled to privileges and immunities of a citizen of the several States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America:

"There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the State of North Carolina, had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to recover the debt which Harris owed him. ***Being a citizen of North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States***, one of which is the right to institute

actions in the courts of another State." Harris v. Balk: 198 U.S. 215, at 223 (1905).

http://books.google.com/books?id=ceIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA223#v=onepage&q=&f=false

"In speaking of the meaning of the phrase '***privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States***,' under section second, article fourth, of the Constitution, it was said by the present Chief Justice, in *Cole v. Cunningham*, 133 U.S. 107, that the intention was 'to confer on the ***citizens of the several States a general citizenship***, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same State would be entitled to under the like circumstances, and this includes the right to institute actions.' " Maxwell v. Dow: 176 U.S. 581, at 592 (1900). **[Footnote 7]**

http://books.google.com/books?id=8toGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA592#v=onepage&q&f=false

Privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States are not the same as privileges and immunities of a citizen of the several States:

"We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment), which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks **ONLY** of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those (privileges and immunities) of citizens of the several States." Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 74 (1873). **[Footnote 8]**

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q=&f=false

A citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States, is considered a citizen of the several States when on the high seas:

"Action to have a certain marriage between plaintiff and defendant declared valid and binding upon the parties. A second amended complaint alleged: That on August 2, 1897, defendant was a minor of the age of 15 years and 10 months, and that her father, one A. C. Thomson, was her natural and only guardian. Plaintiff was of the age of 21 years and 10 months, and ***both plaintiff and defendant were citizens and residents of Los Angeles county, Cal***. On said day plaintiff and defendant, at Long Beach, on the coast of California, boarded a certain fishing and pleasure schooner, of 17 tons burden, called the 'J. Willey,' duly licensed under the laws of the United States, of which W. L. Pierson was captain, and was enrolled as master thereof, and had full charge of said vessel. Said vessel proceeded to a point on the high seas about nine miles from the nearest point from the boundary of the state and of the United States. The parties then and there agreed, in the presence of

said Pierson, to become husband and wife, and the said Pierson performed the ceremony of marriage, and, among other things, they promised in his presence to take each other for husband and wife, and he pronounced them husband and wife. Neither party had the consent of the father or mother or guardian of defendant to said marriage. . . .

Appellant contends (1) that the marriage is valid because performed upon the high seas; and (2) that it would have been valid if performed within this state, because there is no law expressly declaring it to be void. Respondent presents the case upon two propositions, claiming (1) that no valid marriage can be contracted in this state, except in compliance with the prescribed forms of the laws of this state, and contract a valid marriage.

Sections 4082, 4290, 722, Rev. St. U.S., are cited by appellant as recognizing marriages at sea and before foreign consuls, and that section 722 declares the common law as to marriage to be in force on the high seas on board American vessels. We have carefully examined the statutes referred to, and do not find that they give the slightest support to appellant's claim. The law of the sea, as it may relate to the marriage of citizens of the United States domiciled in California, cannot be referred to the common law of England, any more than it can to the law of France or Spain, or any other foreign county. ***We can find no law of congress, and none has been pointed out by appellant, in which the general government has undertaken or assumed to legislate generally upon the subject of marriage on the sea. Nor, indeed, can we find in the grant of powers to the general government by the several states, as expressed in the national constitution, any provision by which congress is empowered to declare what shall constitute a valid marriage between citizens of the several states upon the sea***, **[see Note]** either within or without the conventional three-mile limit of the shore of any state; and clearly does no such power rest in congress to regulate marriages on land, except in the District of Columbia and the territories of the United States, or where is power of exclusive jurisdiction. We must look elsewhere than to the acts of congress for the law governing the case in hand." Norman v. Norman: 54 Pac. Rep. 143, 143 thru 144 (1898).

http://books.google.com/books?id=-QwLAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA143#v=onepage&q&f=false

(**Note**: " . . . [I]t is certain that the Constitution of the United States confers no power whatever upon the government of the United States to regulate marriage in the States or its dissolution." Andrews v. Andrews: 188 U.S. 14, at 32 (1903).

http://books.google.com/books?id=Gd4GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA32#v=onepage&q&f=false)

As such, a citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States, is a citizen of the several States, under international law for purposes of nationality:

From the "United States Naval Institute Proceedings", Volume 45, No. 7, July 1919, at page 1790 thru 1791 there is the following:

http://books.google.com/books?id=kEELP3wiHvAC&pg=PA1790#v=onepage&q&f=false

"Merchant Marine . . .

The ***nationality*** of those shipped as officers (excluding masters) and men (counting repeated shipments) before United States Shipping Commissioners, as returned to the Bureau of Navigation, Department of Commerce, was as follows for 1914 and 1919:

Nationality	1914	1919
Others	11,442	38,811

Those classed as "others" are mainly from the countries of South America, ***citizens of the several states*** which have been created by the war, and Swiss shipping as stewards.—*U.S. Bulletin, 9/8*."

This report of the **Nationality of Crews** can be seen for the years 1907 through 1922, inclusive, at these links:

http://books.google.com/books?id=8y0pAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://books.google.com/books?id=oC4pAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA14#v=onepage&q&f=false

(on page 15)

As can be seen "Others" appears in all of them under Nationality.

Therefore, in the country of the United States, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there are now two citizens; a citizen of the United States, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. For purposes of International Law, there are two citizens; a citizen of the United States, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a citizen of the several States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America.

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Footnotes:

1. "The Government of the United States: National, State, and Local"; William Bennett Munro, Ph.D., LL.B.; (The MacMillan Company); Copyright, 1919.

2. A citizen of the United States is recognized in Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States is recognized at Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America:

" . . . There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a ***citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States***." Crowley v. Christensen: 137 U.S. 86, at 91 (1890).

http://books.google.com/books?id=htIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q&f=false

"Another objection to the act is that it is in violation of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution of the United States, and of the fourteenth amendment, in that this act discriminates both as to persons and products. Section 2, art. 4, declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states; and the fourteenth amendment declares that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. But we have seen that the supreme court, in *Crowley v. Christensen*, 137 U.S. 91, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15, has declared that there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of ***a citizen of a state or of a citizen of the United States***." Cantini v. Tillman: 54 Fed. Rep. 969, at 973 (1893). **[Footnote 3]**

http://books.google.com/books?id=Ehg4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA973#v=onepage&q&f=false

3. A citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States is also a citizen of the several States under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. See my work "Two Distinct State Citizens For Purposes Of Diversity Of Citizenship."

4. See my work "Blunders of the Supreme Court of the United States, Part 3"; where I show that the political jurisdiction (complete jurisdiction) of the United States extends **ONLY** to the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the

United States, and federal enclaves within the several States of the Union. Thus, a citizen of the United States, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, is one who is born in the United States, not the United States of America; that is, in an individual State of the Union.

In this work I also show that an individual State also has political jurisdiction. Thus, one who is born in an individual State is a citizen of that State, and not a citizen of the United States:

"The language of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring two kinds of citizenship is discriminating. It is: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' While it thus establishes national citizenship from the mere circumstance of birth within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, ***birth within a state does not establish citizenship thereof***. State citizenship is ephemeral. It results only from residence and is gained or lost therewith." Edwards v. People of the State of California: 314 U.S. 160, 183 (*concurring opinion of Jackson*) (1941).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6778891532287614638

5. " . . . But since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically provides that 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside,' it is **ASSUMED** that citizenship in a state is acquired by permanent residence therein of any person who by birth or naturalization has become a citizen of the United States; and state citizenship is therefore determined by this test." Constitutional Law in the United States; Emlin McClain, L.L. D.; (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company); 1907; Section 193, Page 276.

http://books.google.com/books?id=z7VCAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA276#v=onepage&q&f=false

6. "Residence and domiciliary residence are not the same:

"This case presents another phase of the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933, which has been before this Court in a series of cases beginning with *Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen*, 304 U.S. 307. The Act imposes a tax upon 'the receipt of the entire gross income' of ***residents and domiciliaries*** of Indiana." Freeman v. Hewit: 329 U.S. 249, at 250 (1946).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2416015038270473786

" . . . 'Domicile' is not necessarily synonymous with 'residence,' *Perri v. Kisselbach*, 34 N.J. 84, 87, 167 A.2d 377, 379 (1961), and one can reside in one place but be domiciled in another, *District of Columbia v. Murphy*, 314 U.S. 441 (1941); In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 80, 182 N.W. 227, 228 (1921)." Mississippi Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: 490 U.S. 30, at 48 (1989).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2358461186912284415

"Residence in fact, coupled with the purpose to make the place of residence one's home, are the essential elements of domicile. *Mitchell v. United States*, 21 Wall. 350; *Pannill v. Roanoke Times Co*., 252 F. 910; *Beekman v. Beekman*, 53 Fla. 858, 43 So. 923; *Babcock v. Slater*, 212 Mass. 434, 99 N.E. 173; *Matter of Newcomb*, 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950; *Beale, Conflict of Laws*, § 15.2." State of Texas v. State of Florida: 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939).

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7. It is to be noted that privileges and immunities of a citizen of a State are in the constitution and laws of a particular State:

". . . Whatever may be the scope of section 2 of article IV -- and we need not, in this case enter upon a consideration of the general question -- the Constitution of the United States does not make the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of one State under the constitution and laws of that State, the measure of the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed, as of right, by a citizen of another State under its constitution and laws." McKane v. Durston: 153 U.S. 684, at 687 (1894).

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8. " ' . . . The ***privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States*** protected by the fourteenth amendment, are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential character of the federal Government, and granted or secured by the Constitution.' *Duncan v. Missouri* (1904) 152 U.S. 377, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485; *Slaughter House Cases*, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.

The provisions of section 2, art. 4, of the federal Constitution, that citizens of each state shall be entitled to ***privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states***, are held to be synonymous with rights of the citizens. *Corfield v. Coryell*, supra. This section is akin to the provision of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, as respects privileges and immunities, but the former is held not to make the privileges and immunities (the rights) enjoyed by citizens of the several states the measure of the privileges and immunities (the rights) to be enjoyed as of

right, by a citizen of another state, under its Constitution and laws. *McKane v. Durston*, 153 U.S. 684, 14 Sup. Ct. 913, 38 L. Ed. 867. This rule necessarily classifies citizens in their rights to the extent that a citizen of one state when in another state must be governed by the same rules which apply to the citizens of that state as to matters which are of the domestic concern of the state. *Cole v. Cunningham*, 133 U.S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538; *People v. Gallagher*, 93 N.Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232; *Butchers' Union v. Crescent City, Mo*., 111 U.S. 746, 4 Sup Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585; *Ex parte Kinney*, 14 Fed. Cas. 602; *Douglas v. Stephens*, 1 Del. Ch. 465." Strange v. Board of Commission: 91 N.E. 242, at 246 (1910).

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Also:

"Williams was arrested upon a warrant charging him with 'the offense of acting as emigrant agent without a license.' He made application to the judge of the superior court of the Ocmulgee circuit for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the warrant under which he was arrested charged him with a violation of that provision of the general tax act of 1898 which imposed 'upon each emigrant agent, or employer or employe of such agents, doing business in this state, the sum of five hundred dollars for each county in which such business is conducted.' Acts 1898, p. 24. He further alleged that the law which he was charged with having violated was in conflict with certain provisions of the constitutions of the United States and of the state of Georgia, enumerating in the application the various clauses of which the act was alleged to be violative . . . .

Is the law (the general tax act of 1898) a regulation or restriction of intercourse among the citizens of this state and those of other states? Under this branch of commerce the states are prohibited from passing any law which either restricts the free passage of the ***citizens of the United States*** through the several states, or which undertakes to regulate or restrict free communication between the ***citizens of the several states***. A tax on the right of a citizen to leave the state, or on the right of a citizen of another state to come into the state, is a regulation of interstate commerce, and void. *Crandall v. Nevada*, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L.Ed. 744; *Henderson v. Mayor*, etc., 92 U.S. 259, 23 L.Ed. 543; *People v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*, 107 U.S. 59, 2 Sup. Ct. 87, 27 L.Ed. 383; *Passenger Cases*, 7 How. 282, 12 L.Ed. 702. Nor can a state pass a law which attempts to regulate or restrict communication between the ***citizens of different states***. *Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton*, 122 U.S. 347, 7 Sup. Ct. 1126, 30 L.Ed. 1187; *Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co*., 96 U.S. 1, 24 L.Ed. 708. But the law under consideration in the present case neither regulates nor restricts the right of citizens of this state to leave its territory at will, nor to hold free communication with the citizens of other states." Williams v. Fears: 35 S.E. 699, at 699, 701 (1900).

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