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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO			
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11	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,) Case No. DF987654		
12	Detitionen	REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS		
13	Petitioner,) AND AUTHORITIES		
14	v.			
15	Elliot JONES,) Date: December 25, 2009		
16	Respondent.) Time: 12:45 p.m.) Dept. 42		
17)		
18	Respondent Elliot Jones respectfully submits the following Reply Memorandum of			
19	Points and Authorities.			
20	STATEMENT OF FACTS			
21	As far back as 2001, Respondent Jones stipulated to genetic testing to determine			
22	whether the child, Elliot, was his. At that time, the biological mother was found living out of			
23	state.			
24	In 2002, the County acknowledges that Jones filed a copy of independent genetic tests			
25 26	excluding him as Elliot's father. In 2002, the County also acknowledges that Jones provided			
26 27	a copy of an order from Pima County Superior Court in Arizona, holding that the genetic test			
27 28	excluded Respondent as the natural father, and dismissed the case for child support against			
20	him.			
	REPLV MEMORANDUM O	1 F POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		

1	In 2002, the County had actual knowledge of the genetic test and the order of the
2	Pima County Superior Court, yet the County did nothing to alleviate the injustice. The
3	County told Respondent to file a motion. Respondent respectfully asserts that the County,
4	armed with actual knowledge, had a duty to act for the benefit of both the child and
5	Respondent. A public entity such as the County operates, or should operate for the public
6	good. The County and its counsel had an ethical duty to act upon the knowledge they had.
7	The County did nothing.
8	LEGAL DISCUSSION
9	Introduction
10	In the County's opposing papers, they argue that the underlying judgment should not
11	be set aside, and that no other relief should be granted to Respondent. Respondent contends
12	that the judgment should be set aside, and the other relief he seeks be granted de facto.
13	A. Setting Aside the Judgment.
14	Respondent contends that this is a court of equity. Marriage of Plescia, 59
15	Cal.App.4 th 252, 257-8 (1997). A court of equity has the inherent authority to grant relief.
16	<u>Rappleyea v. Campbell</u> , 8 Cal.4 th 975 (1994). A court has the inherent authority to reconsider
17	its own judgments. Geddes v. Superior Court, 126 Cal.App.4 th 417, 426 (2005). This
18	inherent authority enables the court to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Hays v.
19	Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 260, 264 (1940).
20	Even a motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure §473 may be granted after the
21	six month time limit on equitable grounds. Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570,576 (1942).
22	While Respondent may have failed to timely file a motion for relief, the County, and
23	its attorneys had actual knowledge of the evidence excluding Respondent as the father as
24	early as 2002. The County and its counsel failed in their ethical duty to act upon the evidence,
25	however provided.
26	The County relies on County of Orange v. Superior Court, 155 Cal.App.4 th 1253
27	(2007) for the proposition that Respondent's instant motion should not be granted. County's
28	reliance is misplaced as County of Orange in factually inapposite.
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REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1	In <u>County of Orange</u> , the putative father signed a declaration of paternity	
2	acknowledging he was the biological father upon the birth of the child. After a default	
2	judgment was entered against him by the County, he then sought an order for a paternity test.	
4	Id. At 1255-6.	
5	The <u>County of Orange</u> court denied putative father's motion for relief, holding that	
6	Family Code §7646(a) sets forth the time frame for relief regarding the default judgment of	
7	paternity. <u>Id</u> . At 1259.	
8	The facts here are quite different. Respondent did not sign a declaration of paternity	
9	upon the birth of the child. Moreover, Respondent had a genetic test done in June, 2002.	
10	Respondent submitted the results of the test to the Pima County Superior Court in Arizona.	
11	The Arizona court then dismissed the child support action against him, citing the genetic test	
12	that excluded him as the father of Elliot.	
13	The County's position is that they have the right to ignore the results of the genetic	
14	test and the Pima County Superior Court's action, of which they had actual knowledge in	
15	June, 2002.	
16	Respondent respectfully submits that despite the enactment of Family Code §7646,	
17	the previously enunciated public policy is the better policy in this instance. In County of Los	
18	Angeles v. Navarro, 120 Cal.App.4 th 246 (2004) [Navarro]. The Navarro court stated:	
19	The County, a political embodiment of its citizens and inhabitants, must	
20	always act in the public interest and for the general good. It should not enforce child support judgments it knows to be unfounded. And in particular,	
it should not ask the courts to assist it in doing so. <u>Id</u> . At 249-3	it should not ask the courts to assist it in doing so. <u>Id</u> . At 249-50	
22	Here, the County had actual knowledge that Respondent was not the father of Elliot,	
23	but did nothing. The County counsel, as officers of the court, have an ethical duty to act on	
24	the evidence, and not wait years to act, legislation to change, and then rely upon newly	
25	enacted procedural form over substance.	
26	Respondent asserts that if County had acted on what it knew in 2002, the judgment	
27	would have been set aside under the previous legislation. Respondent contends that the	
28	County did nothing, essentially lying in wait, for Respondent to take action.	
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	3 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	
I		

1 B. County Makes an Improper Collateral Attack Against the Arizona Judgment. 2 Respondent asserts that the County basically ignores the Arizona judgment of 2002. 3 Respondent contends that California must give full faith and credit to the Arizona judgment excluding Respondent as Elliot's father. A jurisdictionally valid out-of-state judgment must 4 5 be afforded full faith and credit even if contrary to California's law or public policy. There is 6 no roving public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause. Keith G. v. Suzanne H., 7 62 Cal.App.4th 853, 861 (1998), citing with approval Baker by Thomas v. General Motors 8 Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). 9 Respondent also contends that a judgment in a paternity action must also be given full 10 faith and credit in California. It has the same effect as a paternity determination made in 11 California. Family Code §5604; In re Mary G., 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 202-203 (1997). 12 Respondent asserts that the Pima County Arizona court judgment excluding him as 13 Elliot's father must be given full faith and credit here. Additionally, the County had actual 14 knowledge of the judgment in mid-2002, and did nothing. 15 **CONCLUSION** 16 When viewed in its totality, Respondent contends that the judgment should be set 17 aside. In 2002, The County had actual knowledge of the genetic test and the Arizona court 18 judgment that excluded Respondent as Elliot's father. Yet public policy, statute, and case 19 law then in force in 2002 would have allowed Respondent to be relieved of this injustice. 20 Rather than exercise its ethical duty to act, the County did nothing. 21 The County could have brought its own motion to correct a judgment it knew to be 22 incorrect. For whatever reason it did not. This wrong should be righted, and the 23 Respondent's motion granted. 24 Dated: December , 2009 Respectfully submitted, 25 26 Susan Supboena 27 Attorney for Respondent 28