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|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| CENTRAL D | ATES DISTRICT COURT ISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA STERN DIVISION |
| CARI SHIELDS, AMBER BOGC and TERESA STOCKTON, on be of themselves and all others simila situated, Plaintiffs, vs. WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS US, INC., DISNEY ONLINE, INC., DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE, Defendants. | ehalf Assigned to the Honorable Dolly M. |

| 1 | TO: ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN: |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2 | PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on April 11, 2011, at 9:30 a.m. or at such |
| 3 | other date and time as may be ordered by the Court, in Courtroom 7 of the above |
| 4 | captioned Court, located at 312 N. Spring St., Los Angeles, California, 90012, |
| 5 | Plaintiffs in this matter will and hereby do move for an order certifying the classes |
| 6 | as proposed below; for appointment of Cari Shields, Amber Boggs and Teresa |
| 7 | Stockton as class representatives; and for appointment of Anthony Anderson |
| 8 | Benton Dogali and Eugene Feldman to act as class counsel for plaintiff classes. |
| 9 | This motion is made following a meeting between counsel for the parties pursuant |
| 10 | to Local Rule 7-3 which occurred on February 7, 2011. |
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| 13 | Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class Plaint | ffs |
| 15 | | |
| | | DISTRICT COURT CT OF CALIFORNIA |
| 16 | | N DIVISION |
| 17 | | |
| 8 | CARI SHIELDS, AMBER BOGGS | |
| 9 | and TERESA STOCKTON, on behalf | |
| 0 | of themselves and all others similarly | |
| | situated, | |
| 21 | Plaintiffs, | |
| 2 | vs. | G N N 10 5010 |
| 3 | | Case No.: No. 10-cv-5810 |
| 24 | WALT DISNEY PARKS AND | MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION |
| 25 | RESORTS US, INC., DISNEY | |
| | ONLINE, INC., DOES 1-10, | Hearing Date: April 11, 2011 |
| 26 | INCLUSIVE, | Time: |
| 27 | | |
| 28 | Defendants. | |
| 28 | | |

NOTICE

On April 11, 2011, at 9:30 am, or as soon thereafter as this motion may be heard, before the Honorable Dolly Gee, Plaintiffs will, and hereby do, move for an order certifying a series of classes in the above-captioned action. This motion is based on this Notice of Motion, and all accompanying attachments hereto.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs seek an order certifying the following classes¹:

1. PLAINTIFF DISNEY CHARACTER CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926, who were or will become customers of the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and who were or will in the future be denied interaction and equal treatment by Disney employees dressed as Disney characters.

PLAINTIFF SIGNAGE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
 § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have not

 ¹ The Class definitions stated here are slightly expanded from the operative
 ²¹ Complaint, in so far as each expressly includes unknown, future victims of
 ²³ Disney's misconduct, rather than only implicitly doing so. Where the express
 ²⁴ definitions indicate, essentially, "persons who have been discriminated against by
 ²⁵ Disney", the definitions stated here each add words to indicate, essentially,
 ²⁶ "persons who have been <u>or will be</u> discriminated against by Disney". In addition,
 ²⁶ two definitions contain suggested substantive changes to conform to evidence: the
 ²⁷ Parade Class includes "shows" as well as formal parades, and the Parking Class has
 ²⁷ been reduced to address only DisneyLand Resort and not Walt Disney World
 ²⁸ Resort. Plaintiffs' request and basis for these amendments is presented in the

been, or upon visiting in the future will not be provided signage, menus or schedules in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print and were not read, in full, the menus, at the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops in Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.

- 3. PLAINTIFF MAP CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have not been or who upon visiting in the future will not be provided maps in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print, at the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops in Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.
- 4. PLAINTIFF KENNEL CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have either paid a fee for the use of a kennel for his/her service animal at (1)Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida; (2) been deterred from visiting Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida on account of the kennel fee for his/her service animal; (3) been deterred from visiting Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and its theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops on account of there being no reasonable designated areas for service animals to defecate; or (4) been deterred from visiting Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and its theme parks by refusing to allow service animals to be tied to any locations within the theme parks while the visually impaired owner is using park rides,
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or who will suffer such deterrence from, or treatment upon, visiting the Resorts in the future.


- 5. PLAINTIFF AUDIO DESCRIPTION DEVICE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have used or attempted to use, or who will upon future visits use or attempt to use, an audio description device at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and been deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the device.
- 6. PLAINTIFF COMPANION TICKET CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have paid for, or who will upon future visits be required to pay for, an additional ticket for a companion or aide to assist the visually impaired individual to utilize the accommodations at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.
- 7. PLAINTIFF PARADE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have experienced discrimination, or who will upon future visits experience discrimination, due to Defendants' policy of excluding persons with disabilities, other than wheelchair users, from preferential locations to stand or sit during the parades and shows at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.
 - 8. PLAINTIFF LOCKER CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
 § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have been or who will upon future visits be unable to utilize a locker at

Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.

9. PLAINTIFF WEBSITE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have been or who will in the future be unable to access one or more of the websites maintained by Defendants such as www.disney.go.com and were or will be denied equal access to Defendants' theme parks, hotels, restaurants and stores and the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through DEFENDANTS' websites.

10.PLAINTIFF PARKING CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926, who were or will in the future be customers of the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops at Disneyland/California Adventure in California and were or will be denied equal treatment due to Defendants' failure to comply with accessible parking provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guide ("ADAAG"), Americans with Disabilities Act and/or Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations. Additionally, Defendants' parking structure and parking lot at Disneyland are violating the following provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 5, as to violate the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations.

Plaintiffs further request that the Court appoint the Named Plaintiffs Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, and Teresa Stockton as class representatives, and the law firms of Forizs and Dogali, P.A. and Eugene Feldman, P.C. as class counsel.



POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITES

I. <u>BACKGROUND</u> A. NATURE OF THE ACTION

This class action arises from the Defendant Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc.'s and Defendant Disney Online, Inc.'s (collectively "Defendants") failure to make the goods and services they provide to the public accessible to visually impaired persons, and for their adoption of policies and procedures that unlawfully discriminate against visually impaired guests.

B. CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGED

The First Amended Complaint ("FAC") asserts causes of action to enjoin violations of the following statutes:

| Count I | Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131, et. |
|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| | seq.) ("ADA") |
| Count II | Unruh Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code § 51 and § |
| | 52, et. seq.) ("Unruh Act") |
| Count III | California Disabled Persons Act (California Civil Code § |
| | 54, <i>et. seq.</i>) ("CDPA") |

C. FACTS

i. Named Plaintiffs

The Named Plaintiffs in this case are Cari Shields ("Shields"), Amber Boggs ("Boggs") and Teresa Stockton ("Stockton"). All are visually impaired individuals who qualify as disabled under the ADA, CDPA and the Unruh Act. Shields is an annual pass holder for the Disneyland Resort in California, which consists of Disneyland and California Adventure. Ex. A at 55. Shields has also visited the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida, consisting of the Magic Kingdom, Epcot, the Animal Kingdom and Hollywood Studios. Ex. A at 50, 57. Shields utilizes the

1

services of a service animal to help guide her. *See* ex. A at 11; Ex. D at Resp. # 4.
Furthermore, Shields has been to the Disneyland Resort numerous times in the last
two years and to the Walt Disney World Resort one time in the last two years. Ex.
A at 50-51, 57; Ex. D at Resp. #6, Resp. #8. Shields intends to visit the
Disneyland Resort and the Walt Disney World Resort in the future. Ex. A at 50-51
(WDW).

Boggs, along with her visually impaired husband, Richard Boggs, and their two children, are annual pass holders at the Disneyland Resort. Ex. B at 112-13. Like Shields, Boggs utilizes a service animal to assist her. Ex. B at 56; Ex. E at Resp. # 4. Boggs has been to the Disneyland Resort numerous times in the last two years. Ex. E at Resp. # 8. Boggs also intends to visit the Disneyland Resort in the future and possibly the Walt Disney World Resort. Ex. B at 69.

Stockton, with her sighted husband, Mark Stockton, has visited the Walt Disney World Resort two times in the last two years. Ex. F at Resp. #8. Stockton also uses a service animal to assist her. Ex. C at 68; Ex. F at Resp. #4. Stockton intends to visit the Disneyland Resort and the Walt Disney World Resort in the future. Ex. C at 159 (DL).

ii. Defendants

The Defendants are Walt Disney Company affiliates which provide theme park and resort accommodations and services in the United States. Specifically, Defendant Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc. owns and operates the theme parks, restaurants and resorts at the Disneyland Resort and the Walt Disney World Resort. Defendant Disney Online operates portions of the Disney websites, of which visually impaired guests, such as the Named Plaintiffs, should be able to search for information on the Disney theme parks, restaurants and resorts.

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D. SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

i. Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA was enacted in 1990 to ensure that:

Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification - 2

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

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42 U.S.C. §12182(a). Public accommodations include places of lodging, establishments serving food or drink, and parks and other places of recreation. 42 U.S.C. §12181(7).

The discrimination Congress intended to prevent in passing the ADA, includes segregation, exclusion, and denial of benefits, services and opportunities that are as effective and meaningful to people with disabilities as they are to others. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 302 (1990), 1990 WL 125563, *8. The ADA was designed to protect against not only intentional discrimination, but against "the construction of transportation, architectural, and communication barriers or the adoption or application of standards, criteria, practices or procedures that are based on thoughtlessness or indifference—that discrimination resulting from benign neglect." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 302 (1990), 1990 WL 125563, *8.

Discrimination under the ADA includes denial of the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the "goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantaged, or accommodations of an entity." 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1)(i). It is also discriminatory to offer an individual or class of individuals an opportunity to participate in or benefit from those goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations which is not equal to that offered to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1)(ii). Under the ADA, an entity must make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices and procedures in order to ensure that its goods, services, facilities, privileges advantages and accommodations can be afforded to individuals with disabilities, and must provide auxiliary aids and services where necessary. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). The auxiliary aids required to be provided include "qualified readers, taped texts, audio recordings,
Brailled materials, large print materials or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual impairments"
28 C.F.R. §36.303(b)(2). An entity must also remove architectural barriers and structural communication barriers. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).

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ii. The Unruh Civil Rights Act

Section 51 of the California Civil Code (the "Unruh Act") provides that all persons in California are free and equal no matter their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability or medical condition, and are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

Section 52 of the Civil Code provides that whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to section 51, is liable for each and every offense. Section 51(f) of the Civil Code provides that any violation of the right of any individual under the ADA shall also be considered a violation of the Unruh Act.

Defendants' violations of the rights protected by the Unruh Act entitle Named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed classes to receive injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, as provided for in Civil Code 52.

iii. The California Disabled Persons Act

The provisions of Civil Code §§ 54, *et. seq.* (the "CDPA") guarantees, inter alia, that all persons with disabilities, including the visually impaired, shall have the same full and equal access as other members of the general public to the services, facilities and advantages of public accommodations within the jurisdiction of the State of California. Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a)(1). Section 54(c) of the Civil Code provides that any violation of the right of any individual under the ADA shall also be considered a violation of the CDPA.

Defendants' violations of the rights protected by the CDPA entitle Named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed classes to receive injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, as provided for in Civil Code § 54.3.

E. THE PROPOSED CLASSES

Named Plaintiffs are requesting certification of the following Classes to adjudicate the causes of action asserted in the FAC.

PLAINTIFF DISNEY CHARACTER CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926, who were or will become customers of the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and who were or will in the future be denied interaction and equal treatment by Disney employees dressed as Disney characters.

PLAINTIFF SIGNAGE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have not been, or upon visiting in the future will not be provided signage, menus or schedules in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print and were not read, in full, the menus, at the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops in Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.

PLAINTIFF MAP CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have not been or who upon visiting in the future will not be provided maps in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print, at the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops in Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.

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KENNEL CLASS: All visually PLAINTIFF impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have either (1) paid a fee for the use of a kennel for his/her service animal at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida; (2) been deterred from visiting Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida on account of the kennel fee for his/her service animal; (3) been deterred from visiting Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and its theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops on account of there being no reasonable designated areas for service animals to defecate: or (4)been deterred from visiting Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and its theme parks by refusing to allow service animals to be tied to any locations within the theme parks while the visually impaired owner is using park rides, or who will suffer such deterrence from, or treatment upon, visiting the Resorts in the future.

PLAINTIFF AUDIO DESCRIPTION DEVICE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have used or attempted to use, or who will upon future visits use or attempt to use, an audio description device at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida and been or will be deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the device.

PLAINTIFF COMPANION TICKET CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have paid for, or who will upon future visits be required to pay for, an additional ticket for a companion or aide to assist the visually impaired individual to utilize the accommodations at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.

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PLAINTIFF PARADE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have experienced discrimination, or who will upon future visits experience discrimination, due to Defendants' policy of excluding persons with disabilities, other than wheelchair users, from preferential locations to stand or sit during the parades and shows at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.

PLAINTIFF LOCKER CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have been or who will upon future visits be unable to utilize a locker at Disneyland/California Adventure in California or the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida.

PLAINTIFF WEBSITE CLASS: All visually impaired individuals considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and California Government Code Section 12926 who have been or who will upon future visits be unable to access one or more of the websites maintained by Defendants such as www.disney.go.com and were or will be denied equal access to Defendants' theme parks, hotels, restaurants and stores and the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through DEFENDANTS' websites.

PLAINTIFF PARKING CLASS: All visually impaired individuals
considered to have a physical disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §
12102 and California Government Code Section 12926, who were or will in the
future be customers of the theme parks, hotels, restaurants, and shops at
Disneyland/California Adventure in California and were or will be denied equal
treatment due to Defendants' failure to comply with accessible parking provisions

of the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guide ("ADAAG"),
Americans with Disabilities Act and/or Title 24 of the California Code of
Regulations. Additionally, Defendants' parking structure and parking lot at
Disneyland are violating the following provisions of the ADAAG: 4.6.2, 4.1.2,
4.1.3, 4.7.7, 4.29.2 and 4.29.5; all so as to violate the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations.

II. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

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A. THE CLASS DEFINITIONS

The above-recited Class Definitions are slightly expanded from the express language of the FAC. Specifically, each definition is expanded to expressly encompass future, unknown victims of Disney's misconduct, rather than only implicitly encompassing them. Plaintiffs' complaint was always intended to encompass future victims, as it seeks purely prospective injunctive relief, which necessarily benefits the broader class of visually impaired Disney visitors. (Class Counsel also expressly advised the Court at the December 6, 2010 case management conference that the complaint seeks purely injunctive relief for the class, and seeks to correct Disney's systemic policies and procedures). The Class Definitions in the FAC, which appear expressly to refer to existing victims, and the Prayer for Relief in the FAC, which calls for prospective changes to Disney's policies and facilities which benefit the entire visually impaired community rather than only Plaintiffs themselves, cannot be reconciled.⁴ Plaintiffs ask the Court, upon certifying the Classes, to certify them in the only manner which logically interprets and enforces the meaning of their complaint.

⁴ Undersigned counsel apologizes to the Court for this ambiguity and thanks defense counsel for bringing the issue to the undersigned's attention at the Meet and Confer which occurred in advance of this Motion.

Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification - 8

It is within the Court's authority to amend the class definitions. *Kamar v. Radio Shack Corp.*, 254 F.R.D. 387, 391, n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2008); *Williams v. City of Antioch*, 2010 WL 3632197, *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010); *Hagen v. City of Winnemucca*, 108 F.R.D. 61, 64 (D. Nev. 1985); *see also In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation*, 267 F.R.D. 583, 590-91 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting certification of a class broader than pled in the complaint).⁵

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In addition to Plaintiffs' suggestion that the Class Definitions should be clarified to include the future victims who are intended beneficiaries of the Prayer for Relief, two substantive changes to the Class Definitions are suggested. First, as to the Parking Class, discovery has shown no basis for Plaintiffs to represent visually impaired persons who have visited or will visit parking facilities at Walt Disney World Resort - only DisneyLand Resort. None of the Named Plaintiffs has experienced a parking-related violation at Walt Disney World Resort. A reduced Parking Class definition should be adopted, limiting the Parking Class to DisneyLand Resort.

Second, the Parade Class must include "shows", including exhibitions and the like, as well as parades. Disney offers many shows which are similar in nature to parades, so that they can be said to already be encompassed by the Parade Class definition. But should Disney propose that the term "parade" is too narrow to include shows, the Class Definition should be amended to reflect the evidence. The evidence establishes that Disney discriminates against its visually impaired guests not only at parades, but at light and laser shows and similar events. *See* Ex. A at 213-14; Ex. B at 290-92.

⁵ Even if the Class Definitions are not clarified and approved as requested, this Memorandum demonstrates *infra* that sufficient numerosity exists for each Class anyway, as to prior and existing victims of Disney's discrimination, known and unknown, so that the existing Class Definitions will support Rule 23 certification.

B. THE CLASS ACTIONS

Class actions have the main purpose of promoting judicial economy by preventing multiple suits on the same issue and protecting individuals with small claims who might otherwise not be able to bring their claims individually. Park v. Ralph's Grocery Store, 254 F.R.D. 112, 117 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Siddigi v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 2000 WL 33190435, *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2000).

To certify a class the proponent must show that all of the elements in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) are satisfied as well as demonstrating that the class action sufficiently satisfies one of the categories of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This burden is not heavy. Irwin v. Mascott, 96 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971-72 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In making the determination of whether to certify a class the Court must take the allegations made in the complaint as true and only analyze whether the asserted claims are appropriate for resolution as a class. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Additionally, the Court cannot address the merits of the substantive claims made by the class. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732(1974); Target Corp. 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1190, 1193; Siddiqi, 2000 WL 33190435 at *3, *8; Bates v. United Parcel Service, 204 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

When the class sought to be certified is for violations of civil rights, as is the case here, the Rule 23 requirements must be read liberally. *Charles v. Dalton*, 1996 WL 53633, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1996); Adams v. Pinole Point Steel Co., 1994 WL 515347, *2 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1994). Additionally, when class certification is sought under Rule 23(b)(2), as in this action, class certification requirements are relaxed. Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 1994 WL 443464, *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1994). And if there is any doubt concerning class certification, the court should err in favor of certification. Baghdasarian v. Amazon.com, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 383, 386 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Nat'l Organization on

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Disability v. Tartaglione, 2001 WL 1258089, *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2001); Ceaser
 v. Pataki, 2000 WL 1154318, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000); see Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Taco Bell Corp., 184 F.R.D. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 1999).

If there are multiple classes or subclasses to be certified, as is the case here, each class must independently meet Rule 23 class action requirements. *See Bates*, 204 F.R.D. at 443. Therefore, this Memorandum first addresses Rule 23 requirements generally across the spectrum of ten classes, then addresses Rule 23 concerns which may specifically apply to individual proposed classes. Because the Named Plaintiffs have established each class requirement as to each proposed class, the Court should GRANT this Motion.

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i. Requirements of Rule 23(a)

Rule 23(a) requires that: (1) the class be so numerous that joinder is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims of the Named Plaintiffs be typical of the claims of the class; and (4) the Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4).

a. Numerosity

Numerosity requires a showing that the number of class members is such that joinder is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). This showing only requires impracticability, not impossibility. *Bates*, 204 F.R.D. at 444; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4.

Exact numbers need not be alleged to sufficiently demonstrate numerosity. *Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1199; *Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp.*, 220 F.R.D.
604, 608 (N.D. Cal. 2004); *Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.*, 158
F.R.D. 439, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1994) *modified* 158 F.R.D. 439 (adding that the class cannot be amorphous). Presumptively, 40 or more class members will satisfy numerosity. *Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co.*, 254 F.R.D. 610, 617 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Additionally, when the proposed class includes future, unknown members,

joinder is inherently impracticable and numerosity is met regardless of class size. *Jordan v. County of Los Angeles*, 669 F.2d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982) *rev'd on other grounds*, 459 U.S. 810, 103 S. Ct. 35, 74 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1982); *Siddiqi*, 2000
WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters*, 111 F.R.D.
595, 599 (N.D. Cal. 1986); *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson*, 102 F.R.D. 457, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

In determining whether numerosity exists the court should consider the geographic diversity of the class members. *Park*, 254 F.R.D. at 120; *Moeller*, 220 F.R.D. at 608; *Bates*, 204 F.R.D. at 444. The court should also consider the relative ease or difficulty of identifying the class members. *Park*, 254 F.R.D. at 120; *Moeller*, 220 F.R.D. at 608.

When necessary the court can use census data to determine whether 12 numerosity has been met. Moeller, 220 F.R.D. at 608 n.8; see e.g. Park, 254 13 F.R.D. at 120; Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1199; see also Colo. Cross-14 Disability Coal., 184 F.R.D. at 357-58 ("[c]ensus data are frequently relied on by 15 courts in determining the size of the proposed class"). Additionally the court may 16 examine statistical data. E.g. Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1199; Moeller, 220 17 F.R.D. at 608; see also Ass'n for Disabled Ams v. Amoco Oil, Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, 18 462 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Access now, Inc. v. AHM CGH, Inc., 2000 WL 1809979, *2 19 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2000). And the court may make common sense assumptions to 20 support the finding of numerosity. *Moeller*, 220 F.R.D. at 608; see also Neiberger 21 v. Hawkins, 208 F.R.D. 301, 313 (D. Colo. 2002); Alexander v. Novello, 210 22 F.R.D. 27, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Tartaglione, 2001 WL 1258089 at *1; Colo. 23 Cross-Disability Coal., 184 F.R.D. at 358. Finally, numerosity may be satisfied 24 and the class action permitted to proceed based on estimates as to the size of the 25 proposed class. Mazza, 254 F.R.D. at 617; Alexander v. Novello, 210 F.R.D. 27, 26 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 27

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Furthermore, because the proposed classes seek exclusively injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) the numerosity requirement is specifically relaxed. *Sueoka v. United States*, 101 Fed. Appx. 649, 653, 2004 WL 1042541, **2 (9th Cir. May 5, 2004); *see alsoMutli-Ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network v. City of Los Angeles*, 246 F.R.D. 621, 631 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

(i) All Proposed Classes Are So Numerous that Joinder is Impracticable

All of the proposed classes are sufficiently numerous to meet the requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) because joinder of all the class members would be impracticable. Numerosity is specifically met because all of the proposed classes include future, unknown members, which inherently makes joinder impracticable. *Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164*, 102 F.R.D. at 461. However, to give the Court an impression of the sheer size of the proposed classes, the following is provided.

Exact numbers are not needed to satisfy numerosity, *Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1199, and such can be satisfied through estimates as to the amount of class members. *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 617. This is even more true in this case where the Rule 23 requirements, and specifically numerosity, are relaxed because this is a civil rights class action seeking purely injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). *See Charles*, 1996 WL 53633 at *3; *Joyce*, 1994 WL 443464 at *8; *Sueoka*, 101 Fed. Appx. At 653. Additionally courts have regularly relied on statistics, such as census data, to extrapolate estimates and determine that numerosity has been met. *See Moeller*, 220 F.R.D. at 608; *Park*, 254 F.R.D. at 120; *Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.

According to the July 2009 report of the United States Census Bureau, 307 million persons live in the United States. Ex. J at Table 1, pg. 1. 25.1 million visually impaired persons live in the United States. National Center for Health Statistics, National Health Interview Survey, 2008. Ex. L at 36. In other words, roughly 8% of all Americans are visually impaired.

According to Themed Entertainment Association/AECOM Economics 2009 Theme Index, The Global Attractions Attendance Report, the Walt Disney World Resort had over 47 million (47,513,000) visitors in 2009, while the Disneyland Resort had over 21 million (21,950,000) visitors in 2009.⁶ Ex. I at 11.

After the complaint in this action was filed, Greg Hale, who is Worldwide Vice President of Safety and Accessibility for Defendant Disney World Parks and Resorts, publicly stated that of the more than 100,000 persons per day who visit Walt Disney World, the number who are disabled " ... [is] well into the thousands every day". Albright, M., *St. Petersburg Times*, June 22, 2010, Ex. K.

Furthermore, Bob Minnick, also of Disney Parks' Worldwide Safety & Accessibility Department gave a presentation on "Accessibility Design Considerations" for the disabled, stating that in 1997 there were 3.5 million to 4.5 million visually impaired persons in the United States, "equal to the population of This presentation establishes that not only have South Carolina". Ex. S. Defendants long been aware of the population of visually impaired persons, but also that a large number of visually impaired persons visit Disney's resorts. A more recent article approved by Mr. Minnick recites that about 60 million disabled persons live in the United States, that more than 20 million American families include at least one disabled person, and that more than 40,000 "Disney Vacation Club" member families include a disabled person. Ex. R. These Disney-endorsed statistics, combined with census data provided above, demonstrate that the number of visually impaired persons who visit Disney's resorts is substantial – well beyond the modest threshold required under Rule 23. Additionally, using the Disneyendorsed number of 60 million disabled Americans it can be calculated that

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⁶ Plaintiffs have requested attendance documentation from Defendants which Disney has refused to provide citing proprietary, trade secret objections.

roughly 41% of all disabled persons in the United States are visually impaired (25.1 million of 60 million).

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Although Defendants have failed to provide data on the issue, through census data it can be estimated that roughly 3,760,000 million (8% of 47 million) visually impaired persons visited the Walt Disney World Resort in 2009, and roughly 1,680,000 million (8% of 21 million) visually impaired persons visited the Disneyland Resort in 2009. Or, in the alternative, Mr. Hale's admission can be used to estimate that even if only 1,000 disabled persons visited the Walt Disney World Resort daily, 410 of those would be visually impaired (41% of 1,000). And because the Disneyland Resort attendance is roughly 44% of the Walt Disney World Resort attendance (21 million versus 47 million in 2009), the daily visually impaired attendance at the Disneyland Resort would be 180 (44% of 410). Keeping in mind that because this is a civil rights class action and additionally that only injunctive relief is being sought, which requires a liberal or relaxed application of Rule 23 requirements, this data, along with common sense assumptions, leads to the obvious conclusion that numerosity for each of the proposed classes is met.

Additionally, in the Plaintiffs' Request to Produce, the Defendants were specifically asked to provide any record of communications between visually impaired persons and Defendants for the years 2006 to present. In the less than 1250 pages⁷ of discovery documents provided to date there can be found 41 communications from visually impaired persons who visited the resorts and communicated with Disney concerning their experience.⁸ Of the 41

⁷ Excluding 5% of which have been redacted and another 20% of which are redundant copies of the same documents.

⁸ Whether this collection constitutes the universe of complaints is unknown because

 ²⁷ Disney continues an endless process of incrementally and chaotically releasing
 ²⁸ documents to Plaintiffs. See the section, *infra*: Defendants are Estopped from

Contesting Certification Due to Their Systematic Refusal to Provide Discovery.

communications from visually impaired persons, other than the Named Plaintiffs, two are neutral in content, four are positive in content and the remaining 35 2 complain of deficiencies in Defendants' meeting of the needs of the visually impaired.9 See Composite Ex. O. Complaints that specifically relate to particular proposed Classes are addressed infra. 5

Here, common sense and the evidence set forth herein indicates that the proposed classes are sufficiently large to satisfy the numerosity requirement. And even if the Court decides to only allow certification as to past and present victims of the Defendants' discriminatory policies and actions, Mr. Hale's admission and the cited census data specifically demonstrate that such a class is sufficiently large to satisfy numerosity.

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b. Commonality

Commonality requires that there be questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality is permissively construed and "all questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule". Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998); Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 2348659, *4 (N.D. Cal. Jun 8, 2010); Moeller, 220 F.R.D. at 608. In fact, commonality is satisfied when the class members have common legal issues but varying facts, or if they share common facts seek relief based on different legal remedies. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019; Dominguez, 2010 WL 2348659 at *4; Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1200; Bates, 204 F.R.D. at 445.

Commonality is a "minimal" requirement. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020; Moeller, 220 F.R.D. at 608; Bates, 204 F.R.D. at 445. It is a qualitative test, as

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The cited figure does not include test groups that Disney compensated and escorted around the parks to test market their audio descriptive device in 2010 nor articles Disney commissioned concerning use of the Park by the visually impaired. ⁹Note: some visitors had multiple complaints.

opposed to a quantitative one, and can be satisfied with only one common, significant issue of law or fact. *Dukes v. Wal-Mart Inc.*, 509 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2007); *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

In considering whether commonality is satisfied, central decision-making is a factor "weighing heavily towards a finding of commonality, if it does not establish commonality outright". *Moeller*, 220 F.R.D. at 610. Also, in civil rights suits, commonality is satisfied where a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the class members is challenged. *Armstrong v. Davis*, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (abrogated on different grounds); *Dominguez*, 2010 WL 2348659 at *5; *see also Arnold*, 158 F.R.D. at 448 (commonality "met by the alleged existence of common discriminatory practices"); *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 ("[f]acial discrimination allegations also raise common issues of law and fact that are appropriate for class-wide adjudication").

c. Typicality

Typicality requires the claims of the Named Plaintiffs to be typical of the claims of the class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). This is a permissive standard, so that the Named Plaintiffs' claims need not be identical to those of the absent class members, but only "reasonably co-extensive" with them. *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; *Dominguez*, 2010 WL 2348659 at *6; *Bates*, 204 F.R.D. at 446; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *7.

To be typical the Named Plaintiffs must have the same interests and suffer the same injuries as the absent class members. *Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; *Bates*, 204 F.R.D. at 446; *Arnold*, 158 F.R.D. at 449. The injuries need not be identical to those of the absent class members, only similar, resulting from the "same injurious course of conduct". *Armstrong*, 275 F.3d at 869; *Moeller*, 220 F.R.D. at 611.

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d. Adequacy of Representation

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Adequacy of representation requires that the Named Plaintiffs will fairly and 2 adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). To establish 3 adequacy the Named Plaintiffs must show that they and their counsel have no 4 conflicts of interest with the absent class members, and that they will vigorously 5 prosecute the action on behalf of the class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020; Dominguez, 6 2010 WL 2348659 at *7; Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1202; Moeller, 220 7 F.R.D. at 611; Bates, 204 F.R.D. at 447. Additionally, adequacy of representation 8 is generally presumed unless there is evidence to the contrary. In re Madison 9 Associates, 183 B.R. 206, 207 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1995); see also Marcus v. 10 Kansas, Dept. of Revenue, 206 F.R.D. 509, 512 (D. Kan. 2002); Access Now, Inc., 11 2000 WL 1809979 at 4 (citing Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 151 F.R.D. 378 (D. 12 Colo. 1993). 13

The Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel adequately represent the class and 14 will continue to do so. The Named Plaintiffs are more than adequate class 15 representatives and their interests align with the classes they wish to represent, 16 having no antagonistic interests. The Named Plaintiffs have taken this action and 17 their associated responsibilities very seriously. Andy Dogali's Declaration 18 describes in detail the extent to which each of the Named Plaintiffs have been 19 actively involved in this action, including fully participating in the discovery 20 process: attending depositions, responding to discovery requests and remaining abreast of the case status. Ex. M. 22

The undersigned attorneys' Declarations outline that they have no 23 antagonistic interests, and outlines their qualifications and experience to act as 24 Class Counsel. Ex. M; Ex. N. Class Counsel consists of Andy Dogali of Forizs & 25 Dogali, P.A. and Eugene Feldman of Eugene Feldman Attorney at Law. The 26 Dogali and Feldman Declarations demonstrate substantial qualifications and 27 experience inclass actions and complex litigation, including civil rights and ADA 28

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litigation. Ex. M; Ex. N. Class Counsel have also demonstrated diligence thus far 1 in the action, as they have been staunchadvocates for the Named Plaintiffs and the 2 absent class members. Thus far, Class Counsel has appeared before the Court, 3 engaged in multiple depositions, and has diligently attempted to obtain records and 4 disclosures from Disney, diligently reviewing the materials Disney has chosen thus 5 far to provide. In other class ations courts have found Class Counsel adequate, and 6 prior adequacy findings are persuasive support for finding adequacy here. See In 7 re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, 246 F.R.D. 98, 120 (C.D. Cal. 2007); see also 8 Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc., 2000 WL 1774091, *5 (N.D. Ill. 9 Dec. 1, 2000) (stating prior adequacy findings are persuasive for subsequent 10 adequacy findings). 11

As both Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have done commendable, competent work in this action, the adequacy of representation requirement is satisfied as to each of the proposed classes.

ii.

ii. Requirements of Rule 23(b)(2)

A properly certified class must fit into one of the categories contained in Rule 23(b). The proposed classes here meet the requirements contained under Rule 23(b)(2) and Plaintiffs seek Rule 23(b)(2) certification.

To satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) the Named Plaintiffs must show that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class", thus making injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Civil rights class actions are "prime examples" of Rule 23(b)(2) cases. *Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,* 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L.E. 2d 689 (1997); *Moeller,* 220 F.R.D. at 613. Some courts have even stated that section (b)(2) was specifically designed to facilitate civil rights class actions. *See Moeller,* 220 F.R.D. at 613; *Arnold,* 158 F.R.D. at 452. Rule 23(b)(2) certification is also appropriate where injunctive or declaratory relief is the primary

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or exclusive relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); *Dominguez*, 2010 WL
 2348659 at *7.

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Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied when the class members' complaints arise from patterns or practices generally applicable to the entire class, even if not all of the class members have been harmed by the challenged actions. *Bates*, 204 F.R.D. at 447 (citing *Walters v. Reno*, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998)). Additionally, there is no "need" requirement for class certification in the Ninth Circuit and courts will not refuse to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) purely because the injunctive relief requested could also be accomplished through an individual suit. *Park*, 254 F.R.D. at 122-23; *Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High School Dist.*, 251 F.R.D. 564, 565-66 (S.D. Cal. 2008); *see also McMillon v. Hawaii*, 261 F.R.D. 536, 547-48 (D. Hawaii 2009).

The case at hand is a civil rights case where the Named Plaintiffs, and each of the proposed classes as a whole, complain of class-wide discrimination by the Defendants for the failure to accommodate visually impaired guests at their parks, restaurants, resorts and websites. The relief sought by the Named Plaintiffs and each of the proposed classes is exclusively injunctive. *See* FAC. Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate for each of the proposed classes.

C. ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM CONTESTING CERTIFICATION DUE TO THEIR SYSTEMATIC REFUSAL TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY

Named Plaintiffs have requested specific data from the Defendants relating to visually impaired attendance at the Resorts, as well as specific data relating to each of the proposed classes. *See* Ex. P. However, despite the issues being placed directly before Disney prior to the depositions of its Rule 30(b)(6) corporate representatives, Disney shed no light on the number of visually impaired persons who visit the Resorts or the websites. *See* Ex. H at 45; Ex. G at 17-18. Specifically, Defendant Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc.'s corporate

representative, Mr. Jones, could not testify as to the number of visually impaired 1 visitors to the Disneyland Resort, stating this is not something Defendants track or 2 monitor. Ex. G at 17. Disney had performed no diligent effort to see whether the 3 information might be available somewhere, despite having been tasked to do so by 4 the Rule 30(b)(6) notice. Ex. G at 17. Disney acknowledged that its ignorance and 5 failed diligence would be the same for the Walt Disney World Resort, and that 6 neither resort maintains or possesses any information on the number of visually 7 impaired persons who ride the theme park rides or visit the Resort restaurants. Ex. 8 G at 18. 9

In addition, despite one focus of the deposition being upon complaints received by Disney from members of the visually impaired community, Mr. Jones, testifying as Disney, admitted he did not know how many complaints exist, only that he knows some exist because he had seen some which had been given to him by counsel, but that an unknown number of others exist which he, as Disney, knew nothing about because Disney's lawyers were in control of rolling them out and had not yet shared them with him. Ex. G at 27-32.

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As of this date, it is still unknown whether Disney has produced all the 17 customer complaints in its possession which relate to its lack of accommodations 18 for visually impaired patrons. Disney has released information in response to discovery requests at an outlandishly slow pace, and with an absurd level of 20 Of what Disney says is perhaps a 45,000-document universe of disorder. responsive materials, Disney has thus far produced approximately 1,250 pages, encompassing substantially fewer distinct documents due to redundant copies. The production of these items has occurred in haphazard incremental releases. No 24 production or disclosure has been correlated to any specific discovery request 25 rather, Disney simply occasionally provides another few hundred pages of 26 documents with no indication of the request to which they are responsive. Documents are routinely redacted, with no privilege description or log. Over the last three and one-half months, leading up to the deadline for this Motion, Defendants rolled out about 350 pages of documents per month. And because the production is also non-specific, in that Disney has yet to specify the requests to which any produced documents pertain, Plaintiffs have spent many hours attempting to decipher the relevance of the documents produced. Disney's production of records has proceeded as described below:

TIMELINE OF DISNEY NON-DISCLOSURE

10/06/10 Plaintiffs share draft 30(b)(6) notice with Disney

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- 10/27/10 Request for Production to Disney Parks and Resorts and Disney Online;
- 11/04/10 Plaintiff serves formal 30(b)(6) notice on Disney
- 01/11/11 First installment of produced documents, 70 pages produced;
- 01/13/11 Second installment of produced documents, 44 pages produced;
- 01/13/11 30(b)(6) deposition of Mark Jones, Disney doesn't know whether more complaints exist - lawyer has them
- 01/14/11 Third installment of produced documents, 147 pages produced;
- 01/21/11 Fourth installment of produced documents, 24 pages produced;
 - 02/03/11 Fifth installment of produced documents, 542 pages produced;
- 02/04/11 Sixth installment of produced documents, 10 pages produced;

02/07/11 Seventh installment of produced documents, 410 pages produced.

Disney's recalcitrant disclosures are not limited to documents. Disney's approach to the deposition process is the same. When Disney was asked for information relating to any perceived basis for objecting to Plaintiffs' adequacy to represent the classes, or to the typicality or commonality of Plaintiffs' claims, Disney refused to answer the questions on the ground that its counsel had instructed Disney not to answer.¹⁰ Ex. G at 127. Disney should not be permitted to
 conceal facts relating to certification behind a blanket assertion of an inapplicable
 privilege, only to spring them upon Plaintiffs for the first time during motion
 practice.

Further, the Walt Disney Parks and Resorts representative testified that he 5 had no understanding as to the nature of the Named Plaintiffs' complaints. Ex. G 6 at 24, 26. As to certain of the classes, such as the Parking Class, he also refused to 7 answer deposition questions, on Disney's counsel's instruction, as to any 8 understanding Disney might have of the general nature of the Named Plaintiffs' 9 complaints, asserting that Disney's understanding is protected by the attorney-10 client privilege. Ex. G at 117-119. The Disney Online representative gave the 11 same testimony – he had no knowledge of the Named Plaintiffs' individual 12 complaints, and any general understanding he had received came from counsel so 13 he refused, on the instruction of Disney's attorney, to answer questions. Ex. H at 14 56-58. If Disney has no baseline understanding of the Plaintiffs' complaints, how 15 can it possibly propose that those complaints are not typical or common in 16 comparison to anyone else's claims? Presumably, if Disney possesses any evidence 17 with which to contest typicality or commonality, its stratagem has been to first 18 reveal the information during motion practice. Again, Disney should not be 19 permitted to refuse to conduct proper discovery, concealing facts behind 20 preposterous assertions of privilege, and to thereafter reveal the concealed facts as 21 or after certification briefs are filed. 22

Defendants' failure to timely disclose information that is solely within their control, and which would allow Named Plaintiffs to more thoroughly demonstrate

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¹⁰ Specifically, defense counsel instructed Disney not to answer any questions regarding paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of the 30(b)(6) notice, which expressly relate, respectively, to any bases for objecting to adequacy of the representatives, to the typicality and commonality of their claims, and to adequacy of class counsel.

numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy, should create an estoppel 1 against asserting that Named Plaintiffs have failed to carry their Rule 23(a) burden 2 for the proposed classes. See Wise v. Calvary Portfolio Servs, L.L.C., 2010 WL 3 3724249, *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 2010) ("Defendant is not free to decline to 4 provide to Plaintiff information which she requested, and to which only it has 5 access, and then to argue that her motion for class certification must be denied 6 absent that information"); see also Castro v. Collecto, Inc. 256 F.R.D. 534, 540 7 (W.D. Tex. 2009) ("Defendants cannot be permitted to deny numerosity by failing 8 to respond to reasonable discovery requests"); Ventura v. New York City Health 9 and Hospitals Corp., 125 F.R.D. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Plaintiff's lack of 10 knowledge as to the exact number of affected persons is no a bar to maintaining a 11 class action, when defendants have the means to identify those persons at will"). 12

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D. PLAINTIFF DISNEY CHARACTER CLASS

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164*, 102 F.R.D. at 461. Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just for 2009. *See* "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16. In addition, the record already establishes four victims of this flavor of Disney discrimination during 2009 (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs and Teresa Stockton).

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

- Whether Defendants and its entities maintain a policy of refusing to allow costumed Disney characters to interact with visually impaired guests with service animals at the Disneyland Resort and Walt Disney World Resort ("Resorts") as asserted in the FAC;
- Whether Defendants' policy of refusing to allow costumed Disney characters to interact with visually impaired guests with service animals at the Resorts is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Disney Character Class.

iii. Typicality

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Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Disney Character Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. *See* FAC at 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. *See* FAC.

Shields has attended the Resorts and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies when she was refused interaction with costumed Disney characters because of her service animal. Ex. A at 159, 168-70, 172-74, 178-81. Additionally, Shields has been told at least five times of the Defendants' discriminatory costume Disney character interaction policy. Ex. A at 168-81.

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies when she was refused interaction with costumed Disney characters because of her service animal. Ex. B at 159-60, 16669. Boggs may visit Walt Disney World Resort in the summer of 2011. Ex. B at 69.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies when she was refused interaction with costumed Disney characters because of her service animal. See Ex. F at Resp. # 10.

E. PLAINTIFF SIGNAGE CLASS

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. See Jordan, 669 F.2d at 1320; Siddiqi, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 111 F.R.D. at 599; Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164, 102 F.R.D. at 461. Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. See "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition to the four victims in 2009 already established by the record (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs and Teresa Stockton), Defendants have also produced three complaints that relate to the lack of signage, menus or schedules in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print, as well as not being read menus in full upon request. See ex. O.

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

• Whether the Defendants and its entities failed to provide Braille and/or large print signage and/or schedules within the Resorts so as to

orient visually impaired patrons as to the locations of rides, restaurants and facilities and times for shows as asserted in the FAC;
Whether Defendants and its entities failed to provide menus in accessible alternative formats such as Braille and/or large print as asserted by the FAC;
Whether Defendants and its entities failed to readthe menus, in full, to visually impaired guests upon request as asserted by the FAC;
Whether Defendants' and its entities failure to provide signage, menus or schedules in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print at Resorts is in violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC;
Whether Defendants' and its entities failure to train employees to read menus in full to visually impaired guests when there is a lack of a

ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Braille and/or large print menu at the Resorts is a violation of the

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Signage Class.

iii. Typicality

Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Signage Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. *See* FAC at 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. *See* FAC. Additionally, all Named Plaintiffs are capable of reading Braille. Ex. A at 41-42; Ex. B at 85-86; Ex. C at 88-89. Shields has attended the Resorts and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies due to a lack of signage, menus or schedules in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print. Ex. A at 209-11; Ex. D at Resp. # 11. Additionally, Shields has not been read menus in full, despite requesting for such. Ex. A at 144-45; Ex. D at Resp. #12.

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies due to a lack of signage, menus or schedules in an alternative format, such as Braille. Ex. B at 213-15; Ex. E at Resp. # 10. Additionally, Boggs has not been read menus in full, despite requesting for such. Ex. B at 264-67; Ex. E at Resp. # 11.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies due to a lack of signage, menus or schedules in an alternative format, such as Braille. Ex. C at 148-49; Ex. F at Resp. # 11. Additionally, Stockton has not been read menus in full, despite requesting for such. Ex. C at 149, 154-55; Ex. F at Resp. # 12.

F. PLAINTIFF MAP CLASS

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164*, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. *See* "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition, the record already establishes four victims in 2009 (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs and Teresa Stockton)

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ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

- Whether Defendants failed to provide Braille maps in a portable format as asserted by the FAC;
- Whether Defendants failed to provide Braille maps at a reasonable number of locations within the Resorts as asserted by the FAC;
- Whether Defendants' failure to provide Braille maps in a portable format and/or at a reasonable number of locations within the Resorts is in violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Map Class.

iii. Typicality

Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Map Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. *See* FAC at 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. *See* FAC. Additionally, all Named Plaintiffs are capable of reading Braille. Ex. A at 41-42; Ex. B at 85-86; Ex. C at 88-89.

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Shields has attended the Resorts and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies due to a lack of portable maps in an alternative format, such as Braille and/or large print. Ex. A at 117; 119; Ex. D at Resp. # 13.

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies due to a lack of portable maps in an alternative format, such as Braille. Ex. E at Resp. # 12.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies due to a lack of portable maps in an alternative format, such as Braille. Ex. F at Resp. # 13.

G. PLAINTIFF KENNEL CLASS

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164*, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. *See* "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition to the four victims in 2009 already established by the record (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs and Teresa Stockton), Defendants have also produced four complaints that relate to the kennel charge for service animals, the lack of designated areas for service animals to defecate, or the policy refusing to allow service animals be tied and left unattended. *See* ex. O.

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

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| 1 | • Whether it was lawful for the Defendants to charge a \$20 fee for the |
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| 2 | use of kennel facilities at the Resorts for service animals as asserted |
| 3 | by the FAC; |
| 4 | • Whether the Defendants were legally required to have designated |
| 5 | areas with the Resorts for service animals to defecate or to be tied up |
| 6 | while visually impaired owners used the rides as asserted by the FAC; |
| 7 | • Whether the Defendants' practice of charging visually impaired guests |
| 8 | a \$20 kennel fee for their service animal while visiting the Resorts is a |
| 9 | violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the |
| 10 | FAC; |
| 11 | • Whether Defendants are in violation of the ADA, DCPA and/or |
| 12 | Unruh Act for failure to designate reasonable areas for visually |
| 13 | impaired guests' service animals to defecate within the Resorts, which |
| 14 | results in deterring visually impaired guests from visiting the Resorts |
| 15 | as asserted in the FAC; |
| 16 | • Whether Defendants' policy of refusing to allow service animals to be |
| 17 | tied to any location within the Resorts and left unattended is a |
| 18 | violation of the ADA, CDPA and Unruh Act as asserted by the FAC; |
| 19 | • Whether any combination of the above described policies or practices |
| 20 | is a violation of the ADA, CPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the |
| 21 | FAC. |
| 22 | Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied |
| 23 | as to the Plaintiff Kennel Class. |
| 24 | iii. Typicality |
| 25 | Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because |
| 26 | they are all members of the Plaintiff Kennel Class, have the same interests as |

absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually

impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. See FAC at 2 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. See FAC. Additionally, all Named Plaintiffs own service animals which accompany them to the Resorts. See 5 ex. A at 11; Ex. B at 56; Ex. C at 68. 6

Shields has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies for the use of her service animal through a charge for kenneling, Ex. A at 98-99; Ex. D at Resp. # 14 (at least 20 times), a lack of designated areas for animal defecation, Ex. A at 103, and through a policy of preventing the service animal to be tied to any location and left unattended while Shields uses a ride, Ex. A at 113-15. Additionally, Shields has been informed on numerous occasions of the Defendants' discriminatory policies on designated animal defecations areas, Ex. A at103-06.

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies for the use of her service animal through a lack of designated areas for animal defecation, Ex. B at 230-31, 238-39, 246, and through a policy of preventing the service animal to be tied to any location and left unattended while Boggs uses a ride, Ex. B at 126-29. Additionally, Boggs has been informed on numerous occasions of the Defendants' discriminatory policies on designated animal defecations areas. Ex. B at 227-29, 237-41, 246.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies for the use of her service animal through a charge for kenneling, Ex. C at 145-46, and a lack of designated areas for animal defecation, Ex. F at Resp. # 16.

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H. PLAINTIFF AUDIO DESCRIPTION DEVICE CLASS

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164*, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. *See* "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition to the five victims in 2009-2010 already established by the record (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs, Chris Snyder and Teresa Stockton), Defendants have also produced five complaints that relate to deprivation of the full use and enjoyment of the audio description device due to malfunctions. *See* ex. O.

Additionally, Mr. Jones tesfied that just in 2010, approximately 100 devices were used by guests at the Disneyland Resort, though he could not distinguish between use by the visually and hearing impaired. Ex. G at 19.

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

- Whether the audio description devices are reasonably accessible to the visually impaired;
- Whether the Defendants' failure to provide audio description devices at the Resorts that are reasonably accessible to the visually impaired is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Audio Description Device Class.

iii. Typicality

Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Audio Description Device Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. *See* FAC at 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. *See* FAC.

Shields has attended the Disneyland Resort and used or attempted to use an audio description device and has been deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the device due to insufficiency or malfunctions. Ex. A at 122, 128-31.

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and used or attempted to use an audio device and has been deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the device due to insufficiency or malfunctions. Ex. B at 221-24; Ex. E at Resp. # 13. Additionally, Boggs has experienced the audio description device automatically shut down and has been unable to restart the system without sighted help. Ex. B at 224.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and use or attempted to use an audio description device and has been deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the device due to insufficiency or malfunctions. Ex. C at 105-08.

I. PLAINTIFF COMPANION TICKET CLASS

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See*

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Jordan, 669 F.2d at 1320; Siddiqi, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 111 F.R.D. at 599; Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local
Union No. 164, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and
common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1
million just in 2009. See "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition to the five victims in 2009-2010 already established by the record (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs, Chris Snyder and Teresa Stockton), Defendants have also produced seven complaints that relate to the the Defendants' policy of requiring the purchase an additional ticket for a companion or aide to assist a visually impaired person to utilize the accommondations at the Resorts. *See* ex. O.

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

- Whether the Defendants are legally required to provide a free or discounted ticket to the aide or companion of a visually impaired guest to the Resorts as a reasonable accommodation as asserted in the FAC;
- Whether Defendants' practice of requiring visually impaired guests to purchase an additional ticket, at full price, for a companion or aide to assist them utilize the accommodations at the Resorts is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC;
- Whether Defendants' practice of not providing a Disney employee to act as a companion or aide to visually impaired guests at the Resorts is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC;

• Whether a combination of any of the above described practices is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Companion Ticket Class.

iii. Typicality

Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Companion Ticket Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. *See* FAC at 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. *See* FAC.

Shields has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies by being required to purchase a ticket for a companion or aide to assist her in utilizing the Disneyland Resort. Ex. A at 206, 208.

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies by being required to purchase a ticket for a companion or aide to assist her in utilizing the Disneyland Resort. Ex. B at 113-14, 117, 278-79; Ex. E at Resp. # 14. In fact, Boggs has purchased an additional annual pass to accommodate companions and aides during her visits to the Disneyland Resort. Ex. B at 113-14, 118; Ex. E at Resp. # 14.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies by being required to purchase a ticket for a companion or aide to assist her in utilizing the Walt Disney World Resort. Ex. F at Resp. #19.

J. PLAINTIFF PARADE CLASS

i. Numerosity

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As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164*, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. *See* "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition, the record already establishes four victims in 2009 (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs and Teresa Stockton).

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

- Whether Defendants and its entities maintained a policy at parades and shows that only wheelchair users are allowed to use the area designated for handicapped guests and not guests with other disabilities such as visual impairments as asserted in the FAC;
- Whether Defendants' policy of excluding visually impaired guests from preferential locations to stand or sit during parades and shows at the Resorts is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Parade Class.

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iii. Typicality

Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Parade Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. *See* FAC at 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. *See* FAC. Additionally, all Named Plaintiffs have inquired into being permitted to use preferential locations to stand or sit during parades and/or shows. Ex. A at 213-14; Ex. B at 135-37; 290-92; Ex. C at 133-34.

Shields has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies through being excluded from preferential locations to stand or sit during parades and shows. Ex. D at Resp. # 20; Ex. A at 212-14.

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies through being excluded from preferential locations to stand or sit during parades and shows. Ex. B at 135-37, 290-92.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies through being excluded from preferential locations to sit or stand during parades. Ex. C at 133-34.

- K. PLAINTIFF LOCKER CLASS
 - i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local*

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Union No. 164, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. *See* "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition, the record already establishes four victims in 2009 (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs and Teresa Stockton).

Also, the Corporate Representative for Defendant Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., Mr. Jones, was also unable to estimate for any definitive period in 2010 the number of visually impaired people who tried to use the lockers. Ex. G at 110. However, Mr. Jones was the one who received and reviewed guest complaints from the visually impaired from the Parks' guest communication teams. Ex. G at 20.

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

- Whether it was lawful for Defendants and its entities to rent lockers for use to guests which are inaccessible to persons with visual impairments because the lockers: 1) utilize an inaccessible touchscreen; 2) have no attendant to assist the visually impaired; and 3) provide only a printed receipt with the combination to open the rented locker;
 - Whether Defendants' locker system, which is inaccessible to visually impaired guests, is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Locker Class.

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iii. Typicality

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Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Locker Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. See Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. See FAC at 3-5. Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. See FAC.

Shields has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' 10 discriminatory actions and policies through an inability to use the touch-screen locker system at the Disneyland Resort. Ex. A at 199-201, 203. 12

Boggs has attended the Disneyland Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies through an inability to use the touch-screen locker system at the Disneyland Resort. Ex. B at 275-77; Ex. E at Resp. # 16.

Stockton has attended the Walt Disney World Resort and experienced the Defendants' discriminatory actions and policies through an inability to use the touch-screen locker system at the Walt Disney World Resort. Ex. C at 157-58.

L. PLAINTIFF WEBSITE CLASS

In National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp. a class of visually impaired persons was certified to pursue remedies under the ADA, Unruh Act and CDPA for the inaccessibility of the website Target.com. 582 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The court in *Target* held that complaints that the inaccessibility of the Target website prevented visually impaired persons from enjoying the goods and services available at the Target stores was sufficient for the purpose of class certification under the ADA, Unruh Act and CDPA. Id. at 1195-96.

The 26 allegations ranged from having to go elsewhere to find the sought after information 27 to increased time and expense caused by the inaccessibility of the website. Id. at 28

1194. Significant is also the court's rejection of Target's assertion that they accommodated visually impaired shoppers through other means, such as in-person and phone assistance. *Id.* at 1195. The court held such assertions to be affirmative defenses and not proper for consideration at the class certification stage. *Id.*

Similar to the class in *Target*, Plaintiff Website Class alleges that one or more of the Defendants' websites, such as www.disney.go.com, is inaccessible to the visually impaired. Such inaccessibility prevents class members, including Named Plaintiffs, from equal access to the goods, services and benefits offered by Defendants to the public through Defendants' websites. Additionally, the inaccessible websites cause the class members, including Named Plaintiffs, to seek the information elsewhere, and causes increased time and expense. Therefore, class certification to pursue remedies under the ADA, Unruh and/or CDPA is appropriate for the inaccessibility of Defendants' websites.

Additionally, in *Enyart v. National Conference of Bar Examiners, Inc.*, the Court ruled that a reasonable accommodation to make computer-based information accessible to the visually impaired is compatibility with screen reader software. ---F.R.D. ---, 2011 W1 9735 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). Therefore, not only is the inaccessibility of the Defendants' websites ripe for class-wide resolution, but the complaint that such sites are not compatible with screen reader software shows that that Defendants have not made a reasonable accommodation for the visually impaired.

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. *See Jordan*, 669 F.2d at 1320; *Siddiqi*, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; *Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 111 F.R.D. at 599; *Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164*, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and

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common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. *See* "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition to the four victims in 2009 already established by the record (Cari Shields, Amber Boggs, Rick Boggs and Teresa Stockton), Defendants have also produced three complaints that relate to the inaccessibility of the Defendants' websites. *See* ex. O.

Additionally, the Corporate Representative for Defendant Disney Online, Inc., Mr. Davis, was able to report the Defendants' Park website, as an aggregate, was visited by at least 2.96 million unique IP addresses in the month of December, 2010. Ex. H at 43. And that the total aggregate number of unique number of IP addresses visiting all Defendants' websites has been over 30.7 million. Ex. H at 45. Considering that roughly 1.5 million visually impaired persons have regular access to the internet, *see* Ex. Q (National Federation of the Blind), it can be determined through estimates and common sense that a sufficient number of visually impaired persons have and will visit the Defendants' websites to satisfy numerosity.

Furthermore, in Bob Minnick's presentation (Ex. S), it was presented that persons with disabilities do more planning and booking of accommodations via the internet than the general population. Thus further supporting numerosity.

ii. Commonality

The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

• Whether Defendants maintain one or more websites including www.disney.go.com that are not fully accessible for persons with visual impairments utilizing screen reader software which prevents visually impaired persons from enjoying equal access to the Defendants' theme parks, hotels, restaurants and stores and the

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numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Defendants' websites;

Whether Defendants' failure to cause websites maintained by • Defendants, such as www.disney.go.com, to be fully accessible to the visually impaired is a violation of the ADA, CDPA and Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Website Class.

iii. Typicality

Named Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because 10 they are all members of the Plaintiff Website Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. 12 See Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Named Plaintiffs are all visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. See FAC at 15 Named Plaintiffs are also interested in seeking accommodations from 3-5. 16 Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. See FAC. Additionally, all Named Plaintiffs have regular access to the internet. Ex. A at 31; Ex. B at 90; Ex. 18 C at 71.

Shields, Boggs and Stockton have all attempted to and experienced an inability to access one or more of the Defendants' websites, and the goods, services and benefits those websites offer. Ex. A at 35-36; Ex. B at 177-78, 182-83; Ex. C at 77-79.

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M.PLAINTIFF PARKING CLASS

i. Numerosity

As more fully explained above, this class contains future, unknown members thus inherently making joinder impracticable and satisfying numerosity. See Jordan, 669 F.2d at 1320; Siddiqi, 2000 WL 33190435 at *4; Nat'l Ass'n of

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Radiation Survivors, 111 F.R.D. at 599; Int'l Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164, 102 F.R.D. at 461). Additionally, through census data and common sense it can be estimated that the number of class members is over 1 million just in 2009. See "Numerosity" section above at pages 13-16.

In addition the record already establishes three victims in 2009 (Cari
Shields, Amber Boggs and Rick Boggs).

ii. Commonality

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The "minimal" requirement of commonality is easily satisfied for this class. Especially considering that even one common issue of fact or law is sufficient for commonality. *Dukes*, 509 F.3d at 1177; *Mazza*, 254 F.R.D. at 618.

For this class, the common issues of law and fact include:

• Whether Defendants' parking structures and parking lot at the Disneyland Resort is a violation of the ADA, CPDA and/or Unruh Act as asserted in the FAC.

Therefore the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied as to the Plaintiff Parking Class.

iii. Typicality

Shields and Boggs satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because they are all members of the Plaintiff Parking Class, have the same interests as absent class members and are suffering the same injuries as absent class members. *See Target Corp.*, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Additionally, in suits where disabled persons are challenging the architectural design of physical barriers and their legal permissibility, the interests, injuries and claims of all the class members are identical, meaning that any class member could satisfy typicality. *Moeller*, 220 F.R.D. at 611.

Shields and Boggs are visually impaired persons considered to have a physical disability as such is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and the California Government Code Section 12926. *See* FAC at 3-4. Shields and Bogs are also

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interested in seeking accommodations from Defendants under the ADA, Unruh Act and/or CDPA. *See* FAC.

Shields and Boggs have attended the Disneyland Resort and have been denied equal treatment due to the Defendants' failure to comply with accessible parking provisions. Ex. A at 28-30; *see* ex. B at 147, 150; Ex. E at Resp. # 18.

N. SHOULD THE COURT DENY THIS MOTION, THE DENIAL SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiffs have not previously moved for class certification. Should the Court find that Plaintiffs have not yet met the requirements of Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b), the Court should approve certification in part, and with respect to those requirements the Court may deem not yet satisfied, deny the motion for class certification without prejudice, with leave to re-file after additional discovery is conducted. When evidence is insufficient, federal courts routinely deny such motions without prejudice and permit the parties to conduct further discovery. E.g., Jasper v. C.R. England, Inc., 2009 WL 873360, *7 (C.D. Cal. March 30, 2009); Berndt v. California Dept. of Corrections, 2010 WL 20353255, *4 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2010); Wall v. Leavitt, 2007 WL 4239575, *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007). Additionally, when some requirements are of Rule 23 are met, but not all, federal courts grant such motions in part for those requirements that have been met. E.g. Cole v. Asurion Corp., 267 F.R.D. 322 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Menagerie Productions v. Citysearch, 2009 WL 3770668, *19 (C.D. Cal. November 9, 2009); Brazil v. Dell Inc., 2010 WL 5387831 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010). Should the Court be inclined to deny certification at this time, Plaintiffs request additional time to undertake discovery, along with leave to file a renewed motion for certification.

III. CONCLUSION

All of the Classes meet each prerequisite for certification found in Rule 23(a)(1): numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.

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Likewise, the Classes qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(2). The Court should GRANT this Motion for Class Certification.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on Febuary 14, 2011, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by operation of the Court's electronic filing system to all parties indicated on the electronic filing receipt. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.

Respectfully Submitted,

| 11 | /s/ Andy Dogali |
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