SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIVIL DIVISION

- - - - - - - X

:

ELOYD ROBINSON ET AL., : Docket Number: 2015 CAM 008980

Plaintiffs,

:

VS.

:

THE METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, : ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATION ET AL.:

Defendants.

Thursday, July 20, 2017

The above-entitled action came on for a hearing before the Honorable NEAL E. KRAVITZ, Associate Judge, in Courtroom Number 100.

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Plaintiffs:

PATRICK MALONE, Esquire Washington, D.C.

On Behalf of the Defendants:

D. LEE RUTLAND, Esquire TIFFANY RANDOLPH, Esquire Washington, D.C.

17-05074

Deposition Services, Inc.

12321 Middlebrook Road, Suite 210 Germantown, MD 20874 Tel: (301) 881-3344 Fax: (301) 881-3338 info@DepositionServices.com www.DepositionServices.com

2.4

PROCEEDINGS

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, calling the matter of Eloyd Robinson, et al. v. The Metropolitan Washington Orthopaedic Association, et al., 2015 CAM 008980.

Please stand and state your names for the record.

MR. MALONE: My name is Patrick Malone. I'm here for the Robinsons.

MR. RUTLAND: Lee Rutland and Tiffany Randolph on behalf of the defendants, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. I am prepared to make a ruling on the motion, but I don't know if anyone had felt strongly about adding anything orally here this morning in addition to the written papers?

MR. RUTLAND: I do not, Your Honor. I'm willing to submit on the record.

MR. MALONE: Yes, I put everything I had to say in the opposition.

THE COURT: All right. So as you know, the defendants, Rida Azer and The American International Orthopaedic Association, LLC, have filed a timely motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, for remittitur of the \$8.35 million verdict returned by the jury on June 15, 2017 at the end of a two-week trial.

1.3

2.4

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' counsel, and witnesses, made several inflammatory statements concerning the extent of Dr. Azer's negligence, and its impact on Mr. Robinson, and that the plaintiffs' counsel improperly injected the issue of the plaintiffs' race into the trial in an effort to appeal to the jury's emotions, sympathies, and perceived biases.

The defendants also contend that the amount of damages awarded, \$6,750,000 in non-economic damages on Mr. Robinson's medical malpractice claim, and \$1,600,000 on Ms. Robinson's loss of consortium claim, was against the weight of the evidence, and was excessive in the circumstances. The defendants request remittitur to an amount within the \$6 million limit of their insurance policies. The plaintiff have filed an opposition to the motion.

Let me talk first about the alleged trial errors. The defendants complain of statements made by the plaintiffs' counsel that Dr. Azer mutilated and killed Mr. Robinson's leg, and then Dr. Azer should be, quote, held accountable, end quote, for his actions.

The defendants also complained that Dr. Shapiro, the plaintiffs' standard of care expert, testified that Dr. Azer's breaches of the standard of care were egregious, and that the plaintiffs' counsel then repeated

2.4

this assertion in closing argument, along with other allegedly improper references such as to the Grim Reaper.

In addition, the defendants complained of the injection of race into the case by the plaintiffs' counsel in eliciting testimony from Mr. Robinson, and commenting in his jury arguments that Mr. Robinson's experiences in the 1940's and 1950's playing baseball in the old Negro leagues, and on the impact of those experiences on Mr. Robinson's emotional distress, and other non-economic injuries caused by Dr. Azer's negligence.

Finally, the defendants complain of what they contend was an improper Colston argument, C-O-L-S-T-O-N, by the plaintiffs' counsel in the course of his closing argument. The defendants raised many of these same points as objections during the trial, and my rulings on those objections are part of the record of the case.

I can say now having had additional time to study and think about these issues that I remain unpersuaded that there was anything improper about any of the jury arguments or testimony complained of.

Evidence supported the expert's opinion that Dr. Azer's violations of the standard of care were egregious, and the plaintiffs were within their rights, in my view, to present expert testimony to that effect, specifically to prove that this was not a close question on whether

2.4

there was -- on whether there were deviations from the standard of care. Moreover, once the evidence was properly before the jury, the plaintiffs' counsel was entitled to refer to it in his closing argument.

In addition, as the plaintiffs argue in their opposition to the motion, the evidence showed that Mr.

Robinson's leg did die, and that it certainly was mutilated, albeit unintentionally, before it was amputated above the knee, all as a result of Dr. Azer's negligence.

In addition, the evidence of Mr. Robinson's days playing baseball in the Negro leagues was limited in scope, and was directly relevant to the jury's understanding of the effect on Mr. Robinson's life, of his post-amputation, inability to walk, his beat as a security guard near National Stadium, and to talk with people about his past as a professional baseball player.

Finally, the suggestion in closing argument by plaintiffs' counsel that jurors should write down their initial thoughts about the amount of damages, which could be eight figures, or possibly even more, did not run afoul of the Court of Appeals decisions in the Colston case, and the Hechinger case.

Plaintiffs' counsel never advanced any particular number to the jury, and in the circumstances, it was clear to the jury that it was up to them to

2.4

determine how much, if anything, to award the plaintiffs in non-economic damages.

In sum, I think the defendants got a fair trial free of any improprieties by the plaintiffs' counsel, or witnesses, but equally important, I can say with great confidence having been present here on the bench throughout the entire trial, that none of the statements complained of by the defendants in their motion had any significant or material bearing on the verdict rendered by the jury. I have supreme confidence that this verdict was rendered based on the evidence and jury instructions, and without regard to these allegedly inflammatory statements by plaintiff's counsel, and Dr. Shapiro.

In reality here what we have is a complaint about a few stray comments in the course of a two-week trial while the evidence of Dr. Azer's negligence was overwhelming, in my view, from this objective standpoint.

It is important to note, moreover, that the defendants have not complained of any impropriety in the jury instructions, or any error in the jury instructions. The presumed correctness of those jury instructions gives me even more assurance and confidence that the jury decided the case based on the facts and the law rather than on any improper considerations.

Now, with regard to the size of the verdict, the

2.4

parties agree that the legal standard for remittitur is a verdict so large that it, quote, shocked the conscience, end quote, of the Court. In the context of the defendants' motion for a new trial, the defendants must show that the jury's award was, quote, against the clear weight of the evidence, end quote.

Some of the participants in this trial may have been surprised at the size of the verdict. I don't doubt that if that's the case. Both of the plaintiffs are elderly, and it would not have been unexpected or surprising had the jury awarded smaller amounts to them to account for the relatively short periods of time that one could expect the plaintiffs' pain and suffering, and other non-economic damages, to accrue relative to damages that might be awarded to younger persons who have suffered similar injuries.

Nevertheless, the pain endured by Mr. Robinson, and the injuries and damages suffered by both plaintiffs, were shown to be truly profound, and were amply supported in the evidence presented at the trial. Dr. Azer's negligence converted Mr. Robinson from the outgoing, energetic 82-year-old man, who was still working and living a full life before the surgery, into the recluse he became afterwards, unable to work, enjoy friends and family, or even venture out of his bedroom on more than

2.4

the rarest of occasions.

That same negligence converted Ms. Robinson into a full-time caretaker for her husband, unable to enjoy the marital relationship as she had hoped and planned, and unable to live her own life to any meaningful extent.

It was interesting to observe the way the Robinsons testified as the trial in what I would characterize as understated manners. Both Mr. and Ms. Robinson are proud people, and they were obviously reluctant to dwell on their own injuries, or the impact those injuries have had on them, and will continue to have throughout the rest of their lives. But as I said earlier, the injuries that Mr. Robinson has suffered have been truly profound and life-altering for both him and his wife.

In my view, nothing about the size of the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, and nothing about the size of the evidence shocked my conscience.

And for all of those reasons, the defendants' motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, for remittitur, will be denied, and I'll be issuing a brief written order later today just saying that for the reasons stated on the record here in open court, the motion is denied.

MR. MALONE: Thank you. 1 2 THE COURT: Is there anything else that we need 3 to do in this case? 4 MR. RUTLAND: The only other issue would be if a 5 decision is made to file an appeal, we would have to post 6 a bond, and part of that would be post-judgment interest. 7 I'm not sure what the Court of Appeals' schedule 8 is these days as to how long it could be expected, and 9 what would be reasonable to anticipate for purposes of 10 filing a post-trial bond. I'm assuming something in the area of 18 months. 11 12 I don't know if Your Honor has any additional 13 experience in that as to what -- because I think the trial 14 court has to approve the amount of a bond. 15 MR. MALONE: That would be fine with me. 16 think 18 months to two years is unfortunately kind of 17 typical nowadays. 18 THE COURT: One question I would have is the 19 extent to which you've already ordered the trial 20 transcript. 21 MR. RUTLAND: We've ordered parts, not the 22 entire transcript. 23 THE COURT: Because that's usually the -- that's the first delay. 24 25 MR. MALONE: Right.

THE COURT: They won't even -- they won't even 1 2 set a briefing schedule until the appellant certifies that 3 the record is complete. 4 MR. RUTLAND: Oh. 5 THE COURT: Once the briefing schedule -- once 6 the briefing schedule has been set, and the briefs have 7 been filed, I think oral arguments tend to be maybe about 8 six months after that, but I'm really not confident, and 9 then it really, of course, varies wildly depending on how 10 complicated the Court thinks the issues are, and which 11 judge is assigned to write it, and all of that. I would think 18 months would be very 12 13 optimistic. I would think two years would probably be 14 more reasonable, but I guess that's just my initial 15 reaction. 16 MR. RUTLAND: Yeah, I don't know if the Court --17 THE COURT: It sounds like the plaintiffs -- it 18 sounds like they would agree to it anywhere in that time 19 range. 20 MR. MALONE: Yes, sure. 21 MR. RUTLAND: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. So if you get to that point, 23 and you want to file -- I guess you would file a motion 2.4 for a stay based on the suit filing of the supersedeas

If there's agreement, it can be a consent motion,

```
and that will make it easier.
 2
              MR. MALONE: Right.
 3
              MR. RUTLAND: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
 4
 5
              MR. MALONE: Thank you, Judge.
              THE COURT: Have a good rest of the summer. All
 6
7
    right.
              THE DEPUTY CLERK: Court is adjourned.
8
               (Thereupon, the hearing was concluded.)
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

 $\sqrt{}$ Digitally signed by Cecelia Black

ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATE

I, Cecelia Black, transcriber, do hereby certify that I have transcribed the proceedings had and the testimony adduced in the case of ELOYD ROBINSON ET AL. V. THE METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATION, ET AL., Case No. 2015 CAM 008980 in said Court, on the 20th day of July 2017.

I further certify that the foregoing 11 pages constitute the official transcript of said proceedings as transcribed from audio recording to the best of my ability.

In witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed my name, this 18th day of August 2017.

Cicilia Black

Transcriber