Global Whistleblower Hotline Toolkit: How to Launch and Operate a Legally-Compliant International Workplace Report Channel

November 2011

As corporate social responsibility and business ethics continue to grab our attention, evermore-sophisticated “best practices” and compliance strategies emerge. A key practice that anchors many corporate social responsibility programs and compliance initiatives is launching and publicizing an internal whistleblower procedure, report channel, or “hotline”¹ that entices insiders to denounce colleagues’ misdeeds so management can root out corporate crimes, corruption and cover-ups.

Domestically within the US, workplace whistleblower hotlines are a largely uncontroversial “best practice” to which few ever object. But tensions rise when a multinational extends report channels abroad. Overseas, whistleblower hotlines can spark blowback from staff, employee representatives and government enforcers and can trigger confounding legal issues without US counterpart. To a socially responsible American, the hurdles impeding foreign whistleblower hotlines look higher than they should have any right to get.

Workplace whistleblower hotlines take many forms. Some stand on their own while others comprise part of a broader corporate code of conduct, code of ethics, compliance or social responsibility program. Some run in-house while others are outsourced. There are single global hotlines and there are aligned but separate report channels across local affiliates. Some hotlines are closed to staff in certain countries. Whatever the form or reach, the idea behind a workplace hotline is simple: Empower insiders who hear about white collar crime, policy breaches or other wrongdoing to come forward with allegations so management can investigate, right wrongs, and punish the guilty.

Prison, gangster and schoolyard cultures revile “snitches,” “stool pigeons,” and “tattle-tales.” But corporate culture in America and many other modern societies reveres company and political whistleblowers as do-gooders who expose corruption for the benefit of all. Look at all the Hollywood movies championing real-life informants. What was a trickle of based-on-a-true-story whistleblower-themed film dramas—Serpico, All the President’s Men, The Insider, Erin Brockovich—is now, in our post-Enron/post-Madoff age of “Occupy Wall Street,” a steady stream—The Whistleblower, The Informant!, Fair Game, Puncture, documentaries like Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room and Chasing Madoff. Americans who watch these movies root for whistleblowers standing up to white collar criminals and fighting for corporate accountability. And in the workplace, too, rank-and-file Americans tend to welcome whistleblowing (and hence company whistleblower hotlines) as a check and balance against abuses of management. American executives, meanwhile, champion whistleblowing (and hotlines) to support compliance and avert scandals and bet-the-company litigation. Everybody wins—except criminals brought to justice.

¹ This article uses “hotline” to mean any report channel or other internal system or procedure designed to collect whistleblower complaints, regardless of the structure and regardless of the medium (media might include, for example, telephone, email, interactive website, postal mail, social networking, or a combination). See infra note 18.

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But this accommodating view of corporate whistleblowing (and hotlines) is not universal. A cultural component divides some places from the rest. Whistleblowing-averse societies from Russia and Latin America to the Middle East and India to parts of Asia and much of Africa fear reprisals and retaliation so much that they can suspect workplace whistleblower hotlines as tools for entrapment. In jurisdictions such as Korea, corporate whistleblowing is taboo, and parts of Continental Europe resist anonymous whistleblowing (and hence anonymous hotlines) surprisingly vehemently.

European workers may see hotlines as a threat to privacy—their own privacy and even that of powerful wrongdoers. The New York Times says that in "much of Continental Europe" a "less swashbuckling attitude toward matters of privacy offer[s] the powerful," such as corporate officers, "a degree of protection that would be unthinkable in Britain or the United States." The Times points out that "French politicians have been able to hide behind some of Europe's tightest privacy laws, protected by what amounted to a code of silence about the transgressions of the mighty," An article in the Yale Law Journal explores why Continental Europeans approach workplace privacy (and, by extension, workplace whistleblowing) so very differently from our outlook stateside:

[W]e are in the midst of significant privacy conflicts between the United States and the countries of Western Europe—conflicts that reflect unmistakable differences in sensibilities about what ought to be kept "private." * * * To people accustomed to the continental way of doing things, American law seems to tolerate relentless and brutal violations of privacy in [many] areas of law. * * * American privacy law seems, from the European point of view, simply to have "failed." * * * Americans and Europeans are, as the Americans would put it, coming from different places. At least as far as the law goes, we do not seem to possess general "human" intuitions about the "horror" of privacy violations. We possess something more complicated than that: We possess American intuitions—or, as the case may be, Dutch, Italian, French, or German intuitions. * * * Maybe Europeans feel that their personhood is confirmed by the fact that their bosses are obliged to respect their privacy in the workplace.... * * * [O]n the Continent, everybody is protected against disrespect, through the continental law of "insult," a very old body of law that protects the individual right to "personal honor." Nor does it end there. Continental law protects the right of workers to respectful treatment by their bosses and coworkers, through what is called the law of "mobbing" or "moral harassment." This is law that protects employees against being addressed disrespectfully, shunned, or even assigned humiliating tasks like xeroxing.

In societies that value personal privacy above corporate compliance, rank-and-file employees tend to fear workplace whistleblowing, particularly anonymous whistleblowing, as ruthless worker-on-worker espionage. A confidential hotline makes every colleague and co-worker a potential spy, and facilitates unscrupulous rivals lodging false accusations. European workplaces get especially queasy when an employer accompanies an anonymous hotline with a mandatory reporting rule—the common provision in multinational codes of conduct forcing employee witnesses to denounce misconduct or else get fired. Continental Europeans are quick to

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2. As to the corporate whistleblowing taboo in Korea: See Choe Sang-Hun, “Help hence anonymous hotlines) surprisingly vehemently. European workers may see hotlines as a threat to privacy—their own privacy and even that of powerful wrongdoers. The New York Times says that in "much of Continental Europe" a "less swashbuckling attitude toward matters of privacy offer[s] the powerful," such as corporate officers, "a degree of protection that would be unthinkable in Britain or the United States." The Times points out that "French politicians have been able to hide behind some of Europe's tightest privacy laws, protected by what amounted to a code of silence about the transgressions of the mighty," An article in the Yale Law Journal explores why Continental Europeans approach workplace privacy (and, by extension, workplace whistleblowing) so very differently from our outlook stateside:

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5. Some countries outside the common law tradition, such as European regimes that suffered under Nazis, fascists, and Communists, fear anonymous whistleblowing as potentially treacherous and see anonymous whistleblowers as untrustworthy and dangerous sneaks who escape accountability for their denunciations. These cultures fear anonymous hotlines as lures that might tempt a jealous or vindictive grudge holder to accuse rivals of exaggerated or fabricated misdeeds. And these cultures even seem to distort corporations’ skill in conducting unbiased internal investigations into whistleblown allegations. This said, though, obviously we are generalizing. Not every Continental European fears whistleblowers and elevates personal privacy above corporate compliance. Indeed, corporate governance mavens in parts of Continental Europe may be coming over to the Anglo view that values even anonymous whistleblowing (and hence corporate whistleblower hotlines) as a powerful weapon in the fight against corporate wrongdoing. See Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 11-16.

6. Americans see mandatory reporting rules as a clear best practice. See Holly J. Gregory, “Whistleblower Bounty Rules: Impact on Corporate Compliance Programs,” Practical Law: The Journal, July/Aug. 2011, at 20 (“Corporate codes of conduct typically provide that employees have an obligation to come forward with information about potential wrongdoing. … Without [this] direct reporting from employees, the company is hindered in its ability to identify potential problems,” added, footnotes omitted).
This article is a toolkit for a compliance-focused multinational that wants to launch a workplace whistleblowing hotline across worldwide operations and therefore needs to comply with hotline restrictions overseas. Our discussion splits into halves, one conceptual and one practical. Part one, the conceptual part, explores why any legal system would restrict whistleblower hotlines when no jurisdiction anywhere restricts whistleblowing itself and when few whistleblowers even bother with hotlines. Part two, the practical part, analyzes the six categories of laws that restrict global whistleblower hotlines, focusing on compliance strategy.19

Part One: Why Restrict Whistleblower Hotlines Without Regulating Whistleblowing Itself, When so Few Whistleblowers even Bother with Hotlines?

A workplace whistleblower hotline comprises three basic components: (1) a communication that encourages (or forces20) employees to denote colleagues suspected of wrongdoing, that explains how to submit a denunciation and (often) that guarantees informants confidentiality or anonymity and non-retaliation; (2) a medium or media (channel or channels) for accepting denunciations, such as an email address, a web link, a postal mail address, a telephone number, or some combination; and (3) protocols/procedures and scripts by which a hotline responder, often a specialist outsourced company,21 processes denunciations and passes them onto someone at the hotline-sponsor company to investigate. (Internal investigations into whistleblower denunciations raise tough legal issues of their own, particularly in the cross-border context, but investigations into specific denunciations are completely

nothing, they took him to their headquarters. Schachno was ordered to undress and immediately subjected to a severe and prolonged beating by two men with a whip. Afterward, he was released…. He lay in bed for a week. As soon as he felt able, he went to the [U.S.] consulate [which] ordered him taken to a hospital…. “From the neck down he was a mass of raw flesh”; [U.S. consul general for Germany Wilhelm] Messerschmitt saw. “He had been beaten with whips and in every possible way until his flesh was literally raw and bleeding.”


Larson adds:

[In 1930’s Germany,] petty jealousies flared into denunciations made to the… Storm Troopers—or to the… Gestapo…. The Gestapo’s reputation for omniscience and malevolence arose from… the existence of a populace eager… to use Nazi sensitivities to satisfy individual needs and solve jealousies…. [O]f a sample of 213 denunciations, 37 percent arose not from heartfelt political belief but from private conflicts, with the trigger often breathtakingly trivial. In October 1933, for example, the clerk at a grocery store turned in a cranky customer who had stubbornly insisted on receiving three pennings in change. The clerk accused her of failure to pay taxes. Germans denounced one another with such gusto that senior Nazi officials urged the populace to be more discriminating as to what circumstances might justify a report to the police. Hitler himself acknowledged…”we are living at present in a sea of denunciations and human meanness.”
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separate from our topic, the pre-investigatory launch and operation of a workplace whistleblower hotline.22)

In many societies, distrust of or aversion to whistleblowing23 combines with particularly-protective local privacy and labor laws24 to spawn six distinct legal doctrines25 that restrict multinational employers’ freedom to launch anonymous whistleblower hotlines across international operations.26 But to an American, the fact that employers’ freedom to launch anonymous whistleblower hotlines

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In many societies, distrust of or aversion to whistleblowing23 on speech. And dictatorial, repressive and fascist governments do not want to restrict whistleblowing; they encourage denunciations to teacher is a whistleblower. No free society can prohibit or materially restrict whistleblowing without imposing intolerable prior restraints otherwise legal whistleblowing?

As a practical matter, “free-form” whistleblowing—truthful solo denunciations outside formal report channels—is probably impossible to regulate with prior restraints. Whistleblowing intrinsically links to speech, secrecy and human interaction. In its most basic form whistleblowing is ubiquitous—quite literally child’s play: Every toddler tattling on a sibling’s misbehavior to mother and every kindergarten bringing an unruly classmate to the attention of teacher is a whistleblower. No free society can prohibit or materially restrict whistleblowing without imposing intolerable prior restraints on speech. And dictatorial, repressive and fascist governments do not want to restrict whistleblowing; they encourage denunciations to police lawbreakers. Even the legal systems most hostile to hotlines leave free-form whistleblowing—including even anonymous whistleblowing—completely unrestricted.28

With whistleblowing unrestricted, why rein in channels that merely receive otherwise-legal whistleblower reports? The historical (and practical) real that governments, free and authoritarian alike, censor speech is to restrict the speaker—not the listener. No federal communications law would restrict radio receivers but leave radio broadcasts unregulated. Merely crippling hotlines leaves would-be whistleblowers free to denounce colleagues any other way they want, anonymously or not, by telephone, written note, postal mail, e-mail, text message, on-line chat room, tweet, social media, web post, letter to the editor, spreading rumors, contacting government authorities, tying a note to a rock thrown through a window—whatever. With a smorgasbord of non-hotline channels available, restricting only hotlines seems futile.

Indeed, it is futile. Whistleblowers overwhelmingly favor non-hotline channels. Only a tiny minority—3%—of corporate whistleblowers bother with hotlines; a whopping 97% of whistleblowing is free-form.29 The study that confirms this 97% figure was confined to the US—abroad, where hotlines are less common and less accepted, the percentage of non-hotline whistleblower reports is likely even greater. Information-age communications make non-hotline whistleblowing easier now than ever before in history. Put aside old, low-tech whistleblowing channels like mail a letter, dial a telephone, slip a note on someone’s chair or under the door, talk to a news reporter, talk to government authorities, spread a rumor. Today’s whistleblower accesses lots of high-tech channels instantly to

whistleblowing itself.27 Why restrict channels that merely facilitate otherwise legal whistleblowing?

Id at 57 (emphasis added). But cf. James Q. Whitman, supra note 4, 113 YALE L.J at 1165 (arguing that the “Nazism” explanation for the Continental Europeans conception of personal privacy generally—but outside the whistleblowing context—is too facile because it ignores pre-Nazi-era history).

8. See supra note 7, quoting ERIK LARSON at 51 (“Germans denounced one another with such gusto that...Hitler himself acknowledged...we are living at present in a sea of denunciations and human meanness”).

9. The modern political philosopher Jürgens Habermas argues that democratic laws are “procedures according to which citizens, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, successfully pursue the cooperative project of establishing just (or more just) conditions of life”—in short, “procedures” for “citizens’ “cooperatively” to resolve conflicts in “life.” JÜRGENS HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 320 (1996/MIT Press).

10. Every modern society rejects corporate misconduct, but modern American society seems to be particularly vigilant in this regard. As just one example, in August 2011 a U.C.L.A. law professor publicly called for the U.C.L.A. School of Law to reject a $10 million gift donated by Lowell Milken because, over 25 years before, Milken’s brother had been convicted in junk-bond scandals. The donor himself, Lowell, had never been convicted and had never “admitted” to any wrongdoing.” (Protest notwithstanding, U.C.L.A. took the money). Julie Creswell and Peter Lattman, “Milken Gift Stirs Dispute at U.C.L.A.” N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 2011, at B-1.


12. See generally James Q. Whitman, supra note 4. On “proportionality,” see supra note 5.


14. See infra Part Two, “Category #3.”

15. We discuss, infra Part Two, “Category #1,” at “SOX § 301(4)” section, whether U.S. law actually does require hotlines abroad. As to U.S. opinion that it does, see, e.g.,

White & Case 4
transmit denunciations to anyone—anonymou email accounts, interactive websites, social media, tweets, text messages, web chat rooms, disposable cell phones, web-enabled communications. In today’s technology-enabled world, who needs a hotline? Ninety-seven percent of whistleblowers can’t be wrong.

Looking back historically, hotlines always seem to have been mostly irrelevant. Whistleblowing without a hotline is the time-honored way we denounce our fellows. America’s legendary whistleblowers—the real-life informants immortalized by Hollywood—submitted their history-making denunciations without hotlines. Take, for example: environmental whistleblower Erin Brockovich (played by Julia Roberts in Erin Brockovich); New York police whistleblower Frank Serpico (played by Al Pacino in Serpico); Watergate “Deep Throat” whistleblower Mark Felt (played by Hal Holbrook in All the Presidents Men); tobacco industry whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand (played by Russell Crow in The Insider), Archer-Daniels-Midland whistleblower Mark Whitacre (played by Matt Damon in The Informant); Dyncorp/U.N. sex trafficking whistleblower Kathryn Bolkovac (derivative character played by Rachel Weisz in The Whistleblower); Nigeria “Yellowcake” whistleblower Joseph Wilson, husband of Valerie Plame (played by Sean Penn in Fair Game); Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins (star of the documentary Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room); Bernie Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolos (star of the documentary Chasing Madoff); Oval Office sex-scare whistleblower Linda Tripp (parodied by John Goodman on Saturday Night Live). Traiblazing whistleblowers do not bother with hotlines.

To an American, imposing laws to restrict hotlines seems downright quixotic, for two reasons: Hotlines exist to support compliance with government’s own laws; and restricting hotline listeners without bothering whistleblower speakers is both counterintuitive and futile when 97% of whistleblowers avoid hotlines anyway. But this is just an American perspective. For whatever reason, jurisdictions worldwide do regulate workplace whistleblower hotlines, using six separate categories of laws. Multinationals launching cross-border report channels need to comply.

Part Two: Complying with the Six Categories of Law that Restrict Whistleblower Hotlines Around the World

The raison d’être of any whistleblower hotline is compliance. Because hotlines coax out witnesses to reveal otherwise-clandestine wrongdoing so an employer can investigate, right wrongs, and comply with law,3 no hotline can afford to violate applicable law. Reductio ad absurdum: An informant could contact a non-compliant report channel, announce the hotline itself violates some law, and denounce the in-house project team that launched it. So every compliant multinational launching hotlines across borders need to start by checking, in each affected jurisdiction, whether the channel might break the law. Then the multinational must comply. Because American domestic laws tend not to restrict whistleblower hotlines, the issues here seem obscure to American multinationals.32 The rest of this article analyzes the six categories of law that can restrict whistleblower hotlines abroad, focusing on compliance.

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(1) as amended by SOX § 301, quoted at Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 6.
17. David Reilly & Sarah Nassauer, “Tip-Line Bind: Follow the Law in U.S. or EU?”, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at C1. For similar analogies in this context, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at p. 3 note 6. This view prevails into 2011: See supra note 15.
18. This article addresses workplace-context whistleblower hotlines because most regulation specific to hotlines is specific to employee hotlines. Some corporate hotlines are open to employees and, in addition, to other stakeholders like customers, suppliers, contractors, and the general public. Opening a hotline to informants beyond staff raises few if any legal issues beyond the ones we discuss here. Further, hotlines tend to attract most of their calls from employees and ex-employees, not from outsiders.
19. In 2008 this author published a study of the legal issues the reach whistleblower hotlines launched in Europe (Dowling SOX, supra note 2). The present article updates some of the points in the 2008 piece and takes a global focus—beyond Europe.
20. See discussion of employer mandatory reporting rules supra note 6.
21. Hotline-sponsoring multinationals often contract with specialist outsourcer companies to respond to hotline calls. Indeed, a mini-industry of niche “hotline outsourcers” has emerged, companies that respond to hotline calls purportedly in any language. See, e.g., EthicsPoint Whitepaper, “Beyond Compliance: Implementing Effective Whistleblower Hotline Reporting Systems” (N.D.), available at www.ethicspoint.com). To outsource a cross-border hotline offers a hotline...
Category # 1. Laws mandating whistleblower procedures

Our first category of hotline-regulating law is mandates that require setting up whistleblower hotlines, in the first place. These laws reach even an organization already committed to launch a hotline because any report channel rolled out where law requires hotlines must comply with the strictures in the hotline-mandating law. We first address the US hotline mandating law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [SOX], and then we look at similar mandates overseas.

SOX § 301: For multinationals that raise funds on US stock exchanges the vital hotline-mandating law is SOX § 301(4), the US statute that forces company board audit committees to offer “employees” “procedures” for the “confidential, anonymous” submission of “complaints” and “concerns” of “accounting or auditing matters.” (The Dodd-Frank law of 2010 amends many parts of SOX but does not tweak this particular mandate.) SOX § 301(4) requires that audit committees of SOX-regulated corporations, including so-called “foreign private issuers” based outside the US:

shall establish procedures for: (A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.

Fortunately, any viable hotline likely complies if only because SOX § 301(4) offers a lot of leeway in structuring “complaints” “procedures.” Congress wanted audit committees to tailor bespoke report “procedures” to fit each company’s own needs, and so the US SEC refuses to “mandat[e] specific [hotline] procedures.” Any robust whistleblower channel that a SOX-regulated employer communicates to its (at least US) employees likely complies with SOX § 301(4)(B) as long as employees know about it and can access it “confidentially and anonymously.” Structuring a SOX-compliant hotline is so easy that no one ever seems to have gotten it wrong: As of mid-2011, no SOX § 301(4) prosecution had ever been reported. Compliance may be so simple that most all covered “complaints” “procedures” comply with SOX § 301(4).

But our concern here is the global context: How can a multinational launch a compliant hotline for whistleblowers overseas? The international dimension slams the otherwise-straightforward US § 301(4) “procedures” mandate into hotline-restrictive barriers erected overseas to hold hotlines back. Our question therefore might become: To what extent can a SOX-regulated audit committee modify a § 301(4) hotline protocol to conform to overseas laws restricting hotlines? Actually, though, that question assumes SOX § 301(4) steps beyond US soil and confronts hotline-restrictive laws abroad. But notwithstanding a widespread belief and a 2003 statement by the US SEC to the contrary, SOX § 301(4) might be a shut-in. If SOX § 301 does not travel overseas, then a hotline launched abroad is free to conform to any local hotline rules that foreign law might impose. And so our actual question is: Does the SOX § 301(4) “complaints” “procedures” mandate extraterritorially?

27. No known jurisdiction imposes any law that acts as a prior restraint on speech to forbid private citizens from truthfully reporting others’ misdeeds to private third parties (or to government/police authorities, for that matter). Yet legal doctrines could conceivably be triggered under certain narrow whistleblower scenarios. For example, a government employee whistleblower could illegally divulge state secrets; a corporate officer whistleblower could breach a fiduciary duty; a lawyer whistleblower could breach the attorney/client privilege; a whistleblower party to a confidentiality/non-disclosure agreement could breach the agreement.

28. Here we are discussing restrictions against free-form whistleblowing, not laws that promote denunciations to government authorities.

29. “[A]n Ethics Resource Center survey found that only 3 percent of all reports of wrongdoing come through hotlines—possibly indicating that employees don’t trust them. They might be right: A study by the University of New Hampshire concluded that corporate officials take anonymous complaints less seriously and devote fewer resources to them.” Dori Meinert, “Whistle-Blowers: Threat or Asset?” [SHRM] HR Magazine, April 2011, at 27, 31 (emphasis added). Of course, though, there is no firm correlation between anonymous whistleblowing and hotline whistleblowing: Anonymous denunciations get submitted all the time through channels other than hotlines, and self-identifying whistleblowers often call hotlines.

30. Other famous whistleblowers not yet immortalized by Hollywood also made their
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Perhaps not. American statutes apply only domestically unless they say they reach overseas.43 Nothing in SOX nor in any SOX regulation or reported case44 addresses whether § 301(4)(B) reaches “employees” based outside the US. This statutory silence may anchor § 301(4) to US soil.45 In Carnero v. Boston Scientific the US First Circuit Court of Appeals (later confirmed with a US Supreme Court denial of certiorari) confined a different SOX whistleblowing provision—SOX § 806, prohibiting whistleblower retaliation—to the US, reasoning that the § 806 text is silent as to overseas reach.46 SOX § 301(4) is just as silent on that issue. So the Carnero analysis might compel a similar result and confine § 301(4) to the US. Fresh support lies in the 2010 US Supreme Court decision Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank Ltd.,47 eight years newer than SOX. Morrison anchors § 10(b) of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934—like SOX, also a securities law—to America:

It is a “longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” *** When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none. *** On its face, § 10(b) [US securities law] contains nothing to suggest it applies abroad. *** In short, there is no affirmative indication in the [Securities] Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.48

But Morrison is merely the US Supreme Court’s view. Multinationals reflexively presume, following an aging 2003 SEC comment with a fleeting reference to § 301 hotlines in “different well-known denunciations free-form, without resort to formal corporate hotlines. Think of: Japan nuclear power whistleblower Kei Sugaoka; Glaxo Smith Klein whistleblower Cheryl Eckard; “Weinergate” (Anthony Weiner “sexting” whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand. Indeed, workplace whistleblowers denounce errant employees every day without resorting to formal company hotlines. One random, recent example appears in a 2011 California court opinion, San Diego Unified School District v. Commission on Professional Competence, Cal. Ct. App., 4th App. Dist. case no. D05NY0 (May 4, 2011). In that case an anonymous whistleblower denounced, to police—not using any in-house hotline—a middle-school public teacher who had posted pornographic photographs of himself, and had solicited sex, on Craigslist. The California court upheld the firing of the teacher even though the public-sector employee’s Craigslist advertisement had been posted off-hours and was unconnected to his classroom job, and even though the denunciation had been anonymous.

31. A hotline is never necessary for whistleblowing; any whistleblower can submit even anonymous tips in plenty of ways without a hotline. Indeed, only 3% of whistleblowers bother with hotlines. Supra note 29; see generally supra Part One.

32. These six categories comprising our discussion here in Part Two of this article are the categories of laws that regulate the launch and operation of a whistleblower hotline itself. As such, these six categories do not reach—and this article does not address—legal issues ancillary to hotline launch and operation. For example, we do not address either laws regulating the launch of a global code of conduct or laws regulating a mandatory reporting rule that forces employee witnesses to report wrongdoing. This author has addressed both of those issues elsewhere. As to laws regulating a launch of a global code of conduct, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., “Code of Conduct Toolkit: Drafting and Launching a Multinational Employer’s Global Code of Conduct,” chapter 15 in ANDREW P. MORRISS & SAMUEL ESTREICHER, GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER (2010) (Wolters Kluwer). As to laws regulating a mandatory reporting rule that forces employee witnesses to report wrongdoing, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 6, 17, 44-45, and cf. supra note 6.***

33. For our definition of “hotline,” see supra notes 1 and 18. Hotline-mandating laws promote workplace hotlines and so these laws exist only in whistleblowing-friendly jurisdictions.

34. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (hereinafter SOX) reaches all entities, be they U.S.-based or foreign private issuers, that raise funds on U.S. stock exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ.

35. SOX, supra note 34, at § 301(d). Here we address the SOX hotline mandate that audit committees make “procedures” available to “employees.” Separate provisions in SOX impose additional rules as to “reasonably” “promoting”
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of 2009 issued by Liberia's Nobel Peace Prize-winning president required “private entities” to launch procedures for “receiving and processing” “public interest disclosures” about private company “malpractices.” But that order has now lapsed. Norway’s Working Environment Act grants Norwegians a right to report “censurable conditions” and urges employers to “establish” some “routine…or…other measures” for employee whistleblower reports. But this is qualified, little more than a strong recommendation. Multinationals launching cross-border whistleblower hotlines must adapt report channels to strictures in local hotline mandates like the now-lapsed Liberia order and Norway’s Working Environment Act. But beyond US SOX, few laws yet require hotlines, although this might be an emerging trend.

**Category # 2. Laws promoting denunciations to government authorities**

Requirements of whistleblower procedures aside, our next category of hotline regulation is laws like US Dodd-Frank that promote employee/stakeholder getaways to government authorities. These laws do not regulate company hotlines per se, but they steer employer hotline strategy for two reasons: First, encouraging whistleblowing to government competes with employer hotlines by enticing internal whistleblowers to divert denunciations from company compliance experts and over to outside law enforcers who indict white collar criminals. Second, laws that require (as opposed merely to encourage) government denunciations rarely except corporate hotline sponsors. These laws therefore force hotline sponsors to divulge hotline allegations over to law enforcement. For both reasons, hotline sponsors need strategies accounting for these laws. We address US Dodd-Frank first, then similar laws elsewhere.

**US Dodd-Frank:** The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 amended Sarbanes-Oxley in many key respects but did not touch SOX § 301(4)’s mandate for hotline/“complaints” “procedures.” Rather, Dodd-Frank took a radically different approach to whistleblowing that ultimately promotes robust internal company hotlines for a completely different reason. Under Dodd-Frank § 922 and US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implementing rules of May 2011, a US government “bounty” pays cash awards of 10% to 30% of SEC-recovered sanctions over $1 million to eligible whistleblowers—whether living stateside or abroad—who told the SEC “original information” about securities violations leading to an actual money recovery. Even whistleblowers who bypass internal SOX § 301 hotlines are eligible. Dodd Frank’s lure of a huge payday may tempt whistleblowers more than even the warm feeling of doing the right thing by calling an in-house SOX hotline. The Wall Street Journal and many others lament the discordant policy message here to would-be whistleblowers.

Former Deputy US Attorney General George Terwilliger, now a partner practicing white-collar criminal law at White & Case LLP in Washington, DC, analyzes the conflict here in detail and offers strategic advice to corporations caught between SOX and Dodd-Frank. Terwilliger’s analysis merits setting out in detail:

Notably omitted from the [SEC Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty] Final Rules are requirements that were suggested and

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42. See supra note 16.
43. The general, long-standing canon of statutory construction, upheld by a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, is that U.S. statutes do not apply extraterritorially unless they expressly say they reach abroad. See Dowling supra note 2, at 7-11 and citations therein, and see discussion infra.
44. As of mid-2011, a search revealed no case law or other authority on this point.
45. See supra note 43.
46. Camero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. den. 126 S.Ct. 2973 (2006). But cf O’Mahoney v. Accenture, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10600 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (lower court decision distinguishing the facts of Camero). As to the factual distinction between Camero and O’Mahoney, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 8-9, n. 29. After Camero, Dodd-Frank § 929A amended SOX § 806 to expand the definition of covered entity to include “any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statement.” This would seem to include foreign-incorporated affiliates. But the Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX § 806 do not say anything about overseas-based whistleblowers or whistleblowing incidents that occur abroad. And so the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendments probably do not affect the rule in Camero. But if the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendment is somehow held to overrule Camero and extend SOX § 806 abroad, the fact that Dodd-Frank did not similarly amend SOX § 301 buttresses the analysis that § 301 does not extend abroad. Congress could have made a Dodd-Frank § 929A-like
designed to preserve the effectiveness of [SOX § 301-style] corporate internal reporting systems. The Final Rules provide what the SEC posits are a number of incentives to encourage potential whistleblowers to utilize existing internal reporting systems. However, an individual with access to a well-structured, staffed, and responsive internal reporting system can nonetheless forgo reporting internally, provide information directly to the SEC, and remain eligible for [a bounty] award.

The SEC has downplayed the likelihood that individuals seeking awards will bypass internal systems, but the program’s first-to-report requirement, enormous potential financial awards, and lack of an internal reporting requirement represent a significant challenge to maintaining effective compliance programs [including an effective internal hotline]. Companies have implemented these very compliance programs, often at great expense, at the behest of federal authorities and the dictates of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements to effectively monitor operations for compliance with law.

Companies now need to assess the effect of the whistleblower reward provision of Dodd-Frank and the SEC’s implementing rules on their compliance programs and consider such programmatic adjustments and changes as that assessment may suggest. 29

The final SEC rules implementing the bounty attempted, at least ostensibly, to accommodate the critics. According to Terwilliger:

The SEC’s release accompanying its Final Rules identifies three incentives in the Final Rules to encourage individuals to report potential misconduct to internal [hotline] systems, or at least minimize the incentive for individuals to bypass internal reporting systems in the hope of qualifying for an award. First, a whistleblower’s voluntary participation or interference with a corporate compliance program may increase or decrease the award for that whistleblower. Second, if an individual information internally that leads to a successful enforcement action, the SEC will give the whistleblower “full credit” for information disclosed by the corporation for purposes of determining the individual’s eligibility for and amount of an award. Third, if a whistleblower reports information internally and within 120 days, reports that same information to the SEC, the SEC will consider the initial date of internal disclosure as the effective date for purposes of determining the whistleblower’s eligibility for an award. 31

But to Terwilliger, these three would be “incentives…fall short of the rule-making options available to the SEC that would ensure internal [hotlines] continue to help companies identify misconduct and provide opportunities to investigate and take appropriate remedial actions”:

It seems apparent that the SEC made a policy choice that places greater importance on its enforcement interests than on maximizing the continued effectiveness of internal reporting systems and the compliance programs they support. For its part, the SEC “expects that in appropriate cases…it will, upon

56. Section 6(2) of the South Africa law, supra note 55, addresses, but does not mandate, voluntarily-adopted “procedure[s] authorised by [an] employer.” Id. at § 6(2).
60. Discussed in Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 15, n. 48.
61. Here we address laws mandating general denunciations to government authorities. In the specific area of sexual harassment there are some other laws in some jurisdictions like Costa Rica that require employers to offer a report channel specifically for sex harassment complaints. Other countries affirmatively require employers to investigate specific allegations of sex harassment; those countries include Chile, India, Japan, South Africa, and Venezuela. Colombia requires some report channel for “labor” harassment.
63. Id.
receiving a [bounty-eligible] whistleblower complaint, contact a company… and give the company an opportunity to investigate the matter and report back.” While one can hope this positive policy statement will describe a normative practice excepted only in outlier cases where the business…in question bears hallmarks of a criminal enterprise, the SEC’s actual practice under its whistleblower rules merits continued attention, including thorough congressional oversight.

The new whistleblower program provides good cause for corporations to evaluate their compliance efforts and take steps to encourage employees to use internal reporting systems and ensure that companies are made aware of compliance issues as soon as possible.

The objectives of such reevaluation should include (a) maximizing the effectiveness of internal reporting systems; (b) ensuring that internal reports are thoroughly evaluated by a person or group with sufficiently comprehensive knowledge to recognize potential compliance issue in reports that are misdirected or incomplete; and (c) re-examining policies and practices concerning the dissemination of information regarding potential compliance issues within a corporation.

* * *

Corporations may also want to consider renewed effort to inform or remind employees about the existence and use of internal [hotline] reporting systems and provide additional training concerning such use. Employees must believe that reporting internally will not negatively impact their job status. Where appropriate, examples of successful internal reporting offer the best evidence to employees that internal reporting is in the best interest of both the employees and the corporation.

Corporations should also evaluate, assess and update compliance programs to ensure that internal complaints are handled swiftly and, where appropriate, lead to investigations, remediation and disciplinary measures. Such efforts are, of course, necessary to protect shareholder value and mitigate liability if misconduct does occur, as the SEC will continue to consider cooperation efforts by companies in accordance with…SEC policies that reward such efforts.76

Despite the stark policy clash between SOX § 301 and the Dodd-Frank bounty, at the end of the day both laws push company hotline strategy in the very same direction: SOX requires an employer to offer internal hotline “procedures” while Dodd-Frank motivates the very same thing—a conspicuous internal report channel robust enough to attract denunciations that informants might otherwise report to government enforcers.77

**Beyond Dodd-Frank:** Laws outside the US also regulate whistleblower denunciations to local government enforcers. Any multinational launching a global hotline needs to account for these if only because they rarely exempt hotline sponsors themselves and so require companies to disclose hotline denunciations over to local law enforcement. Yet these laws are rare in the free world. The

> “security” broadly to include investment contracts, notes, and other nontraditional investments.

(Emphasis added.)

71. See Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty provision, supra note 66, and Adopting Release, supra note 69. SEC Enforcement Division Associate Director Stephen L. Cohen, speaking at a conference in November 2011, said that critics of the bounty program “warned” that “individuals [would] see[k] financial awards under the program, which by statute will be no less than $100,000 and could reach into the millions of dollars.” Stephen Joyce, “Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program Has Produced Higher Quality Tips,” supra note 2 (emphasis added). The Dodd-Frank bounty is payable only for disclosing a violation of U.S. securities laws—not, for example, for disclosing bribery that violates the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Dodd-Frank, §§ 21F(a)(1), (b)(1), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1). That said, though, “[s]ome whistleblowers may not distinguish between the securities laws and [other laws like] the FCPA…, and once the SEC has received a tip, it can be expected to pass it on to other law enforcement agencies.” Larry P. Ellsworth, “Blowing the Whistle on Private Cos. [sic]?” Employment Law 360, Oct. 26, 2011 (www.law360.com). Whistleblowers resident outside the U.S. who suspect a violation of U.S. securities laws (such as related to accounting fraud occurring overseas) appear to be fully eligible for the bounty.

72. Cf. Tammy Marzigliano & Jordan A. Thomas, supra note 70.
Malaysian Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010, as one example, encourages whistleblowing with a vague Dodd-Frank like bounty.78 Now-lapsed Liberia Executive Order # 2279 used to encourage whistleblowing to government in a few ways. But both these laws and even US Dodd-Frank merely promote denouncing wrongdoers to government. They pose no compliance challenge to companies launching and staffing internal hotlines, although they motivate multinational employers to promote report channels robust enough to attract denunciations that might otherwise go to law enforcers.

The tougher compliance and hotline administration issue here is laws that require divulging evidence of criminal behavior to government enforcers. Because few if any mandatory-reporting laws exempt hotline sponsors, these laws require divulging credible hotline reports to law enforcers even before a thorough internal investigation. Fortunately, very few free-world jurisdictions impose these laws. Slovakia’s Criminal Code,80 as one example, forces Slovaks (including employers) who reliably learn of illegal behavior to denounce wrongdoers to the police. Liberia’s now-lapsed Executive Order # 2281 forced employers that received credible criminal allegations through mandatory hotlines to report them to Liberia’s “attorney general.”82 These laws cripple hotline strategy both because they require organizations to use their hotlines to incriminate themselves and because they limit organizations’ power to invest in investigate denunciations.83

Dodd-Frank not only provides robust whistleblower protection, but it has revived pre-existing whistleblower claims. The False Claims Act (FCA), once limited to individuals who were “original sources” with “direct and independent knowledge,” has been expanded to cover individuals with either information or analysis.… Similarly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) now appears to have the teeth it was intended to have. Dodd-Frank expanded SOX by extending coverage beyond just public companies to employees of affiliates and subsidiaries of publicly traded companies “whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such publicly traded company.”

Category # 3. Laws restricting hotlines specifically (EU data protection laws)

Having discussed laws that both require whistleblower hotlines and promote whistleblowing to government, our next category is hotline mandates that run in completely the opposite direction and restrict organizations’ freedom to launch and operate report channels.84 In theory this category includes all laws that specifically ban or limit whistleblower hotlines, but no such laws is known to exist anywhere. Rather, the only known laws specifically restricting employer whistleblower report procedures are European Union member state guidelines interpreting EU data protection (privacy) laws in the hotline context.85

Some Continental Europeans distrust whistleblowers and therefore hotlines.86 Over a dozen European jurisdictions interpret their local domestic data protection laws (either by regulation or at least by data agency pronouncement) specifically to rein in employer hotlines. In addition, an EU advisory body called the Article 29 Working Party issued a persuasive but non-binding report that recommends all 27 EU states embrace a particularly-restrictive interpretation of EU data law to rein in hotlines.87 Broadly speaking, Europeans see hotlines as threatening privacy rights of denounced targets and witnesses when hotlines are not “proportionate” to other report channels in European workplaces.88 Among the specific hurdles that European jurisdictions erect to frustrate hotlines,


74. George J. Terwilliger III, “SEC Adopts Final Rules to Implement New Whistleblower Program,” supra note 73 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Terwilliger adds: (SEC) Commissioner Paredes stated: “singular attention has centered on the extent to which the [Dodd-Frank] whistleblower [bounty] program, depending on how it is structured, could unduly erode the value of internal compliance programs in rooting out and preventing wrongdoing.” Despite the advocacy for an internal reporting requirement as a condition of award eligibility, the SEC declined to incorporate such a requirement in the final rules.

75. Id. (footnotes omitted). According to David Schwartz and Kathiana Aurelien of the
perhaps the four biggest are: (1) restrictions against hotlines accepting anonymous denunciations, (2) limits on the universe of “proportionate” infractions on which a hotline accepts denunciations, (3) limits on who can use a hotline and be denounced by hotline, and (4) hotline registration requirements. We discuss each in turn.

(1) Restrictions against hotlines accepting anonymous denunciations. European hostility toward whistleblowing runs fiercest against anonymous denunciations90 and hotlines that accept them. Spain and Portugal ban anonymous hotline denunciations entirely and France may prohibit (or at least has prohibited) employers from disclosing that a hotline will accept anonymous calls, even if it does in fact take them.90 Hotline communications across the rest of Continental Europe should affirmatively discourage anonymous calls and affirmatively encourage informants to self-identify. Multinationals that see SOX § 301(4)’s mandate for “anonymous” procedures as reaching overseas face an impossible conundrum in fact take them.90

Employers that think they must reconcile US-style SOX hotlines with European anonymity restrictions have four possible choices, not all fully compliant: (i) violate Spanish, Portuguese and maybe French law by offering and communicating a hotline that accepts anonymous calls; (ii) keep hotline communications silent on anonymity but let hotline staff accept denunciations from informants who refuse to self-identify, even where that violates local law; (iii) issue a hotline communication that discourages but implicitly accepts anonymous denunciations even where this violates local law; or (iv) have hotline staff hang up on anonymous callers where required under local law, taking the position that the SOX § 301 “anonym[ity]” requirement does not reach abroad.

Deciding among these four options forces a multinational to ponder whether to tailor hotline communications locally abroad or to do what probably every American multinational would prefer—issue a single global hotline protocol for affiliate employees worldwide, or at least Europe-wide. This requires tough decisions: How can a global intranet send different messages to employees in different countries? If a hotline sponsor can post country-tailored hotline protocols on its company intranet, what happens if an employee based in one country accesses and follows a protocol for staff in a different country? What if an informant from a country where the employer purports not to accept anonymous calls offers up a huge denunciation but refuses to self-identify—must hotline staff cut off his report? At this level of granularity these are strategy questions; answers depend on circumstances, risk analysis and HR communication systems specific to each organization.92

(2) Limits on the universe of “proportionate” infractions on which a hotline accepts denunciations. Even the most hotline-skeptical jurisdictions in Europe recognize, if grudgingly, that American multinationals feel compelled to offer employee hotlines to collect reports of financial/audit/accounting fraud and bribery/improper payments, to comply at least with the spirit of US SOX and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.93 Hotline-skeptical jurisdictions in

When multinationals feel compelled to offer employee hotlines to collect reports of financial/audit/accounting fraud and bribery/improper payments, to comply at least with the spirit of US SOX and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,93 Hotline-skeptical jurisdictions in

Global Whistleblower Hotline Toolkit: How to Launch and Operate a Legally-Compliant International Workplace Report Channel

law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP:

Even though employers do not pay bounties directly to whistleblowers, many employers are rightly concerned that they will now be subject to unnecessary SEC investigations as employees start to view bounties as personal “lottery tickets.” If a few employees “hit it big,” more complaints to the SEC will follow, whether or not they are well-founded.

“Whistleblowing: Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounties and Their Impact on Employers,” supra note 73, at 14 (emphasis added). See also Holly J. Gregory, supra note 6.

The (Dodd-Frank) rules pose a potential risk to the effectiveness of corporate compliance programs, which by their nature depend on reports from employees about potential wrongdoing. The split 3-2 SEC vote adopting the rules underscores the controversy about the potential impact of the rules on [company compliance] programs. *** A new Office of the Whistleblower has been established within the SEC’s Division of Enforcement to administer the rules. *** [The rules] address concerns that compliance programs will be undermined if employees go directly to the SEC with information about potential wrongdoing. *** The new rules have a detrimental effect on existing internal reporting systems....


76. George J. Terwilliger III, supra note 73 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). For
Europe interpret data protection laws to allow only “proportionate” workplace hotlines closed off to all but these few infractions. But American multinationals see no reason to restrict hotlines this way. They prefer to throw open hotlines to most any impropriety. After all, Americans reason: If we go to the trouble of launching and staffing a hotline we might as well use it to find out about any problem out there, be it an environmental spill, workplace harassment and bullying, vandalism. Corporate espionage, breach of HR policy, breach of expense reimbursement protocols—even theft of office supplies and, unsanitary use of toilets. But to list hotline-reportable infractions is illusory and deceptive if hotline operators will actually take all calls. Yet an employer faces logistical problems confining a hotline to only a few topics: How does hotline-answering staff field an off-point call? Can they even listen? How does hotline staff divert an off-point denunciation to another channel, without dropping it?

(3) Limits on who can use a hotline and be denounced by hotline. Some jurisdictions such as Austria, Hungary, Netherlands and Sweden seem oddly classist and undemocratic in that they force employers to reserve hotlines for executives denouncing misdeeds of upperlevel colleagues. These jurisdictions steer low-level staff to another channel, without dropping it? A compelling denunciation.

are in a special position for keeping their hotlines in front of employees worldwide. The U.S. SEC does not communicate directly with U.S. workforces, much less overseas workforces.

87. For a summary (far more thorough than the discussion infra of these European hotline restrictions, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 18-56; see also chart, infra; Daniel Cooper & Helena Marttila, “Corporate Whistleblowing Hotlines and EU Data Protection Laws,” PLC online (available at http://isandit.practicallaw.com/1-366-2987).

88. On “proportionality” in the hotline context, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 41-42. Continental Europeans insist that a hotline is not “proportionate” (is redundant, unnecessary, or at least “overkill”) if it threatens to compromise data rights of denounced targets and others but offers little benefit beyond simply duplicating alternate, more privacy-protective report channels already in the European workplace. These so-called “alternate report channels” are not hotlines, of course, but rather are local employee representatives (trade unions, works councils, health and safety committees, ombudsmen), local grievance procedures, and local line managers/chains of command/human resources. To an American, though, these are not adequate “alternates” at all. An American sees local representatives/processors/managers as insiders incompetent to substitute for a hotline for two reasons: (1) reporting to local representatives/processors/managers tends to be neither

Beyond these four main types of EU data law hotline restrictions, Europe’s hotline-skeptical jurisdictions regulate other aspects of report channels. Other regulated issues include: (5) alignment with “proportionate” alternate report channels in the workplace, (6) notices to employees, targets and witnesses explaining their rights; (7) restrictions against outsourcing hotlines; (8) communications to targets/witnesses disclosing specific whistleblower denunciations; (9) complying with “sensitive” (EU data directive article 8) data restrictions as to criminal data received by hotline; (10) rights to access, rectify, block or eliminate personal data processed via hotline; (11) restrictions against transferring hotline data outside of Europe; and (12) deleting/purging of data in hotline call files. This chart summarizes hotline laws in Europe on key topics:

White & Case

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Whistleblower Hotlines and Data Protection Laws in Europe

This chart summarizes data protection law pronouncements in those EU member states that issued data-law mandates or interpretations specific to employee whistleblower hotlines as of mid-2011. “Whistleblower hotline” means any channel/system for employees/stakeholders to submit complaints/concerns/allegations of wrongdoing to management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Is the authority binding law?</th>
<th>Must confine hotline to certain topics only?</th>
<th>Are anonymous whistleblower calls ever ok?</th>
<th>Is outsourced (vs. in-house) hotline favored?</th>
<th>Must disclose hotline to data agency?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Art. 29 Working Party</td>
<td>No: opinion of 1 Feb. 06 is persuasive, a collective view of local Data Protection Agency (DPA) representatives from the EU member states</td>
<td>Hotline OK if limited to accounting, internal accounting controls, audit, anti-bribery, banking and financial crimes; no opinion on hotlines that reach other topics</td>
<td>Yes, but do “not advertise” anonymity feature: “The Working Party considers that whistleblowing schemes should…not encourage anonymous reporting as the usual way to make a complaint…. Companies should not advertise the fact that anonymous reports may be made through the scheme…..If, despite this information [being assured of confidentiality], the person reporting…still wants to remain anonymous, the report will be accepted…..”</td>
<td>In-house hotline is favored; trained in-house team should oversee</td>
<td>Art. 29 Working Party has no opinion; disclosure depends on local EU member state law</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Largely yes: Four hotline-specific decisions are binding as to their specific facts and parties only but otherwise are persuasive:</td>
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<td>■ K178.27/0010- DSK/2008 of 5 Dec. 08</td>
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<td>■ K600.07/0002- DVR/2010 of 20 Jan. 10</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Yes. A hotline must be for a legitimate purpose, therefore must be limited to complaints on topics of “substantial importance”; specifically, Austrian authority interprets this to reach: accounting/internal accounting controls; audit; severe misconduct/severe violations of internal code of conduct; money laundering and anti-terrorism might also be considered legitimate</td>
<td>Only reports of misconduct regarding executive managers can be processed and transferred to the US</td>
<td>Yes, but employers are not supposed to encourage anonymous calls</td>
<td>Third-party hotline outsourcer is favored; in any event (whether hotline is answered internally or outsourced), an independent specially-trained team should handle reports</td>
<td>Yes, whistleblowing systems must be notified to the DPA; affirmative DPA authorization is required if the hotline will process sensitive data and/or other special categories of data such as criminal offences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Yes, binding as to notification process with the DPA: Local DPA Whistleblower Guidelines: Procedure for Notification of Whistleblower Systems (updated April 10) There are also two DPA decisions:</td>
<td>Yes, to: criminal offenses; issues under US SOX; serious offenses important to group/company or relevant to life/wellbeing; economic crimes (e.g., bribery, fraud, forgery); accounting, auditing, bank/finance; corruption/crimes; environmental issues; serious work safety issues, serious employee issues (e.g., assault or sexual abuse) Hotline should not accept reports about &quot;less serious offences,&quot; expressly including: harassment, &quot;cooperative difficulties,&quot; incompetence, absence, violation of HR policies</td>
<td>Not addressed by guidelines; Danish lawyers understand anonymous calls are OK but should not be encouraged</td>
<td>Neither is favored; third-party hotline outsourcers must be listed in notification to the DPA as processors</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yes, binding as to notification process with the DPA; Local DPA Whistleblower Guidelines: Procedure for Notification of Whistleblower Systems (updated April 10) There are also two DPA decisions: ■ 2006-42-1061 (Vestas) ■ 2010-42-1941 (Euprin) DPA decisions are not directly binding on non-parties, but have persuasive authority; DPA must treat similar cases similarly</td>
<td>Yes, to: criminal offenses; issues under US SOX; serious offenses important to group/company or relevant to life/wellbeing; economic crimes (e.g., bribery, fraud, forgery); accounting, auditing, banking/finance; corruption/crimes; environmental issues; serious work safety issues, serious employee issues (e.g., assault or sexual abuse)</td>
<td>Not addressed by guidelines; Danish lawyers understand anonymous calls are OK but should not be encouraged</td>
<td>Neither is favored; third-party hotline outsourcers must be listed in notification to the DPA as processors</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>No (local DPA guidelines of 27 July 10)</td>
<td>Yes, to: accounting, financial matters, banking, and bribery Under the Finnish data protection law “necessity” requirement, only information directly necessary for an employee’s employment relationship should be collected through a hotline</td>
<td>Apparently yes, but discouraged; hotline sponsor should discourage anonymous calls; targets have a right to know the source of reports about them unless specifically restricted by law</td>
<td>Neither is favored; hotline needs to be notified to DPA if outsourced</td>
<td>No, unless data transferred outside EU/EEA (without using model contractual clauses, safe harbor or binding corporate rules) or hotline is outsourced to third party</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Yes: local DPA (CNIL) guidelines of 10 Nov. 05 and 8 Dec. 05 (modified by Resolution no. 2010-369 of 14 Oct. 2010 as a result of Dassault Systèmes decision (Cour de Cassation 8 Dec. ’08), and clarified by CNIL Fiche pratique of 14 March 11; see generally Benoist Girard (subsidiary of Stryker) v. CHSCT, Cour d’Appel Caen 3rd Chamber (23 Sept. 11, released 4 Oct. 11)</td>
<td>Yes, to: financial, accounting, audit and banking issues; antitrust/competition practices; and bribery/corruption; per Fiche pratique of 3/11, if serious issues outside the scope (e.g., environmental violations; trade secret disclosure; data breach risks; discrimination, harassment and other “risks” to employee “integrity”) are reported via hotline, the report needs to be redirected to the responsible person (e.g., financial director, HR director)</td>
<td>Yes, but not encouraged, DPA orally said on 2 March 07 that anonymity feature cannot be communicated to employees, but as of 2011 DPA’s position on this seems to have softened; per Fiche pratique of 3/11, “in principle, whistleblower systems are not anonymous” and whistleblower “must” be “invited” to self-identify, Benoist Girard decision (supra) says anonymous denunciations cannot be “accepted except by exception and surrounded by certain precautions”</td>
<td>Neither is favored; if in-house, a trained team should oversee and retain confidentiality</td>
<td>Affirmative permission required under 10 Nov. 05 hotline guidelines; self-certify disclosure necessary under 8 Dec. 05 hotline guidelines</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>No (opinion of 20 April 07 of Düsseldorfer Kreis, a national data agency collective/working group consisting of local German Länder [states] data agency representatives)</td>
<td>Hotline OK if limited to: criminal offenses (in particular, fraud, accounting and auditing matters, corruption, banking and financial crime, and insider trading), human rights (e.g., child labor), and environmental violations; other topics may be OK, but hotline may not focus on “conduct which adversely affects company ethics” (e.g., vague mandates such as “to be friendly when dealing with customers”)</td>
<td>Yes, but discouraged; only for exceptional cases</td>
<td>Not clear; third-party hotline outsourcers appear favored</td>
<td>Yes, but disclosure mandate is general, applying to many data processing systems (no hotline-specific disclosure mandate), and subject to exceptions such as where there is a company data protection officer</td>
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<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Limit hotline to “matters that may cause harm to or jeopardize public interest” (e.g., abuse of public resources, corruption, bribery, health and safety, criminal conduct, environmental issues); if hotline covers other matters (not of public concern), employees’ consent is needed</td>
<td>Yes; Hungary tracks the Art. 29 Working Party opinion</td>
<td>In-house is favored; if outsourced, employees’ consent is needed and hotline must be registered with DPA; in both cases, access to data must be restricted to limited group authorized to handle reports</td>
<td>If hotline involves transferring data beyond the direct employer (e.g., intra-group transfers or transfer to third-party hotline provider), registration (and perhaps also consent) is required; if not, no explicit registration obligation, but registration is advisable; processing personal data from a whistleblowing call must be registered with the DPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>No (guidance posted on local DPA webpage, 6 March 06)</td>
<td>No, hotline can cover whatever violations company specifically designated in advance</td>
<td>Yes, but “not encouraged”</td>
<td>Neither is favored</td>
<td>No, certain data controllers are required to register with DPA, but hotlines do not trigger the registration obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>Segnalazione al Parlamento e al Governo sull’individuazione, mediante sistemi di segnalazione, degli illeciti commessi da soggetti operanti a vario titolo nell’organizzazione aziendale, 10 Dec. 09 (Italian DPA) issued per art. 154, 11 of 30 June 03, no.196(DPA referral of hotline questions to Parliament taking no substantive positions)</td>
<td>No position</td>
<td>No position</td>
<td>No position</td>
<td>No position</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Luxembourg</strong></td>
<td>No (guidance of 30 June 06, updated 10 Nov. 07 and 11 May 09, posted on DPA webpage and affirmed in 2009 Annual Report of Activities at § 2.2.1.2)</td>
<td>Yes, to: accounting, audit, banking and bribery issues</td>
<td>Yes, but anonymity must be discouraged; whistleblowers must identify where possible</td>
<td>Neither is favored; trained hotline-answering team with a confidentiality obligation to handle reports is recommended</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>No, but persuasive: local DPA recommendation to individual party of 16 Jan. 06</td>
<td>Yes, “limit[]” scope to “substantial abuses”; any forwarding of reports to “parent company” can only involve “substantial abuses” above “subsidiary level” (mostly reports of serious abuses by upper management)</td>
<td>Yes, but organizations may not encourage anonymous reports and in theory must use a system by which identity of the informant is established</td>
<td>Third-party hotline outsourcer is favored</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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## Global Whistleblower Hotline Toolkit: How to Launch and Operate a Legally-Compliant International Workplace Report Channel

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<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td>No, but persuasive (“The whistleblower hotline authorizations granted shall make direct reference to the legal principles included herein”): DPA’s deliberation nº 765/2009 of 21 Sep. 09</td>
<td>Yes, to: accounting, internal accounting controls, audit, fight against corruption, banking and financial crimes; targets must be individuals exercising management activities in these fields</td>
<td>Likely no; anonymous calls appear to be forbidden: DPA “deliberation” “repudiates” anonymous hotlines; Portuguese practitioners differ on whether this “repudiation” amounts to a complete ban on accepting anonymous calls</td>
<td>Third-party hotline outsourcers are preferred; if in-house, only a small trained team with a confidentiality obligation (contractual) should handle reports</td>
<td>Yes: hotline must be authorized by DPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
<td>No, Slovenia Information Commissioner Opinion on Registration of Whistleblowing Systems, 26 June 07</td>
<td>No position</td>
<td>Yes. No restrictions</td>
<td>Neither is favored; no position</td>
<td>No; disclose and register investigation files only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>No, but very persuasive: report 0128/2007 of 28 May 07 issued by DPA legal department sets out DPA’s opinion; later cited in: several DPA international data transfer authorizations (files nº: T/000035/2007; T/00222/2009; T/00026/2008; T/00088/2010; T/000889/2010, etc.), 2007 and 2008 DPA Annual Report, and DPA Guide to Data Protection in Labor Relations</td>
<td>Yes, to: violations of internal or external regulations that could subject target to discipline; must specify: what offenses can be denounced; what internal or external regulations the offenses violate</td>
<td>No; “[m]echanisms guaranteeing only the acceptance of reports in which the whistleblower is clearly identified should be established to guarantee the information’s accuracy; not being adequate to establish systems permitting anonymous reports”; Spain’s DPA says (orally) that anonymous calls are not acceptable (hence head-on conflict with SOX § 301, if § 301 is held to extend extraterritorially)</td>
<td>Neither is favored; whistleblowers and targets must be duly informed if data is sent to a third party to investigate the reports</td>
<td>Yes, “it will be necessary to notify” to get “inscription” in DPA “Register” and obtain authorization to send data outside of EU/EEA: this is a general (not hotline-specific) mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>Yes: Swedish Data Inspection Board general regulations DIFS 2010:1 decided 22 Sep. 10 and subsequent Guidelines for companies: Responsibility for personal data processed in whistleblowing systems of Oct. 2010 partially affirming previous holdings in cases: Tyco Decision of 6 March 08; AON Decision of 26 March 08; Telef. Decision of 6 March 08</td>
<td>Yes, to serious irregularities concerning: accounting, internal accounting controls, audit, fight against bribery, banking and financial crimes, other serious irregularities concerning vital interests of the company or group or individuals’ life and health (e.g., serious environmental crimes, major workplace safety issues, serious discrimination or harassment issues). Processing personal data concerning crimes may only involve those in leading positions in the co. or group</td>
<td>Yet, but cf. Shell case of 29 March 2007: proportionality required</td>
<td>Neither is favored; Tyco hotline outsourced to US held OK; there must be a written contract with the outsourcer</td>
<td>No, if hotline complies with DIFS 2010:1; if not, an affirmative § 21 exemption is required (this article prohibits processing data about crimes)</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>No: 11th Annual Report of Activities 2003/2004 (of Swiss DPA), at § 71 (This report is very early, 2003/04, and may not reflect current Swiss DPA thinking)</td>
<td>No restriction</td>
<td>Unclear; hotline must collect at least whistleblower’s untraceable contact information (such as anonymous email address or drop-box address) and, if necessary, complete identity; a complaint should not, in principle, be processed if the whistleblower does not provide this contact information</td>
<td>Neither is favored as neither is seen as a perfect solution; a proposed “compromise” would be to name a person responsible to answer the hotline in each subsidiary; reports made by a given employee of one subsidiary would be answered by the person responsible in a different subsidiary, to assure impartiality</td>
<td>Yes, but notification mandate is general, applying to many data processing systems (no hotline-specific notification mandate), and there are exceptions such as where there is a company data protection officer; if data are sent abroad, the local DPA might also need to be notified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>No (local DPA conference paper of 6 April 06)</td>
<td>No, but there “should be” a “clear” list of topics covered</td>
<td>Yes, but “confidential reporting” is preferred</td>
<td>DPA position unclear: legal advice in UK recommends third-party hotline outsourcers to reduce likelihood of conflicts of interest</td>
<td>Likely yes, as part of general mandate to disclose data processing activities annually (no hotline-specific mandate)</td>
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In discussing laws that expressly restrict workplace whistleblower hotlines we discussed only the data protection laws of Europe because those are the only known laws anywhere that specifically speak to, and restrict, employer whistleblower hotlines. Those laws present the toughest single compliance challenge to a multinational launching a cross-border hotline. In particular, France continues to issue cases, regulations, pronouncements and private letter rulings that regulate hotlines increasingly minutely. Spain aggressively prohibits anonymous hotlines and Portugal seems to, as well. Germany imposes multi-faceted rules that can differ by Lander (state). So many differing hotline-specific restrictions across Europe both impose compliance challenges and they create logistical problems of hotline alignment. Having to tailor disparate local hotlines frustrates multinationals that invariably would prefer just one single global (or at least one single European) hotline protocol.

Category # 4. Laws prohibiting whistleblower retaliation

Having addressed laws that mandate workplace whistleblower hotlines, that regulate denunciations to government authorities and that restrict hotlines specifically, we now turn to a fourth category of whistleblowing law: prohibitions against whistleblower retaliation. These are increasingly common. US SOX and Dodd-Frank as well as American state whistleblower retaliation laws grant causes of action to stateside whistleblowers punished for whistleblowing. Now, more and more overseas jurisdictions from U.K. and South Africa to Malaysia, Japan and beyond have climbed aboard this bandwagon and prohibit whistleblower retaliation. Indeed, freedom from workplace whistleblower retaliation has actually been declared a human right, at least in Europe: In a decision of July 2011 involving Germany, the European Court of Human Rights allowed all employees to denounce wrongdoing free from the specter of retaliation.

problems are not just theoretical or hypothetical; denunciations to local interested insiders get mishandled all the time. For one example, in October 2011 a California jury awarded a Sears employee $5.2 million in a race harassment case that emerged from this very scenario. Loretta Kalb, “Sears Employee Wins $5.2 Million Jury Award for Racial Harassment,” Sacramento (Ca.) City News, Oct. 26, 2011 (www.sacbee.com). The Sears employee had approached his “supervisors” denouncing a racist colleague who happened to be “one of [Sears’s] top sales producers nationally.” Id. The “supervisors,” “not wanting to take action” against the racist sales star, covered up the denunciation and took “subsequent acts...to avoid being exposed for failing to follow the law.” A jury awarded $5.2 million to the
Whistleblower retaliation laws are sometimes colloquially called “whistleblower laws” and so they might seem to play a role in the launch of a legally-compliant hotline. But for the most part they do not. These laws are specific to workplace-context whistleblowing but in practical effect they have almost nothing to say about hotlines because retaliation is impossible until after a whistleblower call ends and a follow-up investigatory stage begins. 108 Retaliation can become an issue only after an employer responds to a would-be whistleblower. 109

That said, there is a big hotline communication issue here. In whistleblowing-averse jurisdictions around the world from Russia to Latin America and the Middle East to India and parts of Asia and Africa, an employer needs to overcome worker fear of reprisal for whistleblowing. This means guaranteeing that no one using the report channel in good faith will suffer retaliation. But globally communicating a non-retaliation commitment almost surely extends, quasi-contractually, otherwise non-existent anti-retaliation rights to whistleblowers in jurisdictions without retaliation laws. 110 Consider carefully the strategic and legal implications before making an anti-retaliation commitment across borders.

Category # 5. Laws regulating internal investigations

Probably every jurisdiction imposes some legal doctrines that reach employer investigations into allegations of employee wrongdoing. Depending on the country and the allegation investigated, an internal investigation might trigger, for example, local laws on labor/employment, data privacy/protection, tort, crimes, criminal procedure, private-party due process, and prohibitions against exporting state secrets. 111 But these doctrines only kick in after an investigation starts. They have almost no bearing on the launch and staffing of a global whistleblower hotline because a hotline is a pre-investigatory tool. 112

This said, there is a hotline communication issue here. Heavy-handed communications about a hotline might later support claimants who allege the employer rigged its investigation process.

For example, imagine a hotline communication that says something to the effect of: We investigate every report exhaustively, leaving no stone unturned to verify the truth of reports received. Few organizations are likely to convey so blunt a message, but if one did the statement might turn up later as evidence supporting a victimization claim. Ensure communications about report channels do not convey an overzealous approach to complaint-processing and investigations. Where necessary, such as in Europe, be sure hotline communications spell out the private due process rights of whistleblowers, witnesses—and targets.

Category # 6. Laws silent on, but possibly triggered by, whistleblower hotlines

Having addressed five types of laws that in at least some contexts regulate hotline whistleblowing specifically, our sixth and final category is broader: Legal doctrines that neither explicitly address hotline whistleblowing nor have yet been interpreted in the hotline whistleblowing context, but that a hotline might theoretically trigger. This category is necessarily vague, and determining which laws fall into it difficult. Our two most likely candidates are data protection laws silent on hotlines and labor laws imposing negotiation duties and work rules obligations.

Data protection laws silent on hotlines: We already discussed, as “category #3,” data protection law doctrines in Europe that explicitly address whistleblower hotlines. Beyond Europe, more and more jurisdictions around the world now impose European-style omnibus data privacy/protection laws. Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, Taiwan, Uruguay, and others as of 2011 had passed or were implementing comprehensive (as opposed to sectoral) data protection laws. Some of these are almost as tough as data laws in Europe. In the future these laws might be argued to reach whistleblower hotlines, paralleling the analysis in Continental Europe. 113 But as of 2011 none of these data laws was known ever to have been interpreted to reach hotlines.
The way Europeans stretch their data laws to reach hotlines may be exceptional. Data privacy/protection laws regulate information about identifiable humans, but the launch and staffing of an employer whistleblower hotline—before it receives a whistleblower call that might or might not later morph into an internal investigation—does not implicate any personal data whatsoever, about anybody. A hotline standing alone does not contain or process personal data about any whistleblower, target, or witness. A hotline is a mere channel, not a database, and is more analogous to a telephone, computer or communications device than to a human resources database warehousing information about, for example, payroll, attendance, performance management, expense reimbursements, business travel or benefits/pension/insurance administration. For that matter, even when a real-life whistleblower contacts a company hotline to denounce an identified colleague, the personal data transmitted get sent by the whistleblower, not the company hotline sponsor. So even an actual hotline denunciation would not seem to implicate a hotline sponsor company in processing personal data until the moment the denunciation ends and hotline staff further processes data received by writing up a report and perhaps launching an investigation. Of course, many but not all European jurisdictions reject this analysis and regulate report channels as if they somehow were databases. We have no way yet to know whether non-European jurisdictions with comprehensive data laws will be so aggressive.

Labor laws imposing negotiation duties and work rules obligations: Labor laws—specifically, mandates imposing labor negotiation duties and obligations regarding work rules—are another type of law that, although silent on and not yet construed as to stand-alone whistleblower hotlines, could reach workplace report channels. Labor laws in most every jurisdiction require at least some employers to bargain with trade unions over certain changes in the workplace. Some jurisdictions also require informing and consulting about new workplace practices with other employee representatives such as works councils, health and safety committees, and ombudsmen. But the texts of collective labor statutes never address hotlines specifically. As of 2011, few if any regulations, court decisions, or administrative rulings anywhere on Earth had construed bargaining obligations as to launching a stand-alone whistleblower hotline.

An employer subject to labor consultation obligations might take the position that merely offering a new stand-alone hotline does not change anyone’s work conditions and so is not subject to labor discussions. Employee representatives might counterargue that now having to work under a hotline regime poisons the work environment because it turns every co-worker and colleague into a possible spy. In the US, unionized employers have to bargain with their unions before implementing new workplace surveillance technology like email and video monitoring. A US labor union inclined to resist a whistleblower hotline could characterize it as a sort of monitoring/surveillance tool that triggers this same bargaining obligation. This same analysis could apply abroad, as well. Whether launching a stand-alone hotline falls under existing bargaining obligations is rarely settled law. The answer can depend

92. These issues lead to real-world litigation. In the case Benoist Girard (subsidiary of Stryker) v. CHSCT, Cour d’Appel Caen 3rd Chamber (23 Sept. 11, released 4 Oct. 11), a French court held illegal the France hotline of Michigan-based medical technology multinational Stryker, even though the French Data Protection Authority had previously approved it. A French whistleblower had gotten past the approved France-specific communications and accessed a different on-line hotline communication meant for Stryker U.S. employees. For a deeper discussion of the strategy issues in play here, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 51-56.

93. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. The FCPA does not expressly mandate in-house hotlines, but FCPA compliance without a hotline presents tough challenges. Even EU jurisdictions seem open to hotlines that accept denunciations of bribery. See Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 30.

94. In short, European jurisdictions see workplace hotlines as a threat to data privacy tolerable only where absolutely necessary. By European standards a hotline is somehow less objectionable if it collects only allegations of audit/accounting fraud and bribery but not allegations of, say, theft, physical violence and sexual harassment. Europeans speak here in terms of “proportionality” – to a European, a hotline that accepts denunciations of thievery, bullying and sex harassment is not “proportionate” because harassers, bullies and thieves, unlike fraudsters and bribers, somehow can be denounced more appropriately via other channels. To an American, this “proportionality” analysis in the hotline context seems circular, even bizarre. See supra note 88 (on “proportionality”).

95. For a summary of these European hotline restriction laws, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 18-56; see also chart, infra; Daniel Cooper & Helena Marttila, supra note 87.

96. See “France” row on chart, infra, and citations therein.

97. For a summary of these European hotline restriction laws, see Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 18-56; see also chart, infra; Daniel Cooper & Helena Marttila, supra note 87.

98. See “France” row on chart, infra, and citations therein.

99. See supra notes 88 and 94 (on “proportionality”).

100. These twelve issues are discussed at Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 41-51.

101. See “France,” “Spain,” and “Portugal” rows on chart, supra, and citations therein.

102. Cf. Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 53-54.

103. SOX § 806 offers whistleblowers an administrative, and ultimately a court, claim for retaliation—cf. the § 806 claim in the Carrero case (cited and discussed supra at note 46 and accompanying text). The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration handles whistleblower claims in the first instance that allege SOX § 806 violations. OSHA whistleblower-retaliation-handling rules appear at 29 CFR Part 1980. These rules were being revised in 2011 to accommodate the changes of Dodd-Frank, and a draft revision issued November 3, 2011. OSHA “Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints under Section 806 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, as Amended, Interim Final Rule, Request for Comments.”
on the comprehensiveness of the local bargaining obligation, the applicable collective agreement, the workplace bargaining history and the local society’s receptivity or aversion to whistleblowing. Consulting over a stand-alone hotline will much more likely be held mandatory in Continental Europe and Hong Kong than in the Middle East, the Americas, much of Asia, Latin America, or Africa.

In launching a stand-alone whistleblower channel outside the US, check whether local worker representatives in each jurisdiction could plausibly argue that new report procedures trigger mandatory bargaining/consultation. Look into whether existing collective arrangements address reporting and grievance procedures, whether the society is whistleblowing-averse, and whether the company’s own worker representatives tend to obstruct most changes to the workplace. Where the employer can convince its worker representatives why the proposed hotline benefits everyone and is not a material adverse change, bargaining/consultation should present no hurdle.

But resisting worker consultation over a stand-alone hotline is not always a sound strategy. In whistleblowing-averse societies that suspect hotlines as a form of entrapment, consultations may make sense to make the hotline effective. And in certain jurisdictions an affirmative agreement with worker representatives about a hotline can help surmount challenges on grounds beyond labor law. For example, a labor/management works agreement (Betriebsvereinbarung) in Germany and a “plant bargaining agreement” in Austria that accept a workplace hotline can rebut claims that report procedures violate data protection laws. Bargaining is also necessary where a hotline does not stand alone but comprises a piece of a more extensive compliance program inarguably subject to consultation, such as a new global code of conduct with a mandatory reporting rule that requires whistleblowing. 123

A workplace hotline can also implicate a separate labor law issue: mandatory work rules. France, Japan, Korea, and other countries require that employers post written work rules that list prohibited workplace infractions. A stand-alone whistleblower hotline, as distinct from a mandatory reporting rule, 124 is not a work rule and so should not require changing already-posted lists of infractions. But a hotline launch that includes a new mandatory reporting rule likely requires tweaks to extant rules.

### Conclusion

Domestically within the US, launching new work rules, employee handbooks and codes of conduct can trigger legal issues, especially in unionized workplaces. And in the US a whistleblower’s call to a workplace hotline triggers a cluster of legal issues, such as regarding internal investigations, employee discipline, and whistleblower retaliation. But American employers, even unionized ones, that make a stand-alone workplace whistleblower hotline available to US employees are available to employees who provide information to the SEC in the manner described in the Final Rules and with a ‘reasonable belief that the information being provided relates to a possible securities law violation that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur’… Dodd-Frank affords individuals a cause in federal district court to enforce the new provisions.

George J. Terwilliger III, supra note 73. See supra note 103.

104. Dodd-Frank, supra note 26, as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(B); cf. Final Rule § 240.21F-2(b)(2). Dodd-Frank whistleblower retaliation provisions appear at Dodd-Frank § 929, which amends SOX § 806 by expanding the statute of limitations significantly, exempting SOX whistleblower claims from mandatory arbitration, and allowing state court SOX whistleblower retaliation claims to be removed to federal court and tried before a jury. Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower retaliation protections:

are available to employees who provide information to the SEC in the manner described in the Final Rules and with a ‘reasonable belief that the information being provided relates to a possible securities law violation that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur’… Dodd-Frank affords individuals a cause in federal district court to enforce the new provisions.

George J. Terwilliger III, supra note 73. See supra note 103.


106. Examples include: UK Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998; South Africa Protected Disclosures Act 2000, art. 6, no. 785; Malaysian Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010; Japan Whistleblower Protection Act (Act No. 122 of 2004); many others. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.


108. To the extent that some jurisdiction’s whistleblower retaliation law separately contains a provision mandating the launch of a whistleblower hotline, for our purposes that would be a “category #1” law, discussed supra Part Two, “Category #1.” Liberia’s now-lapsed whistleblower executive order (supra note 62) is an example—a hybrid retaliation/hotline mandate law. Laws of this type may be emerging, but as of 2011 were extremely rare.

109. An employer that merely structures, communicates, launches, and operates a whistleblower hotline has not yet arrived at a stage where whistleblower retaliation can possibly come into play. An act alleged to be retaliatory can happen only after a would-be whistleblower purports to have made (by hotline or otherwise) a specific denunciation, and after the employer responds in some way that the whistleblower deems victimization.

110. That is to say: A common, perhaps “best” practice is for international hotline communications expressly to guarantee that the employer will not retaliate against those using the hotline in good faith. Making a no-retaliation commitment in a global hotline communication almost surely extends non-retaliation rights quasi-contractually into jurisdictions where local jurisprudence does not specifically protect whistleblowers. And so an employer voluntarily issuing a non-retaliation promise across all a company’s global operations has about the same effect as if each jurisdiction passed a whistleblower retaliation law.

111. This author has analyzed and inventoried international investigation legal issues elsewhere. Dowling Investigations, supra note 6.
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staff rarely get blowback. Indeed, offering employee report “procedures” stateside affirmatively “complies” with a mandate in Sarbanes-Oxley and is a recommended “best practice” response to the Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty.

But America’s laissez faire approach here can lull multinationals into overlooking or minimizing the surprisingly-steep compliance hurdles to launching whistleblower procedures across worldwide affiliates.

Six distinct legal doctrines can restrict hotline whistleblowing abroad. Our American point of view sees hotlines as a best practice for nurturing compliance by rooting out crimes and corruption. So to us these six restrictions look like technicalities grown bigger and more complex than they should have any right to get. For that matter, we Americans have a hard time understanding why laws anywhere would restrict whistleblower hotlines when no jurisdiction bothers to restrict whistleblowing itself and when the vast majority of whistleblowers—97%—tend to avoid hotlines, anyway.

But this policy analysis takes us only so far when legal restrictions already in place around the world actively restrict employers’ freedom to launch a workplace whistleblower hotline. Employees in whistleblowing-averse societies like Russia, Latin America, the Middle East, India, much of Asia and Africa can fear hotlines as entrapment. Meanwhile, data protection laws in Europe actively block hotlines and violations can spark passionate resistance from European workforces and can trigger punitive sanctions.

So launching an international report channel has become a global compliance project of its own. Before making a hotline available to employees worldwide, check which of six legal topics arise in each relevant jurisdiction. Isolate, in each affected country, those issues the hotline will trigger under local law. Then take steps to make reporting protocols and employee communications packages comply.

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SOX, supra note 2, at 16-18.

119. We are addressing stand-alone hotlines. Of course, plenty of labor cases around the world address the launch of work rules, codes of conduct, and mandatory reporting rules (supra note 6), and plenty of cases adjudicate disputes arising out of specific whistleblower denunciations.

120. Supra note 118.


122. Fighting hotlines, though, seems to rank low on U.S. unions’ agenda. Indeed, a U.S. union might be expected to welcome a hotline as a watchdog over abuses of management.

123. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (on mandatory reporting rules). See, e.g., Wal-Mart, Wuppertal Labour Court, 5th Div., 5 BV 20/05, June 15, 2005 (Germany), discussed at Dowling SOX, supra note 2, at 17 (code of conduct with mandatory reporting rule held subject to mandatory information, consultation, and co-determination with works council in Germany).

124. Supra note 123.

125. But cf. supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (hotline launch as possible mandatory subject of U.S. labor union bargaining).

126. Supra Part Two, “Category #1” and “Category #2.”

127. Supra note 29.