OCT 2021

WILLIAMS MULLEN
ENVIRONMENTAL NOTES

INSIDE

WILLIAMS MULLEN

findingyes®

WOTUS, WOTUS, WOTUS...

BY: JESSIE KING

Like everything else today, the definition of "Waters of the United States" (WOTUS) under the Clean Water Act (CWA) ebbs and flows depending on which political party holds office. However, while the Biden Administration gets its ducks in a row to propose a new WOTUS rulemaking, in lawsuits challenging the Trump Era Navigable Waters Protection Rule (NWPR), federal courts are being asked by EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to remand the NWPR without vacating it to allow time to revoke it themselves and issue a new rule after public comment. As has happened previously in WOTUS rulemaking challenges, the courts in different parts of the country are dealing with the same issues but coming out with different rulings, some remanding without vacating the NWPR, some remanding and vacating it, and some still in limbo. Meanwhile, on September 3, 2021, Biden's EPA and the Corps have ended the period for stakeholders to comment on a new WOTUS rulemaking and ended public informational sessions. What does this mean to those in the process of seeking a jurisdictional determination? More uncertainty is guaranteed.

Background: Trump, Obama, Biden...

In 2015, Obama's EPA and the Corps amended the 1986 CWA regulation definition of "navigable waters" or WOTUS by enacting the Clean Water Rule, broadening the scope of the CWA by giving EPA and the Corps jurisdiction over non-adjacent wetlands and other non-navigable water bodies. In 2019 and 2020, Trump's EPA and the Corps fired back, rescinding the Obama-era Clean Water Rule in their first rulemaking and issuing the NWPR in a second rulemaking. Trump's NWPR limited CWA jurisdiction by providing categorical listings of waters and wetlands that are considered WOTUS (i.e. territorial seas, waters used in interstate commerce, tributaries, lakes, ponds, impoundments of jurisdictional waters, and adjacent wetlands), and those that are excluded, including ephemeral streams and isolated wetlands. Lawsuits by states, tribes and environmentalists followed, and, in January of 2021, President Biden took office.

Immediately upon taking office, President Biden issued an Executive Order, directing that federal agencies take action to address Trump-era regulations that do not meet his administration's stated environmental protection goals. EPA and the Corps responded by issuing a June 9, 2021, notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the definition of WOTUS to better protect our nation's water resources. The notice stated a plan to enact two rules: (1) a foundational rule to restore longstanding protections that existed with the 1986 definition of WOTUS and Supreme Court rulings prior to 2015; and (2) a second to build on that foundation with a revamped definition of WOTUS.

In late July, EPA announced initial public meetings to hear from interested stakeholders regarding what the revamped definition of WOTUS should be and

how to implement that definition. EPA also invited interested parties to provide written comments on the subject by September 3, 2021. The docket for these comments shows 348 comments submitted before the deadline, with comments coming from environmentalists, non-profits, government organizations, trade groups, and industry, including but not limited to the following: South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, National Ready Mixed Concrete Association, Alaska Support Industry Alliance, National Stone, Sand and Gravel Association, National Association of Home Builders, National Mining Association, Waters Advocacy Coalition, American Farm Bureau Federation, North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation, Inc., National Cotton Council, American Exploration & Mining Association, United States Chamber of Commerce, United States Senate - Committee on Environment and Public Works, National Wildlife Federation, and Southern Environmental Law Center.

Decisions: Remand With Vacatur, Remand Without Vacatur...

In the meantime, the lawsuits from environmentalists, state attorneys general, and tribes against EPA and the Corps challenging the legality of the Trump-Era NWPR continue to move through the courts. Each case alleges different injury and damages as a result of the NWPR limits on the definition of WOTUS. However, each case has one common thread: EPA and the Corps are defendants and are requesting the courts to remand the cases without vacating the NWPR. EPA and the Corps argue that, by remanding without vacatur, EPA can address the concerns raised in the lawsuit and through EPA's promise to revoke the rule and issue a new one, after public comment and input from stakeholders. While U.S. District Courts like those in South Carolina and Colorado recently granted EPA's request to remand without vacatur, federal courts in Northern California and New Mexico have not ruled yet on a request to remand without vacatur. One court, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, is not waiting on the Biden administration to revoke and pass its promised revised WOTUS definition. The Arizona federal court instead vacated the 2020 Trump-era NWPR by Order of August 9, 2021. The court's Order sides with tribal plaintiffs, stating that vacatur of the NWPR is necessary to prohibit further harm by the continued use of the narrower definition of WOTUS under the Trump-era NWPR.

What's Next...

It is not clear whether the Arizona ruling will be applied nationwide or just in Arizona, or whether it will be appealed by intervenors, or EPA and the Corps. However, vacating the NWPR could have negative consequences for those who received a jurisdictional determination under the NWPR prior to the Arizona Ruling, and those who need to know if their project will impact jurisdictional waters from now until a new WOTUS rule is passed. The Arizona court order recognizes that there may be hundreds if not thousands of decisions made from 2020-2021 using the Trump-era NWPR, possibly resulting in "significant, actual environmental harms." Furthermore, the Arizona court did not vacate the first Trump rule that vacated the 2015 Obama Clean Water Rule. Therefore, it appears that vacating the NWPR reinstates the 1986 definition of WOTUS, not the 2015 Obama-era Rule. This is consistent with EPA's very recent posting to its WOTUS webpage, stating:

> *"In light of this order, the agencies have halted implementation of the Navigable Waters Protection Rule and are interpreting "waters of the United States" consistent with the pre-2015 regulatory regime until further notice. The agencies continue to review the order and consider next steps. This includes working expeditiously to move forward with the rulemakings announced on June 9, 2021, in order to better protect our nation's vital water resources that support public health, environmental protection, agricultural activity, and economic growth."*

In the meantime, the regulated community and other stakeholders remain in limbo as to how soon EPA will issue a new rule, whether jurisdictional determinations made recently, but prior to August 30, 2021, are still effective, and how pending jurisdictional determination requests will be treated.

80 Fed. Reg. 41911 (Aug. 4, 2021)
Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, Case No. 4:20-cv-00266, 2021 W L 3855977 (Aug. 30, 2021)
EPA WOTUS

A PRIMER ON STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR INTERMEDIARY SELLERS IN TOXIC TORT CASES

BY: DEREK TARVER

Consider the following hypothetical: for the last decade, Distributor, Inc., had great success selling Acme Co. widgets. The widgets are a useful consumer product, previously deemed safe for household use around kids and pets, but... according to a new EPA study, contain carcinogens that leech into groundwater. Personal injury and property damage lawsuits centered on the widgets and similar products are suddenly popping up around the country. As a distributor, what exposure does Distributor, Inc. face in these lawsuits? It depends on a lot of factors, the foremost being whether Distributor, Inc., has a sound indemnity agreement with Acme Co. In large part, it also depends upon the law of the state in which each case is pending.

To the second point, regarding state law, several states have enacted "innocent-seller statutes" that will shield an intermediary product distributor from liability for harm caused by a product that the distributor merely sold downstream. These statutes serve as an independent basis for summary judgment in favor of a distributor by establishing that the distributor cannot be held liable under certain products liability theories unless the distributor was involved in the design or manufacture of the product at issue, modified the product, knew or had reason to know of the alleged defect prior to sale, or made promises about the product's quality or capabilities. Certain states also have enacted seller-indemnity statutes, under which a product manufacturer owes a distributor indemnity for costs incurred in defending products liability claims involving the manufacturer's products. These distributor-protective laws vary widely from state to state, but where they are available, they provide invaluable protection against product liability claims.

Innocent-seller statutes typically address one or more of the three theories of products liability: (1) negligence – which is based on the defendant's unreasonable failure to design, manufacture, or warn about a known or knowable risk in a product; (2) strict liability – which imposes liability for harm caused by an inherently dangerous product against the product's designer and manufacturer, who are considered to be in a better position than the consumer to assess and address the danger; and (3) breach of warranty – which arises out of a defendant's express or implied promise relating to the product's quality or performance.

The logic underpinning innocent-seller statutes is that, where a distributor is not involved in a product's design or manufacture and did not modify the product, but simply sold it downstream, the elements of negligence and strict liability cannot be established against the distributor. A negligence claim against a "mere distributor" fails because the distributor had no way of knowing of the alleged design or manufacturing defect. It is essentially a consumer itself, and since it did not design or manufacture the product, it owes no duty of care related to the product. Equally, a strict liability claim fails on similar grounds because the distributor is in the same position as the consumer in the ability to know the risks inherent in the product's design or manufacture. Imposing strict liability on the distributor when it had no way of knowing the risks attendant to the product's design

is inconsistent with the bases for strict liability against the manufacturer.

As it pertains to warranty claims, these statutes often make clear that, unless the plaintiff can show that the distributor made some affirmation of fact about the product's quality or capabilities, or failed to exclude implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, there is no basis for a breach of warranty claim against the distributor. Therefore, distributors should always **conspicuously** and **unambiguously** exclude implied warranties, if allowed under applicable law.

States vary in terms of the breadth of their innocent-seller statutes. While over half of the states have enacted an innocent-seller statute in one form or another, only twelve states provide complete protection against all three product liability claims (Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah). The remainder of states with innocent-seller statutes provide only partial protection against one or two theories of liability, with strict liability being most commonly precluded. Even in these states, however, a distributor may still seek summary judgment based on the plaintiff's inability to prove certain elements of her case, such as when the distributor expressly excluded all warranties, or was not involved in the design or manufacture of the product.

Conversely, several states' innocent-seller statutes are triggered only where the original manufacturer can be sued in the case at hand; so where the manufacturer is overseas, cannot be served, or has dissolved, the statutory protection may not be available to the distributor. Regardless of these limitations on innocent-seller statutes, it is important to be familiar with them in every state into which a distributor client sells products.

In addition to (or sometimes in lieu of) innocent-seller statutes, several states provide distributors a statutory right to indemnity from product manufacturers. While less optimal than an innocent-seller statute, in that they do not serve to bar claims against the distributor, these statutes provide a right to recover costs incurred in defending against those claims. Where the parties have not previously established indemnity as a matter of contract, or where equitable indemnity is unavailable, these statutes provide absolute clarity on the question of who, between the distributor and the manufacturer, ultimately bears responsibility for harms caused by the manufacturer's products.

Circling back to Distributor, Inc.'s case – the best method by which Distributor, Inc., might have limited its potential exposure in the widget litigation would have been through contractual allocation of risk with Acme Co. via a sound indemnity provision covering product liability claims against Distributor, Inc. However, in the event

that contractual indemnity from Acme Co. is not forthcoming, Distributor, Inc.'s next step should be to look into whether an innocent-seller statute or seller-indemnity statute is available, and then move toward building a record in support of summary judgment based on the applicable state statute.

EPA'S CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY REPORT IS OF LITTLE VALUE

BY: JAY HOLLOWAY

On September 2, 2021, EPA released a new report entitled *Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impact Sectors.* EPA characterizes the report as "one of the most advanced environmental justice studies to date that looks at how projected climate change impacts may be distributed across the American public." In EPA's view, the analysis used to prepare the report "indicates that racial and ethnic minority communities are particularly vulnerable to the greatest impacts of climate change." The analysis concludes that these communities are the least able to prepare and recover from heat waves, poor air quality, flooding, and other severe impacts of climate change.

EPA Administrator Michael S. Regan remarked that

> "The impacts of climate change that we are feeling today, from extreme heat to flooding to severe storms, are expected to get worse, and people least able to prepare and cope are disproportionately exposed," . . . "This report punctuates the urgency of equitable action on climate change. With this level of science and data, we can more effectively center EPA's mission on achieving environmental justice for all."

Key findings of the report include:

- That Black and African American individuals are projected to face higher impacts of climate change for all six impacts analyzed in this report, compared to all other demographic groups. For example, with 2°C of global warming, Black and African American individuals are:
  - 34% more likely to currently live in areas with the highest projected increases in childhood asthma diagnoses. This rises to 41% under 4°C of global warming.
  - 40% more likely to currently live in areas with the highest projected increases in extreme temperature related deaths. This rises to 59% under 4°C of global warming.
- That Hispanics and Latinos have high participation in weather-exposed industries, such as construction and agriculture, which are especially vulnerable to the effects of extreme temperatures. With 2°C of global warming, Hispanic and Latino individuals are 43% more likely to currently live in areas with the highest projected reductions in labor hours due to extreme temperatures. With regard to transportation, Hispanic and Latino individuals are about 50% more likely to currently live in areas with the highest estimated increases in traffic delays due to increases in coastal flooding.

One observation is that all the health-related conclusions relate to changes in temperature, not severe storms and flooding. As for the asthma conclusion, there is no connection between temperature change and asthma cases. The air in

this country continues to improve. The National Ambient Air Quality Standards are set at levels that take potential impacts on severe asthma cases into consideration. Current climate initiatives and other legal requirements are forcing retirement of coal-fired units and some natural gas generation. Construction of renewable energy has exploded. While storage and many other technical issues currently prevent renewable energy from being stand-alone generation, renewable energy provides a significant percentage of emissions-free generation to the grid. By 2050, the Energy Information Agency projects that renewable energy and natural gas generation will split the generation of electricity in the country. Poor air quality simply will not result from the utility, manufacturing and industrial sectors regardless of EPA's analysis of climate change impacts.

One conclusion of the report is that climate change will have disparate impacts on Hispanics and Latinos who are reliant on agriculture and construction jobs. The analysis concludes: "[w]ith 2°C of global warming, Hispanic and Latino individuals are 43% more likely to currently live in areas with the highest projected reductions in labor hours due to extreme temperatures." No specific hours reductions are mentioned. The 43% projection ignores many factors like new sources of employment or likelihood of moving to find new employment, and no health or other disparate impacts are found.

The report also concludes that Hispanics and Latinos are 50% more likely than other members of the population to live in coastal areas and experience more traffic delays from high-tide flooding. The executive summary of the report also finds that minorities are 41% more likely to experience these delays compared to non-minority communities. These data are interesting since Hispanics and Latinos are included within the definition of minority.

Value of the Report

The report includes analyses of:

1. Air Quality and Health
2. Extreme Temperature and Health
3. Extreme Temperature and Labor
4. Coastal Flooding and Traffic
5. Coastal flooding and Property
6. Inland Flooding and Property

The air quality and health impacts are purportedly from increases in PM2.5. EPA notes in the introduction that its models do not

> "evaluate or assume specific greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation or adaptation policies in the U.S. or in other world regions. Therefore, the results should not be interpreted as supporting any particular domestic or global mitigation policy or target."

Again, the shift from goal to natural gas almost eliminates PM2.5, and, obviously, renewables have no direct emissions. This reality is entirely ignored by the model which explains the conclusions about general health and asthma impacts resulting from increased PM2.5 emissions until 2056 for the 2 degree increase assumption and until 2097 for the 4 degree assumption.

In other words, for every impact addressed, the report assumes no reductions in GHGs between now and 2056. On this basis alone the report's value should be completely discounted. The only source that EPA references projects increases in maximum daily temperatures through 2095 up to 7.6°C for one model and 11.8°C for another. The models are based on a 2011 CO_2 emissions set and again do not consider GHG or other emission decreases or even use a 2°C increase assumption. The study concludes that "[t]hese findings suggest that reducing future air pollutant emissions could also reduce the climate-driven increase in deaths associated with air pollution by hundreds to thousands."

The EPA analysis uses a U.S. Census Bureau 2014-2018 American Community Survey, not 2020 Census Data. This is important because the model projects climate temperature increases across the country assuming a 2°C increase from a 1986-2005 baseline rather the baseline used in all other analyses (1850-1900) to 2056. Once that projection is made (as tremendously skewed as it is) in 2056, the census data are used to make assumptions as to where low income and minority citizens live and pair up the two assumptions.

Based on these very questionable projections, the report even finds that adults 65 and older have no increased risks of climate impacts. Also, the report concludes that sea level rise will have no disproportionate impact on low income or minority communities.

With the scale weighted as much as one can imagine plus the assumption that all studied groups live in the highest impacted communities, the summary of national results is that:

- Childhood asthma increases 15% for low income and 14% for minorities relative to the reference population (non-low income).
- Extreme temperature mortality up 11% for low income and 8% for minorities.
- Extreme temperature labor lost hours lost up 25% for low income and 35% for minorities.
- Coastal flooding traffic delays up 14% for low income and 41% for minorities.
- Coastal flooding property loss up 16% for, low income and -4% for minorities.
- Inland flooding property loss is 0% for low income and -12% for minorities.

  Low income is defined as 200% of the 2021 poverty level, which is $56,000 for a family of four.

Even utilizing an unrealistic set of assumptions, EPA's conclusions do not demonstrate disproportionate impacts for many of the studied scenarios on low income, minority and over 65 populations.

Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impact Sectors, September 2, 2021
EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2020, January 29, 2020

UNPACKING THE TSCA POLYMER EXEMPTION

BY: RYAN TRAIL

Manufacturers of chemical substances in the United States are well aware of the regulatory burdens placed on their industry by the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). TSCA requirements can be cumbersome and difficult to understand. Fortunately, TSCA contains several exemptions offering relief for companies in certain circumstances.

One TSCA exemption applies to companies manufacturing polymers, if the manufacturer can meet conditions making the polymer unlikely to present an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. The polymer exemption removes the regulatory burden of TSCA premanufacture notification (PMN) requirements from manufacturers of substances that are relatively stable and inert.

To qualify for the polymer exemption, a company must ensure the polymer it intends to manufacture meets three general criteria: (1) the substance must meet the regulatory definition of a "polymer;" (2) the substance must meet certain molecular weight or composition requirements; and (3) no regulatory exclusions from the exemption may apply.

Definition of A Polymer

The seemingly obvious initial criterion for the TSCA polymer exemption is that the substance must in fact be a "polymer," as the term is defined by regulation. TSCA defines a polymer to be a chemical substance in which greater than 50% of the molecules are composed of at least 3 monomer

units plus at least one other monomer unit or other reactant; and less than 50% of the molecular weight of the substance may be comprised of molecules of any one molecular weight.

Molecular Weight and Composition Criteria

Assuming the chemical substance is in fact a "polymer," the polymer must also meet molecular weight requirements or be a polyester to be eligible for exemption. If the average molecular weight of the polymer is between 1,000 and 10,000 daltons, the oligomer content of the polymer must be less than 10% by weight below 500 daltons and less than 25% by weight below 1,000 daltons. If the average molecular weight is greater than 10,000 daltons, the oligomer content must be less than 2% below 500 daltons and less than 5% below 1,000 daltons. The polymer may also qualify if it contains at least two carboxylic acid ester linkages, at least one of which links internal monomer units together, making the polymer a "polyester."

Exclusion Criteria

To be exempt, an otherwise eligible polymer may not possess any of four exclusionary conditions in the regulation. First, the polymer may not be cationic or reasonably anticipated to become a cationic polymer in a natural aquatic environment (e.g., rivers, lakes) unless:

1. the polymer is a solid material not soluble or dispersible in water and will be used only in solid phase (e.g., polymers for use as ion exchange beads), or
2. the combined (total) functional group equivalent weight of cationic groups in the polymer is equal to or greater than 5,000.

Second, the polymer must be made up of at least two of the atomic elements of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, silicon, and sulfur. The polymer may not be exempt if it includes (as an integral part of composition, not including impurities) elements outside of the those allowed by regulation.
Third, polymers manufactured or imported from monomers and reactants not on the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory may not be exempt.

Finally, if it is reasonably anticipated the polymer will undergo substantial degradation, decomposition, or depolymerization, the polymer is excluded from exemption. Under normal use, if the polymer is expected to break down into simpler, small weight substances as the result of oxidation, hydrolysis, heat, sunlight, attack by solvents, or microbial action, the polymer may not be exempt. However, this exclusion does not apply to normal landfill degradation over a long period of time, but rather significant degradation in, for instance, a waste treatment system. Minor byproduct degradative reactions do not exclude the polymer from exemption.

Reporting and Recordkeeping

Importantly, the TSCA polymer exemption is self-executing, meaning no application to or approval from EPA is required. However, companies manufacturing exempt polymers are subject to certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The manufacturer must carefully document

exemption evaluation and create a Certification Statement, including the following statements:

1. The substance is manufactured or imported for a commercial purpose other than for research and development.
2. All information in the certification is truthful.
3. The new chemical substance meets the definition of a polymer, is not specifically excluded from the exemption, and meets the conditions of the exemption in federal regulations.

The manufacturer must maintain evidence of the exemption (calculations, exclusion evaluations, etc.), the Certification Statement, the date of commencement of manufacture, and documentation of 3 years production volumes onsite for at least 5 years from the date manufacture commences. This information must be made available to EPA upon request but is not required to be submitted on any established basis.

Finally, the manufacturer must submit an "Exemption Report" to EPA by January 31 of the year following initial manufacture, in which the company simply provides a name, address, and phone number of a technical contact, and the number of exempt polymers manufactured in the preceding year.

While the TSCA polymer exemption requirements may seem complex, the alternative of undergoing EPA's PMN process is far more onerous, costly, and uncertain. Companies intending to manufacture polymers for distribution in commerce should seriously consider evaluating them for potential TSCA exemption.

EPA SIGNIFICANT NEW USE RULE: COMMONLY USED CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES

BY: ETHAN WARE

EPA recently issued significant new use rules (SNURs) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) for three chemical substances as a result of their premanufacture notices (PMNs). These rules require affected persons to notify EPA at least 90 days before commencing manufacture (defined by statute to include import) or processing of any listed chemical substances for a designated significant new use and submit a Significant New Use Notice (SNUN). The SNURs are effective October 15, 2021. The chemical substances subject to the SNURs are the following:

- Rosin adduct ester, polymer with polyols, compound with ethanolamine (generic).
- Rosin adduct ester, polymer with polyols, potassium salt (generic).
- 1,3-Propanediol, 2,2-Dimethyl-, 1,3-Diacetate.

Procedural Background

All manufacturers or importers of a chemical substance must register the chemical with EPA by filing a PMN. As part of the PMN, the registering company must describe the anticipated use of the chemical substance. A person who intends to manufacture, import, or process for commercial purposes certain PMN substances and intends to engage in a significant new use of such substances must file a SNUN with the Agency.

In determining what would constitute a significant new use for the chemical substances that are the subject of these SNURs, EPA considers relevant information about the toxicity of the chemical substances and potential human exposures and environmental releases that may be associated with the substances in the context of the following factors:

- The projected volume of manufacturing and processing of a chemical substance.
- The extent to which a use changes the type or form of exposure of human beings or the environment to a chemical substance.
- The extent to which a use increases the magnitude and duration of exposure of human beings or the environment to a chemical substance.
- The reasonably anticipated manner and methods of manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, and disposal of a chemical substance.

New SNUR Designations

Although the new SNUR designations are for chemicals subject to confidential business information claims, the SNUR provides descriptions of those types of chemical substances covered by the new uses. Accordingly, manufacturers and importers of chemicals in the process categories listed above may be subject to the SNUR for their process chemicals and restricted in the future use and distribution of those substances.

The significant new uses for these chemicals are generally limitations on production volumes to those specified in the PMN for each. The covered facilities also must comply with existing recordkeeping requirements at 40 CFR § 721.125. EPA may at any time modify or revoke SNUN requirements for a chemical substance that has been added to the SNUR list.

To establish a significant new use, EPA must determine that the use is not ongoing. The chemical substances subject to this rule were undergoing PMN review at the time of signature of the proposed rule and were not on the TSCA inventory. In cases where EPA has not received a notice of commencement (NOC) and the chemical substance has not been added to the TSCA Inventory, no person may commence such activities without first submitting a PMN. Therefore, for the chemical substances subject to these SNURs, EPA concluded at the time of signature of the proposed rule that the designated significant new uses were not ongoing.

Conclusion and Suggested Action

Manufacturers and importers intending to process polymers and other chemical substances listed in the SNUR may wish to develop compliance plans for the recordkeeping and limitations implemented under the new regulation. A self-audit under EPA's self-policing policies may provide the company maximum protection against enforcement for violation of the SNUR requirements.

86 Fed. Reg. 45651 (August 16, 2021)

Biden Administration Updates

Please visit https://www.williamsmullen.com/biden-resources for legal updates related to new legislation, policies and initiatives driven by the Biden administration.

CONTACT US



Ethan Ware
Partner & Chair
Columbia, SC
803.567.4610

Carrick Davidson
Partner
Richmond, VA
804.420.6317

Jay Holloway
Partner
Richmond, VA
804.420.6054



Jessie King
Partner
Columbia, SC
803.567.4602



Channing Martin
Partner
Richmond, VA
804.420.6422



Mona O'Bryant
Partner
Raleigh, NC
919.981.4091



Speaker Pollard
Partner
Richmond, VA
804.420.6537



Ryan Trail
Partner
Columbia, SC
803.567.4605



Liz Williamson
Partner
Richmond, VA
804.420.6050



Dick Willis
Partner
Columbia, SC
803.567.4611



Amos Dawson
Of Counsel
Raleigh, NC
919.981.4010



Ruth Levy
Senior Associate
Columbia, SC
803.567.4613

Derek Tarver
Associate
Columbia, SC
803.567.4615



Pierce Werner
Associate
Columbia, SC
803.567.4606