## VIRGINIA

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY

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GERALD WAYNE CORBITT,

Plaintiff,

-vs- : CASE NO. CL09-491

:

TRANG THIEN THI THAN,

:

Defendant.

:

Courtroom 1
Spotsylvania County Courthouse
Spotsylvania, Virginia

Monday, December 6, 2010

The above-entitled matter came on to be heard, before the HONORABLE DAVID H. BECK, Judge, in and for the Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County, in the Courthouse, Spotsylvania, Virginia, beginning at 10:25 o'clock a.m.

On Behalf of the Plaintiff:

JASON PELT, ESQUIRE

On Behalf of the Defendant:

RICHARD H. NGUYEN, ESQUIRE

## PROCEEDINGS

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2 (The Court Reporter was sworn by the Clerk of 3 the Court.)

THE COURT: This is the case of Corbitt v. 4

5 Mr. Pelt, you represent Gerald Corbitt and Mr.

Nguyen you represent Trang Than. Neither party is present today.

This matter is actually set for trial later 9 this month, December 23rd.

Something I MR. PELT: It is, Your Honor. think that opposing counsel and I agree on is that of our two competing motions for summary judgment, one should be granted. I don't think there's middle ground.

Either one or the other should be granted, which would dispose of it. I may be talking out of turn, but --

THE COURT: You think yours should be granted, he thinks his should be granted?

MR. PELT: I think we both think that they should be granted. I'm trying to get to the point where one of them should be granted, which would take off the trial for the 23rd. I guess that's what I was trying to get to.

I'd be happy to kind of state my position.

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THE COURT: Yes, sir. Then we'll hear from Mr. Nguyen subsequently.

MR. PELT: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court, I represent Gerald Wayne Corbitt. I know the Court has had an opportunity to read my motion for summary judgment.

Just to lay out some of the facts of the case, this matter comes before the Court when Mr. Corbitt is suing Ms. Than for breach of contract. This is where Mr. Corbitt purchased a nail salon from Mrs. Than.

The nail salon is called Only Nails. I would refer to Only Nails as the nail salon. As part of his agreement to purchase this nail salon, we turn to paragraph 7 of the contract.

Paragraph 7 states in part the seller agrees not -- and just for an interesting side note, the word not is all capitalized -- to open any nail salon business or related business within a ten mile radius of the Only Nails business within three years from the date of this bill of sale. That's paragraph 7.

After the bill of sale was executed, the Plaintiff received information that Ms. Than had violated

that provision. Subsequently this complaint of breach of that contract -- breach of a non compete contract -- pursuant to a bill of sale of the business.

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During the discovery process, the Defendant acknowledged that she worked in three different nail salons within the three year period of time --

MR. NGUYEN: I would object to that. I believe if Mr. Pelt has documentation to that effect, the documentation will speak for itself.

THE COURT: I'm going to go ahead and hear from Mr. Pelt and then we'll hear from the Defendant.

MR. NGUYEN: Yes, sir.

MR. PELT: Certainly there was discovery on this exact matter. Certainly I will defer to counsel if he wants to argue against it. It's through the discovery process information was admitted that Ms. Than worked in three different nail salons during the three year period, all within the ten mile radius.

Based on that and that alone, Mr. Corbitt comes before the Court upon his motion for judgment and upon his motion for summary judgment in this matter saying that based on the admitted conduct that she worked in the nail salon business within a three year period of time,

within the ten mile radius, and upon the paragraph 7 that seller agrees not to open any nail salon business or related business within a ten mile radius of the nail salon business within the three years of the bill of sale, that there's no disputed matter, except as but for damages and that would be the only disputed matter before the Court.

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The Court -- certainly this is not a unique situation amongst the Courts and the Courts have to deal with these. It really comes down to exactly what the non compete agreement says.

Now, we know exactly what ours say. Under Rule 3:20 it's proper for a party to make a motion of summary judgment if there are no facts in dispute. Now, when evaluating and determining the validity of forcibility of this restricted covenant, the law is well established.

I will tell you that Mr. Corbitt has the burden here to prove it. If there's any ambiguity to the term and terminology, it really falls to Ms. Than in this situation and we acknowledge that.

That's well established with two of the big cases that have been cited on both sides of the case,

6 Richard v. Paxton and Roanoke Engineering versus 1 2 Rosenbaum. The facts before this Court though are very 3 clear that the Defendant sold a business to the Plaintiff 4 5 with paragraph 7 being inserted into the sales contract. 6 The restriction was of a limited time, three years, and 7 was with a limited area, ten miles. 8 So certainly the restriction is not overly 9 harsh or overly oppressive as cited in Roanoke Engineering 10 versus Rosenbaum. MR. NGUYEN: Your Honor, with all due respect, 11 12 if I may renew my objection. This is testimony as to the 13 facts that his Plaintiff has the burden to prove, Your 14 Honor, and he's giving testimony. 15 MR. PELT: Your Honor, we are arguing a 16 summary judgment motion. I'm going to hear from you in the 17 THE COURT: 18 I know you may disagree on certain points, but matter. 19 I'm going to hear from Mr. Pelt. 20 MR. NGUYEN: Yes, sir. 21 So really I think the only true MR. PELT: 2.2 issue before the Court -- and I'm an attorney that likes

The only real issue is what the

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to narrow the issues.

word open means in paragraph 7. What exactly did paragraph 7 intend to mean when it said she would not open another nail salon or competing business?

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It really just turns down to that actual word, four letters, open. Mr. Corbitt would say open, while he would concede that she did not open a new business, that she did not establish a new place of business within the ten miles and within the three years, but she opened and worked in three other nail salons and opened from time to time that business, and put herself in that stream of commerce.

She opened herself up to that stream of commerce, Your Honor. With that, Mr. Corbitt is saying that she has violated the terms of paragraph 7 and that the violation -- there's no facts in dispute about that violation and then the only thing that this Court would have to decide is damages.

I will address very briefly in the opposing motion for summary judgment there is an argument that Mr. Corbitt doesn't own Only Nails. I will address that. He does not own Only Nails anymore. He has subsequently sold that business.

His rights under paragraph 7 in that contract

survives him owning Only Nails anymore. Certainly that contract is -- Only Nails is not a Defendant or even a party to this suit. This contract was between two individuals.

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He doesn't have any interest in Only Nails, however, that doesn't stop him from moving forward on this breach of contract, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So contrary to Mr. Nguyen's argument, which we'll come to in a moment, you're asserting that for Mr. Corbitt, the Plaintiff, that contractual provision -- that paragraph 7 that you referred to -- didn't transfer over to the purchaser when Mr. Corbitt sold to another purchaser?

MR. PELT: It didn't. Paragraph 7 is a purchase agreement between two individuals. Mr. Corbitt then entered into another purchase. He sold the business to another person. That is a completely separate contract. There would be no restrictions to the next in line purchaser.

THE COURT: But as an asset of the business, you're asserting that did not carry over? Just as if it was a piece of furniture?

MR. PELT: It would be. It didn't. It was

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1	not a she was under no
2	THE COURT: Not part of the bill of sale?
3	MR. PELT: She was under no further
4	restriction to any other person or persons after Mr.
5	Corbitt sold the business. She was only restricted as to
6	Mr. Corbitt, not to any subsequent purchaser of Only
7	Nails.
8	THE COURT: Thank you.
9	MR. PELT: For those reasons, I'd be asking
10	for a summary judgment and for
11	THE COURT: On the issue of liability?
12	MR. PELT: The issue of liability and then ask
13	that a damages hearing be set, and that damages hearing
14	does not have to be on December 23rd or whenever the case
15	is heard. The damages hearing doesn't need to be before a
16	jury.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Nguyen?
18	MR. NGUYEN: Your Honor, may I make my
19	argument from here?
20	THE COURT: Yes, sir.
21	MR. NGUYEN: To address Plaintiff's argument,
22	under Rule 3:20, Your Honor, it's clear that we understand
23	in order for the Plaintiff to prevail on his motion for

summary judgment, there needs to be no material issue of fact.

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I'd like to point out those issues of fact that I've reviewed are clearly in dispute and they are genuinely in dispute, Your Honor.

I'd point the Court to the Answer and Grounds of Defense filed on behalf of my client. If Your Honor will review paragraph 7, 8 and 9, in which the Defendant denied the allegations as to the breach of that clause that caused damages to the Plaintiff, et cetera, that's clearly an issue in dispute.

That's something Mr. Pelt, the Plaintiff, has not addressed. He mentions discovery vaguely. I haven't seen a pleading or an admission before the Court that would prove that.

Under Rule 3:20, the Court must look at the pleadings, orders and admissions in order to rule on summary judgment. Deposition transcripts and things of that nature are not admissible.

Your Honor, on an evidentiary or a substance level, we would argue that there's nothing before the Court to show the admissions Mr. Pelt claims were made by my client.

Furthermore, the ten mile radius, that's a conclusion made by the Plaintiff that we've seen no evidence of. The names of the locations and even what admissions were made, we don't see where that was substantiated.

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In page 2 of the answer, Your Honor, my client has asserted two affirmative defenses, the first of which being what Mr. Pelt touched upon in enforcibility of the contract, if there's a reasonableness, which Mr. Pelt --

THE COURT: Which goes to the burden?

MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor, which goes to the burden upon the Plaintiff at trial to prove -- which in the Plaintiff's own motion they cite what that is, to prove the reasonableness, how it isn't more -- I'll reference the Plaintiff's motion and I'll cite what it says there.

It says the employer bears the burden to show that the restraint is no greater than necessary to protect a legitimate business interest. It's not unduly harsh or oppressive in compelling any employee's ability to earn a livelihood and it's reasonable.

These are the factual allegations the Plaintiff must prove at trial or today through admissions,

which they have not yet done, Your Honor. 1 2 We suggest to the Court that that doesn't attest to any of this, other than the Plaintiff's 3 testimony, which we've objected to. 4 5 Your Honor, we would point the Court to the 6 Stoneman case, Stoneman versus Wilson, 169 VA 239, Your 7 I have copies of that for Your Honor. 8 (Whereupon, Mr. Nguyen passed documents to the 9 Court and to counsel for their examination.) This is a case we believe is 10 MR. NGUYEN: 11 directly on point. It deals with the business sale 12 between two parties in which there was a non compete 13 clause of similar drafting to the one at issue. 14 Would you like time to read that or may I --15 THE COURT: Let me just refer to the -- you 16 know, you've given me a very thorough written argument for 17 your summary judgment. I think you're going to the first 18 portion of your summary. 19 MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead. 20 21 It clearly shows the analysis the MR. NGUYEN: 2.2 Virginia Supreme Court made in reviewing the agreement, 23 that agreement stated that the restricted party would not

delve into I believe the hardware business. That's similar in category to this, will not open a nail salon business. It's ambiguous, Your Honor.

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As the Plaintiff has admitted -- has conceded that -- but any ambiguity should be construed in favor of the employee or the Defendant in this case, my client.

Your Honor, under the similar facts of

Stoneman and their conclusion, the Court held that in

order to be restricted by the seller in this case, it was

that they could not occupy the same position in another

business. That's what they looked at. They looked at

what they didn't do in the past and though they did that

in the future.

We'd argue that the Plaintiff has shown really no admissions or pleadings that would attest to what my client is doing. The Plaintiff has conceded that they have not started a new business, Your Honor.

They said with that concession made under the Stoneman holding, that if they have not opened a business in which they were the owner before, they cannot be in violation of this non-compete option.

That's something that is clearly set forth by the case cited in the brief, Your Honor, the Burchell

versus Capital City Dairy, Your Honor, another Virginia
Supreme Court case.

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That case has very similar facts, Your Honor. The Court determined that the party had sold its business to another party, that business and its assets being in a non compete agreement, stated that that asset -- that non compete agreement -- went with the sale.

It didn't even have to be spelled out specifically in that sales agreement, that subsequent sale, to be transferred. In this case, Mr. Pelt has acknowledged that's happened. We have a request for admissions that we've attached to our motion, which admits that they sold their entire interest and all their interest in this Only Nails business to another party.

We've tried to locate the identity of that party. We've tried to do it through a request for production.

THE COURT: In the request for admissions, you said admit or deny that you conveyed all your interest in the business.

MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor. That's exactly right. We would submit that as an exhibit, our cross motion for summary judgment.

In conclusion, Your Honor, clearly under the 1 2 Burchell holdings, it shows that a party that has conveyed 3 all its interest of a business, that this includes the non 4 compete agreement, they don't have standing to enforce 5 that agreement. 6 It's very clear that they have no standing in 7 this above the other arguments that I've presented, Your 8 Honor. We'd ask that the Plaintiff's complaint as amended be dismissed with prejudice, Your Honor, based on all of 10 the above --THE COURT: Grant your client's summary 11 12 judgment on both liability and damages? 13 MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Going back to the first prong of 15 your argument, you're focusing on the same word -- it's 16 the same word, both of you -- in that paragraph 7 of the 17 agreement. 18 Then relying on the Stoneman case? 19 MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor. We submit based 20 on the Plaintiff's interpretation of the word open, that interpretation is overly broad and as such that 21 2.2 interpretation is not enforceable. 23 THE COURT: And Mr. Pelt acknowledges that

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1	document needs to be read in favor
2	MR. NGUYEN: As strictly construed
3	THE COURT: Strictly construed and construed
4	in favor of your client, who was the seller in this
5	matter.
6	MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Pursuant to the written opinion in
8	the Roanoke Engineering case.
9	MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor. The case cited
10	by the Plaintiff in his motion.
11	THE COURT: Is that everything?
12	MR. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Mr. Pelt, anything final?
14	MR. PELT: Just briefly, Your Honor. I was
15	under the impression that Mr. Nguyen was in my we did
16	some robust discovery in this. I was under the impression
17	that Mr. Nguyen would stand by his discovery answers that
18	Ms. Than worked
19	THE COURT: It's admissible in summary
20	judgment?
21	MR. PELT: What's that? I'm sorry, Your
22	Honor.
23	THE COURT: No, you go ahead.

I was under the impression that Mr. 1 MR. PELT: 2 Nguyen was admitting these facts. And maybe he's not now, 3 and maybe Ms. Than would go back on those discovery -what she -- the information she provided in discovery. 4 5 If that's the case, Your Honor, then certainly 6 that would be a disputed fact for a fact finder to look 7 at, Your Honor. 8 If the Court finds some weight to the 9 Defendant's motion that the Plaintiff lacks standing in 10 this matter, certainly that wouldn't be a summary 11 That would be a motion to dismiss, Your Honor. judgment. 12 THE COURT: Then I understand that your client 13 takes the position that that would be -- by my questions 14 to you -- a factual matter that would be in the words of 15 the summary judgment a matter that is genuinely in 16 dispute. 17 MR. PELT: Yes, sir. 18 So certainly if there is a standing issue and 19 we need more parties to protect the Defendant -- because 20 certainly the Defendant has the right to have all of the 21 plaintiffs come before and fight this case at one time. 22 If we needed more plaintiffs on this side of

the table, that would be a motion to dismiss without

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prejudice and certainly the Plaintiff then could seek to find these other potential plaintiffs.

I don't think that's the case. When you look at the bill of sale, it was a bill of sale between one person to another person. It was not contemplated that the business Only Nails was ever a party to that.

Certainly Mr. Gerald Corbitt held that right of the non compete and he held that. When he sold that business, that right did not transfer. But I'll leave it to the Court to determine.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. NGUYEN: If I may, Your Honor. My client stands by any discovery responses that she's provided.

The burden is on the Plaintiff to submit to the Court the basis for his motion, Your Honor. I addressed that initially.

We believe the standing issue is important, but the substantive legal issues in the provision were noted, we believe that's dispositive of the motion.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, thank you very much.

That's the Court's conclusion in this matter and let me

provide it to you. I'm going to ask Mr. Nguyen to prepare
this order.

First, with regard to the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, it's denied. I adhere -- and I accept that there are -- when we look solely at the Plaintiff's summary judgment motion, there are material facts genuinely in dispute, which Mr. Nguyen asserts.

But likewise, when you look at the second prong, Mr. Nguyen, of your client's summary judgment motion that your client asserts, that is the sale of the business and the transfer on of this covenant not to compete and consequently the standing issue, I'm going to deny that as well because there are material facts in dispute from the Plaintiff's point of view.

What was conveyed to the subsequent purchaser in the Court's mind -- I understand the cases cited, the Burchell case, the Defendant clearly digging into the facts of what Mr. Corbitt conveyed off, genuine facts materially in dispute.

But then we come to the first prong of Mr.

Nguyen's client's motion for summary judgment. It cuts

right to the liability and the damages. It's this word

open.

As Mr. Pelt can agree and the Court would acknowledge with regard to his client's position, that

language must be certainly construed and in the event of any ambiguity has to be construed in favor of Mr. Nguyen's client.

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Then we look at the acknowledgments of fact that are set forth in the Plaintiff's motion. Those acknowledgments of fact make it clear to the Court that interpreting the word open in this context, strictly construing it against Mr. Corbitt and resolving any ambiguity in favor of Mr. Tran (sic), that it's appropriate to grant summary judgment pursuant to the principles in Richardson, Roanoke Engineering and the Stoneman case that you cite on behalf of your client under those principles that this word open contemplated where an owner -- that is, Ms. Tran (sic), your client, sold the business to Mr. Corbitt.

She was the owner, that's an acknowledged fact, Only Nails. She did not become owner of any subsequent business. She merely worked. I find that the limitation of time, three years, and the limitation in range, ten miles, is appropriate and not an undue burden.

But it's clear that the word open in the Court's mind and in the context of those three cases that we have that both of you made mention of and recognize,

means that I would need to have -- and acknowledged in the 1 2 Plaintiff's argument for summary judgment is that Ms. Tran 3 (sic) did not open a business. She worked in three other nail salons. 4 5 going to grant the first summary judgment on that first 6 prong, Mr. Nguyen, of your client's motion for summary 7 judgment on both the issue of liability and the issue of 8 damages, because what did open mean? Interpreting that 9 word under these cases. 10 So if you would prepare that order. Gentleman, this concludes that matter set for December 11 12 23rd and it shall be removed from the docket for that day. 13 The Clerk's going to let the jury coordinator know. Thank you, Your Honor. 14 MR. NGUYEN: 15 order prepared, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: You have an order prepared? 17 Yes, sir. If I could make one MR. NGUYEN: 18 correction. My client's name is Ms. Than, T-H-A-N, not 19 Tran, just for the reporter. 20 I apologize. THE COURT: The court reporter 21 can correct that the Defendant's name is Ms. Than, 2.2 T-H-A-N.

MR. NGUYEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

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## CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

I, MICHELLE L. MOLL, a Verbatim Reporter, do hereby certify that I took the stenographic notes of the foregoing proceedings and thereafter reduced the same to typewriting; that the foregoing is a true record of said proceedings; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were held; and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

\_MICHELLE L. MOLL VERBATIM REPORTER