On September 19, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted in part and denied in part a complaint filed by two pro se plaintiffs who alleged that the defendant’s debt collection efforts related a balance due from a timeshare membership program violated the FCRA, TILA, and FDCPA. In reaching its decision, the court explained that complaints filed by pro se pleadings must be construed more liberally than those drafted by lawyers. Notwithstanding this more liberal approach, however, the court still determined that plaintiffs’ TILA and FCRA claims were insufficiently pled. With respect to the TILA claim, the court stated that plaintiffs failed to specify which provisions were allegedly violated and only alleged that “Defendant has computed and imposed an internal alleged account balance on plaintiff including principal balance, interest rates, fees and terms without property consumer transparency of mode of accounting verification methods,” which was insufficient to allege a TILA violation. The court noted that to the extent it could interpret plaintiffs’ complaint to implicate specific provisions of the FCRA, plaintiffs still failed to state claim under any of the potentially relevant provisions, either because there was no private right of action or there were no facts supporting any alleged claims.
By contrast, plaintiffs did allege specific provisions of the FDCPA that defendant’s conduct purportedly breached. While the court still concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim with regard to most of the cited FDCPA provisions, it determined that plaintiffs had plausibly stated a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, which, among other things, requires a debt collector to cease debt collection efforts if, within 30 days of receiving a validation notice from the debt collector, a consumer disputes the debt or any portion thereof.
Although the record did not reflect whether the defendant had sent plaintiffs a validation notice, the court, in liberally construing plaintiffs’ complaint, found it reasonable to “infer” that such notice had been provided to the plaintiffs. Specifically, the court reasoned that plaintiffs’ notarized letter to defendant, titled “Validation of Debt / Claim” was likely sent in response to a validation notice from defendant, and therefore, under Section 1692g, all collection activity should have ceased following receipt of plaintiffs’ letter.
