The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently clarified the standards for invoking the “transportation worker” exception to the Federal Arbitration Act. The court noted that fact-finding on that exception should focus on the frequency with which workers transport goods as part of their duties (regularly or only occasionally) and whether that transportation constitutes engaging in interstate commerce.
Sara Fraga worked as a merchandiser for Premium Retail Services Inc., a company that supported brands at their stores by having its merchandisers create advertising displays, update pricing and signage, and perform a number of other tasks. Premium and Fraga agreed that Fraga would receive marketing and promotional materials at her home and bring them to stores as part of her job. But Fraga and Premium disagreed about how frequently Fraga did so. Fraga claimed she received materials at her home and transported them to retail stores almost daily while Premium claimed it sent materials to merchandisers’ homes rarely.
Fraga filed a putative class action lawsuit against Premium under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Massachusetts law. She claimed that Premium failed to pay her and other merchandisers for overtime, time spent traveling to and between worksites, and work performed before arriving at a worksite, such as sorting and preparing display materials.
Premium moved to compel arbitration under Fraga’s employment contract, which also included a class action waiver. Fraga opposed Premium’s motion on the ground that she fell within the FAA’s exception for transportation workers. She argued that the FAA therefore did not apply and that Massachusetts law, which prohibits class action waivers, governed the dispute.
The district court denied Premium’s motion. It concluded that Fraga had plausibly alleged that she fell within the FAA’s exemption for transportation workers.
The First Circuit vacated and remanded. It concluded that further fact-finding was needed to determine whether Fraga and her co-workers fell within the transportation worker exception.
The First Circuit also provided guidance on what facts would allow Fraga to invoke the exception. In short, the First Circuit instructed the district court’s further fact-finding to focus on the work in which Fraga and other merchandisers were actually engaged rather than exclusively or even primarily focusing on the industry in which they worked (i.e., whether they worked in the transportation industry or another industry). The First Circuit emphasized that the “frequency” that Fraga and other merchandisers in the putative class worked on transporting goods was a key question (particularly given that the parties disputed the frequency that Fraga transported goods). If Fraga did not frequently deliver materials to retailers, then Fraga’s FAA exemption argument fails and the matter should be referred to arbitration. Conversely, if sorting, loading, and then transporting materials to retailers were frequently performed job duties, then the exemption would be met if the merchandisers were engaged in interstate commerce.
With respect to interstate commerce, the First Circuit noted that an employee need not necessarily drive across state lines to be engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA’s relevant exception. At the same time, intrastate deliveries of goods that previously traveled in interstate commerce might not be enough to meet the exception. The First Circuit instructed the district court to analogize this case to its relevant decisions based on the fact-finding that needed to be performed to determine whether interstate commerce existed.
Fraga v. Premium Retail Services, Inc., No. 22-1101 (1st Cir. Mar. 3, 2023).
