The Third Circuit’s new opinion on class certification issues in Mielo v. Steak ‘N Shake Operations, Inc., No. 17-2678 (3d Cir. July 26, 2018) provides helpful guidance for district courts and class action lawyers on both sides. The case alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) at the defendant’s restaurants. In brief, here are my takeaways from it:

• Standing: In prior opinions, the Third Circuit has taken the view that the standing inquiry focuses only on the named plaintiffs, not on the class members. That’s an issue ripe for the Supreme Court to tackle. In this case, the Third Circuit found it sufficient for standing purposes for the named plaintiffs to allege that they had personally encountered difficulties with parking facilities that they alleged violated the ADA. Whether the plaintiffs could pursue claims involving restaurants they never visited was an issue the court viewed as a Rule 23 issue rather than an Article III standing issue, in the Third Circuit’s view.

• Numerosity: The Third Circuit explained how “[i]n recent years the numerosity requirement has been given ‘real teeth.’” (Slip op. at 35.) It requires real evidence, not speculation. Merely because there are millions of persons with mobility disabilities in the United States and it might be fair to assume that at least 40 of them experienced the alleged access issues at the defendant’s restaurants was not enough. The court noted that the numerosity requirement is not “relaxed” in any sense when certification is sought for declaratory or injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). The lesson for defendants here? Think twice before you give up on numerosity.

• Commonality: This is the most significant part of the opinion, in my view. The court focused on how, although the case plainly focused on a common legal issue involving one ADA provision, that was not enough for commonality. The class definition encompassed various different types of alleged ADA violations under the same statutory provision and regulations, from parking lots to bathrooms to water fountains. The court said that “the collective claims are so widely divergent that they would be better pursued on either an individual basis or by a sufficiently numerous lass of similarly-aggrieved patrons,” and “[w]ith such a potentially wide array of different claims by members of the class,” commonality was not satisfied. (Slip op. at 51.) Defendants can use this decision effectively in lots of cases that involve similar alleged statutory violations or contract claims. In a footnote, the court suggested (but did not decide) that a very narrowly-pled case might satisfy commonality. But that might make numerosity a challenge, and could make a class case much less attractive for plaintiffs’ counsel to pursue. It will be interesting to see if (and how) the plaintiffs continue to pursue this case on remand.

• Rule 23(b)(2): The court did not reach any issue under Rule 23(b)(2). But footnote 24 of the opinion provides some important guidance, reminding the district court that: (1) subsection (b)(2) applies only if a “single” injunction or declaratory judgment would apply to the entire class; and (2) Rule 65 requires specificity and detail in any proposed injunction.

[View source.]