On Friday afternoon, January 4, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the following six cases:

Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, No. 18-459:  Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held, in express disagreement with five other courts of appeals, that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on a negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer.

Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18-302:  Whether the prohibition on the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(a), is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Taggart v. Lorenzen, No. 18-489:  Whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor’s good-faith belief that the discharge injunction does not apply precludes a finding of civil contempt.

United States v. Davis, No. 18-431:  Whether the subsection-specific definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B), which applies only in the limited context of a federal criminal prosecution for possessing, using, or carrying a firearm in connection with acts comprising such a crime, is unconstitutionally vague.

Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422:  This North Carolina gerrymandering case presents the following issues:  (1) Whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering claims.  (2) Whether plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable.  (3) Whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map is, in fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726:  This Maryland gerrymandering case presents the following issues:  (1) Are the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court unmanageable?  (2) Did the three-judge district court err when, in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, it resolved disputes of material fact as to multiple elements of plaintiffs’ claims, failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and treated as “undisputed” evidence that is the subject of still-unresolved hearsay and other evidentiary objections?  (3) Did the three-judge district court abuse its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief, rendering the remedy applicable to at most one election before the next decennial census necessitates another redistricting?