In Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Plaintiff Aleksick represented a class claiming that 7-Eleven’s payroll system violated California Business and Professional Code 17200.  The complaint alleged that 7-Eleven’s method of converting partial hour worked from minutes to hundredths of an hour sometimes docked employees of few seconds of time, and therefore shorted them commensurate pay.  The trial court had granted 7-Eleven’s summary judgment motion.  The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed.

First, the Court held, raising a 17200 claim based on “unlawful” conduct required Aleksick to point to a particular statute that 7-Eleven had violated, since “section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices.”  Although Aleksick cited to various Labor Code sections in her appellate papers, she had not cited to any in her complaint.  The Court ruled that Aleksick should have sought leave to amend to allege such violation, but did not do so, and therefore she had forfeited her argument under the Labor Code wage statutes.

Second, even if her complaint had alleged violation of the Labor Code wage statutes, the Court still would have found against her because the Labor Code governs “the employer-employee relationship, and undisputed evidence shows 7-Eleven was not the class members’ employer.”  Aleksick’s employer was the franchisee who operated a 7-Eleven franchise. 7-Eleven was the franchisor.  Aleksick conceded that 7-Eleven was not her employer.  The Court held that 7-Eleven’s provision of payroll services to its franchisees did not change this relationship or render 7-Eleven liable under the Labor Code.

Third, Aleksick failed to establish “unfair” conduct on the part of 7-Eleven under section 17200.  Where an “unfair” act is predicated on public policy, the Court explained, “the public policy which is a predicate to the action must be ‘tethered’ to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.”  Aleksick argued that 7-Eleven’s payroll practices are “tethered” to the public policy in favor of full payment to employees of all hours worked, as codified in the Labor Code.  However, because 7-Eleven was not the employer, these statutes did not apply to it.


The narrow basis of this ruling is simply that 7-Eleven was not the employer, and therefore a 17200 claim based on violation of Labor Code statutes could not apply to it.  It is important to note that the Court of Appeal explicitly did not rule on the issue of whether an employer could be liable under the Labor Code wage statutes and section 17200 for using the payroll practices that 7-Eleven uses. (See Opinion, at 22, fn. 6.)  Thus, this ruling provides no guidance to employers as to whether the practice of converting partial hours worked from minutes to hundredths of an hour is permissible.  As the Court recounts, the trial court had determined that the amounts docked were too minimal to be a sufficient basis for a 17200 claim — however, the Court of Appeal did not affirm this part of the trial court’s ruling.