On February 26, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, __. U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 768 (2020). The Court unanimously held that Christopher Sulyma ("Sulyma") did not necessarily have "actual knowledge" under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2) of the information contained in the disclosures that he received, because he did not read, or could not recall reading, the disclosures. Rather, to meet § 1113(2)s "actual knowledge" requirement, the Court held that Sulyma must in fact have become aware of the information in the disclosures sent to him.

Sulyma was employed by Intel Corporation ("Intel") from 2010 through 2012 and participated in two of Intel's ERISA-governed retirement plans. Intel's investment committee disclosed its investment decisions to participants through various documents available on Intel's website. The documents disclosed, among other things, the committee's decision to participate in alternative investments, such as hedge funds and private equity. While Sulyma accessed the Intel website, he testified that he did not recall reading the disclosures regarding his investments while working at Intel, and was not aware of the alternative investments and the impact on his retirement accounts until October 2015. He filed his lawsuit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated more than three years after the disclosures were made available to him.

The issue presented to the Court was whether the three-year limitations period in 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), which runs from "the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation," barred Sulyma's lawsuit.

While ERISA does not define the phrase "actual knowledge" in the statute, the Court found that its meaning is plain and that to have "actual knowledge" of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it. The Court found support for this interpretation in dictionaries, as well as congressional intent drawing the distinction between actual knowledge and constructive knowledge in other provisions of ERISA.

The Court noted, however, that the disclosures to Sulyma were "no doubt relevant in judging whether he gained knowledge of that information." The Court further stated that its decision did not foreclose "any of the 'usual ways' to prove actual knowledge at any stage in the litigation," such as by "inference from circumstantial evidence." For example, if electronic records showed that a plaintiff viewed the relevant disclosures and evidence suggested that the plaintiff took action in response, actual knowledge could be established. Additionally, the Court stated that its opinion also did not preclude defendants from contending that evidence of "willful blindness" supports a finding of "actual knowledge."

Intel did not argue that "actual knowledge" was established in any of these ways, it only argued that it need not offer any such proof in light of the disclosures provided. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Sulyma, there was a genuine dispute as to his actual knowledge, precluding summary judgment in Intel's favor.