Court Rules That Detroit Is Eligible For Chapter 9 And That Pensions May Be Impaired In Chapter 9

by Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

On December 5, 2013, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan released its 143 page decision upholding the City of Detroit’s eligibility to be a debtor under chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.  In re City of Detroit, Michigan, Case No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2013).1  The Court’s decision is the first ever to address the treatment of municipal pensions in bankruptcy, concluding that pension obligations may be adjusted in a chapter 9 case, notwithstanding protective provisions in the state constitution.  A similar issue is pending, but not yet decided, in the Stockton and San Bernardino chapter 9 cases in California.

I.          Constitutionality of Chapter 9 and the Ability to Impair Pensions

The Court rejected the objectors’2 arguments that chapter 9 violates the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The objectors argued that chapter 9 usurps state sovereignty by invalidating state law protections that are afforded to pensioners.  The Court concluded that the issue of chapter 9’s constitutionality was already decided in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937.  Further, the Court found that chapter 9 does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it specifically protects a state’s right to consent.  Here, eligibility for chapter 9 is expressly predicated on a state “specifically authorizing” a municipality to file for chapter 9 and thus chapter 9 is limited to voluntary proceedings. 

The Court also rejected certain objections that chapter 9 is unconstitutional “as applied” in this case.  The objectors argued that under the Pensions Clause of the Michigan Constitution,3 the pensioners have an absolute right to be protected from any impairment of their vested pension benefits, including in a chapter 9 case.  The Court disagreed and found that the Pensions Clause does not afford an absolute prohibition against impairment of vested pension benefits.  In analyzing applicable Michigan law, the Court found that the purpose of the Pensions Clause was not to create an absolute protection for pensioners.  Rather, the Court found that the state legislature enacted the Pensions Clause to treat pensions as contractual obligations, as opposed to gifts. 

Furthermore, the Court found that even though Michigan had a bankruptcy authorizing statute when the state legislature enacted the Pensions Clause in 1963, the state legislature did not take any measures to protect pensions from impairment in bankruptcy.  According to the Court, the state legislature could “have given pensions protection from impairment in bankruptcy in several ways,” including prohibiting municipalities from filing for bankruptcy,  creating a property interest, creating a secured interest in the municipality’s property, or explicitly requiring that the State guaranty pension benefits.  The Court stated that the state legislature could have provided pensioners with more protections in a municipal bankruptcy, but it declined to do so.  Therefore, the Court held that pensions are merely contractual obligations under Michigan law and they are subject to impairment in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. 

Furthermore, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code preempts the Pensions Clause.  The Court noted that “if the Tenth Amendment prohibits cuts of pension benefits in this case, then it would also prohibit the adjustment” of any other debt in this case.  That result, according to the Court, would be untenable because “it has long been understood that bankruptcy law entails the impairment of contracts.”  The Court cautioned, however, its ruling should not be interpreted to mean that the Court would necessarily confirm any plan of adjustment that impairs pensions. 

II.         Eligibility for Chapter 9 Protection

Next, the Court turned to the issue of the City’s eligibility to be a chapter 9 debtor.  The Court noted that the City bears the burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the City satisfied each requirement under section 109(c).  Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an entity may only file for chapter 9 if that entity is (i) a municipality, (ii) “specifically authorized” under state law to file for chapter 9, (iii) insolvent, (iv) desires to effect a plan of adjustment, and (v) has engaged in good faith prepetition negotiations with its creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 109(c).  With respect to the fifth requirement, a debtor is excused from engaging in such prepetition negotiations where those efforts are “impracticable.”  Id. § 109(c)(5)(C)

1.  State Law Authorization

The Court held that, under Public Act 436 (“PA 436”), the City of Detroit was specifically authorized by Michigan to file for chapter 9.  The objections to this requirement focused primarily on the constitutionality of PA 436.  The objectors argued that PA 436 is unconstitutional because it was substantively identical to Public Act 4 (which was repealed in November 2012) and included appropriation provisions for the sole purpose of usurping the public’s referendum rights.  The Court acknowledged that “there certainly was some credible evidence in support of the assertion” that the state legislature attached appropriations provisions to avoid the referendum requirement.  However, the Court concluded that based on Michigan state court decisions, the inclusion of the appropriations provisions in PA 436 was constitutional under Michigan law even if it was done to avoid the referendum requirement. 

Next, the Court addressed whether the failure to include contingencies in PA 436 that protect pensions violated the Pensions Clause.  The Court held that the failure to protect pension rights did not make PA 436 inconsistent with the Pensions Clause because the Pensions Clause does not provide absolute protections for pensions.   Furthermore, the Court held that, based on section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code, once a state consents to a municipal bankruptcy, “no state law can protect contractual pension rights from impairment, just as no law could protect other types of contract rights.”  State law, according to the Court, “cannot reorder the distributional priorities of the bankruptcy code” and once a state consents to a municipal bankruptcy, the state may not “cherry pick” the application of Bankruptcy Code provisions after the case has been filed.  The Court likewise concluded that the failure of the Governor to condition his authorization on the protection of vested benefits did not conflict with the Pensions Clause.  The Court noted that any contingency attached to the Governor’s authorization “may have rendered the authorization itself invalid.” 

Finally, the Court addressed whether the Ingham County Circuit Court’s decision4 regarding the constitutionality of chapter 9 had any preclusive effect on the Bankruptcy Court’s ability to decide that the state specifically authorized the City to file for chapter 9.  The Court concluded that it did not have any binding effect for two reasons:  (i) the state court’s declaratory judgment was void because the Bankruptcy Court has exclusive jurisdiction over eligibility issues once the City commences a chapter 9 case, and (ii) the state court violated the automatic stay by granting the declaratory relief after the City filed its chapter 9 petition.

2.  Insolvency

The Court held that the evidence conclusively established that the City is insolvent as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.5  First, the Court concluded that the City was not paying its debts as they came due.  In particular, the City deferred payments on obligations that are payable from its general fund in June 14, 2013, and absent such deferment of payments, the Court noted that the City would have completely run out of cash by the end of that month.  The Court rejected the objectors’ argument that the City could have avoided insolvency by monetizing its assets.  According to the Court, a “one-time infusion of cash” would only delay the inevitable, and would not significantly improve the City’s long-term financial problems

Second, the Court held that the City was “service delivery insolvent”—meaning that the City was unable to pay for basic municipal services to maintain the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Detroit.  According to the Court, the City was unable to maintain its lighting system and its police force’s equipment was “in a state of disrepair.”  As a result of this service delivery insolvency, the Court found that City’s crime rate has soared to dangerous levels. 

3.  Desire to Effect a Plan Adjusting Debts

Similar to other chapter 9 cases, certain objectors argued that the City failed to meet this requirement because it did not file a plan or term sheet with its chapter 9 petition.  The objectors also argued that the City did not satisfy this requirement because the City only desired to impair pension benefits and that such impairment would result in a plan that is not confirmable under the Bankruptcy Code.  The Court found that whether the City’s prepetition restructuring proposal could be confirmed in a chapter 9 case was not relevant to the eligibility proceedings.  According to the Court, the City’s restructuring proposal “overwhelmingly” supported the conclusion that the City desired to effect a plan adjusting its debts because it classified creditors and proposed adjustments to unsecured debt. 

4.  Good Faith Negotiations

The Court held that the City did not negotiate in good faith, as required by section 109(c)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Among other things, the City argued that it engaged in good faith negotiations because it provided creditors with a restructuring proposal prior to filing for chapter 9 and because the City invited feedback on that proposal.  The Court found that the City’s efforts did not qualify as “good faith” negotiations.  In particular, the Court noted that the City did not provide creditors with sufficient information in its restructuring proposal and also noted that its meetings with creditors were purely informational.  According to the Court, “[c]haritably stated, the proposal is very summary in nature.”  Furthermore, the City explicitly told creditors that its meetings were not negotiations.  The Court also concluded that the City did not provide creditors with enough time to evaluate its restructuring proposal.  The Court stated that creditors had only 30 days to offer a counterproposal, and that the City’s calendar “was very tight and did not request counterproposals.”  The Court held that 30 days was simply not enough time to engage in meaningful negotiations given the complexity and size of the City’s creditor body.  Based on these circumstances, the Court found that the City failed to establish that it engaged in good faith negotiations. 

However, the Court held that, based on section 109(c)(5)(C), the negotiation was impracticable and accordingly, the City was excused from the good faith negotiation requirement.  The Court found that a debtor can satisfy this requirement if it has a large creditor body.  Here, the Court concluded that the City’s creditor body was large enough to render prepetition negotiations impracticable because the City has over 100,000 creditors, its creditor list is over 3,500 pages, and many of these creditors were difficult to locate.   The Court rejected the objectors’ arguments that it was not impracticable for the City to engage in prepetition negotiations over the treatment of pension obligations because the City could have negotiated with the unions.  The Court noted that many of those unions did not have the authority to bind any individual retirees.  Further, the Court found that it was impracticable for the City “to negotiate with a group that asserts that their position is immutable.”  According to the Court, the City simply did not have enough time to locate and negotiate with each of its creditors because “time was running out” for the City.

5.  Section 921(c)’s Good Faith Requirement

Pursuant to section 921(c), a Court may dismiss a chapter 9 case if a municipality did not file its petition in good faith.  Here, the Court found that the City filed its petition in good faith.  The objectors argued that the City did not file its petition in good faith because the City conspired to file for chapter 9 for a prolonged period of time and did so with the intent to impair pensions.  The Court acknowledged that “in some particulars, the record does support the objectors’” narrative.  However, the Court found that the objectors’ arguments did not establish that the City filed its petition in bad faith. 

The Court found that the City filed its petition in good faith because (i) the City’s financial problems are exactly the type of problems that chapter 9 seeks to address; (ii) the City’s decision to file for chapter 9 after various retiree groups commenced state lawsuits was proper; (iii) the City attempted to improve its financial condition outside of bankruptcy to no avail; and (iv) the citizens of Detroit would be prejudiced if the Court dismissed the City’s chapter 9 case. The Court found that if the City’s chapter 9 case is dismissed, the City would be forced to return to the path that it was on prior to filing for chapter 9, which would likely require the City to “borrow money, defer capital investments, and shrink its workforce.”  The Court found that such results would be “dangerous” and “unworkable,” and would exacerbate the problems that the City currently faces.


The Court’s decision is significant because it is the first to confirm that pensions can be impaired in a chapter 9 case, notwithstanding state constitutional protections. A similar question is presented in the San Bernardino and Stockton chapter 9 cases.  Although CalPERS has suggested that, because it is an arm of the State, the Detroit ruling should not apply to it, the Detroit precedent still casts a long shadow over those cases.  Moreover, this ruling may ultimately have implications in other contexts, including whether general obligation bondholders may enforce state law covenants against a municipality during the pendency of a chapter 9 case.

1 Cadwalader represents Merrill Lynch Capital Services in the City of Detroit’s chapter 9 case

2  The objectors include Michigan Council 25 of the AFL-CIO (“AFSCME”), the Retired Detroit Police & Firefighters Association, the Detroit Retired City Employees Association, the UAW, the Detroit Retirement Systems, and the Retired Detroit Police Members Association.   

3 See Article IX, Section 24 of the Michigan Constitution (providing that accrued pension benefits of a state or municipal retirement system “shall not be diminished or impaired” by the state and its political subdivisions). 

4 See Court Approves Extension of the Automatic Stay in Detroit’s Chapter 9 Case to State Officials, Clients & Friends Memorandum dated July 26, 2013, available at

5 Section 101(32)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “insolvent” as the inability of a municipality to “pay its debts as they become due.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C).

DISCLAIMER: Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular situations.

© Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP | Attorney Advertising

Written by:

Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP on:

Readers' Choice 2017
Reporters on Deadline

"My best business intelligence, in one easy email…"

Your first step to building a free, personalized, morning email brief covering pertinent authors and topics on JD Supra:
*By using the service, you signify your acceptance of JD Supra's Privacy Policy.
Custom Email Digest
- hide

JD Supra Privacy Policy

Updated: May 25, 2018:

JD Supra is a legal publishing service that connects experts and their content with broader audiences of professionals, journalists and associations.

This Privacy Policy describes how JD Supra, LLC ("JD Supra" or "we," "us," or "our") collects, uses and shares personal data collected from visitors to our website (located at (our "Website") who view only publicly-available content as well as subscribers to our services (such as our email digests or author tools)(our "Services"). By using our Website and registering for one of our Services, you are agreeing to the terms of this Privacy Policy.

Please note that if you subscribe to one of our Services, you can make choices about how we collect, use and share your information through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard (available if you are logged into your JD Supra account).

Collection of Information

Registration Information. When you register with JD Supra for our Website and Services, either as an author or as a subscriber, you will be asked to provide identifying information to create your JD Supra account ("Registration Data"), such as your:

  • Email
  • First Name
  • Last Name
  • Company Name
  • Company Industry
  • Title
  • Country

Other Information: We also collect other information you may voluntarily provide. This may include content you provide for publication. We may also receive your communications with others through our Website and Services (such as contacting an author through our Website) or communications directly with us (such as through email, feedback or other forms or social media). If you are a subscribed user, we will also collect your user preferences, such as the types of articles you would like to read.

Information from third parties (such as, from your employer or LinkedIn): We may also receive information about you from third party sources. For example, your employer may provide your information to us, such as in connection with an article submitted by your employer for publication. If you choose to use LinkedIn to subscribe to our Website and Services, we also collect information related to your LinkedIn account and profile.

Your interactions with our Website and Services: As is true of most websites, we gather certain information automatically. This information includes IP addresses, browser type, Internet service provider (ISP), referring/exit pages, operating system, date/time stamp and clickstream data. We use this information to analyze trends, to administer the Website and our Services, to improve the content and performance of our Website and Services, and to track users' movements around the site. We may also link this automatically-collected data to personal information, for example, to inform authors about who has read their articles. Some of this data is collected through information sent by your web browser. We also use cookies and other tracking technologies to collect this information. To learn more about cookies and other tracking technologies that JD Supra may use on our Website and Services please see our "Cookies Guide" page.

How do we use this information?

We use the information and data we collect principally in order to provide our Website and Services. More specifically, we may use your personal information to:

  • Operate our Website and Services and publish content;
  • Distribute content to you in accordance with your preferences as well as to provide other notifications to you (for example, updates about our policies and terms);
  • Measure readership and usage of the Website and Services;
  • Communicate with you regarding your questions and requests;
  • Authenticate users and to provide for the safety and security of our Website and Services;
  • Conduct research and similar activities to improve our Website and Services; and
  • Comply with our legal and regulatory responsibilities and to enforce our rights.

How is your information shared?

  • Content and other public information (such as an author profile) is shared on our Website and Services, including via email digests and social media feeds, and is accessible to the general public.
  • If you choose to use our Website and Services to communicate directly with a company or individual, such communication may be shared accordingly.
  • Readership information is provided to publishing law firms and authors of content to give them insight into their readership and to help them to improve their content.
  • Our Website may offer you the opportunity to share information through our Website, such as through Facebook's "Like" or Twitter's "Tweet" button. We offer this functionality to help generate interest in our Website and content and to permit you to recommend content to your contacts. You should be aware that sharing through such functionality may result in information being collected by the applicable social media network and possibly being made publicly available (for example, through a search engine). Any such information collection would be subject to such third party social media network's privacy policy.
  • Your information may also be shared to parties who support our business, such as professional advisors as well as web-hosting providers, analytics providers and other information technology providers.
  • Any court, governmental authority, law enforcement agency or other third party where we believe disclosure is necessary to comply with a legal or regulatory obligation, or otherwise to protect our rights, the rights of any third party or individuals' personal safety, or to detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security or safety issues.
  • To our affiliated entities and in connection with the sale, assignment or other transfer of our company or our business.

How We Protect Your Information

JD Supra takes reasonable and appropriate precautions to insure that user information is protected from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction. We restrict access to user information to those individuals who reasonably need access to perform their job functions, such as our third party email service, customer service personnel and technical staff. You should keep in mind that no Internet transmission is ever 100% secure or error-free. Where you use log-in credentials (usernames, passwords) on our Website, please remember that it is your responsibility to safeguard them. If you believe that your log-in credentials have been compromised, please contact us at

Children's Information

Our Website and Services are not directed at children under the age of 16 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under the age of 16 through our Website and/or Services. If you have reason to believe that a child under the age of 16 has provided personal information to us, please contact us, and we will endeavor to delete that information from our databases.

Links to Other Websites

Our Website and Services may contain links to other websites. The operators of such other websites may collect information about you, including through cookies or other technologies. If you are using our Website or Services and click a link to another site, you will leave our Website and this Policy will not apply to your use of and activity on those other sites. We encourage you to read the legal notices posted on those sites, including their privacy policies. We are not responsible for the data collection and use practices of such other sites. This Policy applies solely to the information collected in connection with your use of our Website and Services and does not apply to any practices conducted offline or in connection with any other websites.

Information for EU and Swiss Residents

JD Supra's principal place of business is in the United States. By subscribing to our website, you expressly consent to your information being processed in the United States.

  • Our Legal Basis for Processing: Generally, we rely on our legitimate interests in order to process your personal information. For example, we rely on this legal ground if we use your personal information to manage your Registration Data and administer our relationship with you; to deliver our Website and Services; understand and improve our Website and Services; report reader analytics to our authors; to personalize your experience on our Website and Services; and where necessary to protect or defend our or another's rights or property, or to detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security, safety or privacy issues. Please see Article 6(1)(f) of the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") In addition, there may be other situations where other grounds for processing may exist, such as where processing is a result of legal requirements (GDPR Article 6(1)(c)) or for reasons of public interest (GDPR Article 6(1)(e)). Please see the "Your Rights" section of this Privacy Policy immediately below for more information about how you may request that we limit or refrain from processing your personal information.
  • Your Rights
    • Right of Access/Portability: You can ask to review details about the information we hold about you and how that information has been used and disclosed. Note that we may request to verify your identification before fulfilling your request. You can also request that your personal information is provided to you in a commonly used electronic format so that you can share it with other organizations.
    • Right to Correct Information: You may ask that we make corrections to any information we hold, if you believe such correction to be necessary.
    • Right to Restrict Our Processing or Erasure of Information: You also have the right in certain circumstances to ask us to restrict processing of your personal information or to erase your personal information. Where you have consented to our use of your personal information, you can withdraw your consent at any time.

You can make a request to exercise any of these rights by emailing us at or by writing to us at:

Privacy Officer
JD Supra, LLC
10 Liberty Ship Way, Suite 300
Sausalito, California 94965

You can also manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard.

We will make all practical efforts to respect your wishes. There may be times, however, where we are not able to fulfill your request, for example, if applicable law prohibits our compliance. Please note that JD Supra does not use "automatic decision making" or "profiling" as those terms are defined in the GDPR.

  • Timeframe for retaining your personal information: We will retain your personal information in a form that identifies you only for as long as it serves the purpose(s) for which it was initially collected as stated in this Privacy Policy, or subsequently authorized. We may continue processing your personal information for longer periods, but only for the time and to the extent such processing reasonably serves the purposes of archiving in the public interest, journalism, literature and art, scientific or historical research and statistical analysis, and subject to the protection of this Privacy Policy. For example, if you are an author, your personal information may continue to be published in connection with your article indefinitely. When we have no ongoing legitimate business need to process your personal information, we will either delete or anonymize it, or, if this is not possible (for example, because your personal information has been stored in backup archives), then we will securely store your personal information and isolate it from any further processing until deletion is possible.
  • Onward Transfer to Third Parties: As noted in the "How We Share Your Data" Section above, JD Supra may share your information with third parties. When JD Supra discloses your personal information to third parties, we have ensured that such third parties have either certified under the EU-U.S. or Swiss Privacy Shield Framework and will process all personal data received from EU member states/Switzerland in reliance on the applicable Privacy Shield Framework or that they have been subjected to strict contractual provisions in their contract with us to guarantee an adequate level of data protection for your data.

California Privacy Rights

Pursuant to Section 1798.83 of the California Civil Code, our customers who are California residents have the right to request certain information regarding our disclosure of personal information to third parties for their direct marketing purposes.

You can make a request for this information by emailing us at or by writing to us at:

Privacy Officer
JD Supra, LLC
10 Liberty Ship Way, Suite 300
Sausalito, California 94965

Some browsers have incorporated a Do Not Track (DNT) feature. These features, when turned on, send a signal that you prefer that the website you are visiting not collect and use data regarding your online searching and browsing activities. As there is not yet a common understanding on how to interpret the DNT signal, we currently do not respond to DNT signals on our site.

Access/Correct/Update/Delete Personal Information

For non-EU/Swiss residents, if you would like to know what personal information we have about you, you can send an e-mail to We will be in contact with you (by mail or otherwise) to verify your identity and provide you the information you request. We will respond within 30 days to your request for access to your personal information. In some cases, we may not be able to remove your personal information, in which case we will let you know if we are unable to do so and why. If you would like to correct or update your personal information, you can manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard. If you would like to delete your account or remove your information from our Website and Services, send an e-mail to

Changes in Our Privacy Policy

We reserve the right to change this Privacy Policy at any time. Please refer to the date at the top of this page to determine when this Policy was last revised. Any changes to our Privacy Policy will become effective upon posting of the revised policy on the Website. By continuing to use our Website and Services following such changes, you will be deemed to have agreed to such changes.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about this Privacy Policy, the practices of this site, your dealings with our Website or Services, or if you would like to change any of the information you have provided to us, please contact us at:

JD Supra Cookie Guide

As with many websites, JD Supra's website (located at (our "Website") and our services (such as our email article digests)(our "Services") use a standard technology called a "cookie" and other similar technologies (such as, pixels and web beacons), which are small data files that are transferred to your computer when you use our Website and Services. These technologies automatically identify your browser whenever you interact with our Website and Services.

How We Use Cookies and Other Tracking Technologies

We use cookies and other tracking technologies to:

  1. Improve the user experience on our Website and Services;
  2. Store the authorization token that users receive when they login to the private areas of our Website. This token is specific to a user's login session and requires a valid username and password to obtain. It is required to access the user's profile information, subscriptions, and analytics;
  3. Track anonymous site usage; and
  4. Permit connectivity with social media networks to permit content sharing.

There are different types of cookies and other technologies used our Website, notably:

  • "Session cookies" - These cookies only last as long as your online session, and disappear from your computer or device when you close your browser (like Internet Explorer, Google Chrome or Safari).
  • "Persistent cookies" - These cookies stay on your computer or device after your browser has been closed and last for a time specified in the cookie. We use persistent cookies when we need to know who you are for more than one browsing session. For example, we use them to remember your preferences for the next time you visit.
  • "Web Beacons/Pixels" - Some of our web pages and emails may also contain small electronic images known as web beacons, clear GIFs or single-pixel GIFs. These images are placed on a web page or email and typically work in conjunction with cookies to collect data. We use these images to identify our users and user behavior, such as counting the number of users who have visited a web page or acted upon one of our email digests.

JD Supra Cookies. We place our own cookies on your computer to track certain information about you while you are using our Website and Services. For example, we place a session cookie on your computer each time you visit our Website. We use these cookies to allow you to log-in to your subscriber account. In addition, through these cookies we are able to collect information about how you use the Website, including what browser you may be using, your IP address, and the URL address you came from upon visiting our Website and the URL you next visit (even if those URLs are not on our Website). We also utilize email web beacons to monitor whether our emails are being delivered and read. We also use these tools to help deliver reader analytics to our authors to give them insight into their readership and help them to improve their content, so that it is most useful for our users.

Analytics/Performance Cookies. JD Supra also uses the following analytic tools to help us analyze the performance of our Website and Services as well as how visitors use our Website and Services:

  • HubSpot - For more information about HubSpot cookies, please visit
  • New Relic - For more information on New Relic cookies, please visit
  • Google Analytics - For more information on Google Analytics cookies, visit To opt-out of being tracked by Google Analytics across all websites visit This will allow you to download and install a Google Analytics cookie-free web browser.

Facebook, Twitter and other Social Network Cookies. Our content pages allow you to share content appearing on our Website and Services to your social media accounts through the "Like," "Tweet," or similar buttons displayed on such pages. To accomplish this Service, we embed code that such third party social networks provide and that we do not control. These buttons know that you are logged in to your social network account and therefore such social networks could also know that you are viewing the JD Supra Website.

Controlling and Deleting Cookies

If you would like to change how a browser uses cookies, including blocking or deleting cookies from the JD Supra Website and Services you can do so by changing the settings in your web browser. To control cookies, most browsers allow you to either accept or reject all cookies, only accept certain types of cookies, or prompt you every time a site wishes to save a cookie. It's also easy to delete cookies that are already saved on your device by a browser.

The processes for controlling and deleting cookies vary depending on which browser you use. To find out how to do so with a particular browser, you can use your browser's "Help" function or alternatively, you can visit which explains, step-by-step, how to control and delete cookies in most browsers.

Updates to This Policy

We may update this cookie policy and our Privacy Policy from time-to-time, particularly as technology changes. You can always check this page for the latest version. We may also notify you of changes to our privacy policy by email.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about how we use cookies and other tracking technologies, please contact us at:

- hide

This website uses cookies to improve user experience, track anonymous site usage, store authorization tokens and permit sharing on social media networks. By continuing to browse this website you accept the use of cookies. Click here to read more about how we use cookies.