Louisiana Supreme Court Wades Into Punitive Damages In Maritime Context

by Mayer Brown - Punitive Damages Blog

Louisiana generally does not permit punitive damages. But if an accident happens on navigable waters, and the plaintiff brings a claim under federal maritime law, a Louisiana jury can award punitive damages, and Louisiana courts then must decide the full panoply of issues that arise in punitive damages cases.  That’s what happened in Warren v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.

Don’t let the name of the case fool you. It’s a product-liability, failure-to-warn case against the manufacturer of the hydraulic steering system in a speedboat.  The case has a complicated procedural history that I will omit, but the underlying facts are relatively straightforward.

The plaintiff’s son was a passenger in a speedboat operated by a friend. While the boat was travelling at a high speed, the hydraulic steering system failed, the boat went into a J-hook, the plaintiff’s son was ejected from the boat, the boat spun, and its propeller struck the plaintiff’s son multiple times, resulting in his death.

The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the steering system under state tort law and maritime law, alleging that the defendant failed to warn that a loss of hydraulic fluid could cause the steering system to fail. A jury awarded compensatory damages of $125,000 and punitive damages of $23 million.  The trial court upheld the verdict in full, and the Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed.  The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review.

Of relevance here, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to bifurcate the trial, that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of liability for punitive damages, that the $23 million punitive award was excessive, and that a punitive award of $4,250,000 “more appropriately furthers the goal of punitive damages, that is, to punish and to deter future conduct, while protecting the defendant’s right to due process.”

Along the way, the court addressed numerous issues that arise with regularity in punitive damages cases—getting several right, but a greater number wrong. I will discuss the good, the bad, and the ugly in this post.


The vast majority of states require bifurcation in punitive damages cases upon the defendant’s request. But as with so many other aspects of its legal system, Louisiana does things differently.  Perhaps because Louisiana does not allow punitive damages at all, except when authorized by statute, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure authorizes bifurcation only “with the consent of all parties.”  Because the plaintiff did not consent, the trial court refused to bifurcate the punitive damages issues from the underlying liability and damages issues.  Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to overturn that ruling.

Although recognizing elsewhere in the opinion that punitive damages were in the case solely because of the maritime-law claim, the court failed to consider whether the protection afforded by bifurcation is so fundamental as to be treated as substantive and hence a matter of federal maritime law rather than state procedural law. The court likewise failed to consider—possibly because the argument may not have been raised—whether due process requires bifurcation.  As Andy Frey and I wrote in this post, there are compelling arguments that defendants have a due process right to a bifurcated trial.

Liability for Punitive Damages

Recognizing that punitive damages are available under Louisiana law only when authorized by statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a jury may award punitive damages under maritime law upon proof that “a defendant’s intention or wanton and reckless conduct amounted to a conscious disregard for the rights of others.” The court proceeded to affirm the finding of liability for punitive damages, stating that “the record contains evidence on which the jury could have reasonably found the defendant had acted recklessly in not placing on the steering system a visible sticker warning that loss of fluid could result in sudden loss of steering, ejection, and even death.”

The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that there was evidence that the defendant “knew about the potential consequences on the loss of steering from a small amount of fluid loss some nine years before the system was sold and sixteen years prior to the accident.” The court also held that the testimony of the system’s designer that a warning would have caused “mass hysteria” was evidence of “callous disregard for the safety of others.”

In deeming this evidence sufficient to justify the imposition of punitive damages, the court acknowledged, but gave no weight to, the fact that “for fifteen years, with more than a million SeaStar systems in use world-wide, the record reveals no prior accidents of this type.” In contrast, many courts have held that when the number of prior incidents is low in relation to the number of units of a product in commerce, punitive damages should not be imposed because the defendant cannot be said to have been on notice that its product created a high risk of harm.

Perhaps the Louisiana Supreme Court’s failure to take this evidence into account can be explained by its application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. If so, it serves to highlight the importance of the higher clear-and-convincing-standard that has been adopted by many states.  It thus would behoove defendants in maritime cases to ask the trial court to apply the clear-and-convincing standard, and, if it refuses, to seek appellate review on that basis.

The choice of the standard would be a matter of federal common law that the Supreme Court could ultimately weigh in on. Although the Court held in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip that this standard is not constitutionally required, it acknowledged that “[t]here is much to be said in favor of a State’s requiring” it. Sitting as a common-law court, as it did in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, therefore, the Supreme Court could well be persuaded to adopt the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for maritime cases.


Although concluding that the $23 million punitive award was excessive, the analysis by which the Louisiana Supreme Court arrived at what it considered “a constitutionally appropriate exemplary damage award” was flawed in multiple respects, resulting in a reduced award of $4,250,000 that was still grossly excessive.

Because the punitive award was imposed under maritime law, the excessiveness inquiry should have been governed by federal common law, and in particular the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, rather than the three due process guideposts articulated by the Supreme Court in BMW.  To be sure, the Court mentioned Exxon several times, but by not focusing directly on Exxon, it failed to give sufficient heed to the 1:1 cap that the Supreme Court established in that case.  Moreover, the way in which it applied the BMW factors, and in particular the ratio guidepost, reflected a number of conceptual errors that skewed the outcome.


In general, courts have a tendency to apply the reprehensibility factors identified in BMW and State Farm too mechanistically, and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion was no exception.  Still, in evaluating the factors, the court got more right than wrong.

As you would expect, the court found the first and second factors—physical as opposed to economic harm, and reckless disregard for the health or safety of others—to be present. They are both always present by definition in any product-liability case warranting punitive damages, so that merely identifying their presence says very little about the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct.

Recognizing that there was no evidence that the defendant “had ‘targeted its conduct’ upon its less-experienced customers because of their financial vulnerability,” the court found the third factor to be absent. In so doing, the Louisiana Supreme Court joined the growing number of courts that have recognized that the third factor requires not just that the injured party be financially vulnerable (which is often happenstance), but that the defendant have targeted the party because of that vulnerability (which goes to the defendant’s state of mind).

The court deemed the fourth factor—whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident—to be “a closer call,” even though one case in millions of units sold would appear to be the paradigm of an isolated instance. Despite this, the court ultimately concluded that the fourth factor was present because the defendant “possessed knowledge of the risk to its customers * * * and either chose not to act or failed to do so despite opportunities.”

This conclusion boils down to double counting the second factor. The court instead should have recognized that this factor is about recidivism; because there was no evidence that the defendant had engaged in a pattern of failing to warn about the dangers of its products, the court should have found this factor to be absent.

Finally, the court correctly determined that the fifth factor—whether the conduct involved intentional malice, trickery, or deceit—was absent, rejecting the notion that the designer’s testimony that a warning risked causing “mass hysteria” could be fairly equated with “a conscious decision to further a profit motive.”

The court accordingly concluded that, though reprehensible, the conduct was not “on the extreme end of ‘malicious behavior and dangerous activity carried on for the purpose of increasing a tortfeasor’s financial gain’” (quoting Exxon Shipping).


As I have foreshadowed, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s treatment of the ratio guidepost is problematic. And the problems all stem from the court’s analysis of the denominator of the ratio.  Recall that the compensatory damages themselves were only $125,000 and that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages therefore was an enormous 184:1.

The Louisiana Court of Appeal had reasoned that the denominator of the ratio should be “the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff had he lived and suffered amputation or severe disability” and then estimated that figure at $8 million based on an analysis of compensatory damages awarded to plaintiffs who suffered traumatic leg amputations. The Court of Appeal held that the ensuing 2.8:1 ratio was not impermissible under Exxon Shipping.

This analysis is manifestly wrong for reasons discussed in this post, but the defendant argued more broadly that potential harm can never be considered in a maritime case. The Louisiana Supreme Court declined “to try to anticipate how [the U.S. Supreme] Court might rule” on that issue.  So it instead made a major error of its own.

Stating the undeniable premise that “actual harm is certainly a relevant consideration,” the court reasoned that “[t]he mother of [the deceased passenger] settled her claims prior to trial, thus the compensatory damages she received could logically be added to the denominator in the ratio analysis as included in the actual harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.”

Then, noting that the Louisiana Court of Appeal had recently affirmed damages of $2 million to each parent of a deceased child in a products-liability case, the court held that “relevant compensatory damages in this case could reasonably total $2,125,000, which when compared to the punitive damages awarded by the jury, would result in a ratio of 10.8:1.”

This analysis overlooks the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Philip Morris USA v. Williams that the Due Process Clause forbids punishing a defendant for harms to non-parties—which is what the mother of the deceased in this case was.

One of the concerns underlying Williams is that punishing for harm to non-parties can result in repeated punishment for the same injury.  That is very much a possibility here.  There is no way to know—because no evidence on the issue was introduced at trial—whether the settlement paid to the mother already contained a punitive component.  But even the possibility that it could have is why the Supreme Court categorically barred punishment for harm to non-parties.

Moreover, the fact that there was no evidence of the amount of the mother’s settlement and that the Louisiana Supreme Court was therefore forced to borrow the damages awarded in another, unrelated case is an independent reason why it was error to include the mother’s injury in the denominator. Because the jury was the finder of fact, its award should not be sustained even in part on the basis of evidence that it never considered.

The Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court considered settlements in determining the denominator in Exxon Shipping.  But there was no issue in that case about the amount of the denominator.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court indicated that it would “take for granted the District Court’s calculation of the total relevant compensatory damages.”  In addition, the amounts of the settlements were part of the record in Exxon Shipping, so there was no need to speculate.

Legislatively Established Penalties for Comparable Conduct

The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that there is “no codal authority that would impose monetary civil or criminal penalties for the conduct of [the defendant] in this case.”  But instead of treating that as a reason to be skeptical of a multi-million-dollar punitive award, the court—like so many others—simply treated this guidepost as irrelevant.

This would be problematic if the case truly were governed by the three guideposts, but the 1:1 ratio rule set forth in Exxon Shipping makes this error largely beside the point in maritime cases.


Citing cases decided under Louisiana law, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant’s net worth is relevant to determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive because “[w]hat may be awesome punishment for an impecunious individual defendant may be wholly insufficient to influence the behavior of a prosperous corporation” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). This premise is wrong, for the reasons Andy Frey explained in this post.

But punitive damages theory aside, the Louisiana Supreme Court overlooked the fact that this case is governed by federal maritime law, not Louisiana law. And the U.S. Supreme Court has given no hint that a corporate defendant’s wealth should be considered in reviewing punitive awards imposed under maritime law.

Indeed, if wealth were relevant in maritime cases, the Court surely would have mentioned Exxon’s enormous net worth in Exxon Shipping.  Instead, by holding that a 1:1 ratio is “a fair upper limit” in most maritime cases, it effectively made net worth irrelevant.

Despite holding that wealth is effectively a fourth guidepost, the Louisiana Supreme Court mitigated that holding by announcing that “wealth should not be a driving factor behind a punitive damage award in the absence of a showing that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by malice or greed.” Because the court did not deem the evidence sufficient to show that the defendant’s failure to warn was motivated by greed, the court’s limitation on the use of corporate wealth—and its application of that limitation in this case—should be useful to defendants in future punitive damages cases.

The “constitutionally appropriate exemplary damage award”

After considering the guideposts, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that “the award of punitive damages in the amount of $23,000,000 was higher than reasonably required to serve the objective of punitive damages awards: punishment, general deterrence, and specific deterrence.” As discussed in this post, the “higher than reasonably necessary” standard is the correct one for constitutional excessiveness, so in this respect the court established a good precedent. But as I have already noted, because this case is governed by federal common law, there should have been no need to apply the constitutional standard.

Be that as it may, the court determined that the punitive damages were unconstitutionally excessive and therefore turned to setting a “constitutionally appropriate” punitive award. Reasoning that “the harm caused was great—physical injury resulting in the violent death of a young man—while the defendant’s conduct was not the most egregious on the spectrum of punishable cases, and the compensatory damages actually awarded were relatively small,” the court settled on a 2:1 multiple of the hypothetical combined compensatory damages of the two parents.

But the U.S. Supreme Court deemed the defendant’s conduct in State Farm to be “reprehensible,” yet nonetheless indicated that a ratio of 1:1 likely marked the constitutional line because the damages in that case—approximately $1 million—were “substantial.”

Many courts have held that damages exceeding $100,000—as they were in this case—are substantial for purposes of the State Farm ratio guidance.  But even if the $125,000 is not regarded as substantial, given the injury suffered, the court’s decision to include in the denominator the hypothetical damages to the mother—$2 million—should make it beyond question that the denominator is substantial.  The Louisiana Supreme Court offered no reason why a punitive award equal to its hypothesized $2,125,000 denominator would have been inadequate to accomplish the goals of retribution and deterrence.

So the bottom line is that the decision is a compromise that is likely to be cited by both plaintiffs and defendants in future punitive damages litigation. Because the court’s errors are obvious and not likely to be repeated by other courts, my take is that the favorable aspects of the ruling are more helpful than the unfavorable aspects are harmful.

DISCLAIMER: Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular situations.

© Mayer Brown - Punitive Damages Blog | Attorney Advertising

Written by:

Mayer Brown - Punitive Damages Blog

Mayer Brown - Punitive Damages Blog on:

Readers' Choice 2017
Reporters on Deadline

"My best business intelligence, in one easy email…"

Your first step to building a free, personalized, morning email brief covering pertinent authors and topics on JD Supra:
*By using the service, you signify your acceptance of JD Supra's Privacy Policy.
Custom Email Digest
- hide

JD Supra Privacy Policy

Updated: May 25, 2018:

JD Supra is a legal publishing service that connects experts and their content with broader audiences of professionals, journalists and associations.

This Privacy Policy describes how JD Supra, LLC ("JD Supra" or "we," "us," or "our") collects, uses and shares personal data collected from visitors to our website (located at www.jdsupra.com) (our "Website") who view only publicly-available content as well as subscribers to our services (such as our email digests or author tools)(our "Services"). By using our Website and registering for one of our Services, you are agreeing to the terms of this Privacy Policy.

Please note that if you subscribe to one of our Services, you can make choices about how we collect, use and share your information through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard (available if you are logged into your JD Supra account).

Collection of Information

Registration Information. When you register with JD Supra for our Website and Services, either as an author or as a subscriber, you will be asked to provide identifying information to create your JD Supra account ("Registration Data"), such as your:

  • Email
  • First Name
  • Last Name
  • Company Name
  • Company Industry
  • Title
  • Country

Other Information: We also collect other information you may voluntarily provide. This may include content you provide for publication. We may also receive your communications with others through our Website and Services (such as contacting an author through our Website) or communications directly with us (such as through email, feedback or other forms or social media). If you are a subscribed user, we will also collect your user preferences, such as the types of articles you would like to read.

Information from third parties (such as, from your employer or LinkedIn): We may also receive information about you from third party sources. For example, your employer may provide your information to us, such as in connection with an article submitted by your employer for publication. If you choose to use LinkedIn to subscribe to our Website and Services, we also collect information related to your LinkedIn account and profile.

Your interactions with our Website and Services: As is true of most websites, we gather certain information automatically. This information includes IP addresses, browser type, Internet service provider (ISP), referring/exit pages, operating system, date/time stamp and clickstream data. We use this information to analyze trends, to administer the Website and our Services, to improve the content and performance of our Website and Services, and to track users' movements around the site. We may also link this automatically-collected data to personal information, for example, to inform authors about who has read their articles. Some of this data is collected through information sent by your web browser. We also use cookies and other tracking technologies to collect this information. To learn more about cookies and other tracking technologies that JD Supra may use on our Website and Services please see our "Cookies Guide" page.

How do we use this information?

We use the information and data we collect principally in order to provide our Website and Services. More specifically, we may use your personal information to:

  • Operate our Website and Services and publish content;
  • Distribute content to you in accordance with your preferences as well as to provide other notifications to you (for example, updates about our policies and terms);
  • Measure readership and usage of the Website and Services;
  • Communicate with you regarding your questions and requests;
  • Authenticate users and to provide for the safety and security of our Website and Services;
  • Conduct research and similar activities to improve our Website and Services; and
  • Comply with our legal and regulatory responsibilities and to enforce our rights.

How is your information shared?

  • Content and other public information (such as an author profile) is shared on our Website and Services, including via email digests and social media feeds, and is accessible to the general public.
  • If you choose to use our Website and Services to communicate directly with a company or individual, such communication may be shared accordingly.
  • Readership information is provided to publishing law firms and authors of content to give them insight into their readership and to help them to improve their content.
  • Our Website may offer you the opportunity to share information through our Website, such as through Facebook's "Like" or Twitter's "Tweet" button. We offer this functionality to help generate interest in our Website and content and to permit you to recommend content to your contacts. You should be aware that sharing through such functionality may result in information being collected by the applicable social media network and possibly being made publicly available (for example, through a search engine). Any such information collection would be subject to such third party social media network's privacy policy.
  • Your information may also be shared to parties who support our business, such as professional advisors as well as web-hosting providers, analytics providers and other information technology providers.
  • Any court, governmental authority, law enforcement agency or other third party where we believe disclosure is necessary to comply with a legal or regulatory obligation, or otherwise to protect our rights, the rights of any third party or individuals' personal safety, or to detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security or safety issues.
  • To our affiliated entities and in connection with the sale, assignment or other transfer of our company or our business.

How We Protect Your Information

JD Supra takes reasonable and appropriate precautions to insure that user information is protected from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction. We restrict access to user information to those individuals who reasonably need access to perform their job functions, such as our third party email service, customer service personnel and technical staff. You should keep in mind that no Internet transmission is ever 100% secure or error-free. Where you use log-in credentials (usernames, passwords) on our Website, please remember that it is your responsibility to safeguard them. If you believe that your log-in credentials have been compromised, please contact us at privacy@jdsupra.com.

Children's Information

Our Website and Services are not directed at children under the age of 16 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under the age of 16 through our Website and/or Services. If you have reason to believe that a child under the age of 16 has provided personal information to us, please contact us, and we will endeavor to delete that information from our databases.

Links to Other Websites

Our Website and Services may contain links to other websites. The operators of such other websites may collect information about you, including through cookies or other technologies. If you are using our Website or Services and click a link to another site, you will leave our Website and this Policy will not apply to your use of and activity on those other sites. We encourage you to read the legal notices posted on those sites, including their privacy policies. We are not responsible for the data collection and use practices of such other sites. This Policy applies solely to the information collected in connection with your use of our Website and Services and does not apply to any practices conducted offline or in connection with any other websites.

Information for EU and Swiss Residents

JD Supra's principal place of business is in the United States. By subscribing to our website, you expressly consent to your information being processed in the United States.

  • Our Legal Basis for Processing: Generally, we rely on our legitimate interests in order to process your personal information. For example, we rely on this legal ground if we use your personal information to manage your Registration Data and administer our relationship with you; to deliver our Website and Services; understand and improve our Website and Services; report reader analytics to our authors; to personalize your experience on our Website and Services; and where necessary to protect or defend our or another's rights or property, or to detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security, safety or privacy issues. Please see Article 6(1)(f) of the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") In addition, there may be other situations where other grounds for processing may exist, such as where processing is a result of legal requirements (GDPR Article 6(1)(c)) or for reasons of public interest (GDPR Article 6(1)(e)). Please see the "Your Rights" section of this Privacy Policy immediately below for more information about how you may request that we limit or refrain from processing your personal information.
  • Your Rights
    • Right of Access/Portability: You can ask to review details about the information we hold about you and how that information has been used and disclosed. Note that we may request to verify your identification before fulfilling your request. You can also request that your personal information is provided to you in a commonly used electronic format so that you can share it with other organizations.
    • Right to Correct Information: You may ask that we make corrections to any information we hold, if you believe such correction to be necessary.
    • Right to Restrict Our Processing or Erasure of Information: You also have the right in certain circumstances to ask us to restrict processing of your personal information or to erase your personal information. Where you have consented to our use of your personal information, you can withdraw your consent at any time.

You can make a request to exercise any of these rights by emailing us at privacy@jdsupra.com or by writing to us at:

Privacy Officer
JD Supra, LLC
10 Liberty Ship Way, Suite 300
Sausalito, California 94965

You can also manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard.

We will make all practical efforts to respect your wishes. There may be times, however, where we are not able to fulfill your request, for example, if applicable law prohibits our compliance. Please note that JD Supra does not use "automatic decision making" or "profiling" as those terms are defined in the GDPR.

  • Timeframe for retaining your personal information: We will retain your personal information in a form that identifies you only for as long as it serves the purpose(s) for which it was initially collected as stated in this Privacy Policy, or subsequently authorized. We may continue processing your personal information for longer periods, but only for the time and to the extent such processing reasonably serves the purposes of archiving in the public interest, journalism, literature and art, scientific or historical research and statistical analysis, and subject to the protection of this Privacy Policy. For example, if you are an author, your personal information may continue to be published in connection with your article indefinitely. When we have no ongoing legitimate business need to process your personal information, we will either delete or anonymize it, or, if this is not possible (for example, because your personal information has been stored in backup archives), then we will securely store your personal information and isolate it from any further processing until deletion is possible.
  • Onward Transfer to Third Parties: As noted in the "How We Share Your Data" Section above, JD Supra may share your information with third parties. When JD Supra discloses your personal information to third parties, we have ensured that such third parties have either certified under the EU-U.S. or Swiss Privacy Shield Framework and will process all personal data received from EU member states/Switzerland in reliance on the applicable Privacy Shield Framework or that they have been subjected to strict contractual provisions in their contract with us to guarantee an adequate level of data protection for your data.

California Privacy Rights

Pursuant to Section 1798.83 of the California Civil Code, our customers who are California residents have the right to request certain information regarding our disclosure of personal information to third parties for their direct marketing purposes.

You can make a request for this information by emailing us at privacy@jdsupra.com or by writing to us at:

Privacy Officer
JD Supra, LLC
10 Liberty Ship Way, Suite 300
Sausalito, California 94965

Some browsers have incorporated a Do Not Track (DNT) feature. These features, when turned on, send a signal that you prefer that the website you are visiting not collect and use data regarding your online searching and browsing activities. As there is not yet a common understanding on how to interpret the DNT signal, we currently do not respond to DNT signals on our site.

Access/Correct/Update/Delete Personal Information

For non-EU/Swiss residents, if you would like to know what personal information we have about you, you can send an e-mail to privacy@jdsupra.com. We will be in contact with you (by mail or otherwise) to verify your identity and provide you the information you request. We will respond within 30 days to your request for access to your personal information. In some cases, we may not be able to remove your personal information, in which case we will let you know if we are unable to do so and why. If you would like to correct or update your personal information, you can manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard. If you would like to delete your account or remove your information from our Website and Services, send an e-mail to privacy@jdsupra.com.

Changes in Our Privacy Policy

We reserve the right to change this Privacy Policy at any time. Please refer to the date at the top of this page to determine when this Policy was last revised. Any changes to our Privacy Policy will become effective upon posting of the revised policy on the Website. By continuing to use our Website and Services following such changes, you will be deemed to have agreed to such changes.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about this Privacy Policy, the practices of this site, your dealings with our Website or Services, or if you would like to change any of the information you have provided to us, please contact us at: privacy@jdsupra.com.

JD Supra Cookie Guide

As with many websites, JD Supra's website (located at www.jdsupra.com) (our "Website") and our services (such as our email article digests)(our "Services") use a standard technology called a "cookie" and other similar technologies (such as, pixels and web beacons), which are small data files that are transferred to your computer when you use our Website and Services. These technologies automatically identify your browser whenever you interact with our Website and Services.

How We Use Cookies and Other Tracking Technologies

We use cookies and other tracking technologies to:

  1. Improve the user experience on our Website and Services;
  2. Store the authorization token that users receive when they login to the private areas of our Website. This token is specific to a user's login session and requires a valid username and password to obtain. It is required to access the user's profile information, subscriptions, and analytics;
  3. Track anonymous site usage; and
  4. Permit connectivity with social media networks to permit content sharing.

There are different types of cookies and other technologies used our Website, notably:

  • "Session cookies" - These cookies only last as long as your online session, and disappear from your computer or device when you close your browser (like Internet Explorer, Google Chrome or Safari).
  • "Persistent cookies" - These cookies stay on your computer or device after your browser has been closed and last for a time specified in the cookie. We use persistent cookies when we need to know who you are for more than one browsing session. For example, we use them to remember your preferences for the next time you visit.
  • "Web Beacons/Pixels" - Some of our web pages and emails may also contain small electronic images known as web beacons, clear GIFs or single-pixel GIFs. These images are placed on a web page or email and typically work in conjunction with cookies to collect data. We use these images to identify our users and user behavior, such as counting the number of users who have visited a web page or acted upon one of our email digests.

JD Supra Cookies. We place our own cookies on your computer to track certain information about you while you are using our Website and Services. For example, we place a session cookie on your computer each time you visit our Website. We use these cookies to allow you to log-in to your subscriber account. In addition, through these cookies we are able to collect information about how you use the Website, including what browser you may be using, your IP address, and the URL address you came from upon visiting our Website and the URL you next visit (even if those URLs are not on our Website). We also utilize email web beacons to monitor whether our emails are being delivered and read. We also use these tools to help deliver reader analytics to our authors to give them insight into their readership and help them to improve their content, so that it is most useful for our users.

Analytics/Performance Cookies. JD Supra also uses the following analytic tools to help us analyze the performance of our Website and Services as well as how visitors use our Website and Services:

  • HubSpot - For more information about HubSpot cookies, please visit legal.hubspot.com/privacy-policy.
  • New Relic - For more information on New Relic cookies, please visit www.newrelic.com/privacy.
  • Google Analytics - For more information on Google Analytics cookies, visit www.google.com/policies. To opt-out of being tracked by Google Analytics across all websites visit http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout. This will allow you to download and install a Google Analytics cookie-free web browser.

Facebook, Twitter and other Social Network Cookies. Our content pages allow you to share content appearing on our Website and Services to your social media accounts through the "Like," "Tweet," or similar buttons displayed on such pages. To accomplish this Service, we embed code that such third party social networks provide and that we do not control. These buttons know that you are logged in to your social network account and therefore such social networks could also know that you are viewing the JD Supra Website.

Controlling and Deleting Cookies

If you would like to change how a browser uses cookies, including blocking or deleting cookies from the JD Supra Website and Services you can do so by changing the settings in your web browser. To control cookies, most browsers allow you to either accept or reject all cookies, only accept certain types of cookies, or prompt you every time a site wishes to save a cookie. It's also easy to delete cookies that are already saved on your device by a browser.

The processes for controlling and deleting cookies vary depending on which browser you use. To find out how to do so with a particular browser, you can use your browser's "Help" function or alternatively, you can visit http://www.aboutcookies.org which explains, step-by-step, how to control and delete cookies in most browsers.

Updates to This Policy

We may update this cookie policy and our Privacy Policy from time-to-time, particularly as technology changes. You can always check this page for the latest version. We may also notify you of changes to our privacy policy by email.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about how we use cookies and other tracking technologies, please contact us at: privacy@jdsupra.com.

- hide

This website uses cookies to improve user experience, track anonymous site usage, store authorization tokens and permit sharing on social media networks. By continuing to browse this website you accept the use of cookies. Click here to read more about how we use cookies.