On mandamus review, the Ninth Circuit recently vacated a district court order directing Defendant Williams-Sonoma to produce a list of California consumers, as the order improperly sought to aid plaintiff’s counsel in finding a California named plaintiff to pursue class claims.

• Plaintiff William Rushing, a Kentucky resident, filed a putative consumer class action against Williams-Sonoma, alleging that the company made misrepresentations about the thread count of the bedding he had purchased.
• The district court determined that Plaintiff did not have standing to bring a claim under California law and that his claim was governed by Kentucky consumer law, which prohibits class actions.
• Plaintiff opted to pursue his claim individually under Kentucky law but sought and obtained a discovery order requiring Williams-Sonoma to produce a list of California consumers. The purpose of the order was to aid counsel in finding a named plaintiff with standing to bring class claims under California law.
• The Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s discovery order was “clearly erroneous as a matter of law” based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). In Oppenheimer, the Supreme Court held that an “attempt to obtain [] class members’ names and addresses cannot be forced into the concept of ‘relevancy’” under FRCP 26.
• Relying on Oppenheimer—and subsequent amendments to Rule 26 that were “intended to restrict, not broaden, the scope of discovery”—the Ninth Circuit held that “using discovery to find a client to be the named plaintiff before a class action is certified is not within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).” The court then determined that Williams-Sonoma had no other adequate means for relief and that “the disclosure and damage to its (and its customers’) interest would be complete” before a direct appeal could be taken. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and vacated the district court’s order.
• Judge Paez dissented, concluding that the district court had not erred, let alone committed “clear and indisputable error.” According to Judge Paez, Oppenheimer was distinguishable because it dealt with post-certification class notice under Rule 23(c), whereas Rule 23(d) provides district courts with “‘substantial residual powers’ to regulate communications with absent class members outside of formal notice requirements.”
• The case is In re: Williams-Sonoma, Inc.; Williams-Sonoma Advertising, Inc.; Williams-Sonoma DTC, Inc., and the opinion is available here.