The DTSA After One Year: Has the Federal Trade Secrets Law Met Expectations?

McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP

On May 11, 2017, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) – the law that created a Federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation – celebrated its first birthday. The law was the result of years of negotiation between stakeholders concerned with balancing improved protection of corporate intellectual property with protecting market competition, employee rights and mobility, and individual privacy. The DTSA reflects those negotiations with three basic elements: a civil cause of action modeled on (but not identical to) the state-law Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), an ex parte seizure provision to prevent threatened destruction or dissemination of secrets, and whistleblower protection provisions. From the first year of enforcement, it appears that the DTSA got the balance right with some provisions, may need to be tweaked with others, and has yet to render clear results in some.

DTSA Claims Have Uniformly Been Paired with UTSA Claims

The DTSA was originally proposed as a necessary alternative to the UTSA because of the burden of obtaining discovery (especially prompt discovery for temporary restraining order proceedings) from other states and the lack of uniformity in enactment of the UTSA among the states. That is not how the DTSA has been used. Instead, DTSA and UTSA claims have been pled together in almost every case, with the UTSA claims usually falling only under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. That is, rather than being used as an alternative to UTSA claims, the DTSA has supplied an easy route into Federal court with both Federal and State claims. Notably, this has led to a convergence of the DTSA and UTSA as interpreted in a district court, diminishing some of the uniformity of application of the DTSA across districts.

While the unexpectedly consistent linking of DTSA claims to UTSA claims is not overly troubling, it may carry with it some unintended consequences. First, more litigation of UTSA claims in Federal court can lead to greater inconsistency in outcomes based solely on the choice of Federal or State court. While both fora are expected to follow binding state authority, they may fill in the interstices between the controlling decisions differently. Second, increasing familiarity with a given state’s UTSA claims is likely to inform how Federal courts interpret the DTSA. And, while that may harmonize the law between UTSA and DTSA decisions, it may continue to lead to different DTSA outcomes from different Federal courts. Third, the distinction between the procedural rules in State and Federal courts may ultimately shape UTSA decisions merely because plaintiffs have used the DTSA to get into Federal court.

Ex Parte Seizure Has Been Appropriately Rare

The ex parte seizure provision, unprecedented in American civil law, was the most controversial part of the DTSA when enacted. In fact, it was the only provision that had both witnesses testifying for it and witnesses testifying against it in pre-enactment hearings. Based on that testimony, additional safeguards against the overuse of the ex parte provisions were put into place. Those protections form almost half of the entire DTSA itself. And, at least from the experience so far, those protections appear to have worked.

There is a complex set of procedural and substantive safeguards that protects defendants against ex parte seizures; most importantly, a seizure order can be granted only under “extraordinary circumstances.”[1] According to the legislative history, “[t]he ex parte seizure provision is expected to be used in instances in which a defendant is seeking to flee the country or planning to disclose the trade secret to a third party immediately or is otherwise not amenable to the enforcement of the court’s orders.”[2] It thus requires a very strong showing of imminent harm from the defendants’ actions, including a finding that a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctions would not protect the plaintiff.

While plaintiffs have sought ex parte seizure orders several times, courts have generally seized on the availability of standard temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions to deny them. In OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov,[3] the plaintiff moved for ex parte seizure of one defendant’s laptop and phone, preservation of e-mail evidence, and a temporary restraining order against evidence destruction and dissemination of trade secrets. The Court denied the ex parte seizure for lack of extraordinary circumstances. Instead, it ordered Google and Rackspace to preserve the defendants’ e-mail, and ordered the defendants to preserve other evidence (and provide the computer and phone to the court). In comparison, in Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra,[4] the plaintiff moved for a TRO against potential evidence destruction and dissemination of trade secrets, and for a third party to image a laptop and phone. The court ordered the defendant to turn over his laptop to the plaintiff’s counsel for imaging. In doing so, the court made it clear that it was ruling based on Rule 65 (TRO), rather than the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision.

Only one reported decision has involved an ex parte seizure order under the DTSA, and it appeared to involve the very sort of circumstances that the provision was designed for. That is, it arose out of the court’s imposition of a seizure after the defendant failed to comply with a standard temporary restraining order, not the plaintiff’s initial motion for an ex parte seizure. In Mission Capital Advisors, LLC v. Romaka,[5] the plaintiff filed a complaint under the DTSA and state trade secret law and contemporaneously sought an ex parte seizure. The court refused to enter the ex parte seizure order, and instead issued a temporary restraining order and order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered.[6] The defendant ignored the court’s order, neither responding to e-mail notice of the orders nor accepting in-person service.[7] In response, the court entered an ex parte order for the U.S. Marshal to copy the plaintiff’s customer contact list from the defendant’s desktop computer as evidence, then delete the file from the computer.[8] As it turned out, the defendant had not sought to leverage the customer contact list – or any of the plaintiff’s other files that he had on his computer – but had simply stopped responding to anyone. When the plaintiff sent a private investigator to his apartment, he willingly turned his entire computer over to the investigator and never asked for it back.[9] Thus, while the defendant’s contempt of court motivated the order, the order itself did not actually prevent any imminent spoliation of evidence or misuse of trade secrets.

Because the Mission Capital seizure order was both atypical and uncontested, it has left important questions of implementation of the seizure provisions unanswered. Unlike the seizure cases contemplated in the drafting of the DTSA, the marshal did not seize a physical device – such as a personal computer – that could have both relevant and irrelevant information stored on it. How will seizure orders play out to protect a defendant’s privacy and property rights when non-trade secret information is stored on the seized device? Also, what will happen if misappropriated trade secrets are held on a third party’s devices, such as in the cloud? How will the statute’s prohibition on a plaintiff’s publicizing an alleged misappropriation square with the requirements for Federal court openness and publication of orders on PACER? All of these questions remain to be answered in the years to come, and may call for amending the DTSA to react to changes in technology.

We Still Await Clarity on the Whistleblower Provisions

As a counterbalance to the increased power of employers to enforce their trade secret rights against employees (both current and former), the DTSA included whistleblower protections. Specifically, the Act insulates individuals from trade secret misappropriation liability under either State or Federal law if they are turning information over, in confidence, to governmental officials or a lawyer “solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law.”[10] Based on the one reported case weighing in on the provisions, however, it appears that the defense may not work as smoothly as intended.

In Unum Group v. Loftus,[11] the plaintiff was a benefits provider and the defendant was its recently-departed Director of Individual Disability Insurance Benefits. The plaintiff’s in-house counsel interviewed the defendant as part of an internal investigation on claims practices; within the next week, the defendant was seen coming to work on a Sunday afternoon and returning to work late on a week night, in both cases leaving with boxes or bags of documents. The plaintiff sued the defendant for trade secret misappropriation, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss under the whistleblower provisions.

The Unum court analyzed the whistleblower defense under traditional motion to dismiss jurisprudence. That is, it looked to the face of the complaint to determine whether the defense was supported there. Of course, the plaintiff had not pled that the removed documents would be relevant to a whistleblower suit, that the defendant had turned all of the documents over to a lawyer, or that the documents were being used only in relation to the investigation of a suspected violation of law. Notably, no whistleblower lawsuit had yet been filed by the court’s resolution of the motion to dismiss, over two months after the documents were taken. As a result, the Unum court denied the motion to dismiss and granted a motion for preliminary injunction, compelling the return of the documents.

Certainly, the whistleblower provisions were not meant to protect defendants only when the use of trade secrets for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law appears on the face of an aggrieved party’s complaint. That would render the protections useless, as a plaintiff is highly unlikely ever to admit the existence of an appropriate justification for a defendant’s actions, especially when those facts would not be necessary for the proper pleading of a misappropriation claim. On the other hand, the provisions were not meant to insulate every defendant who turns the trade secrets over to a lawyer. Accordingly, the whistleblower provisions will need to be clarified, either through further court decisions or further legislation.

The DTSA Has Borrowed from State Law, and Vice Versa

Because the DTSA was drafted against the backdrop of the UTSA, courts construing the DTSA’s provisions have often looked to the UTSA for guidance. For example, in Panera LLC v. Nettles,[12] the court analyzed the plaintiff’s claims under the Missouri UTSA, then simply dropped a footnote reaching the same conclusion under the DTSA because “[a]lthough the Court’s analysis has focused on Panera's Missouri trade secrets claim, an analysis under the Defend Trade Secrets Act would likely reach a similar conclusion.”[13] Similarly, in Earthbound Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc.,[14] the court performed its analysis under the Washington UTSA then stated, “The same evidence demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits on Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the Economic Espionage Act, as amended by the Defend Trade Secrets Act.”[15] And, in Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC,[16] the court simply relied on the parties’ agreement that the Wisconsin UTSA and the DTSA are “essentially the same” substantively and that “courts may look to the state UTSA when interpreting the DTSA.”[17]

On the other hand, the State of Texas has revised its version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to more closely track the DTSA.[18] The amendments, which take effect on September 1, 2017, include revised definitions of a “trade secret,” “owner,” “willful and malicious misappropriation,” and “clear and convincing.”[19] All four revised definitions draw the Texas statute closer to the DTSA, although the definition of a trade secret continues to include a “list of actual or potential customers,” unlike the DTSA.[20] In addition, the section on remedies was amended to limit injunctions for actual or threatened misappropriation to situations in which “the order does not prohibit a person from using general knowledge, skill and experience that person acquired during employment.”[21] Thus, just as state law has informed the DTSA, the DTSA has been used as a model for revising state law.[22]

Courts Have Found Continuing Misappropriation Sufficient to Assert a Claim that Started with Pre-DTSA Conduct

One way in which the DTSA clearly differs from the UTSA is in its effective date provision. The UTSA expressly excludes a claim for “continuing misappropriation”: The UTSA “does not apply to misappropriation occurring prior to the effective date. With respect to a continuing misappropriation that began prior to the effective date, the [Act] also does not apply to the continuing misappropriation that occurs after the effective date.”[23] In contrast, the DTSA applies “with respect to any misappropriation of a trade secret [as defined therein] for which any act occurs on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.”[24] Federal courts have read this distinction as allowing claims that began before May 11, 2016, but continue afterward.

In Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook,[25] acts of misappropriation started no later than May 10, 2016, but there were additional acts of misappropriation on May 12, 2016 and later. The court entered a TRO and preliminary injunction with no discussion of the continuing misappropriation issue. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Rote,[26] the defendant quit her position as an agent on February 29, 2016, months prior to the DTSA’s enactment. However, she refused to honor the geographic term of her non-compete agreement and retained confidential information. The court entered a preliminary injunction ordering return of the confidential information, but not relocation. The Rote court thereby “split the baby” between the pre-DTSA conduct and post-DTSA conduct without addressing the continuing misappropriation issue.

After Cook and Rote, defendants began to challenge the viability of claims under a continuing misappropriation theory. They have failed. In Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. Trizetto Group, Inc.,[27] the plaintiff terminated a software consulting agreement in February 2015 based on November 2014 notice of termination; the trade secrets were allegedly downloaded between the notice and termination. In September 2016, after discovery, the defendant sought to amend counterclaims to add DTSA claims (among others) based on post-DTSA conduct. The court stated,

The plain language of the Act defines misappropriation to include ‘disclosure or use of a trade secret without the consent of another.’ Accordingly, as Defendants allege that Syntel continues to use its Intellectual Property to directly compete with Trizetto, the wrongful act continues to occur after the date of the enactment of DTSA.[28]

Similarly, in Adams Arms, LLC v. Unified Weapon Sys., Inc., [29] the defendants got access (subject to an NDA) to the plaintiff’s rifle designs, prices, and plant from 2014 through 2015. One of the defendants then signed an agreement with the Peruvian army for arms sales based on the confidential information on May 16, 2016. It relied on the DTSA’s statute of limitations provision to argue against liability for continuing misappropriation. The statute of limitations provision states,

A civil action under [the DTSA] may not be commenced later than 3 years after the date on which the misappropriation with respect to which the action would relate is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered. For purposes of this subsection, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim of misappropriation.[30]

The Adams Arms court relied on the introductory phrase to limit that last sentence to application only to statute of limitations questions. It then noted that the DTSA’s language regarding initial application was different from the UTSA and concluded that the difference was intentional. It therefore drew a distinction between liability for pre-DTSA conduct (for which there would be none, and Adams Arms appeared not to be seeking) and post-DTSA conduct, which would be subject to the Act.

The issue of continuing misappropriation came to a head in Brand Energy & Infrastructure Servs., Inc. v. Irex Contracting Group.[31] Former Brand employees had gone to Irex in 2014-15, allegedly taking financial, technical, and client information. Irex was allegedly continuing to use Brand’s information and “Market Playbook” after enactment of the DTSA. Brand sued, and Irex challenged timeliness of the claim based both on the statute itself and constitutionality as an ex post facto law. The court relied on prior decisions and the distinction between the UTSA and the DTSA to find that the DTSA applied to continuing misappropriation. Brand had pled factually specific allegations of continued use of its trade secrets to support a claim for continuing misappropriation, so the court turned to the question of constitutionality under the ex post facto clause of Article I, Section 9. The critical question there was whether it would be permissible for the statute to apply retroactively. The Brand court applied the Supreme Court’s previously-established framework for whether the DTSA could apply retroactively. That required it to ask whether Congress had expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If so, the inquiry was over; if not, the court should “try to draw a comparably firm conclusion about the temporal reach specifically intended by applying our normal rules of construction.”[32] Here, nothing in the DTSA expressly prescribes its proper reach and its language is amenable to different readings. But, although the DTSA was generally modeled upon the UTSA, it strikingly left out UTSA § 11’s prohibition against continuing misappropriation claims. Thus, the Brand court held, Congress’s choice to omit the anti-retroactivity language was conscious, so a continuing misrepresentation claim is constitutional.

Under the existing case law, it appears that a claim for continuing misappropriation will be recognized under the DTSA, even if the original misappropriation occurred before May 11, 2016. However, the claim has to be pled with some post-DTSA conduct identified, and recovery will be limited to post-DTSA misappropriation. Nonetheless, it provides an alternative to the UTSA for such claims, while the UTSA would not provide such an alternative to the DTSA in the same circumstances.

The DTSA May Not Have Eliminated the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine

The DTSA appeared to limit equitable remedies in a way that prevented trade secret owners from invoking the inevitable disclosure doctrine in order to prevent a former employee from taking a job at a competitor when there is no proof that the employee took information improperly. First applied in a case under the Illinois UTSA, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, [33] the inevitable disclosure doctrine allows a trade secret owner to “prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that [the] defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.” Against the backdrop of the Redmond case, the DTSA limited injunctive relief to situations in which a court’s order would not “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows.”[34] In doing so, it appeared that the DTSA had chosen not to recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine.

On the DTSA’s first birthday, however, a district court appeared to bring the possibility of applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine back to life. In Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp.,[35] the plaintiff brought claims under the DTSA and the Illinois Trade Secrets Act against a competitor that hired its former head of quality control.[36] That competitor argued that the plaintiff may have a case against the former employee, but that it had done nothing wrong. In response, the plaintiff argued that disclosure and use of trade secrets could be inferred under the inevitable disclosure doctrine.[37] The defendant moved to dismiss; the court analyzed the DTSA claim under the standards of the Illinois UTSA for inevitable disclosure and refused to dismiss.[38] Thus, without citing the DTSA’s equitable remedies provision, the Molon court appeared to revive the possibility of a claim for inevitable disclosure under the act.[39]


The first year of the DTSA has shown us that it has generally worked well, although with some unintended consequences and a few hiccups. We will have to see how the law continues to develop, and whether Congress sees the need to fix any of the issues with the DTSA.

[1] 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836–1839 (2016).

[2] H.R. Rep. No. 114-529 at 9–10 (2016).

[3] No. 5:17-cv-00017-EJD (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017).

[4] No. 2:16-cv-524-PPS-JEM (N.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2017).

[5] No. 1:16-cv-05878-LLS (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2016).

[6]  Id. at Dkt. #7, p.1 (July 29, 2017)

[7] Id. at 2.

[8] Id. at 5.

[9] Id. at Dkt. # 22, p. 2 (Sept. 20, 2016).

[10] 18 U.S.C. §§ 1833(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2016).

[11] No. 4:16-cv-40154-TSH (D. Mass., Dec. 6, 2016).

[12] No. 16-cv-1181-JAR (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).

[13] Id. at n.2.

[14] No. C16-1150 RSM (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016).

[15] Id. at 10.

[16] No. 15-cv-703-jdp (W.D. Wisc. Mar. 15, 2017).

[17] Id. at 5.

[18] See Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Title 6, Chapter 134A (2017).

[19] See Texas House Bill H.B. No. 1995 (May 8, 2017).

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] The amendments to the Texas UTSA also included the adoption of a seven-factor test for determining whether a party can participate and assist counsel in the presentation of the party’s case. There is no analogous provision in the DTSA.

[23] UTSA § 11.

[24] See Pub. L. 114–153, §?2(e),  130 Stat. 381 (May 11, 2016).

[25] No. 16-cv-03166 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2016).

[26] No. 3:16-cv-01432 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2016).

[27] No. 15-cv-211(LGS)(RLE) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016).

[28] Id. at 13 (citations omitted).

[29] No. 8:16-cv-1503 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2016).

[30] Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).

[31] No. 16-2499 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2017).

[32] Id. at 5.

[33] 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 

[34] 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I).

[35] No. 1:16-cv-03545 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017),

[36] Id. at 1.

[37] Id. at 11.

[38] Id. at 11-15.

[39] The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri also made use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the DTSA, saying, “Although Missouri has not formally adopted the doctrine of inevitable disclosure—and neither has the Eighth Circuit, with regard to federal trade secrets claims—the Court finds the rationale underpinning such a theory helpful to understanding why [the defendant’s] performance of his new role would almost certainly require him to draw upon and use trade secrets and the confidential strategic planning to which he was privy at [the plaintiff].” Panera LLC v. Nettles, No. 16-cv-1181-JAR (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).

DISCLAIMER: Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular situations.

© McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP | Attorney Advertising

Written by:

McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP

McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP on:

Readers' Choice 2017
Reporters on Deadline

Related Case Law

"My best business intelligence, in one easy email…"

Your first step to building a free, personalized, morning email brief covering pertinent authors and topics on JD Supra:
*By using the service, you signify your acceptance of JD Supra's Privacy Policy.
Custom Email Digest
- hide

JD Supra Privacy Policy

Updated: May 25, 2018:

JD Supra is a legal publishing service that connects experts and their content with broader audiences of professionals, journalists and associations.

This Privacy Policy describes how JD Supra, LLC ("JD Supra" or "we," "us," or "our") collects, uses and shares personal data collected from visitors to our website (located at (our "Website") who view only publicly-available content as well as subscribers to our services (such as our email digests or author tools)(our "Services"). By using our Website and registering for one of our Services, you are agreeing to the terms of this Privacy Policy.

Please note that if you subscribe to one of our Services, you can make choices about how we collect, use and share your information through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard (available if you are logged into your JD Supra account).

Collection of Information

Registration Information. When you register with JD Supra for our Website and Services, either as an author or as a subscriber, you will be asked to provide identifying information to create your JD Supra account ("Registration Data"), such as your:

  • Email
  • First Name
  • Last Name
  • Company Name
  • Company Industry
  • Title
  • Country

Other Information: We also collect other information you may voluntarily provide. This may include content you provide for publication. We may also receive your communications with others through our Website and Services (such as contacting an author through our Website) or communications directly with us (such as through email, feedback or other forms or social media). If you are a subscribed user, we will also collect your user preferences, such as the types of articles you would like to read.

Information from third parties (such as, from your employer or LinkedIn): We may also receive information about you from third party sources. For example, your employer may provide your information to us, such as in connection with an article submitted by your employer for publication. If you choose to use LinkedIn to subscribe to our Website and Services, we also collect information related to your LinkedIn account and profile.

Your interactions with our Website and Services: As is true of most websites, we gather certain information automatically. This information includes IP addresses, browser type, Internet service provider (ISP), referring/exit pages, operating system, date/time stamp and clickstream data. We use this information to analyze trends, to administer the Website and our Services, to improve the content and performance of our Website and Services, and to track users' movements around the site. We may also link this automatically-collected data to personal information, for example, to inform authors about who has read their articles. Some of this data is collected through information sent by your web browser. We also use cookies and other tracking technologies to collect this information. To learn more about cookies and other tracking technologies that JD Supra may use on our Website and Services please see our "Cookies Guide" page.

How do we use this information?

We use the information and data we collect principally in order to provide our Website and Services. More specifically, we may use your personal information to:

  • Operate our Website and Services and publish content;
  • Distribute content to you in accordance with your preferences as well as to provide other notifications to you (for example, updates about our policies and terms);
  • Measure readership and usage of the Website and Services;
  • Communicate with you regarding your questions and requests;
  • Authenticate users and to provide for the safety and security of our Website and Services;
  • Conduct research and similar activities to improve our Website and Services; and
  • Comply with our legal and regulatory responsibilities and to enforce our rights.

How is your information shared?

  • Content and other public information (such as an author profile) is shared on our Website and Services, including via email digests and social media feeds, and is accessible to the general public.
  • If you choose to use our Website and Services to communicate directly with a company or individual, such communication may be shared accordingly.
  • Readership information is provided to publishing law firms and authors of content to give them insight into their readership and to help them to improve their content.
  • Our Website may offer you the opportunity to share information through our Website, such as through Facebook's "Like" or Twitter's "Tweet" button. We offer this functionality to help generate interest in our Website and content and to permit you to recommend content to your contacts. You should be aware that sharing through such functionality may result in information being collected by the applicable social media network and possibly being made publicly available (for example, through a search engine). Any such information collection would be subject to such third party social media network's privacy policy.
  • Your information may also be shared to parties who support our business, such as professional advisors as well as web-hosting providers, analytics providers and other information technology providers.
  • Any court, governmental authority, law enforcement agency or other third party where we believe disclosure is necessary to comply with a legal or regulatory obligation, or otherwise to protect our rights, the rights of any third party or individuals' personal safety, or to detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security or safety issues.
  • To our affiliated entities and in connection with the sale, assignment or other transfer of our company or our business.

How We Protect Your Information

JD Supra takes reasonable and appropriate precautions to insure that user information is protected from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction. We restrict access to user information to those individuals who reasonably need access to perform their job functions, such as our third party email service, customer service personnel and technical staff. You should keep in mind that no Internet transmission is ever 100% secure or error-free. Where you use log-in credentials (usernames, passwords) on our Website, please remember that it is your responsibility to safeguard them. If you believe that your log-in credentials have been compromised, please contact us at

Children's Information

Our Website and Services are not directed at children under the age of 16 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under the age of 16 through our Website and/or Services. If you have reason to believe that a child under the age of 16 has provided personal information to us, please contact us, and we will endeavor to delete that information from our databases.

Links to Other Websites

Our Website and Services may contain links to other websites. The operators of such other websites may collect information about you, including through cookies or other technologies. If you are using our Website or Services and click a link to another site, you will leave our Website and this Policy will not apply to your use of and activity on those other sites. We encourage you to read the legal notices posted on those sites, including their privacy policies. We are not responsible for the data collection and use practices of such other sites. This Policy applies solely to the information collected in connection with your use of our Website and Services and does not apply to any practices conducted offline or in connection with any other websites.

Information for EU and Swiss Residents

JD Supra's principal place of business is in the United States. By subscribing to our website, you expressly consent to your information being processed in the United States.

  • Our Legal Basis for Processing: Generally, we rely on our legitimate interests in order to process your personal information. For example, we rely on this legal ground if we use your personal information to manage your Registration Data and administer our relationship with you; to deliver our Website and Services; understand and improve our Website and Services; report reader analytics to our authors; to personalize your experience on our Website and Services; and where necessary to protect or defend our or another's rights or property, or to detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security, safety or privacy issues. Please see Article 6(1)(f) of the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") In addition, there may be other situations where other grounds for processing may exist, such as where processing is a result of legal requirements (GDPR Article 6(1)(c)) or for reasons of public interest (GDPR Article 6(1)(e)). Please see the "Your Rights" section of this Privacy Policy immediately below for more information about how you may request that we limit or refrain from processing your personal information.
  • Your Rights
    • Right of Access/Portability: You can ask to review details about the information we hold about you and how that information has been used and disclosed. Note that we may request to verify your identification before fulfilling your request. You can also request that your personal information is provided to you in a commonly used electronic format so that you can share it with other organizations.
    • Right to Correct Information: You may ask that we make corrections to any information we hold, if you believe such correction to be necessary.
    • Right to Restrict Our Processing or Erasure of Information: You also have the right in certain circumstances to ask us to restrict processing of your personal information or to erase your personal information. Where you have consented to our use of your personal information, you can withdraw your consent at any time.

You can make a request to exercise any of these rights by emailing us at or by writing to us at:

Privacy Officer
JD Supra, LLC
10 Liberty Ship Way, Suite 300
Sausalito, California 94965

You can also manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard.

We will make all practical efforts to respect your wishes. There may be times, however, where we are not able to fulfill your request, for example, if applicable law prohibits our compliance. Please note that JD Supra does not use "automatic decision making" or "profiling" as those terms are defined in the GDPR.

  • Timeframe for retaining your personal information: We will retain your personal information in a form that identifies you only for as long as it serves the purpose(s) for which it was initially collected as stated in this Privacy Policy, or subsequently authorized. We may continue processing your personal information for longer periods, but only for the time and to the extent such processing reasonably serves the purposes of archiving in the public interest, journalism, literature and art, scientific or historical research and statistical analysis, and subject to the protection of this Privacy Policy. For example, if you are an author, your personal information may continue to be published in connection with your article indefinitely. When we have no ongoing legitimate business need to process your personal information, we will either delete or anonymize it, or, if this is not possible (for example, because your personal information has been stored in backup archives), then we will securely store your personal information and isolate it from any further processing until deletion is possible.
  • Onward Transfer to Third Parties: As noted in the "How We Share Your Data" Section above, JD Supra may share your information with third parties. When JD Supra discloses your personal information to third parties, we have ensured that such third parties have either certified under the EU-U.S. or Swiss Privacy Shield Framework and will process all personal data received from EU member states/Switzerland in reliance on the applicable Privacy Shield Framework or that they have been subjected to strict contractual provisions in their contract with us to guarantee an adequate level of data protection for your data.

California Privacy Rights

Pursuant to Section 1798.83 of the California Civil Code, our customers who are California residents have the right to request certain information regarding our disclosure of personal information to third parties for their direct marketing purposes.

You can make a request for this information by emailing us at or by writing to us at:

Privacy Officer
JD Supra, LLC
10 Liberty Ship Way, Suite 300
Sausalito, California 94965

Some browsers have incorporated a Do Not Track (DNT) feature. These features, when turned on, send a signal that you prefer that the website you are visiting not collect and use data regarding your online searching and browsing activities. As there is not yet a common understanding on how to interpret the DNT signal, we currently do not respond to DNT signals on our site.

Access/Correct/Update/Delete Personal Information

For non-EU/Swiss residents, if you would like to know what personal information we have about you, you can send an e-mail to We will be in contact with you (by mail or otherwise) to verify your identity and provide you the information you request. We will respond within 30 days to your request for access to your personal information. In some cases, we may not be able to remove your personal information, in which case we will let you know if we are unable to do so and why. If you would like to correct or update your personal information, you can manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard. If you would like to delete your account or remove your information from our Website and Services, send an e-mail to

Changes in Our Privacy Policy

We reserve the right to change this Privacy Policy at any time. Please refer to the date at the top of this page to determine when this Policy was last revised. Any changes to our Privacy Policy will become effective upon posting of the revised policy on the Website. By continuing to use our Website and Services following such changes, you will be deemed to have agreed to such changes.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about this Privacy Policy, the practices of this site, your dealings with our Website or Services, or if you would like to change any of the information you have provided to us, please contact us at:

JD Supra Cookie Guide

As with many websites, JD Supra's website (located at (our "Website") and our services (such as our email article digests)(our "Services") use a standard technology called a "cookie" and other similar technologies (such as, pixels and web beacons), which are small data files that are transferred to your computer when you use our Website and Services. These technologies automatically identify your browser whenever you interact with our Website and Services.

How We Use Cookies and Other Tracking Technologies

We use cookies and other tracking technologies to:

  1. Improve the user experience on our Website and Services;
  2. Store the authorization token that users receive when they login to the private areas of our Website. This token is specific to a user's login session and requires a valid username and password to obtain. It is required to access the user's profile information, subscriptions, and analytics;
  3. Track anonymous site usage; and
  4. Permit connectivity with social media networks to permit content sharing.

There are different types of cookies and other technologies used our Website, notably:

  • "Session cookies" - These cookies only last as long as your online session, and disappear from your computer or device when you close your browser (like Internet Explorer, Google Chrome or Safari).
  • "Persistent cookies" - These cookies stay on your computer or device after your browser has been closed and last for a time specified in the cookie. We use persistent cookies when we need to know who you are for more than one browsing session. For example, we use them to remember your preferences for the next time you visit.
  • "Web Beacons/Pixels" - Some of our web pages and emails may also contain small electronic images known as web beacons, clear GIFs or single-pixel GIFs. These images are placed on a web page or email and typically work in conjunction with cookies to collect data. We use these images to identify our users and user behavior, such as counting the number of users who have visited a web page or acted upon one of our email digests.

JD Supra Cookies. We place our own cookies on your computer to track certain information about you while you are using our Website and Services. For example, we place a session cookie on your computer each time you visit our Website. We use these cookies to allow you to log-in to your subscriber account. In addition, through these cookies we are able to collect information about how you use the Website, including what browser you may be using, your IP address, and the URL address you came from upon visiting our Website and the URL you next visit (even if those URLs are not on our Website). We also utilize email web beacons to monitor whether our emails are being delivered and read. We also use these tools to help deliver reader analytics to our authors to give them insight into their readership and help them to improve their content, so that it is most useful for our users.

Analytics/Performance Cookies. JD Supra also uses the following analytic tools to help us analyze the performance of our Website and Services as well as how visitors use our Website and Services:

  • HubSpot - For more information about HubSpot cookies, please visit
  • New Relic - For more information on New Relic cookies, please visit
  • Google Analytics - For more information on Google Analytics cookies, visit To opt-out of being tracked by Google Analytics across all websites visit This will allow you to download and install a Google Analytics cookie-free web browser.

Facebook, Twitter and other Social Network Cookies. Our content pages allow you to share content appearing on our Website and Services to your social media accounts through the "Like," "Tweet," or similar buttons displayed on such pages. To accomplish this Service, we embed code that such third party social networks provide and that we do not control. These buttons know that you are logged in to your social network account and therefore such social networks could also know that you are viewing the JD Supra Website.

Controlling and Deleting Cookies

If you would like to change how a browser uses cookies, including blocking or deleting cookies from the JD Supra Website and Services you can do so by changing the settings in your web browser. To control cookies, most browsers allow you to either accept or reject all cookies, only accept certain types of cookies, or prompt you every time a site wishes to save a cookie. It's also easy to delete cookies that are already saved on your device by a browser.

The processes for controlling and deleting cookies vary depending on which browser you use. To find out how to do so with a particular browser, you can use your browser's "Help" function or alternatively, you can visit which explains, step-by-step, how to control and delete cookies in most browsers.

Updates to This Policy

We may update this cookie policy and our Privacy Policy from time-to-time, particularly as technology changes. You can always check this page for the latest version. We may also notify you of changes to our privacy policy by email.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about how we use cookies and other tracking technologies, please contact us at:

- hide

This website uses cookies to improve user experience, track anonymous site usage, store authorization tokens and permit sharing on social media networks. By continuing to browse this website you accept the use of cookies. Click here to read more about how we use cookies.