The recent announcements in three U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) national security prosecutions offer an early glimpse into some of the Trump Justice Department’s enforcement priorities. Indeed, these actions are consistent with the announced priorities of Attorney General Pamela Bondi, as set forth in her “First Day” memoranda released on February 5, 2025.[1]
The actions (two guilty pleas; one sentencing) underscore that prosecutions of those acting surreptitiously on behalf of foreign principals, at least under the current administration—and whether under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) or analogous espionage statutes—are likely to focus on traditional espionage-like activity, particularly in cases of action on behalf of a U.S. adversary, such as China, Russia, or Iran. This enforcement is consistent with our analysis of AG Bondi’s “First Day” memoranda, where we predicted that rumors of the demise of FARA enforcement were exaggerated, even if the nature and character of such enforcement may change.
Key Takeaways:
- Continued Enforcement of Traditional Espionage-Related Activities: Recent cases highlight DOJ's continued commitment to prosecuting individuals acting as unregistered agents of foreign governments, especially when such actions resemble espionage.
- Compliance Remains Crucial: Businesses and individuals should ensure ongoing compliance with FARA requirements with appropriate documentation to avoid penalties, including potentially criminal charges and substantial fines.
- National Security Focus: Despite initial uncertainty about DOJ’s commitment to enforcing FARA and other white-collar offenses in the new Trump administration, these cases suggest that DOJ will continue to pursue enforcement actions when related to particular national security concerns and adversaries.
Former CIA Official Pleads Guilty to Illegally Acting as an Agent of U.S. Lobbying Firm and Mishandling Classified Documents
On April 23, 2025, Dale Britt Bendler, a former Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) official with more than 30 years’ experience working for the Agency, pleaded guilty to one count of acting as a foreign agent while in the capacity of a public official, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 219, and one count of mishandling classified documents and materials, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1924.[2] According to court documents, Bendler worked with a U.S. lobbying firm while employed as a CIA contractor and used his Top Secret / Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance—the highest level of security clearance in the U.S.—to search classified CIA systems for information related to his private lobbying clients.[3] Bendler’s plea to the § 219 violation follows last year’s conviction of U.S. Senator Robert Menendez for violation of the same statute. Section 219 violations differ from FARA failure to register violations because § 219 flatly prohibits any public official from acting as a foreign agent, regardless of whether they are also registered as such with DOJ’s FARA Unit.
Bendler also admitted to attempting to use his access at the CIA to both influence a foreign government’s embezzlement investigation of one of his foreign national clients, and to influence the U.S. government’s decision concerning a visa application for a client facing terrorism financing allegations. In all, Bendler allegedly received hundreds of thousands of dollars in exchange for his illegal services.
Bendler’s sentencing is scheduled for July 16, 2025, before U.S. District Judge Rossie D. Alston, Jr. Bendler faces a maximum penalty of seven years in prison—two years for the § 219 violation, and five years for mishandling classified material. This case highlights that conduct at the very heart of FARA’s focus—namely, unidentified foreign influence over U.S. public opinion—is likely to continue to be prosecuted under the Trump administration, particularly when “plus factors” are present, such as the involvement of public officials in sensitive positions of authority who abuse security clearances.
Former FAA Contractor Pleads Guilty to Illegally Acting as an Agent of the Iranian Government
On April 16, 2025, Abouzar Rahmati, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Virginia and former contractor with the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to act as the agent of a foreign government without notice to the U.S. Attorney General, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and one count of acting as the agent of a foreign government (the Islamic Republic of Iran) without notice to the U.S. Attorney General government, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 951.[4]
Section 951 requires anyone other than a diplomat acting on behalf of a foreign power to notify the Attorney General before acting on behalf of that power. As we discussed in our FARA 2024 Review and 2025 Outlook, an individual may satisfy § 951’s notification requirement by registering under FARA. But Rahmati failed to do so.
The Indictment alleges that Rahmati assisted with the procurement of aviation-related materials and technology for Iran, which is subject to U.S. sanctions.[5] The Indictment also states that Rahmati worked with Iranian government officials and acted on their behalf, met with Iranian intelligence officers in Iran, used a cover story to hide his conduct and communication with Iranian intelligence and government officials, and provided non-public materials about the U.S. solar energy industry to Iranian officials.
Rahmati’s sentencing is set for August 26, 2025 before U.S. District Judge Loren L. AliKhan, and faces a maximum statutory penalty of 10 years in prison. Rahmati’s case—well within the heartland of traditional espionage cases, and involving a known adversary of the United States, like Iran—demonstrates that DOJ will continue to pursue traditional espionage activity as a prosecution priority, particularly when it involves adversaries of the United States.
DOJ Sentencing Memorandum Emphasizes Criminal Actions of Private Investigator Acting as Chinese Agent
Michael McMahon, a retired New York Police Department officer working as a private investigator, was recently sentenced for engaging in interstate stalking and harassment of Chinese nationals residing in the United States.[6] Over a three-year period, McMahon used various methods, including cyberstalking and physical surveillance, to intimidate and harass the victims on behalf of clients with interests in China. According to court documents, McMahon knew he was participating in a scheme to coerce the victims to return to China to face criminal charges.
Following a three-week trial in June 2023, McMahon was convicted of violating Title 18, United States Code, Section 951 for acting as an undisclosed agent of the government of the People’s Republic of China, as well as two additional stalking charges.[7] Ultimately, Judge Pamela Chen of the Eastern District of New York sentenced McMahon to an 18-month sentence and imposed a $11,000 fine, far less than the government had proposed (i.e., a 48-month sentence for the § 951 offense, and a concurrent 87-month sentence on the stalking counts).[8]
Although McMahon’s sentencing follows his June 2023 conviction at trial—and therefore stems from a charging decision preceding the current administration—the government’s sentencing memorandum, filed on April 3, 2025, is enlightening for what it says about the current administration’s plans to prosecute individuals acting as unregistered agents of foreign principals. First, the memorandum confirms that Attorney General Bondi’s “First Day” memoranda only “appl[y] to general charging policy, not to charged cases,”[9] and therefore we can expect still pending cases that are holdovers from the prior administration to proceed apace, despite the different approach to FARA and related prosecutions articulated in Bondi’s pronouncements.
Second, the memorandum helpfully clarifies how the government is likely to exercise its prosecutorial discretion when electing to prosecute a FARA violation or a more serious § 951 violation. Specifically, the memorandum explains that § 951 will be charged when a failure to register as an agent of a foreign principal is coupled with additional action by the unregistered agent. As the government explains:
The defendant alternatively cites as sufficiently analogous the Guidelines for failing to report income taxes, failure to register for military service, and false statements in relation to documents required by ERISA. This argument also fails. Section 951 criminalizes the action of the agent of a foreign government without notification to the Attorney General, not merely the failure to notify the Attorney General. Indeed, the failure to notify is only one element of the Section 951 offense. Here, the defendant took numerous actions in the United States beyond the failure to notify. For example, he located and targeted Xu Jin and his family; passed sensitive information about the victims to PRC officials to assist with the surveillance efforts; and surveilled the victims on behalf of the PRC government.
Id. at 15–16.
Conclusion
As we previously noted in our commentary on Attorney General Bondi’s “First Day” memorandum addressing national security resources and priorities, that memorandum directs the DOJ’s National Security Division to focus on traditional espionage-related activities rather than on the kinds of criminal investigations and prosecutions of FARA registration violations typical in the previous administration. As the Bondi Memo addressing charging decisions states, “[r]ecourse to criminal charges under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and 18 U.S.C. § 951 shall be limited to instances of alleged conduct similar to more traditional espionage by foreign government actors.”
The three prosecutions discussed above are emblematic of this approach, as they concern conduct that is either clearly espionage or clearly “espionage-like,” and therefore contain certain “plus factors” beyond the run-of-mill FARA failure-to-register violations. Thus, in our view, the administration seems to be keeping its promises as far as national security-related prosecutions are concerned. In the fullness of time, we expect to learn more about what espionage-like activities will be deemed worthy of the DOJ’s limited resources. As this focus sharpens, we look forward to continuing to share our observations with clients and friends.
[1] The 14 memoranda are available on the website of the Office of the Attorney General, and include those titled: “Eliminating Internal Discriminatory Practices”; “Ending Illegal DEI and DEIA Discrimination and Preferences”; “Establishment of Joint Task Force October 7”; “General Policy Regarding Charging, Plea Negotiations, and Sentencing”; “General Policy Regarding Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of the United States”; “Reinstating the Prohibition on Improper Guidance Documents”; “Reinstating the Prohibition on Improper Third-Party Settlements”; “Rescinding Environmental Justice Memorandum”; “Restoring a Measure of Justice to the Families of Victims of Commuted Murderers”; “Restoring the Integrity and Credibility of the Department of Justice”; “Return to Full-Time In-Person Work at the Department of Justice”; “Reviving the Federal Death Penalty and Lifting the Moratorium on Federal Executions”; “Sanctuary Jurisdiction Directives”; and “Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations.” See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Website, navigate to: Justice.gov, Office of the Attorney General, Select Publications, available at https://www.justice.gov/ag/select-publications (last visited May 5, 2025).
[2] See Plea Agreement, United States v. Bendler, Case No. 1:25-cr-00109 (E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2025), ECF No. 8; Information, United States v. Bendler, Case No. 1:25-cr-00109 (E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2025), ECF No. 6.
[3] See Statement of Facts, United States v. Bendler, Case No. 1:25-cr-00109 (E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2025), ECF No. 9.
[4] See Minute Order, United States v. Rahmati, Case No. 1:24-cr-00438 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2025); Indictment, United States v. Rahmati, Case No. 1:24-cr-00438 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2024).
[5] See Indictment, supra note 4, at 6–13.
[6] See Judgment, United States v. McMahon, Case No. 1:21-cr-00265 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2025), ECF No. 380.
[7] See Sentencing Memo 3–5, United States v. McMahon, Case No. 1:21-cr-00265 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2025), ECF No. 364.
[8] See Judgment, supra note 6; see also Sentencing Memo, supra note 7, at 14.
[9] Sentencing Memo, supra note 7, at 38.
