Joining an IPR Triggers IPR Estoppel Only for Instituted Grounds

Knobbe Martens

Knobbe Martens


Before Prost, Newman, and Bryson. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Summary: A party joined to an IPR under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) is not statutorily estopped from raising in district court any invalidity grounds other than those that were instituted in the IPR, because the joining party cannot raise additional grounds during the IPR.

Network-1 sued HP, Avaya, and other defendants in federal district court alleging infringement of one patent. Avaya petitioned for inter partes review (“IPR”) of the asserted patent, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) instituted IPR based on two grounds. After institution, HP filed its own petition for IPR of the asserted patent and also moved to join Avaya’s IPR. The Board found that HP’s petition was time barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because it had been filed more than one year after Network-1 served HP with its district-court complaint, but the Board granted HP’s motion to join Avaya’s IPR. Thereafter, the Board issued a final written decision in Avaya’s IPR upholding patentability of the asserted patent over the instituted grounds.

The district court case later proceeded to trial, where HP argued that Network-1’s asserted patent was rendered obvious both by public use of an allegedly prior-art system and by patents and printed publications that had not been included in the instituted IPR. Using a general verdict form, the jury found the asserted patent was invalid. But following the verdict, the district court granted a motion by Network-1 for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on invalidity. The district court reasoned that the proffered public use was not prior art and that HP was estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) from raising its obviousness challenges based on patents and printed publications because HP had joined Avaya’s IPR. Network-1 appealed regarding other issues and HP cross-appealed the portion of the district court’s invalidity decision regarding estoppel.

The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s JMOL regarding invalidity and remanded for further proceedings. It stated that, although HP had been time barred under § 315(b) from bringing its own IPR petition, HP was permitted to join Avaya’s IPR as a party under § 315(c). The Federal Circuit noted that § 315(c) does not permit the joining party to raise new grounds of invalidity that had not been instituted. The court therefore reasoned that HP, as the joining party, could not have raised any additional invalidity challenges in Avaya’s IPR. The estoppel statute, § 315(e), applies only to grounds that a party “raised or reasonably could have raised” during the subject IPR. The Federal Circuit concluded that because HP could not have raised in Avaya’s IPR its obviousness challenges based on patents and printed publications that had not been instituted, HP was not estopped under § 315(e) from raising those obviousness challenges in district court.

Editor: Paul Stewart

DISCLAIMER: Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular situations.

© Knobbe Martens | Attorney Advertising

Written by:

Knobbe Martens

Knobbe Martens on:

Reporters on Deadline

"My best business intelligence, in one easy email…"

Your first step to building a free, personalized, morning email brief covering pertinent authors and topics on JD Supra:
*By using the service, you signify your acceptance of JD Supra's Privacy Policy.
Custom Email Digest
- hide
- hide

This website uses cookies to improve user experience, track anonymous site usage, store authorization tokens and permit sharing on social media networks. By continuing to browse this website you accept the use of cookies. Click here to read more about how we use cookies.