Friday, January 19, 2024: Federal Trial Court Dismissed Novel Complaint Alleging Certain Algorithm-Based Applicant Screening Tools Discriminated Based on Race, Age, & Disability
Complaint Sought Class Action Certification
Judge Allowed Lead Plaintiff Opportunity to Revise Complaint
A potential lead plaintiff in a case seeking class action certification failed to sufficiently allege facts in his complaint to support his claim that Workday, Inc., violated federal anti-discrimination laws by providing companies with algorithm-based applicant screening tools that discriminated against him and other similarly situated job applicants based on race, age, and disability, a federal trial court ruled. Judge Rita F. Lin of the United States District for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) concluded the plaintiff did not allege the necessary facts to state a plausible claim that Workday is liable as an “employment agency” under the anti-discrimination statutes at issue (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Nevertheless, Judge Lin allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint and spent a significant amount of her written opinion providing the plaintiff with instructions on how to replead his case. The case is Mobley v. Workday, Inc. (No. 3:23-cv-00770).
Employment Agency Theory
After ruling that the plaintiff sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies, the court turned to the deficiencies of his complaint. The plaintiff claimed that, as an African-American man over the age of forty with anxiety and depression, he applied to 80 to 100 jobs with companies that use Workday’s screening tools and received not a single job offer. His complaint was deficient, however, because he did not allege facts to state a plausible claim that Workday is liable as an “employment agency” under the anti-discrimination statutes at issue, Judge Lin wrote. Specifically, he did not allege facts sufficient to state a claim that Workday was “procuring” employees for these companies, as required for Workday to qualify as an “employment agency.”
Still, the plaintiff contended that he could amend his complaint to fix those deficiencies by pleading additional facts, which he outlined in his brief opposing Workday’s motion to dismiss his complaint.
Indirect Employer & Agent Theories
Moreover, at the motion hearing and in his opposition brief, the plaintiff also identified two other potential legal bases for Workday’s liability: as an “indirect employer” and as an “agent.”
Finding that the plaintiff could potentially amend his complaint to sufficiently plead these legal theories, Judge Lin not only permitted him to do so but also guided him as to how to go about it. As to the “indirect employer” theory, the plaintiff must allege facts to establish Workday’s control over, participation in, or interference with the job application process, she instructed. For the agency theory, the plaintiff would need to provide factual allegations about companies delegating control to Workday over the hiring process.
Intentional Discrimination & Disparate Impact
The judge also found that the complaint lacked sufficient allegations to support the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination under either the intentional discrimination or disparate impact theories. Among other things, Judge Lin stated that the plaintiff failed to allege the type of jobs for which he applied, what his qualifications were for those jobs, or whether he got better results applying to similar jobs that did not use Workday.
He also did not adequately identify a specific employment practice. His complaint was not clear as to what or whose specific use of the referenced screening tools is allegedly discriminatory, the judge pointed out.
Finally, Judge Lin noted that he failed to plead a plausible theory of causation. He did not plead allegations sufficient to show a significant disparity sufficient to infer causation, nor did he cite any data, scientific literature, or personal experiences to support the theory that Workday’s screening tools had a discriminatory impact on a specific protected group.