Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp., 78 F.4th 587 (3d Cir. 2023)

A group of oil rig hands sued their employer, Precision Drilling Corp. (PDC), alleging they were entitled to wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for time spent changing in and out of their protective gear, which included flame-retardant coveralls, steel-toed boots, hard hats, safety glasses, gloves, and earplugs. The plaintiffs argued that changing in and out of their gear was “integral and indispensable” to their principal activity of drilling for oil and gas and, thereby, was compensable under the FLSA. By contrast, PDC argued that it amounted to no more than non-compensable “preliminary and postliminary activity.”

In granting summary judgment for PDC, the district court applied the Second Circuit’s “extraordinary risk” test, finding that the gear was neither integral nor indispensable to oil drilling as the risks necessitating the gear were “ordinary, hypothetical, isolated,” and the gear’s protection was incomplete.

On appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the “extraordinary risk” test was too narrow for evaluating if changing in and out of the protective gear was an integral and indispensable and, thereby, compensable activity under the FLSA. Instead, the court called for a more fact-specific inquiry and enumerated several key considerations for the lower court, including:

(a) location—i.e., where the workers change;
(b) regulations— i.e., whether changing in and out of the gear is required by law or regulation; and
(c) the specialized nature of the gear.

Briefly applying this test, the court found several factual disputes relating to rules and regulations bearing on protective gear precluded summary judgment and, consequently, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.