In February 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a decision reconciling precedent in Pennsylvania courts regarding claims for tortious interference with employment relationships. Previously, Pennsylvania courts typically limited tortious interference claims to prospective, not current, at-will employment relationships. In Salsberg v. Mann, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that individuals can sue third parties for tortious interference with existing at-will employment relationships. The Court further held that a supervisor does not constitute a third party when the supervisor’s actions are within the scope of their employment.

Plaintiff Cara Salsberg (“Salsberg”) worked as an at-will employee for Drexel University (“Drexel”) under the supervision of Defendant Donna Mann (“Mann”) from October 2011 to June 2017. In June 2017, Salsberg was fired for unsatisfactory job performance based on Mann’s recommendation and representations. Salsberg then filed a tortious interference claim against Mann alleging that Mann intentionally interfered with Salsberg’s employment relationship with Drexel. Salsberg claimed the reported performance issues were a pretext and the termination was actually in retaliation for Salsberg meeting with Mann’s supervisor to express concerns about Mann.

Mann moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Pennsylvania courts did not recognize claims for intentional interference with present at-will employment relationships. The trial court granted Mann’s motion for summary judgment due to prior rulings limiting tortious interference claims to prospective at-will employment relationships. The Superior Court affirmed summary judgment, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review.

In Salsberg, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled the Superior Court and held that Pennsylvania law permits claims against certain third parties for tortious interference with existing at-will employment relationships. The Court based its analysis on cases from Pennsylvania courts, the United States Supreme Court, and other state courts around the country, ultimately concluding that recognizing the tort was consistent with Pennsylvania law and served the interests of justice.

The Salsberg Court nevertheless upheld summary judgment for Mann because the facts of the case showed Mann was not a third party. The Court observed that a corporation can only act through its officers, agents, and employees. Thus, a coworker cannot be held liable for tortiously interfering with an employee’s at-will employment unless acting outside the scope of employment, thus qualifying as a true third party to the contractual relationship.

Applying this principle, the Court found that Salsberg failed to produce evidence showing that Mann was acting outside the scope of her authority as Salsberg’s manager. The Court therefore determined that Mann was not considered a “third party” subject to liability on a tortious interference claim, and upheld summary judgment for Mann.

Nonetheless, Salsberg’s permission of tortious interference claims against third parties is significant. It opens the door for Pennsylvania employees to allege tortious interference claims against third parties, which may include managers, supervisors, and coworkers.

As the Salsberg Court noted, though, there is an inherent tension between the principle of at-will employment, which limits employees’ ability to sue for wrongful termination, and recognizing a tort for third party tortious interference with at-will employment. The Court expressly cautioned that claims for intentional interference with an existing at-will employment relationship must not be used to maneuver around the law of at-will employment. Rather, it noted, “courts must remain vigilant against such practice when addressing claims of intentional interference with contractual relationships by third parties in the at-will employment context.” To what extent Pennsylvania at-will employees’ tortious interference claims ultimately succeed in light of this competing concern remains to be seen.