In this issue:

- SEC Issues Cautionary Staff Report On IFRS

- FSOC Designates Eight Systemically Significant Financial Market Utilities

- CFTC Approves NFA Segregated Funds Reporting Requirements

- NFA Announces Review of FCM Audit Practices

- CFTC Issues Temporary No-Action Relief For Non-Clearing Swap Dealers

- CFTC’s Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight Issues Time-Limited No-Action Relief to Certain CPOs and CTAs to Meet Registration and Compliance Obligations

- FTC Correctly Treated Merger Between Large Manufacturer and New, Smaller Entrant to Industry as One Between “Actual Competitors” that Violated Antitrust Law

- DOL Issues Direct Final Rule Related to Service Provider Disclosures

- CFPB Issues Bulletin to Credit Card Issuers Re Add-On Products

- Federal Reserve Reiterates Risk Management Standards on Fedwire and Fedwire Securities Services

- Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Established

- Changes to Money Laundering Regulations Announced

An excerpt from "Federal Reserve Reiterates Risk Management Standards on Fedwire and Fedwire Securities Services:

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) on July 19 reaffirmed its long-standing policy of applying relevant international risk-management standards to the Federal Reserve Banks' Fedwire funds and Fedwire securities services. These services play a critical role in the financial system and in facilitating the safe and efficient settlement of private-sector financial market utilities. The Board's announcement follows the Financial Stability Oversight Council's (FSOC) final designation of eight financial market utilities (FMUs) as systemically important for purposes of implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The four factors that FSOC uses to determine its designations are (1) the aggregate monetary value of transactions processed by the FMU; (2) the aggregate exposure of the FMU to its counterparties; (3) the relationship, interdependencies, or other interactions of the FMU with other FMUs or payment, clearing, or settlement activities; and (4) the effect that the failure of or a disruption to the FMU would have on critical markets, financial institutions, or the broader financial system.